Airport security - the right way?

If TSA suspects person to be carrying contraband in their hijab and takes them aside
-> suspect can inquire whether said hijab is the reason for taking aside (Yes)
-> TSA requests scanner (Subject Refuses)
--> only now a patdown of only the head/neck area (which said hijab would cover) is done.

What of this makes no sense?
 
Probably nothing, except for maybe the effectiveness.

If its a bomb that is small enough to be hidden on your body, it will be limited in size. It could kill some people (security workers, civilians in line) and probably throw the airport into chaos for a while, but the death toll and overall effects will probably be much less than if they managed to set off the bomb on the plane (likely causing a crash, with the death of everyone on board.)

Plus, setting off the explosives in the airport (rather than on the plane) might almost be seen as a victory for airport security (as in "see? we stopped the bad men from crashing planes).

If one person hopping a dividing ropeline can cause thousands to be rescreened and many planes to be delayed for hours, I would reckon a somewhat coordinated bombing of security screening queues in airports would be pretty effective if the goal was to disrupt travel or infrastructure.
 
On the possibility of someone setting off explosives in the screening area...
Probably nothing, except for maybe the effectiveness.

If its a bomb that is small enough to be hidden on your body, it will be limited in size. It could kill some people (security workers, civilians in line) and probably throw the airport into chaos for a while, but the death toll and overall effects will probably be much less than if they managed to set off the bomb on the plane (likely causing a crash, with the death of everyone on board.)
If one person hopping a dividing ropeline can cause thousands to be rescreened and many planes to be delayed for hours, I would reckon a somewhat coordinated bombing of security screening queues in airports would be pretty effective if the goal was to disrupt travel or infrastructure.
Ah, but that's a little different scenario than I was picturing.

I was imagining a terrorist trying to smuggle explosives on board a plane, getting caught, and then setting off the explosives as a "last ditch attempt" to cause damage. This is a little different than the idea of "coordinated bombing". In that situation the terrorists would be less limited as to explosive size (no need to sneak anything past security, so go nuts with the C4).

And yes, it would cause delays, re-screenings, and horrendous problems for the airport. I still think it would be less problem than if a plane were actually brought down with explosives.
 
If the reason for profiling/taking them aside is their hijab, AND they refuse the scanner, THEN the patdown should only occur around the head/neck area .

Why? All you've done with this rule is open a door that terrorists can now exploit to smuggle stuff on the plane. It's Stuck On Stupid.
 
If TSA suspects person to be carrying contraband in their hijab and takes them aside
-> suspect can inquire whether said hijab is the reason for taking aside (Yes)
-> TSA requests scanner (Subject Refuses)
--> only now a patdown of only the head/neck area (which said hijab would cover) is done.

What of this makes no sense?

No one is going to be taken aside for wearing a hijab. It's not legal for TSA to profile, and the hijab itself is no different than baggy clothes.
 
Not to mention the 3 hours of time that EL AL wastes from every passenger, every flight, both ways. Also the tickets become more expensive when more money goes to security.

Where in the article did it say that Israeli airport security wastes time (especially 3 hours!)?

From the article:
The first layer of actual security that greets travellers at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport is a roadside check. All drivers are stopped and asked two questions: How are you? Where are you coming from?

"Two benign questions. The questions aren't important. The way people act when they answer them is," Sela said.

(Maybe 5-10 minutes delay)

Once you've parked your car or gotten off your bus, you pass through the second and third security perimeters.

Armed guards outside the terminal are trained to observe passengers as they move toward the doors, again looking for odd behaviour. At Ben Gurion's half-dozen entrances, another layer of security are watching. At this point, some travellers will be randomly taken aside, and their person and their luggage run through a magnometer.

(for most passengers, these 2 levels of security won't slow them down at all, it's passive and allows them to walk right on by, unless they're some of a few who get selected to go through a magnometer...a matter of a few minutes, again)

As you approach your airline check-in desk, a trained interviewer takes your passport and ticket. They ask a series of questions: Who packed your luggage? Has it left your side?

"The whole time, they are looking into your eyes — which is very embarrassing. But this is one of the ways they figure out if you are suspicious or not. It takes 20, 25 seconds," said Sela.

(20-25 seconds)

Five security layers down: you now finally arrive at the only one which Ben-Gurion Airport shares with Pearson — the body and hand-luggage check.

"But here it is done completely, absolutely 180 degrees differently than it is done in North America," Sela said.

"First, it's fast — there's almost no line. That's because they're not looking for liquids, they're not looking at your shoes. They're not looking for everything they look for in North America. They just look at you," said Sela.

(another few minutes here)


And the bottom line:
That's the process — six layers, four hard, two soft. The goal at Ben-Gurion is to move fliers from the parking lot to the airport lounge in a maximum of 25 minutes.
 
I accompanied a colleague to an El Al office in Rome in 1980. He was planning a holiday trip to Israel.
You could not just buy a ticket in any shop-it had to be El Al approved.
I repeat- this wast, buying a ticket not checking in at an airport.

The door of the travel agency was bullet proof glass.
There was an air lock- like portico. One person entered and was locked, between 2 glass doors, so a security agent ( IDF?) could see behind him.
Once the SA opened the inner door, letting the prospective customer into the shop, the PC was frisked.
Me? I waited outside.

I've gone on holiday in some wierd places. Some dangerous places.
But never one where the owners of the tourist shops frisk you before you buy stuff.

I dare say they're pretty good at security. They've had the practice.
But I have to wonder- why do so many people hate them that they have to live this way?
 
