andyandy
anthropomorphic ape
- Joined
- Apr 30, 2006
- Messages
- 8,377
Afghanistan has risen back to the top of the political agenda in Britain after eight service personnel were killed in 24 hours. The conflict had largely slipped from public consciousness, only for it to be brought firmly into focus both by the recent deaths and because British conflict involvement in Iraq has effectively finished. And people are asking (not before time), what exactly is our exit strategy? At what time did a war against Al Qaeda morph into an eight year war of attrition against the Taliban?
The first question to ask is whether it was worth invading in the first place. Our motivation was to find Bin Laden and to disrupt the international terrorist training camps in the country. On the first count we have failed, but on the second count we have largely succeeded in preventing international terrorist camps operating with impunity in the country.
But having achieved that the second question is what do we do now? The terrorist training camps are now in Pakistan or along the amorphous Pakistan/Afghanistan border. The failed/failing states of Somalia and Yemen provide new safe havens for terrorist training. It's as if we are simply squeezing a balloon, preventing the air from entering one part only to see it filling up someplace else.
So just what is our strategy? Is it now to embark on the global mission of empire building to eliminate all failed/failing states which might serve as terrorist hubs? What is the point of spending another decade in Afghanistan if it won't actually impact on the ability of international terrorists to train over the border in Pakistan?
Is the Afghanistan war going to transform into a retrofit humanitarian mission (like we saw with Iraq), where our continued involvement is reframed in terms of human rights? Because if it is we should start asking from a utilitarian perspective why this conflict and not others. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Somalia, all spring to mind as more pressing humanitarian missions, but on these countries we spend virtually nothing.
And finally on whose side are we fighting? The Afghanistan government is almost universally decried as corrupt and incompetent, with rule extending little further than the outskirts of Kabul. Regional warlords are afforded significant provincial authority and yet these are the same brutal authoritarian leaders who control violent militia and the drugs trade.
My own suggestion would be maintaining a presence until after the August elections, but then after that realistically starting to look at scaling back involvement. Within two years we should no longer be fighting against the Taliban. We could maintain a capability of disrupting any terrorist training camps (but in any case Pakistan now offers a far superior base, not least because of the impossibility of monitoring British Pakistani visits to the country, which affords perfect cover for the new breed of disaffected second/third generation wannabe jihadis).
Is it a perfect solution? Of course not. The question is however what is the least bad option, and I think we are getting to the point where we should reconsider our involvement in the country.
What do you think?
The first question to ask is whether it was worth invading in the first place. Our motivation was to find Bin Laden and to disrupt the international terrorist training camps in the country. On the first count we have failed, but on the second count we have largely succeeded in preventing international terrorist camps operating with impunity in the country.
But having achieved that the second question is what do we do now? The terrorist training camps are now in Pakistan or along the amorphous Pakistan/Afghanistan border. The failed/failing states of Somalia and Yemen provide new safe havens for terrorist training. It's as if we are simply squeezing a balloon, preventing the air from entering one part only to see it filling up someplace else.
So just what is our strategy? Is it now to embark on the global mission of empire building to eliminate all failed/failing states which might serve as terrorist hubs? What is the point of spending another decade in Afghanistan if it won't actually impact on the ability of international terrorists to train over the border in Pakistan?
Is the Afghanistan war going to transform into a retrofit humanitarian mission (like we saw with Iraq), where our continued involvement is reframed in terms of human rights? Because if it is we should start asking from a utilitarian perspective why this conflict and not others. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Somalia, all spring to mind as more pressing humanitarian missions, but on these countries we spend virtually nothing.
And finally on whose side are we fighting? The Afghanistan government is almost universally decried as corrupt and incompetent, with rule extending little further than the outskirts of Kabul. Regional warlords are afforded significant provincial authority and yet these are the same brutal authoritarian leaders who control violent militia and the drugs trade.
My own suggestion would be maintaining a presence until after the August elections, but then after that realistically starting to look at scaling back involvement. Within two years we should no longer be fighting against the Taliban. We could maintain a capability of disrupting any terrorist training camps (but in any case Pakistan now offers a far superior base, not least because of the impossibility of monitoring British Pakistani visits to the country, which affords perfect cover for the new breed of disaffected second/third generation wannabe jihadis).
Is it a perfect solution? Of course not. The question is however what is the least bad option, and I think we are getting to the point where we should reconsider our involvement in the country.
What do you think?