Ask a Radical Atheist

But you have just made a very firm ontological commitment to the kind of stuff that behaves according to relational rules.

Se above, quarks, objects, x rays and consciousness are constructs, deductions, the primitives are phenomena and such sets of relational rules. If you go further away (and yes, it can be done) you cease to relate to phenomena via language, and beyond language nothing can be said.

Tautological, I know, yet necessary sometimes. :)
 
Jump right in, no apology necessary. Welcome to the forum!

Thanks for the welcome!

The fact we have an imagination is not evidence the things we imagine exist. And the same is true for math. Would it exist if we weren't here? No. None of that supports the fact that if we imagine gods that is somehow evidence of gods.

I agree that the mere fact that we can imagine gods doesn't prove they exist. I'm not so sure about the "math wouldn't exist if we weren't here" point, though. Wouldn't the ratio of a circle's circumfrence to its diameter remain the same whether or not there were any humans around to measure the quantity and give it a label? (I guess this is sort of like the old "If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound?" question.)

And as I mentioned before, some of the more esoteric mathematical concepts, like imaginary numbers, do actually bring up an interesting point. By definition, you can't take the square root of a negative number. Yet, the quantity "i", which is defined as the square root of -1, exists. If a number can defy mathematical laws but still exist, then perhaps a deity can defy physical laws but still exist. This gets back to the root of Piggy's original assertion, namely that we can say not only "God doesn't exist", but the much stronger "God can't exist".

Finally, since this thread was originally supposed to be about questions to Piggy, I have one to ask just out of curiosity: Piggy, what evidence would be required to make you doubt your strong atheist position?
 
I still can't tell what he means when he says he is skeptical of the materialist world view, but he is a naturalist. He says he has a different world view than the materialists. I consider myself both... and a rationalist and a skeptic. I don't believe in things for which there is no measurable evidence... no things which are indistinguishable from delusions. I believe there is are objective truths...

Supposely BDZ is different somehow and skeptical of materialism... but I can't tell what the hell it means. Maybe I'm skeptical of materialism.... what would that mean? Is he like Interesting Ian who believes there are natural explanations for things like souls or something that we just haven't discovered yet? Or does he just not know or care about the brain and how it generates consciousness? Or does he think the stuff we don't understand implies something that he's not saying or can't convey?

Pixy is smart... When he appears, I'll try and ask him again. I think I remember the thread where he tried to explain it... or was that Ich? But I couldn't make sense of it... kind of like with Piscivore, I think on this thread. They are inferring something-- but I don't know what it is or how it differes from what the majority of us understand as naturalism/materialism/physicalism. Is it something worth finding out about... or is it just semantics like creationists use to put down those who threaten what they want to believe?

I understand that he's skeptical of materialism... but I have no idea if it's worth it to try and figure out why. Clearly he thinks this is a good way to be... but I can't make sense of it.

I still think he's saying nothing--just using words to feel like he has "higher truth" than those "materialists" that "don't share his world view" (his words.)
 
Ah Robin! Now we are talking! (I believe I have answered to your questions many times but we haven't arrive to this level of understanding before) :)
I believe we have come close. Remember I was the only one who did not leap to conclusions about your "Theoretical Framework" and assume you were talking about Solipsism or Idealism?

I compared it, you will recall, to Compte's or Mach's Positivism.
I don't know all phenomena is describable, it is an assumption, a place from where you can start to deal with phenomena in a coherent, orderly fashion (doing science for example).
Which is comparable to Quinean pragmatism.
Regarding your definition, care to explain more about 1?
First there is the rather simple consideration of incorporating the fact that there might be real randomness in the universe.

The second is that we cannot assume that there is a unified mathematical model that will predict any observable phenomenon. It may be that there is, but we cannot assume that there is.

Take for example the old Interesting Ian question "are qualia causally efficacious?" I cannot say for sure whether they are or whether they are simply a side effect. If they were then it might be possible that there could be no mathematical model that could precisely predict behaviour from brain chemistry.

