SEPTEMBER 11th, WAR ON TERROR & HOMELAND SECURITY
LIES:
FACTS:
Focus on Al Qaeda Pre-9/11
In response to Richard Clarke’s book, Dr. Rice asserted, “the fact of the matter is [that] the administration focused on this before 9/11.” (03.22.04)
Press Secretary McClellan claims that fighting terrorism was a top priority before
9-11.
Cheney: Bush “wanted a far more effective policy for trying to deal with [terrorism] and that process was in motion throughout the spring.”
Bush & Al Qaeda – By The Numbers
0 – Number of meetings held by Vice President Cheney’s counterterrorism task force (which was created in May 2001)
0 – References to Al Qaeda in Dr. Rice’s 2000 Foreign Affairs article listing Bush’s top foreign affairs priorities
0 – References to Al Qaeda in Secretary Rumsfeld 2001 memo outlining national security priorities
0 – References to terrorism is Justice Department's top seven goals for 2001
0 – Number of National Security Council meetings held by Bush administration before invasion of Iraq was discussed (i.e., it was discussed at the very first meeting)
1 – Number of times the Bush administration mentioned al Qaeda prior to 9-11. This was in a notice continuing an executive order issued by President Clinton.
1 – Number of hours President Bush and Vice President Cheney agreed to allow in their joint meeting with the 9-11 panel.
2 – Number of National Security Council meetings on terrorism prior to 9-11 (out of approximately 100).
2 – Weeks into administration when Energy Task Force announced.
2 – Number of public statements by the Bush administration mentioning Osama bin Laden prior to 9-11 (excluding press briefings and press questions which would raise the total to 19)
4 – Minimum number of Al Qaeda millennium attacks thwarted by the Clinton administration (only plots to bomb Seattle, Los Angeles, Brooklyn and Jordan have been specifically identified)
4 – Number of hours Bush spent with Bob Woodward as part of his book, “Bush at War.”
4 – Months into Bush administration when aid to the Taliban was restored.
4 – Months into administration when Energy Task Force report was released.
6 – Months that it would take for Vice President Cheney to respond to draft counterterrorism and homeland security legislation sent to him on July 20, 2001 by Senators Feinstein and Kyl, as stated by his top aid.
6 – Months before 9-11 that Paul Bremer - current Iraq administrator and former chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism - claimed that the Bush administration was “paying no attention” to terrorism. “Bremer stated that the Bush administration would “stagger along until there’s a major incident and then suddenly say, ‘Oh my God, shouldn’t we be organized to deal with this.’”
8 – Months the administration sat on an “urgent” request from its counterterrorism chief (Clarke) to meet about al Qaeda.
9 – Percentage cut sought by Bush in FY2005 budget for Nunn-Lugar program to secure Soviet nuclear material and prevent them from getting into the hands of terrorists, while pushing for billions in spending to deploy an unproven missile defense system.
10 – Number of meetings of Cheney’s Energy Task force prior to 9/11
12 – Number in thousands of US troops in Afghanistan Winter 2004 (compared to 150,000 in Iraq)
36 – Months passed without any meeting of the Cheney terrorism task force since its formation in May 2001
58 – Number of days President Bush spent in Kennebunkport or at his Crawford ranch from January 21 to September 10, 2001
101– Number of public statements by the Bush administration on his missile defense (aka Star Wars) program from January 21 to September 10, 2001.
104 – Number of public statements by the President Bush on Saddam Hussein from January 21 to September 10, 2001
150 – Number in thousands of US troops in Iraq Winter 2004
700 – Millions of dollars Bush administration diverted from war against Al Qaeda to prepare for Iraq war.
800 – Millions of dollars Congress sought to shift from missile defense to counter-terrorism programs prior to 9/11, but Bush threatened to veto any such measure.
President Bush admitted to Bob Woodward that “I didn’t feel the sense of urgency,” about terrorism before 9/11.
In April 2001 the administration released the government’s annual terrorism report with no extensive mention of Osama bin Laden as in prior years. A State Department official told CNN that "the Clinton administration had made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden.”
Similarly, at an April meeting of deputies Clarke urged a focus on Al Qaeda. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz responded, “No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al-Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States.”
In addition, General Donald Kerrick, the deputy National Security Advisor under Clinton who stayed on for a few months with the Bush administration, wrote a memo to his successor (Stephen Hadley) that the administration needed to pay attention to al Qaeda since they will strike again. “They never once asked me a question nor did I see them having a serious discussion about it. They didn’t feel it was imminent the way the Clinton administration did.”
The Bush administration terminated a highly classified program to monitor Al Qaeda suspects in the U.S. and even provided aid to the Taliban in 2001. (9)
Dr. Rice told the 9/11 Commission that "George Tenet met with the president every morning [before 9/11]."
CIA records show that despite increased threat warnings, Tenet briefed the president only twice in August - once in Crawford, Tex., on Aug. 17, and once in Washington, on Aug. 31. Tenet added that "I don't have a recollection of being called" by telephone. (24)
In her public testimony before the 9-11 commission, Dr. Rice claimed “We decided immediately to continue pursuing the Clinton Administration's covert action authorities and other efforts to fight the network."
Newsweek reported that "In the months before 9/11, the U.S. Justice Department curtailed a highly classified program called 'Catcher's Mitt' to monitor al-Qaeda suspects in the United States."
