Atheism and Christianity: a Third Way?

[andyandy]

In my opinion there is a difference between true intent and making a rationalization to attempt to justify immoral actions. I could rationalize lying to a woman to get her to have sex with me by telling myself she will enjoy the sex and thank me for it later, but my intent is still to deceive her.

but with intent as a determinent factor then how can one judge what is immoral? if I were a utilitarianist i would likely subscribe to consequentialism: Whether an action is morally right or wrong depends entirely on its consequences. An action is right if it brings about the best outcome of the choices available. Otherwise it is wrong.

My intent would be wholly positive - and yet this form of framing can lead to all sorts of things being regarded morally right that most people reject as morally wrong.

A simple thought experiment (from here);

Suppose that Jack is in the hospital for routine tests, and there are people
there who need vital organs right away. A doctor has the opportunity to kill Jack and make his death look natural. It would maximize happiness to cut Jack up and give his heart to one patient, his liver to another, his kidneys to still others. (We are supposing that the organs are good matches, and the other patients will die if they don’t get them).

Utilitarianism seems to imply that the doctor should kill Jack for his organs - as this maximises the outcome out of the choices available. Consequential morality jars with most individuals' concepts of morality despite having wholly positive intentions. Couldn't the consequentialist argue that the moral objector who decided that 3 people should die so that one could live was immoral - as his actions would be directly responsible for the needless death of 2 people? "Good intentions" aren't enough because who judges what is good?

 

[Jon.]

I don't think all forms of deception are by definition immoral, but I do think self-serving deception is nearly always immoral.

Aren't you heading for some pretty non-objective methods of determining morality here? Words like "self-serving" and "nearly always" are pretty non-absolute.

Personally I believe lying to a child to get him to do something that's "for his own good" is also immoral. It's certainly a very lazy way to solve the problem of an uncooperative child, and there are far better alternatives. Sure, he'll agree to the shot if you fool him. Once. After that he'll be far more likely to distrust you and every other authority figure in his life. Is that really "for his own good?"

You are confusing morality with utility here. I doubt very much you want to go down that road.

At any rate I'm not sure it matters to this discussion whether all deception is immoral. The only pertinent question here is whether the deception in all of the examples you mentioned is immoral. The only reason I hesitated on (c) is that the statement "you're going to have the best orgasm of your life" could end up being true. But if it was said in an attempt to deceive, then I agree it would be immoral to say it.

It does matter to this discussion whether all deception is immoral. You may think you have an absolute standard of morality with respect to sex, but only at the expense of bringing in a very non-absolute standard of morality with respect to deception.

Still, how does that support or refute my previous post? I think you disagree with what I said, but at this point I'm not sure why.

I wanted to point out that you still have to get into some pretty murky territory where absolutes won't work. As for my opinion, I'm not sure it really matters, but I would consider that (a) and (b) vitiate consent and make the sex itself immoral; statements (d) and (f) are immoral if the truth of them is important to the partner but do not vitiate the consent and make the sex itself immoral; (c) is "mere puffery" and does not affect morality; and (e) is not immoral if the claimant is, in fact, emotionally mature enough to meaningfully consent to sex and believable enough that the partner can avoid criminal prosecution by claiming reasonable mistake with respect to age (if that defence is available in his/her jurisdiction).

 

[andyandy]

The interesting thing about thought experiments is that how they're framed affects how we respond - even if they represent logically the same situation. New Scientist had an article on this not too long back....

A TROLLEY train comes hurtling down the line, out of control. It is heading towards five people who are stuck on the track. If you do nothing they face certain death. But you have a choice: with the flick of a switch, you can divert the trolley down another line - a line on which only one person is stuck. What do you do? Perhaps, like most people, you believe that it is right to minimise the carnage, so you do the rational thing and flick that switch.

But what if the situation was slightly different? This time you are standing on a footbridge overlooking the track. The trolley is coming. The five people are still stuck, but there's no switch, no alternative route. All you've got is a hefty guy standing in front of you. If you push him onto the line, his bulk will be enough to stop the runaway trolley. You could sacrifice his life to save the others - one for five, the same as before. What do you do now? Suddenly the dilemma is transformed. If you respond the way most people do, you won't push the hapless fellow to his fate. The thought of actively killing someone, even for the greater good, just feels all wrong.

