Sorry for necroing this, but on the bright side, it is a pretty interesting topic.
Note that contrary to the popular image of the battle, there was initially no snow though. Lots of mud, rain and mist, but no snow. In fact, one of Kampfgruppe Peiper's first lost tank was due to a bazooka man they didn't see in the rain.
Another public "impression" of the battle you often see is that of the Germans throwing in all the heavy stuff. One of the iconic pictures of the campaign is a kingtiger tank with lots of infantry on it, for instance. In reality though, compared to for instance the Kursk offensive, the battle was pretty low tech. In fact I have seen it claimed that it had more in common with the German last ditch attack in WW1 than with the 1940 - 1941 Blitzkrieg offensives. Certainly the initial penetrations were to be made by infantry, often without tank support, as the weather made it hard to employ them or the assault guns infantry divisions were supposed to have hadn't been brought up or even delivered.
Lastly, it seems that the advantage in skill and training the Germans had often enjoyed in the past was thoroughly eroded by this time, as evidenced by reports of human wave tactics, including by paratroop divisions.
In many ways it was more an embarrassing fizzle than a final hurrah.
Note that contrary to the popular image of the battle, there was initially no snow though. Lots of mud, rain and mist, but no snow. In fact, one of Kampfgruppe Peiper's first lost tank was due to a bazooka man they didn't see in the rain.
Another public "impression" of the battle you often see is that of the Germans throwing in all the heavy stuff. One of the iconic pictures of the campaign is a kingtiger tank with lots of infantry on it, for instance. In reality though, compared to for instance the Kursk offensive, the battle was pretty low tech. In fact I have seen it claimed that it had more in common with the German last ditch attack in WW1 than with the 1940 - 1941 Blitzkrieg offensives. Certainly the initial penetrations were to be made by infantry, often without tank support, as the weather made it hard to employ them or the assault guns infantry divisions were supposed to have hadn't been brought up or even delivered.
Lastly, it seems that the advantage in skill and training the Germans had often enjoyed in the past was thoroughly eroded by this time, as evidenced by reports of human wave tactics, including by paratroop divisions.
In many ways it was more an embarrassing fizzle than a final hurrah.