Additionally, AP reported "though Predator drones spotted Osama bin Laden as many as three times in late 2000, the Bush administration did not fly the unmanned planes over Afghanistan during its first eight months," thus terminating the reconnaissance missions started during the Clinton Administration. (23)
Dr. Rice: “Richard Clarke had plenty of opportunities to tell us in the administration that he thought the war on terrorism was moving in the wrong direction and he chose not to.” (03.22.04)
On the 4th day of the Bush administration (January 24), Clarke sent a memo to Rice marked “urgent” asking for a Cabinet-level meeting to deal with an impending al Qaeda attack. No meeting occurred until one week before 9/11 – eight months after the urgent request.
The administration does not dispute this fact but claims “principals did not need to have a formal meeting to discuss the threat.”
The 9/11 panel asked Clarke whether an eight-month delay was unusual. Clarke explained, “
t is unusual when you are being told every day there is an urgent threat.” (12)
Dr. Rice: “No al Qaeda plan was turned over to the new administration” by the Clinton administration. (03.22.04)
On the 5th day of the Bush administration (January 25), Clarke forwarded the 1998 Delenda plan and his December 2000 strategy paper to Dr. Rice which included a covert action plan from the CIA called “Blue Sky”. (13)
After September 11th, Condoleezza Rice denied attending a transition briefing in which Clinton NSC Advisor Sandy Berger warned that “the Bush administration would spend more time on terrorism in general, and on al Qaeda specifically, than any other subject.” Rice’s spokesperson said she recalled no briefing where Berger was present.
Rice spoke with a New York Times reporter after the briefing who then reported that “Berger met with his successor, Condoleezza Rice, and gave her a warning. According to both of them, he said that the war on terrorism – and particularly Mr. bin Laden’s brand of it – would consume far more of her time than she had ever imagined.”
The Bush administration ignored this warning, focusing on Star Wars and restructuring the military instead. In fact, Rumsfeld threatened a veto when Congress proposed to shift $0.6 billion from Star Wars to counter-terror programs. (5)
In May 2002, after the press learned about the August 6th PDB (see Pre-9/11 Warnings below), Condoleezza Rice told reporters that Bush had requested the August briefing because of his keen concern about elevated terrorist threat levels that summer.
The CIA told the 9/11 panel that the briefing was not requested by the President and that the idea to compile the briefing came from within the CIA. (8)
In her 60 Minutes interview, Condoleezza Rice claimed “I don’t know what a sense of urgency any greater than the one we had would have caused us to do anything differently. I don't know how...we could have done more. I would like very much to know what more could have been done.”
There were many more things that could have been done: first and foremost, the Administration could have desisted from de-emphasizing and cutting funding for counterterrorism in the months before 9/11. It could have held more meetings of top principals to get the directors of the CIA and FBI to share information, especially considering the major intelligence spike occurring in the summer of 2001 – just as the Clinton administration did to prevent millennium attacks.
As 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick said on ABC the same day as the Rice interview, the lack of focus and meetings meant agencies were not talking to each other, and key evidence was overlooked. For instance, with better focus and more urgency, the FBI's discovery of Islamic radicals training at flight schools might have raised red flags.
Similarly, the fact that "months before Sept. 11, the CIA knew two of the al-Qaeda hijackers were in the United States" could have spurred a nationwide manhunt. But because there was no focus or urgency, "No nationwide manhunt was undertaken," said Gorelick.
"The State Department watch list was not given to the FAA. If you brought people together, perhaps key connections could have been made." (21)
Dr. Rice: “Our [pre-9/11 National Security Presidential Directive on Terrorism (“NSPD”)] called for military options to attack al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, ground forces and other targets – taking the fight to the enemy where he lived.” (03.22.04)
Commissioner Gorelick:
Q: “There is nothing in the NSPD that came out that we could find that had an invasion plan, a military plan.”
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage (under oath)
A: “Right.”
Q: “Is it true, as Dr. Rice said, ‘Our plan called for military options to attack Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.”
A: “No, I think that was amended after the horror of 9/11.”
The Commission reports that Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley rejected Clarke’s urgent call for a quick decision in favor of providing secret military aid to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to prevent their defeat by the Taliban.
The plan developed by Rice actually called for two stages of diplomatic efforts with the Taliban before resorting to military action. (10)
Secretary Powell: “Our goal was to eliminate Al Qaeda. It was no longer to roll it back or reduce its effectiveness.” before 9/11. (03.23.04)
Press Secretary McClellan: “We didn’t feel it was sufficient to simply roll back Al Qaeda; we pursued a policy of elimination.”
Dr. Rice: “The president wanted more than a laundry list of ideas simply to contain al Qaeda or ‘roll back’ the threat. Once in office, we quickly began crafting a comprehensive new strategy to ‘eliminate” the al Qaeda network.” (03.22.04)
In written testimony submitted in 2002, Deputy National Security advisor Hadley said the administration’s goal “was to move beyond the policy of containment, criminal prosecution and limited retaliation for specific attacks, toward attempting to ‘roll back’ Al Qaeda.” (16)
In her public testimony before the 9-11 commission, Dr. Rice claimed “We bolstered the Treasury Department's activities to track and seize terrorist assets.”
The new Bush Treasury Department "disapproved of the Clinton Administration's approach to money laundering issues, which had been an important part of the drive to cut off the money flow to bin Laden."