I accompanied a colleague to an El Al office in Rome in 1980. He was planning a holiday trip to Israel.
You could not just buy a ticket in any shop-it had to be El Al approved.
I repeat- this wast, buying a ticket not checking in at an airport.

The door of the travel agency was bullet proof glass.
There was an air lock- like portico. One person entered and was locked, between 2 glass doors, so a security agent ( IDF?) could see behind him.
Once the SA opened the inner door, letting the prospective customer into the shop, the PC was frisked.
Me? I waited outside.

I've gone on holiday in some wierd places. Some dangerous places.
But never one where the owners of the tourist shops frisk you before you buy stuff.

I dare say they're pretty good at security. They've had the practice.
But I have to wonder- why do so many people hate them that they have to live this way?
Heh, there was a high-end stereo/television shop by where I grew up that had the exact same entrance procedure, minus the frisk.
 
Ah, but that's a little different scenario than I was picturing.

I was imagining a terrorist trying to smuggle explosives on board a plane, getting caught, and then setting off the explosives as a "last ditch attempt" to cause damage. This is a little different than the idea of "coordinated bombing". In that situation the terrorists would be less limited as to explosive size (no need to sneak anything past security, so go nuts with the C4).

And yes, it would cause delays, re-screenings, and horrendous problems for the airport. I still think it would be less problem than if a plane were actually brought down with explosives.

Really? Imagine a suitcase bomb at every major US airport, or just the top 5 hubs. That would shut down air travel far more than a single plane coming down.

People would not just be afraid of flying, they would be afraid of airports. Or of any gathering of people.

The thing is that these scanners aren't making us safer, they are just making us more irritated and poorer. I'm not flying again for another month. I sure hope they have this stuff figured out by then.
 
Where in the article did it say that Israeli airport security wastes time (especially 3 hours!)?

I was about to respond in a similar manner, but I thought I'd check what the airline says, and according to El Al, economy passengers should check in 3 hours in advance of flight time. Other classes are slightly less. But it doesn't specifically mention security in that figure.

http://www.elal.co.il/elal/english/allaboutyourflight/attheairport/checkintimes.html
 
I was about to respond in a similar manner, but I thought I'd check what the airline says, and according to El Al, economy passengers should check in 3 hours in advance of flight time. Other classes are slightly less. But it doesn't specifically mention security in that figure.

http://www.elal.co.il/elal/english/allaboutyourflight/attheairport/checkintimes.html

That's interesting. I noticed on that link you provided:
Economy Class Passengers – Three hours before departure.
Business Class and VIP Passengers – Two and a half hours before departure.
First Class Passengers - One and a half hours before departure.
Please Note:

* Check-in for Israel travel flights closes about one hour before departure. Late passengers will not be able to check in once their flight has closed.

So that leaves 2 hours for Economy Class pax, 1.5 hours for Business and VIP pax, and half an hour for First Class pax to check in and get through all the security. Not terribly out of line with US policies, if I recall. (I think it's 1 hour for domestic flights and 2 hours for international ones). And with their estimate that it should only take 25 minutes, that leaves you just enough time to buy that crappy paperback you'll never read, and that overpriced sandwich from Au Bon Pain :)
 
Nuance can be helpful. If the reason for profiling/taking them aside is their hijab, AND they refuse the scanner, THEN the patdown should only occur around the head/neck area .

On the one hand, can't the TSA officer simply say, "no, it's not because of your head scarf", and then just pat you down entirely?

On the other hand, if I can trigger a secondary screening because of my head scarf, and then restrict the pat-down to my head and neck area, doesn't that give me guaranteed safe passage for things hidden in other pat-downable areas on my person? And doesn't that bit of nuance make tomfoolery out of your bit of nuance?
 
Really? Imagine a suitcase bomb at every major US airport, or just the top 5 hubs. That would shut down air travel far more than a single plane coming down.
Even more effective would be one a day for 10 days in different locations. Or maybe randomly skip a day or two here and there. There would be a HUGE drop in traffic.
 
I'm reminded of a scene in The Battle of Algiers where during searches for bombs, one of the French security guards told a trainee, "you're not allowed to touch their women." And therefore the women smuggled in the bombs.
 
On the other hand, if I can trigger a secondary screening because of my head scarf, and then restrict the pat-down to my head and neck area, doesn't that give me guaranteed safe passage for things hidden in other pat-downable areas on my person? And doesn't that bit of nuance make tomfoolery out of your bit of nuance?

I must admit that was my first thought too. Personally, I don't particularly mind the security at airports, although I think some of it is daft. I don't think it needs to be made any dafter, and this would seem to qualify.
 
On the one hand, can't the TSA officer simply say, "no, it's not because of your head scarf", and then just pat you down entirely?

On the other hand, if I can trigger a secondary screening because of my head scarf, and then restrict the pat-down to my head and neck area, doesn't that give me guaranteed safe passage for things hidden in other pat-downable areas on my person? And doesn't that bit of nuance make tomfoolery out of your bit of nuance?

I just prefer actually citing the CAIR website rather than a derived article. The conclusion or what you think of it is up to you :)
 
I just prefer actually citing the CAIR website rather than a derived article. The conclusion or what you think of it is up to you :)

But the bit you quoted indicates clearly that you can ask if the search is because of a suspicious hijab (!). If they say "Yes" then they can only search the Hijab, leaving the rest of you unsearched. If they say "No" then they can search the rest of you.

Assuming it is true, does nothing about that strike you as odd?

Surely if you're searching someone because there is something suspicious about them then you want to do a reasonable job. If you're searching someone because they've been selected randomly, then you still want to do a reasonable job. Why the special limitations here?
 

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