Two logically equivalent situations, yet two different outcomes. What is going on? For decades, this thought experiment has confounded philosophers and psychologists. They have long been split into two camps: one arguing that moral judgments arise from rational thought, the other that the roots of morality are emotional. But the trolley-train dilemma just doesn't fit this black-or-white way of thinking. Now, as the subject of morality moves from the philosopher's armchair into the lab, the error of this dichotomy is becoming clear. Researchers looking at the psychological basis of morality are finding that reason and emotion both play a part.

snip

Their functional magnetic resonance imaging studies suggest that the different situations elicit different brain responses. Given the choice to flick a switch, areas towards the front of the brain, associated with "executive" decision-making functions, become active, much as they do in any cost-benefit analysis. By contrast, when deciding whether or not to push a man to his death there appears to be a lot of activity in brain areas associated with rapid emotional responses. Throwing someone to their death is the sort of up-close-and-personal moral violation that the brain could well have evolved tools to deal with, explains Greene. By contrast, novel, abstract problems such as flicking a switch need a more logical analysis.

As well as using different brain areas in the footbridge scenario, people also take longer to make a decision - and longer still if they decide to push the man. There is evidence of an internal conflict as they consider taking a morally unpalatable action to promote the greater good. This shows up as increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, an area of the brain known to be activated in cognitive conflict. Following this, areas associated with cognitive control and the suppression of emotional responses also light up - with activity particularly marked in people who choose to push.

Greene believes this activity reflects the cognitive effort required to overcome the emotional aversion to harming others. He is currently working on variations of the trolley-train thought experiment to incorporate other moral issues, such as the role that promising not to harm a given individual might have in influencing decisions, and how this affects the underlying brain activity.

http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg18825271.700.html;jsessionid=NPECKDHHLHAH

 

[VanillaCone]

Aren't you heading for some pretty non-objective methods of determining morality here? Words like "self-serving" and "nearly always" are pretty non-absolute.

There's no objective ambiguity whatsoever about the term "self-serving." If I lie to you to get something I want from you, that's bad. I said "nearly always" because I have not examined every single one of the infinite number of possible situations to ensure self-serving deception is absolutely always immoral. My suspicion is that it is, but hey, I admit that I hedged..

You are confusing morality with utility here. I doubt very much you want to go down that road.

So you stand by the assertion that tricking a child into getting a shot is moral. I'm guessing your line of work is not child psychology.

It does matter to this discussion whether all deception is immoral. You may think you have an absolute standard of morality with respect to sex, but only at the expense of bringing in a very non-absolute standard of morality with respect to deception.

Sex is a physical activity. Deception is an abstract concept. What if we were talking not about sex but about some other physical activity, such as signing a document? There is nothing inherently immoral about signing a document. Now forgery is another matter entirely. Why? Because it involves signing a document in an attempt to deceive. It's the underlying deception that's immoral, not the physical act of pressing the pen to the paper and moving it around.

 

[Jon.]

There's no objective ambiguity whatsoever about the term "self-serving." If I lie to you to get something I want from you, that's bad. I said "nearly always" because I have not examined every single one of the infinite number of possible situations to ensure self-serving deception is absolutely always immoral. My suspicion is that it is, but hey, I admit that I hedged..

If you lie to get something, but do no harm to the hearer, is that immoral?

So you stand by the assertion that tricking a child into getting a shot is moral. I'm guessing your line of work is not child psychology.

No, it's not. But yes, I stand by my assertion. I was told that a shot would not hurt, and I have told my kids the same thing. No apparent problems have resulted.

Sex is a physical activity. Deception is an abstract concept.

Deception has to occur via a physical activity.

What if we were talking not about sex but about some other physical activity, such as signing a document? There is nothing inherently immoral about signing a document.

"Signing a document" has no moral value one way or another. Signing a particular document, or a particular type of document, might: a cheque to a charity vs. a death warrant, for instance.