Specifically, the Bush Administration opposed Clinton Administration-backed efforts by the G-7 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that targeted countries with "loose banking regulations" being abused by terrorist financiers. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration provided "no funding for the new National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center." (23)
Dr. Rice: “The president increased counterterrorism funding several-fold” before 9/11. (03.24.04)
The facts are the opposite, President Bush opposed additional funding. Bush
(i) rejected an FBI request for $58 million for 149 counterterrorism field agents, 200 intelligence analysts and 54 additional translators;
(ii) proposed a $65 million cut for state and local counterterrorism grants; and
(iii) rejected a request to divert $800 million from missile defense into counterterrorism.” (11)
Responding to the fact that Clarke called for arming Predators (unmanned reconnaissance drones), Rice claimed “we pushed hard to arm the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle so we could target terrorists with greater precision” prior to 9-11. (03.22.04)
While the Pentagon successful tested an armed Predator in the first half of 2001, the Bush administration failed to resolve a bureaucratic struggle over whether the CIA or Pentagon should operate the system.
While the Predator spotted Osama bin Laden three times in late 2000, the Bush administration failed to even fly an unmanned Predator over Afghanistan prior to 9-11. (17)
Pre-9/11 Warnings
In her public testimony before the 9-11 commission, “I do not remember any reports to us, a kind of strategic warning, that planes might be used as weapons.”
After the attacks, Ari Fleischer stated that the President had no warnings of an attack and President Bush explained
“[n]ever [in] anybody’s thought processes . . . did we ever think that the evil doers would fly not one but four commercial aircraft into precious US targets . . . never.”
In May 2002, Condoleezza Rice claimed, “I don’t think anybody could have predicted that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile.” (05.16.02)
Dr. Rice: “[W]e received no intelligence that terrorists were preparing to attack the homeland using airplanes as missiles, though some analysts speculated that terrorists might hijack airplanes to try to free U.S.-held terrorists.” (03.22.04)
President Bush: “Had I known that the enemy was going to use airplanes to strike America, to attack us. I would have used very resource, every asset, every power of this government to protect the American people.” (03.25.04)
Surprisingly, Bush reiterated this comment at an April 13 press conference. “[T]here was nobody in our government, at least, and I don’t think the prior government that could envision flying airplanes into buildings.”
Dr. Rice admitted privately to the 9-11 panel that she had “misspoken” when she said there were no prior warnings, but then proceeded to repeat this claim in public. (1)
The warnings received (see below) were sufficient for Attorney General Ashcroft to begin “traveling exclusively by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines” because of what the Justice Department called “a threat assessment.” The Justice Department has yet to release this “threat assessment.” (1)
Warnings 2001
Sibel Edmonds, a translator with the FBI, indicates "that it was clear there was sufficient information during the spring and summer of 2001 to indicate terrorists were planning an attack."
"President Bush said they had no specific information about 11 September and that is accurate but only because he said 11 September," she said. There was, however, general information about the use of airplanes and that an attack was just months away. (22)
Condoleezza Rice was the top National Security official with President Bush at the July 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa. There, "U.S. officials were warned that Islamic terrorists might attempt to crash an airliner" into the summit, prompting officials to "close the airspace over Genoa and station antiaircraft guns at the city's airport." (23)
Bush received an August 6, 2001 memo entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” which mentioned bin Laden’s desire and capability to strike the US possibly using hijacked airplanes. The CIA warned that bin Laden will launch an attack against the US and/or Israel in the coming weeks that “will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests.” (1)
The Bush administration prevented the release of details of the August 6th briefing in the report issued by the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the 9-11 attack. (1)
Also that spring and summer intelligence reports indicated that
(i) Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols which stand out”;
(ii) there was a threat to assassinate Bush at the July 2001 G-8 summit using an airplane stuffed with explosives;
(iii) al-Qaeda was planning an attack using multiple airplane hijackings; and
(iv) that bin Laden was in advanced stages of executing a significant operation within the US.
This was included in reports entitled “Bin Laden planning multiple operations,” “Bin Laden’s network’s plan advancing,” and “Bin Laden threats are real” which warned of catastrophic damage. (1)
The CIA’s National Reconnaissance Office had scheduled an exercise in which a small corporate jet would crash into an office tower following equipment failure for the morning of September 11th. (6)
In February 2001, the Hart-Rudman report warned that “mass-casualty terrorism directed against the U.S. homeland was of serious and growing concern” and that the US was woefully unprepared for a “catastrophic” domestic terrorist attack.
President Bush refused to act on this report, preferring to await the findings of Cheney’s terrorist task force which failed to even meet before 9-11. (1)
Warnings 1994-1998
Intelligence reports from 1998 indicated that Bin Laden had a plot involving explosive laden aircraft in the New York and D.C. areas while a 2000 report mentioned that possible Bin Laden targets included the Statue of Liberty, skyscrapers and nuclear power plants. (1)
Similarly, in 1994 Algerians hijacked an Air France airliner with the intention to fly it into the Eiffel Tower; in 1995 Philippine authorities uncovered an al Qaeda plot to fly a plane into CIA headquarters; and there were al Qaeda plots in 1996 and 1997 to fly a plane from outside the US into the White House and World Trade Center.
