But I still feel I had a choice if I answered this post, just as I feel I have choices about what I’m going to cook for dinner tonight and what I’m going to watch on TV.
When Wilhelm Wundt, in his early psychological laboratory, introspected about the decision-making process, he deliberately started with very very simple decisions. Seeing a signal, deciding which of two signals it was, responding appropriately. And introspecting about what the processes must be that make up this chain.
Perception, apperception, thought, each subjectively dissected; we have extensive writings on what this task
feels like.
Modern neuroscience can trace the pathways back and forth (there are always feedback loops; it is not a one-way process) through various serial and parallel brain processes, from the retina through the LGN to the primary (V1) visual cortex, though V2, V4, on to the infratemporal cortex, up to the prefrontal, primary motor cortext, motor projection areas, spinal cord, down to the finger that presses the key. What is happening is very little like what it feels like (we have no sensory nerves in the brain, after all).
Even when we can locate the neural equivalent of "this is what making a choice feels like", we see (a la Libet) that it is effect, rather than cause. We also see (e.g., Chalmers) that conscious awareness is not necessary for many of the things we do for which we have always assumed that conscious awareness in necessary (blindsight is perhaps the most well-known counter-example, but it is not the only one).
Perhaps you are a more committed Determinist than I?
Or perhaps I have simply filled in more gaps. At some point, thinking those gaps are big enough to hide "free will" is just silly; even the defenders of free will on this forum have had to redefine it in a much more modest form than "free will" has historically taken.