In any event, sex is not simply "a physical activity", because of the significance our society has placed on it. If it were, then rape would not be considered a separate crime, but simply a species of assault.

Now forgery is another matter entirely. Why? Because it involves signing a document in an attempt to deceive. It's the underlying deception that's immoral, not the physical act of pressing the pen to the paper and moving it around.

The act becomes immoral because of the deception involved in so acting. The problem for any theory of absolute morality is that some kinds of deception are immoral and others are not, and they shade into one another so gradually that it is not possible to draw a bright line demarcating the boundary.

 

[VanillaCone]

If you lie to get something, but do no harm to the hearer, is that immoral?

I suppose that if you lie to get something, and you don't harm the hearer or anyone else, and the lie does not contribute to any future harm to the hearer or anyone else, then it's not immoral. I just can't think of a specific example that meets all of the above conditions.

No, it's not. But yes, I stand by my assertion. I was told that a shot would not hurt, and I have told my kids the same thing. No apparent problems have resulted.

Well I'm in no position to judge another's parenting choices. It just seems to me that since children have to get multiple shots, that strategy could backfire after the first one.

Deception has to occur via a physical activity.

I completely agree. The same applies to all morally charged abstracts, including intimidation, humiliation, vengeance, etc.

"Signing a document" has no moral value one way or another. Signing a particular document, or a particular type of document, might: a cheque to a charity vs. a death warrant, for instance.

In any event, sex is not simply "a physical activity", because of the significance our society has placed on it. If it were, then rape would not be considered a separate crime, but simply a species of assault.

Rape actually is considered a species of assault, known as sexual assault. Police don't actually use the term "rape." But that's neither here nor there. I agree that sex is a very significant physical activity.

All I'm trying to say is that consensual sex is not immoral, just as signing a document is not immoral, just as throwing a baseball is not immoral. There has to be an underlying immoral abstract motivating the act to make the act immoral.

For instance, if two people were having consensual sex in front of someone else to make that person jealous or angry, that's immoral. But in the examples you used, the immoral act -- lying -- already had occurred. If the sex itself was supposed to be motivated by something other than the simple desire to have sex, you did not mention that. So from my point of view, the lying was immoral and not the sex. If I lied to a woman by claiming I was a millionaire, and based on that false information she accepted my proposal of marriage, would that mean the act of marrying her was immoral? Maybe it would be. But it makes more sense to me to focus on the immorality of the lying itself, and not on the aftermath of the lying.

ETA -- I just remembered there's a major exception in your examples: The guy who has sex to spread AIDS. That's clearly immoral. My only point there was that intentionally spreading AIDS by any other means is equally immoral.

The act becomes immoral because of the deception involved in so acting. The problem for any theory of absolute morality is that some kinds of deception are immoral and others are not, and they shade into one another so gradually that it is not possible to draw a bright line demarcating the boundary.

I'm not arguing for absolute morality as a general concept. I merely took issue with someone's assertion that time and culture are the primary factors involved in determining the morality of a given sexual encounter. My argument is that the mutuality of consent (or lack thereof) is the most important thing. No means no, and it doesn't matter when or where. But I'd be a hypocrite if I didn't also accept that yes means yes.

 

[andyandy]

I'm not arguing for absolute morality as a general concept. I merely took issue with someone's assertion that time and culture are the primary factors involved in determining the morality of a given sexual encounter.

Who asserted that?.....I simply provided an example through which the consideration of time was relevant for the absolutist to consider in how they drew their absolute line. All that was required was that one accepted that at a given time A the act was moral and that at a given time B the act was immoral and that both people believed the act was of their own volition.

But if you're not arguing for absolute morality anymore then we probably agree

 

[VanillaCone]

Who asserted that?.....I simply provided an example through which the consideration of time was relevant for the absolutist to consider in how they drew their absolute line. All that was required was that one accepted that at a given time A the act was moral and that at a given time B the act was immoral and that both people believed the act was of their own volition.

But if you're not arguing for absolute morality anymore then we probably agree

I think it's like you said earlier, Andy: I walked in on a much bigger argument and, in the process of trying to make one small point, was perceived as being part of the larger debate.