As early as 1995 the CIA warned that Islamic extremists were likely to attack U.S. aviation, Washington landmarks or Wall Street and by 1997 identified Osama bin Laden as an emerging threat on U.S. soil. (4)
In her public testimony before the 9-11 Commission, Dr. Rice stated that there was "nothing about the threat of attack in the U.S." in the Presidential Daily Briefing the President received on August 6th.
After CBS broke the story about the August 6th memo, Condoleezza Rice contended that the “overwhelming bulk of the evidence was that this was an attack that was likely to take place overseas.”
Deputy NSC Advisor Steve Hadley: “All the chatter [before 9-11] was of an attack, a potential al Qaeda attack overseas.”
The title of the August 6th memo is: "Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States” and refers to bin Laden’s desire to strike in the US.
In addition, the December 2002 report of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9-11 found:
“In May 2001, the intelligence community obtained a report that Bin Laden supporters were planning to infiltrate the United States" to "carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives." The report "was included in an intelligence report for senior government officials in August [2001]." In the same month, the Pentagon "acquired and shared with other elements of the Intelligence Community information suggesting that seven persons associated with Bin Laden had departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.” (1) and (23)
In her public testimony, Dr. Rice stated “[o]ne of the problems was there was really nothing that look like was going to happen inside the United States...Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaeda activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle East and North Africa...We did not have...threat information that was in any way specific enough to suggest something was coming in the United States."
“If we had known an attack was coming against the United States...we would have moved heaven and earth to stop it."
Page 204 of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 noted that "In May 2001, the intelligence community obtained a report that Bin Laden supporters were planning to infiltrate the United States" to "carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives." The report" was included in an intelligence report for senior government officials in August [2001]." In the same month, the Pentagon "acquired and shared with other elements of the Intelligence Community information suggesting that seven persons associated with Bin Laden had departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States."
Rice admits that she was told that "an attack was coming." She said, "Let me read you some of the actual chatter that was picked up in that spring and summer: Unbelievable news coming in weeks, said one. Big event -- there will be a very, very, very, very big uproar. There will be attacks in the near future." (23)
In her public testimony before the 9-11 commission, Dr. Rice claimed “When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001, we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity."
Documents indicate that before Sept.11, 2001, the Bush Administration "did not give terrorism top billing in their strategic plans for the Justice Department, which includes the FBI." Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until Oct. 1, 2001, said during the summer, terrorism had moved "farther to the back burner" and recounted how the Bush Administration's top two Pentagon appointees, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, "shut down" a plan to weaken the Taliban.
Similarly, Gen. Don Kerrick, who served in the Bush White House, sent a memo to the new Administration saying "We are going to be struck again" by al Qaeda, but he never heard back. He said terrorism was not "above the waterline. They were gambling nothing would happen." (23)
In her public testimony before the 9-11 commission, Dr. Rice claimed “The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was not specific as to...manner of attack"
ABC News reported, Bush Administration "officials acknowledged that U.S. intelligence officials informed President Bush weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks that bin Laden's terrorist network might try to hijack American planes."
Dateline NBC reported that on August 6, 2001, the President personally "received a one-and-a-half page briefing advising him that Osama bin Laden was capable of a major strike against the US, and that the plot could include the hijacking of an American airplane." Rice herself actually admitted this herself, saying the Aug. 6 briefing the President received said "terrorists might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft." (23)
September 11th Response
During the Presidential debates, Bush repeatedly claimed “75 percent of al Qaeda leaders have been brought to justice.” (Although earlier the administration claimed “two-thirds” had been captured or killed.)
Neither figure is accurate since it is based on known Al Qaeda members at the time of September 11 and Al Qaeda has expanded since then to approximately 18,000 operatives in more than 60 countries. Of the 27 suspect terrorists on the administration’s “most wanted” list, only three have been captured or killed, i.e., 11 percent. (32_
Gosh, I don’t think I ever said I’m not worried about Osama Bin Laden. That’s kinda one of those exaggerations. (3rd Debate)
In 2002 Bush said: “Well, as I say, we haven't heard much from him. And I wouldn't necessarily say he's at the center of any command structure. And, again, I don't know where he is. I--I'll repeat what I said. I truly am not that concerned about him.”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html
You gotta have a president who'll pursue the terrorists
We've never let up on Osama bin Laden from day one
Bush will “. . . [f]ind terrorists where they train and hide.” (Campaign commercial)
.
Failing To Go After A Cornered Bin Laden The " Gravest Error" in the War on Terror. "The Bush administration has concluded that Osama bin Laden was present during the battle for Tora Bora late last year and that failure to commit U.S. ground troops to hunt him was its gravest error in the war against al Qaeda, according to civilian and military officials with first-hand knowledge."
BUSH: "And [Osama Bin Laden is] just – he 's a person who has now been marginalized. His network is — his host government has been destroyed. He's the ultimate parasite who found weakness, exploited it, and met his match…So I don't know where he is. Nor — you know, I just don't spend that much time on him really, to be honest with you. I…I truly am not that concerned about him."
"I don't know where bin Laden is. I have no idea and really don't care. It's not that important. It's not our priority."
Three years after September 11, the CIA has fewer experienced case officers assigned to its HQ unit dealing with Osama bin Laden than it did at the time of the attacks. The unit relies on inexperienced officers rotated in and out every 60-90 days. The CIA has 5 TIMES as many agents to investigate Cuban embargo violations as it has to investigate bin Laden’s financial infrastructure.” While taking their eye off bin-Laden, Al Qaeda has regrouped and are now directing a plot to “carry out a large-scale terror attack against the United States” from remote hideouts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan boarder.