But even if there were no such model it would still be the case that behaviour follows deterministically from brain chemistry (ie quale follows deterministically from brain states, then behaviour follows deterministically from the quale), or to the extent that it did not, behaviour would be arbitrary.
because I like your 2, in fact I like it a lot (you didn't resort to the classic "mental events are material".
Or the "mental events reduce to physical events". Both are statements devoid of meaning, unless "material" and "physical" are also defined.
Now, my question to you would be: Why keeping the name "materialism" when it is carrying so much history on its back? What "material" and "materialism" mean have changed countless times throughout history!
Because I don't agree that Materialism has changed significantly since d'Holbach at least. d'Holbach denied that we could know the elements of matter, only the effect it had on our conscious experience. He simply stated that everything, including human minds behaved according to the laws of nature. The Churchlands say much the same thing.

In any case the history is important, as I said before those who ignore philosophy are doomed to repeat it. The first part of my definition, for example, comes from an argument by Hume 200 years ago,

And finally I believe my definition to be a synthesis of what modern era Materialists (18th century onwards) have been saying.
Take for instance "god", or "good" and "evil" I believe we skeptics should propose new terminology instead of using such words, generally speaking of course.
Or at least get a clear idea of what we are talking about when we use them. In some ways this will simplify the argument.

From my point of view God, Dualism and Idealism all refer to the claim that there is at least one mental entity that is not a functional composite of non-mental entities.

Libertarian free will refers to the claim that there is at least one event that is neither deterministic nor random.

When speaking of "good" it would be great if people would refrain from conflating the form of this word that requires an adverb and that which does not.
 
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Why? care to explain more?
Actually as a result of something hammegk said. He said that Positivism was a cop-out and basically he is right.

It is perfect as a starting point, but if we were not able to move beyond it and say something meaningful about the world then philosophy would be useless.

Also the debate that has gone on in JREF about libertarian free will and the dichotomy between the deterministic and the random has been part of my move. Seeing this argument in Hume more than 2 centuries ago was interesting.

Basically it was brought on by the train of thought started by the question "what is meant by 'physical'?'.
 
Se above, quarks, objects, x rays and consciousness are constructs, deductions, the primitives are phenomena and such sets of relational rules. If you go further away (and yes, it can be done) you cease to relate to phenomena via language, and beyond language nothing can be said.

Tautological, I know, yet necessary sometimes. :)
More accurately quarks, radiation, particles etc are elements in a mathematical model used to predict observations. Since mathematics is the most precise language we have then these things are the most precise thing we can say about or universe.

If there is no unified mathematical model that describes every observable then there are some things that we could not precisely say about the universe.
 
No, I'm the artist, you get moved by me.

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I understand that he's skeptical of materialism...
Well, I was also, until a piano was dropped on my head..

..but I have no idea if it's worth it to try and figure out why. Clearly he thinks this is a good way to be... but I can't make sense of it. I still think he's saying nothing--just using words to feel like he has "higher truth" than those "materialists" that "don't share his world view" (his words.)
My dear, nothing is worse than being married to everyone you talk to, and given how helpless you are to be nothing else, your disbelief in anything good makes perfect sense.
 
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Articulett, this is an honest answer, not a bully one. Thanks for that.

I still can't tell what he means when he says he is skeptical of the materialist world view, but he is a naturalist. He says he has a different world view than the materialists. I consider myself both... and a rationalist and a skeptic. I don't believe in things for which there is no measurable evidence... no things which are indistinguishable from delusions. I believe there is are objective truths...

Then we believe the same, except for the fact that I don't believe in that the world is "made of matter" or that "everything is material". These concepts are naively expressed as "the ultimate truth" by some members of the JREF forums (and elsewhere of course).

