Godel's proof
This is just a quick overview, cribbed from Nagel and Newman.
Given an axiomatic system sufficiently powerful to support arithmetic (such as that described in
Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead):
1. Godel shows how to construct a meta-mathematical statement
G (a formula in arithmetic) that says "Formula
G is not demonstrable."
2. Then he shows that
G is demonstrable if and only if not-
G is demonstrable. (since
G say "G is not demonstrable")
If a formula and its negation are both demonstrable, then the axioms of the system are inconsistent.
3. Then he proves that
G is true, but not formally demonstrable. (It asserts that every integer has a certain property and that can be shown to be true of every integer we examine, but cannot be shown to be true of all integers)
4. Since
G is true and formally undecidable, the axioms of arithmetic are incomplete.
5. Then, he shows how to construct a formula
A that represents the statement "Arithmetic is consistent", and proves that "
A implies
G" is formally demonstrable.
Then he shows that
A itself is not formally demonstrable.
This means that there is a true statement in the formal system that cannot be demonstrated by the axioms of the formal system.
If
G is added to the axiom set, then the same process can generate another expression that is also true but undecidable.
It says nothing at all about the nature of matter, time, space, and the universe as a whole.
It is, however, one of the shining achievements of twentieth century mathematics.
http://www.faragher.freeserve.co.uk/godeldef2.htm