CIA Official Tasked To Track Bin Laden Said U.S. Policies Have Failed. A new book, “Imperial Hubris,” by a senior Central Intelligence Agency officer who headed a special office to track Osama bin Laden and his followers warns that the United States is losing the war against radical Islam and that the invasion of Iraq has only played into the enemy's hands. “U.S. leaders refuse to accept the obvious,” the officer writes. “We are fighting a worldwide Islamic insurgency -- not criminality or terrorism -- and our policy and procedures have failed to make more than a modest dent in enemy forces.”
War In Iraq Hurt War On Terror. Richard Clarke, Bush’s former counterterrorism chief, testified before the 9/11 commission and said that “by invading Iraq, the president of the United States has greatly undermined the war on terrorism.”
Bush I National Security Advisor Scowcroft Warned Iraq War Would Be Diversion From War On Terror. President George H.W. Bush’s National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft: “But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.” (34)
Dr. Rice in her public testimony discussing the role of Iraq in the war on terrorism stated “given that this was a global war on terror, should we look not just at Afghanistan but should we look at doing something against Iraq”
The Administration has not produced one shred of evidence that Iraq had an operational relationship with Al Qaeda, or that Iraq had anything to do with the 9/11 attacks on America.
In fact, a U.S. Army War College report said that the war in Iraq has been a diversion that has drained key resources from the more imminent War on Terror. USA Today reported that "in 2002, troops from the 5th Special Forces Group who specialize in the Middle East were pulled out of the hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to prepare for their next assignment: Iraq." Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) confirmed this, noting in February of 2002; a senior military commander told him "We are moving military and intelligence personnel and resources out of Afghanistan to get ready for a future war in Iraq." (23)
Dr. Rice in her public testimony stated after 9/11, "the President put states on notice if they were sponsoring terrorists”
The President continues to say Saudi Arabia is "our friend" despite their potential ties to terrorists. As the LA Times reported, "the 27 classified pages of a congressional report about Sept. 11 depict a Saudi government that not only provided significant money and aid to the suicide hijackers but also allowed potentially hundreds of millions of dollars to flow to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups through suspect charities and other fronts."
Newsweek reported "within weeks of the September 11 terror attacks, security officers at the Fleet National Bank in Boston had identified 'suspicious' wire transfers from the Saudi Embassy in Washington that eventually led to the discovery of an active Al Qaeda 'sleeper cell' that may have been planning follow-up attacks inside the United States." (23)
Dr. Rice in her public testimony stated “having a Homeland Security Department that can bring together the FAA and the INS and Customs and all of the various agencies is a very important step.”
While this is not necessarily a lie, the fact is the White House vehemently opposed the creation of the Department of Homeland security. Its opposition to the concept delayed the creation of the department by months (23)
Dr. Rice: “Not a single National Security Council principal at that meeting recommended to the president going after Iraq. The president thought about it. The next day he told me Iraq is to the side.” (03.22.04)
According to the Washington Post, "six days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush signed a 2-and-a-half-page document" that "directed the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq."
This is corroborated by a CBS News, which reported on 9/4/02 that five hours after the 9/11 attacks, "Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq."
In terms of resources, the Iraq decision had far-reaching effects on the efforts to hunt down Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As the Boston Globe reported, "the Bush administration is continuing to shift highly specialized intelligence officers from the hunt for Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to the Iraq crisis." (14) & (21)
Dr. Rice: “The president returned to the White House [on 9/11] and called me in and said, ‘I’ve learned from George Tenet that their no evidence of a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11.’” (03.22.04)
If this is true why did the administration repeatedly claim there was such a link or send a letter to Congress on the eve of the Iraqi invasion that the Iraq war was permitted specifically under legislation that authorized the use of force against “nations, organization, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11.” (15)
Afghanistan
Vice President Cheney: We have “closed down the training camps [in Afghanistan] where terrorists trained to kill Americans.”
Two weeks before this statement, the Bush administration warned of an imminent attack on the U.S. homeland from terrorists operating in Afghanistan. (29)
Dr. Rice: “We have eliminated [the terrorists’] base in Afghanistan. We have freed 25 million Afghans.” (03.22.04)
“Resources were not taken from Afghanistan" (04.18.04)
The administration has only secured Kabul, which is becoming increasingly unsafe, and al Qaeda and Taliban forces remain in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. When Secretary Powell visited Afghanistan the week prior to Dr. Rice’s remarks, the State Department advised the media to take precautions since it was “a war zone.”
To give a sense of the administration’s priorities, only 12,000 U.S. soldiers are in Afghanistan, which is barely more than the public-safety force for the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. The administration denied requests for additional troops but had no problem sending 150,000 troops to Iraq. (18)
In 2002, the administration removed the 5th Special Forces Group - which specialized in the Middle East - from Afghanistan to prepare for Iraq. Their replacements specialized in Spanish cultures. The CIA, meanwhile, was stretched badly in its capacity to collect, translate and analyze information coming from Afghanistan. (24)
By focusing on Iraq and not Afghanistan, al Qaeda was allowed to regroup and carry out attacks in Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Spain. (18)
President Bush: “We are on the hunt for al Qaeda. You just got to know that there’s a lot of brave people searching them out. And I view the hunt for Al Qaeda as part of the war on terror. And it requires all assets, intelligence assets and military assets, to chase them down and bring them to justice.”