Now, sure, this might sound as a bold claim BUT ONLY IF you consider that I'm implying here the common opposite, this is, that I'm someone who believes in "immaterial stuff" like souls or supernatural things like mental superpowers. Well, I CLEARLY DON'T, first of all, because I do not believe in that duality, it is completely illogical, kind of a "gift" from the past (dark ages and religious theological arguments about the "world of god" and "the world of men" which needed to be as different as possible).

Supposely BDZ is different somehow and skeptical of materialism... but I can't tell what the hell it means. Maybe I'm skeptical of materialism.... what would that mean? Is he like Interesting Ian who believes there are natural explanations for things like souls or something that we just haven't discovered yet? Or does he just not know or care about the brain and how it generates consciousness? Or does he think the stuff we don't understand implies something that he's not saying or can't convey?

Ok, first of all, I'm not "skeptical of materialism" just skeptical about the "final constituent" or a "final substance". I also believe that some materialists (not scientists, not professional philosophers, but common people) still carry all the baggage that was abandoned like two centuries ago about matter being something solid (which obviously "really really existed" as opposed to something not solid "read immaterial" which was "imaginary stuff".

I hope this clear things up once and for all!! :)

I understand that he's skeptical of materialism... but I have no idea if it's worth it to try and figure out why. Clearly he thinks this is a good way to be... but I can't make sense of it...

... I still think he's saying nothing--just using words to feel like he has "higher truth" than those "materialists" that "don't share his world view" (his words.)

I hope it is transparent by now. If it is not, ask questions, don't fight strawmans, nor accuse me of believing in things I don't. Ok? There are more than the materialists, the dualists and the idealists points of view, and I'm sure you are capable to understand that.
 
I think whatever you believe in is so ambiguous and non-parsimonious that it allows you to believe in whatever you want. Same goes for Piscivore.
 
I think whatever you believe in is so ambiguous and non-parsimonious that it allows you to believe in whatever you want. Same goes for Piscivore.

Only because you can't see what I'm talking about. And you've explicitly declined to discuss it further. Parsimony is very much part of my thinking. And if what I say seems ambiguous, it is only my failure to communicate something that's counterintuitive and counter to the most basic elements of most people's earliest unculturation.

ETA: I'm just going to take a wild-ass guess here and surmise that you've not been a skeptic all that long, Alric?
 
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I believe we have come close. Remember I was the only one who did not leap to conclusions about your "Theoretical Framework" and assume you were talking about Solipsism or Idealism?

I remember, but I have the feeling that sometimes you felt that I didn't answer concrete questions of yours. But I did tried, so, maybe it was about our different discourses, because with these last posts of yours I can see that we think alike in lots of things.

First there is the rather simple consideration of incorporating the fact that there might be real randomness in the universe.

Interesting, as opposed to classical mechanics determinism? you know, the assumption that if you know the position and trajectories of every atom you could predict absolutely everything. Is this related to some inherent chaos?

The second is that we cannot assume that there is a unified mathematical model that will predict any observable phenomenon. It may be that there is, but we cannot assume that there is.

Well, it is a common assumption among most science, particularly theoretical physicists, that there can be one big theory to rule them all. I'm with you in that it is not necessarily the case (in fact I do believe that it is not the case).

Take for example the old Interesting Ian question "are qualia causally efficacious?" I cannot say for sure whether they are or whether they are simply a side effect. If they were then it might be possible that there could be no mathematical model that could precisely predict behaviour from brain chemistry.

Too soon to tell, as I have repeatedly say to those who simply equate "consciousness = brain, nothing that we don't understand".

But even if there were no such model it would still be the case that behaviour follows deterministically from brain chemistry (ie quale follows deterministically from brain states, then behaviour follows deterministically from the quale), or to the extent that it did not, behaviour would be arbitrary.

I'm not sure I follow. For instance, those results in which the brain "chooses" before the individual is actually aware of that decision would indicate (IMO) that most reactions are, somehow, hardwired. But it is an hypercomplex topic, so I don't know.

