Am I the atoms that make me?

[Phaedrus74]

Here is where I think we differ. I would say:

"A substrate capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness is not necessarily capable of producing consciousness."

But if I am understanding you and others you are saying this statement is untrue.

Don't you mean to say:

"A substrate capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness will not necessarily produce consciousness."

Your statement is a bit off, otherwise.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

Come and look at it through my eyes. Just come and be inside my brain and you will know exactly what I mean. You can't? That is what makes it subjective. You could examine my brain minutely with whatever instruments you pleased and you would have no idea what it is like to be me, nor I what it is like to be you.

In other words "subjective" and "biological action of an organic machine" are not mutually exclusive terms.

This is in fact the same assertion you made earlier and it remains just an assertion. How do you know that if we induce the same "neurological state" (whatever that actually is is irrelevant to my point) our "experience" will not be the same?

Although at the moment we can't with confidence say the experience would be the same all the evidence we have about how the world works in other areas would indicate that we would have the same experience, and our ever increasing knowledge of how the brain works also indicates this.

Personal experience also hints that this is the case. A personal experience I have had is the "taste of rusty nails" even though I have never tasted rusty nails. How did I have the experience of tasting rusty nails even though I've never tasted rusty nails? Well I once had to have a series of x-rays taken which required an opaque to x-rays dye to be injected into my bloodstream. For various reasons I didn't have the standard dye and the one I was given had a known side effect - you experienced the "taste of rusty nails". And I and all the other people who had this particular dye all experienced the "taste of rusty nails". Now of course that is not "conclusive proof" but it does hint that the same stimulus results in the same experience in all of us.

 

[Robin]

Don't you mean to say:

"A substrate capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness will not necessarily produce consciousness."

Your statement is a bit off, otherwise.

No, I meant to say what I said:

"A substrate capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness is not necessarily capable of producing consciousness."

Explain why it is a bit off.

 

[Robin]

This is in fact the same assertion you made earlier and it remains just an assertion. How do you know that if we induce the same "neurological state" (whatever that actually is is irrelevant to my point) our "experience" will not be the same?

You didn't read. I already accepted that if we induce the same brain states then the subjective experience will be the same. You are still missing my point, which was to explain what I meant by "subjective experience".

Here is the thing - if you induce those neurological states in my brain (whether by offering me a peach or planting electrodes in my brain), then you will not know what it is like to eat a peach no matter how deeply you can examine my brain. But I will.

 

[Phaedrus74]

No, I meant to say what I said:

"A substrate capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness is not necessarily capable of producing consciousness."

Explain why it is a bit off.

Okay, so what you mean is that something (a tree for instance) which is potentially a table is not necessarily a table.

True, but trivial.

I do not mean this as harsh as it sounds, your statement just becomes slightly less interesting.

 

[Darat]

You didn't read. I already accepted that if we induce the same brain states then the subjective experience will be the same. You are still missing my point, which was to explain what I meant by "subjective experience".

Here is the thing - if you induce those neurological states in my brain (whether by offering me a peach or planting electrodes in my brain), then you will not know what it is like to eat a peach no matter how deeply you can examine my brain. But I will.

Robin I did read and I understood what you said but your assertion is still there.

Your assertion is still that there is something unique that we can't duplicate no matter what "physical stimulus" we use. That's why I added my further examples since the evidence we do have at the moment suggests the opposite to your assertion is true - i.e. that the same stimulus produces the same reaction.

We have no reason (at the moment) given the sparse evidence we have to suppose that you and I "experience" the same thing somehow differently (that isn't a physical difference - for example if I was colour blind and you weren't).

 

[Robin]

Okay, so what you mean is that something (a tree for instance) which is potentially a table is not necessarily a table.

True, but trivial.

I do not mean this as harsh as it sounds, your statement just becomes slightly less interesting.

No, you have got it completely and utterly wrong, I don't know how you can derive your tree example from my statement.

Any substrate that is not capable of being conscious is clearly not potentially conscious, is it?

You appear to be assuming that "capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness" equates to "potentially conscious"

 

[Robin]

Robin I did read and I understood what you said but your assertion is still there.

Your assertion is still that there is something unique that we can't duplicate no matter what "physical stimulus" we use. That's why I added my further examples since the evidence we do have at the moment suggests the opposite to your assertion is true - i.e. that the same stimulus produces the same reaction.

No, you didn't read or didn't understand, one way or the other you got hold of the wrong end of the stick. How many times do I have to say and in how many ways that I accept that the same stimulus produces the same reaction?

Look, you say you are reading - prove that you are reading what I am writing, finally acknowledge that you have read what I have been saying for a while now - I am not making an assertion, I am simply trying to explain what I mean when I use the expression "subjective experience"

We have no reason (at the moment) given the sparse evidence we have to suppose that you and I "experience" the same thing somehow differently (that isn't a physical difference - for example if I was colour blind and you weren't).

I don't know what you are trying to say here or how it relates to my attempts to explain what I mean by "subjective experience". I don't think I have touched on that subject at all, I am still stuck in definitions. How can we even discuss the nature of experiences when you won't even agree to a common referrent for the word?

 

[Phaedrus74]

No, you have got it completely and utterly wrong, I don't know how you can derive your tree example from my statement.

Any substrate that is not capable of being conscious is clearly not potentially conscious, is it?

You appear to be assuming that "capable of performing the information processing tasks necessary for consciousness" equates to "potentially conscious"

That was the way I read it, yes. Sorry, my bad, but I am curious why "a substrate capable of performing the information processes necessary for consciousness" is not potentially conscious. (Apart from the obvious, that "a substrate capable of performing &c &c" is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness to occur.) What in other words is needed for such a substrate to become "potentially conscious".

 

[Robin]

That was the way I read it, yes. Sorry, my bad, but I am curious why "a substrate capable of performing the information processes necessary for consciousness" is not potentially conscious. (Apart from the obvious, that "a substrate capable of performing &c &c" is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness to occur.) What in other words is needed for such a substrate to become "potentially conscious".

I don't even know if my statement is correct and of course I will accept whatever science finds about it. My feeling is that some property of the material will prove to be important in providing the quality of the experience.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I don't even know if my statement is correct and of course I will accept whatever science finds about it. My feeling is that some property of the material will prove to be important in providing the quality of the experience.

Yeah, it's one of those big puzzles (perhaps THE biggest)...

 

[chris epic]

How is law as punishment pragmatic? What practical purpose does punishment serve?

I never used "pragamatic" as support for my own personal opinion or understanding of legal punishment; its pragmatic for the people and establishment it serves: the loved ones of the victims, and the authority of the state to exercise discipline. Is it universally or fundamentally practical? Personally, I don't think so.