Experts have concluded that the Iraq war “is diverting resources from the war on terror” and may have hurt the global battle against al Qaeda. The US Army War College reported that the Iraq war “diverted attention and resources away from the security of the American homeland against further assault by an undeterable al Qaeda.” (19)
“To date we have arrested or otherwise dealt with many key commanders of Al Qaeda”.
Most Al Qaeda leaders remain at large, including Osama bin Laden and September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The US has captured and/or killed as many as 16 lower echelon Al Qaeda leaders.
On November 24, 2003, Bush boasted that we “put the Taliban out of business forever.” Similarly, in a September 2003 address to military personnel and families in California, Bush claimed “Afghanistan today is a friend of the United States of America. It is not a haven for America’s terrorist enemies.”
Bush’s November statement came after a series of US casualties in Afghanistan, a day after the Taliban attack Kabul's most prominent hotel and on the very same day that the Afghan Foreign Minister desperately requested more help in fighting off the Taliban. The resurgent Taliban has forced the UN to remove it staff from parts of the country and led the German ambassador to warn that they threaten the country’s efforts to form a democratic government.
In addition, Afghanistan remains a haven for Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden who is believed to be in remote tribal areas near the Afghan-Pakistani border. Bush allowed Al Qaeda and bin Laden to regroup by withdrawing resources from Afghanistan for the Iraq war.
By May 2004, a member of the British Foreign Affairs Committee warned that “Afghanistan is a basked case. It’s a forgotten country.” Opium production is rocketing and the Taliban and warlords are back in control in large areas. The NATO commander in Afghanistan has asked for 10 helicopters for his force of more than 1,000 but not a single one has been delivered. (24)
Homeland Security
We have tripled the homeland security budget from 10 to 30 billion dollars. (3rd Debate)
He did not even double the budget. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) budget has grown from $19.7BB in FY 2001 to $36.5BB in FY 2004. (31)
My administration worked with the Congress to create the Department of Homeland Security. (1st Debate)
Bush opposed the creation of DHS for nearly nine months and reversed himself before the 2002 elections only after Congress stripped labor protections for civil service employees. (30)
The White House claims that it has given first responders and public health systems “the training and equipment to prepare, prevent and respond to any future attack.”
The White House now concedes that it has not provided enough money to protect against terrorist attacks on American soil and by December 2003, 76 percent of cities reported that they had no received first responder/critical infrastructure funding.
Bush’s FY 2005 budget (i) cuts $800 million in funding for the Homeland Security Department’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, (ii) cuts federal assistance to state and local law enforcement by $1 billion and (iii) slashes the Clinton administration program to add 100,000 cops to local police forces by 94 percent which could end up in taking 88,000 police officers off the streets.
The administration also sought to block $90 million in funding for sick firefighters and policemen who were part of the Ground Zero rescue efforts. When Congress forced the Administration to accept the $90 million, it delayed the money and threatened to shut down the health-screen program. As of Memorial Day 2004, the NYPD has been denied much needed health grants. (25)
Secretary Ridge claimed that Bush “exercised bold leadership . . . when he . . . moved at lighting speed . . . to make Homeland Security a cabinet department.”
The White House opposed the creation of a Homeland Security Department which was pushed by the Democrats in 2001. Bush did not support the measure until June 2002 by which point it was a faith accompli. (26)
After September 11th, President Bush promised to take "every possible measure" to guarantee the security of the homeland.
The Council on Foreign Relations task force headed by former Republican Senator Rudman (which in 2001 warned against a catastrophic terrorist attack on US soil and called for the creation of a Homeland Security Department), concluded that the administration was spending only one-third of what is required “to adequately provide for emergency responders.”
The House Select Committee on Homeland Security found that dangerous security gaps remain that place America at risk to security attack and the Department of Homeland Security has yet to complete a threat and vulnerability assessment, a bio-defense preparedness and response plan, or a national critical infrastructure risk assessment. At the same time the GAO found that “federal regulators are still doing little to make sure the nation’s chemical plants are safe from terrorist attacks”.
Since September 11th, the administration has repeatedly opposed efforts to increase homeland security efforts – opposing amendments that would have added a combined $40 billion to homeland security spending. (27)
In speaking to the employees of the new Homeland Security Department, Bush claimed “I proposed record funding for the first responders . . . Unfortunately, the Congress . . . reduced my total request . . . by $1 billion and designated part of the funding to go to other priorities.”
House Republicans clearly stated that “if the president wanted the money, he should have asked for it. He never did.” (27)
“President Bush and our leaders in Congress have a plan: Enhance border and port security . . . ” (Campaign Commerical)
Port Security Still Shows Serious Gaps, Yet Bush & GOP Congress Refuse To Fully Fund Port Security Reforms. Seven million cargo containers arrive in US ports each year, but as little as 5 percent of those are screened. To meet the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (2002), the Coast Guard and various port security officials estimate that it will cost from $7 billion to $10 billion between 2003 and 2012. But the $491 million in grants Congress has issued to ports and vessels to improve security in the past three years -- about $163 million a year on average -- won't come close to meeting the 10-year cost estimates if the spending patterns continue. The Bush administration proposed only $46 million for port security grants for FY 2005.