Or the "mental events reduce to physical events". Both are statements devoid of meaning, unless "material" and "physical" are also defined.

Agreed. Furthermore, it is an oversimplification that ignores that there are no mental events located "inside the brain". The mind needs the brain as much as it needs an environment, for a start.

Because I don't agree that Materialism has changed significantly since d'Holbach at least. d'Holbach denied that we could know the elements of matter, only the effect it had on our conscious experience. He simply stated that everything, including human minds behaved according to the laws of nature. The Churchlands say much the same thing.

But you talk here about professionals. The average "hard core materialists" in our daily life (for example, some members of this forum) consistently demonstrate that they believe in "solid" matter, to have a clear opposite to "immaterial stuff" like souls and such kind of things.

This is why I'm so insistent about this "materialism" stuff. It is an old word that encompasses many more meanings that what it actually has. Lately matter means more like "some fussy state that we can predict" than that "solid, touchable, concrete stuff" that our ancestors believed in. But this is not evident for everybody.

From my point of view God, Dualism and Idealism all refer to the claim that there is at least one mental entity that is not a functional composite of non-mental entities.

Good, I like it.

Actually as a result of something hammegk said. He said that Positivism was a cop-out and basically he is right.

What do you mean by that?

Also the debate that has gone on in JREF about libertarian free will and the dichotomy between the deterministic and the random has been part of my move. Seeing this argument in Hume more than 2 centuries ago was interesting.

Im not aware of such debate. "libertarian free will" is what exactly?

Basically it was brought on by the train of thought started by the question "what is meant by 'physical'?'.

Which is a VERY good question BTW. As I said, I believe most "everyday people" take for granted that it is something solid (to put it in a word).

More accurately quarks, radiation, particles etc are elements in a mathematical model used to predict observations. Since mathematics is the most precise language we have then these things are the most precise thing we can say about or universe.

AGREED! Forms of description, which is why I insist (and maybe articulett will be able to understand now) to use "describe" instead of "explain" when dealing with theories.

If there is no unified mathematical model that describes every observable then there are some things that we could not precisely say about the universe.

Indeed. Now, the question is if it, even in principle, we can reach such mathematical model. I believe we can't as our descriptions are deeply tied to what we are. In other words, we can only think about certain things, and these are still limited by our biology.
 
Only because you can't see what I'm talking about. And you've explicitly declined to discuss it further.

Then say it. No metaphors. Just say it. The shorter the better. I'll say mine.

The material world is all there is. Consciousness is a pattern, that like constellations, only exist in some animal material brains.

That's it. Your turn.
 
From my point of view God, Dualism and Idealism all refer to the claim that there is at least one mental entity that is not a functional composite of non-mental entities.
The material world is all there is. Consciousness is a pattern, that like constellations, only exist in some animal material brains

Put in those terms, the god I'm talking about is a functional composite of mental entities (human conciousnesses) that are themselves functional composites of non-mental entities (nurons).

That's not strictly speaking accurate, but hopefully enlightening.

Alric, are those patterns that form consiousness physical? Remembering that an EEG map of them the pattern is not the pattern itself?

ETA: I'm not asking this to be a pest, or to be Claus. I think we have a difference in at least one of our basic premises, and I think yours is wrong.
 
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Of course not. Patterns don't have mass.

You realize that there is no evidence whatsoever that what you propose does or could exist.
 
Then say it. No metaphors. Just say it. The shorter the better. I'll say mine.

The material world is all there is. Consciousness is a pattern, that like constellations, only exist in some animal material brains.

That's it. Your turn.

I know the question is for Piscivore but since you accused me of ambiguity and about being wordy I will paste here my answer (originally posted about 4 posts ago):

I believe that phenomena is describable in terms of sets of relational rules.

As you can see, yours is way more complex and requires several (big) assumptions. What is matter?, for instance, or how can consciousness exist in brains? You should also note how I avoid making statements in the form of "X is Y" as these tend to be highly problematic. You used two.
 

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