 

[Herzblut]

however from these two premises, induction leads to a moral permissability to do Y at any age.

No, it doesnt.

Such a method does not account for cumulative change, and yet it appears logically pretty sound.

Ignoring cumulative change means ignoring any change in the scope of your method. If the function - say - I(t), where I is your "Identity", is not continuous and differentiable I nevertheless changes over a timescale not bigger than one day. You have to integrate these changes over time.

1 day is sufficiently granular to define whatever morale rule based on your age.

I disagree to a notion of "absolute morale", but nevertheless I find your mathematical argument pretty weak.

Herzblut

 

[andyandy]

No, it doesnt.

yes it does. Point out the flaw in the inductive argument given the premises as stated.

P1 = true
pn implies pn+1
therefore pn is true for all n.

Ignoring cumulative change means ignoring any change in the scope of your method. If the function - say - I(t), where I is your "Identity", is not continuous and differentiable I nevertheless changes over a timescale not bigger than one day. You have to integrate these changes over time.

Integration requires a sum of infinitesimals which incorporate a defined interval. To apply calculus to this problem, one has to arrive at a value for d - in this case the distance between T and F. If there is no distance between T and F, as one would expect from classical bivalent logic for a discrete model, then d is zero, and you have a sum to infinity as d tends to a number it's already at. Thus integration can not resolve this paradox.

but nevertheless I find your mathematical argument pretty weak.

Where is the mathematical flaw?

 

[ChristineR]

Who has made the claim that "there exist absolute morals" implies "There exists an age A and a set of actions P; below age A performing action P is immoral?" And even if there was such a claim how could imposing a granularity of say, one second, weaken the claim in any way?

 

[andyandy]

Who has made the claim that "there exist absolute morals" implies "There exists an age A and a set of actions P; below age A performing action P is immoral?" And even if there was such a claim how could imposing a granularity of say, one second, weaken the claim in any way?

how would you seek to define absolute morality if not in terms of a dividing line?

 

[ChristineR]

how would you seek to define absolute morality if not in terms of a dividing line?

The two obvious ones that leap to mind are the greatest good for the greatest number and the categorical imperative.

 

[andyandy]

The two obvious ones that leap to mind are the greatest good for the greatest number and the categorical imperative.

How would either be applicable to a time-line dependent morality where one makes an argument for absolute morality? I don't take the position that the paradox covers all types of absolute morality. It is there for an absolute moralist to overcome - do you wish to apply utilitarian principle to say sexual consent? Equally recourse to any categorical imperative is nothing more than sophistry unless one actually explains how that imperative presents the absolute morality one claims.

 

[ChristineR]

How would either be applicable to a time-line dependent morality where one makes an argument for absolute morality?

I'm not sure anyone is making a claim for a time-line dependent morality. The closest I can come up with would be to have recourse to the law: the law says it becomes moral whenever the person turns 18 (in that jurisdiction); disobeying the dictates of the law (at least without a very compelling reason) is wrong. I assume the courts have dealt with these sorts of "exactly when" issues before, so all questions concerning time zones, etc. have been resolved by precedent.

I don't take the position that the paradox covers all types of absolute morality. It is there for an absolute moralist to overcome - do you wish to apply utilitarian principle to say sexual consent?

I personally don't consider myself a utilitarian, but I don't seen any reason why you couldn't apply utilitarian principles to questions of sexual consent. I imagine you'd come up with "why would you commit a felony for personal lust/love?" just as I did before. Sex-with-a-17.99-year-old may not be immoral, but ignoring a law meant to protect children certainly violates utilitarianism.

Equally recourse to any categorical imperative is nothing more than sophistry unless one actually explains how that imperative presents the absolute morality one claims.

I don't understand your question. I could claim something like "any action that violates Kant's first statement of the categorical imperative is absolutely immoral." True, there are issues of how to apply the dictum in any given situation and it's easy to imagine someone always resolving questionable cases in his own favor. But I do not see that this undermines the claim that there is an absolute right or wrong choice, and certainly not the claim that in some circumstances there is an absolute right or wrong.