Council on Foreign Relations Fellow Calls Bush’s Container Security Initiative System Destined to Fail. Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Stephen Flynn criticized Bush’s container initiative, calling it a system destined to fail, according to the Sunday Telegram. Flynn stated, “Container security has to be everyone's business, not just Customs, which is only able to examine the smallest percentage of shipments entering and leaving this country on any given day. What makes this situation inherently dangerous is that Customs relies almost entirely on the reputation of an exporter or importer to determine whether a container should be a part of the small percent it actually inspects.”
Despite Known Threats, Bush Leaves Northern Border Under-resourced. Less than 10 percent of the nation’s border agents secure the Northern border. Only 1,000 border agents patrol the United State’s border with Canada, compared to 9,500 that patrol the nation’s southern border. While the US-Mexico border is 2,000 miles long, the US-Canada border is 5,000 miles, meaning that only one agent patrols for every 5 miles of border. [
Bush Administration Has Failed To Adopt Ability To Match Up Terror Suspect Data At U.S. Borders. Federal auditors concluded that delays still exist in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to the Departments of State and Homeland Security. In some cases, it took the Department of State 6 months or more to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. (33)
Hiding Environmental Risk to NYC
Under pressure from the White House, the Environmental Protection Agency assured the public that the New York City air was safe to breathe a week after 9-11.
“I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C. that their air is safe to breath[e] and their water is safe to drink.” Christie Todd Whitman in EPA Press Release 9/18/01.
A recent Sierra Club report has charged the Bush administration with “reckless regard” for public health in the days and months following 9/11. The Bush administration repeatedly ignored warnings, misinterpreted data and issued of overly optimistic and unsupported statements about environmental conditions which endangered and/or ruined the health of rescue workers and residents near Ground Zero. (28)
The EPA omitted warnings about potential health effects from airborne dust containing asbestos, lead, glass fibers and concrete. For example Air particulates in Manhattan one month after the attack were at higher levels than the Kuwaiti oil fires. In addition, the EPA claim that the air was safe to breathe was done without any monitoring data to support it.
The White House edited a draft EPA release (9/13) that EPA was “testing terrorized sites for environmental hazards” to EPA “reassures public about environmental hazards.” Another press release (9/16) was edited from “[r]ecent samples of dust . . . on Water Street show higher levels of asbestos” to “[n]ew samples confirm . . . ambient air quality meets OSHA standards.”
The White House refused to talk with the EPA Inspector General investigating these claims.
In 2004, 1,700 NYC cops and firefighters suffering adverse health effects from Ground Zero rescue efforts were forced to sue to obtain medical help they require. (2)
9-11 Commission
In her 60 Minutes Interview, Rice stated “[n]othing would be better from my point of view than to be able to testify, but there is an important principle involved here it is a longstanding principle that sitting national security advisors do not testify before the Congress”
Republican Commission Member John F. Lehman, who served as Navy Secretary under President Reagan said on ABC this morning that "This is not testimony before a tribunal of the Congress…There are plenty of precedents for appearing in public and answering questions…There are plenty of precedents the White House could use if they wanted to do this." 9/11
Commissioner Jamie Gorelick agreed, saying "Our commission is sui generis…the Chairman has been appointed by the President. We are distinguishable from Congress."
Rice's remarks on 60 Minutes that the principle is limited to "sitting national security advisers" is also a departure from her statements earlier, when she said the "principle" applied to all presidential advisers. She was forced to change this claim for 60 Minutes after 9/11
Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste "cited examples of non-Cabinet presidential advisers who have testified publicly to Congress."
Finally, the White House is reportedly moving to declassify congressional testimony then-White House adviser Richard Clarke gave in 2002. By declassifying this testimony, the White House is breaking the very same "principle" of barring White House adviser's testimony from being made public that Rice is using to avoid appearing publicly before the 9/11 commission. (21)
In November 2002, as he appointed Henry Kissinger to be chairman of the independent 9-11 Commission, President Bush declared, “we must uncover every detail and learn every lesson of September the 11th."
At that time, Bush also said that the “investigation should carefully examine all the evidence and follow all the facts, wherever they may lead.”
The Bush administration has stonewalled both the joint Congressional committee and the 9-11 Commission to the point that the Commission’s Republican chairman has been forced to issue subpoenas.
With respect to the Presidential Daily Briefings sought by the Commission, the administration will only permit them to be viewed by a small portion of the Commission and reserves the right to edit them beforehand – even though the administration freely gave the PDBs and classified notes from National Security Council meetings to Bob Woodward for his book “Bush at War.”
Commissioners question “how could the White House deny a federal panel investigating the worst crime in U.S. history access to documents it already shared with journalists?” Vietnam war hero and former Senator Max Cleeland condemned the restrictions as unconscionable. Commission member Timothy Roemer complained, “our members may see only two or three paragraphs out of a nine-page report.”
Among other things, the administration has (i) withheld intelligence warnings the White House reviewed before 9/11,
(ii) refused to say whether certain pre-9/11 intelligence warnings—including a July 2001 report noting that Osama bin Laden was poised to launch a "spectacular" attack "designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests" — were shared with Bush and what he did in response, if he had received them;
(iii) claimed that Bush’s awareness of these warnings (not the warnings themselves) was classified information—an argument unprecedented in the modern history of national security secrets; and
(iv) withheld FAA documents relating to tracking of the hijacked airliners on 9-11.