Nor do any of these violate the claim that absolute good and evil exist, and are not merely social constructs. I'm trying to avoid the whole question of whether an absolute morality can exist if we can't always determine what is or isn't moral.

 

[andyandy]

Nor do any of these violate the claim that absolute good and evil exist, and are not merely social constructs. I'm trying to avoid the whole question of whether an absolute morality can exist if we can't always determine what is or isn't moral.

I'm not quite sure of your angle on this -

one can say that absolute morality does exist - but refuse to provide proof for such a claim, refuse to be drawn on how such morality is calculated and indeed refuse to be drawn on exactly what absolute morality is. Such a concept of absolute morality is as nebulous as the god construct and whilst not disprovable by its very nature, rendered irrelevent by its own impotence.

 

[ChristineR]

can you put 37 concepts of morality in my hand?

Sorry, I missed this. No, I can't. But that's not where I was going with this. At even given moment, apples are losing water to evaporation. They are undergoing decay. If you wait long enough, there will be nothing there that is comparable to an apple.

We can agree that at some time there is an apple, and at some time there is no longer an apple. Yet there is no exact moment when the apple becomes a pile of dust. Yet there is a time where you can point at the apple and say: there is an apple, and that is an absolute truth. Likewise there is a time where you can point at the pile of dust and say: there is no apple.

If I follow your argument to it's logical conclusion, there are no apples. Yet someone I am quite sure that there are apples, and some of them are even in my refrigerator.

 

[ChristineR]

I'm not quite sure of your angle on this -

one can say that absolute morality does exist - but refuse to provide proof for such a claim, refuse to be drawn on how such morality is calculated and indeed refuse to be drawn on exactly what absolute morality is. Such a concept of absolute morality is as nebulous as the god construct and whilst not disprovable by its very nature, rendered irrelevent by its own impotence.

I'm not sure whether absolute morality can be proved, just as I'm not sure that basic logic principles can be proved (i.e, both A and not A cannot be true). I'm still working my way through the philosophers on that one.

As for how morality is calculated and what it is, there are many different ways to look at that, and we go on and on about it. I hope I haven't been so evasive. I'm trying to give answers to general statements without getting into my own personal ideas of what is moral.

I don't agree that god is nebulous. False, maybe, nebulous, I'm not so sure. Various, certainly. Disprovable, sometimes. And I don't see how you can claim god concepts are irrelevant and impotent. Have you been to a church lately?

 

[kellyb]

one can say that absolute morality does exist - but refuse to provide proof for such a claim, refuse to be drawn on how such morality is calculated and indeed refuse to be drawn on exactly what absolute morality is. Such a concept of absolute morality is as nebulous as the god construct and whilst not disprovable by its very nature, rendered irrelevent by its own impotence.

Technically I agree with you.

But I'm still closer to the absolutist side, since moral relativism strikes me as "icky".

 

[andyandy]

Sorry, I missed this. No, I can't. But that's not where I was going with this. At even given moment, apples are losing water to evaporation. They are undergoing decay. If you wait long enough, there will be nothing there that is comparable to an apple.

We can agree that at some time there is an apple, and at some time there is no longer an apple. Yet there is no exact moment when the apple becomes a pile of dust. Yet there is a time where you can point at the apple and say: there is an apple, and that is an absolute truth. Likewise there is a time where you can point at the pile of dust and say: there is no apple.

If I follow your argument to it's logical conclusion, there are no apples. Yet someone I am quite sure that there are apples, and some of them are even in my refrigerator.

quite - back in post #2 (it seems such a long time ago ) I did outline that one is seemingly forced to abandon bivalent logic and accept a probabilistic framework to resolve sorites-style problems. The paradox as given is a paradox precisely because if the premises are accepted then it leads to absurdities - for one can use induction either way - either to argue that it is moral to do X at any age, or that it is immoral to do X at any age. Nevertheless a probabilistic framework is not the absolute divisor that the absolutist requires, and thus the paradox must be overcome in a different way by the absolutist - hence the reason i posted it.