Bush also refused to let the congressional inquiry release the portion of its final report that concerned connections between the 9/11 hijackers and Saudi citizens or officials. He is reported to have refused “to answer repeated questions by the September 11 commission” about allowing relatives of Osama bin Laden to leave the country immediately after 9-11.
President Bush and Vice President Cheney initially refused to meet with the whole commission and will only meet privately with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman and only for one hour each. In contrast, Bush spent four hours with Bob Woodward for his book, “Bush at War.” (7)
September 11th
Bush repeatedly has claimed to have watched the first airplane striking the World Trade Center on TV just before entering a classroom at a Florida elementary school and thought “'there's one terrible pilot.' And I said, 'It must have been a horrible accident.' But I was whisked off there - I didn't have much time to think about it. And I was sitting in the classroom, and Andy Card, my Chief of Staff, who is sitting over here, walked in and said, `A second plane has hit the tower, America is under attack”
This is impossible since there was no live coverage of the first plane crash and no video emerged until the following day. (3)
Sources: (1) The Left Coaster 07.14.03, Waterman – UPI 07.23.03, Priest – Washington Post 07.25.03, Dean – Findlaw.com 07.29.03, Ridgeway – Village Voice 07.31.03, Franken – Lies And The Liars Who Tell Them, Daily Mis-Lead 03.11.04, Center for American Progress Fact Sheet 03.22.04, Progress Report 03.26.04, Rice – Washington Post 03.22.04, Progress Report 03.26.04, Daily MisLead 04.14.04; (2) DemocracyNow.org 08.12.03, Heilprin – Washington Post 08.23.03, Noah – Slate 09.05.03, Meyers – NBC News 09.03.03; Daily MIs-Lead 05.25.04 (3) Schorrow – Boston Herald 10.22.02; (4) Plotz – Slate 09.10.03, USA Today – 04.16.04; (5) Franken – Lies and The Liars Who Tell Them, (6) Lumpkin – Associated Press 10.28.03; (7) The Daily Mis-Lead 10.27.03, Corn – BushLies.com, The Daily Mis-Lead 11.17.03; Isikoff & Hosenball - Newsweek 02.18.04; Progress Report 02.23.04, Progress Report 03.01.04; Daily Mis-Lead 05.20.04 (8) Center for American Progress (“CAP”) Fact Sheet 03.26.04; (9) Scheer – Los Angeles Times 05-22-01, Allen - Washington Post 08.07.01, Progress Report 03.10.04, CAP Fact Sheet 03.22.04, Yglesias – The American Prospect 03.23.04, Progress Report 03.25.04, CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04, The Daily Mis-Lead 03.26.04, CAP Fact Sheet 04.05.04; AP – Los Angeles Times 04.30.04, Center for American Progress 04.20, 04; Daily Mis-Lead 08.19.04; (10) CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04, Ackerman – TNR Online 03.24.04, Progress Report 03.24.04; (11) CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04; (12) CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04, Progress Report 03.25.04; (13) CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04, Ackerman – TNR Online 03.25.04; (14) CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04; (15) CAP Fact Sheet 03.26.04; (16) Rice – Washington Post 03.22.04, Lizza – TNR Online 03.23.04, Ackerman – TNR Online 03.24.04; (17) Rice – Washington Post 03.22.04, Progress Report 03.23.04, Progress Report 03.25.04; (18) Progress Report 03.23.04, CAP Fact Sheet 03.23.04, Moniz & Komarow – USA Today 03.29.04; (19) Progress Report 02.23.04; (20)AP 12.27.02, Institute for Public Accuracy SOU Response, CAP Fact Sheet 01.20.04; (21) CAP Fact Sheet 03.28.04; (22) Buncombe – The Independent 04.02.04; (23) CAP Fact Sheets 04.08.04; (24) Center for American Progress, Claim v. Fact Database; (24) Corn – BushLies.com 9.13.03, Daily Mis-Lead 11.25.03; Brown & Sengupta – Independent 05.25.04; (25) Center for American Progress 12.13.03 and 02.03.04; (26) Center for American Progress 02.25.04; Daily Mis-Lead 05.25.04 (27) The Daily Mis-Lead 10.02.03, Center for American Progress 02.25.04; Carville – Had Enough? (28) Progress Report 08.19.04; (29) Daily Mis-Lead 07.29.04; (30) FactCheck.org; (31) CBO, “Federal Funding for Homeland Security” 4/30/04, OMB, Budget FY 2005, page 178); (32) FactCheck.org (Oct. 1, 2004), Greenberg & Holmes, The American Prospect (November 2004); (33) www.omb.gov, Women’s Wear Daily, 8/17/04; Daily Press, (Newport News, VA), 9/11/04, Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 7/10/03; Portland Press Herald, 7/5/03, Sunday Telegram, 3/30/03, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), 7/20/03, www.gao.gov, 7/04; (34) Washington Post, 4/17/02, Bush Remarks, 3/13/02, Daily Mis-Lead 09.15.04, NYTimes, 6/23/04, Imperial Hubris, Clarke 9/11 Commission Testimony, 3/24/04, Scowcroft Op-ed, WSJ, 8/15/02.
" or he should consider changing that policy. To argue that it's dangerous to question him, is to argue that it's better to have poor leadership decisions, than dissent. I submit that BOTH are harmful to the war effort, and we should err on the side of truth.
