A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[cpolk]

Blindsight has nothing to do with metaphors. It simply shows that we can do some visual processing nonconsciously.

It shows that images are formed in the eyes, not in the brain. It is a metaphor - can someone who is blind have blind sight? They have no visual processing whatsoever, neither conscious nor unconscious.

Therefore, it is a metaphor.

Are you suggesting you have continuous balancing qualia while you are walking? If so, pray tell, what do they feel like?

I personally don't at this time, but a baby learning to walk does. As the infant continues to experience qualia, it becomes second-nature - one of those 'unconscious' things.

Also, think of people in rehab after traumatic accidents, who have to learn to re-walk. Isn't quale involved in that process?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No, no changes to the physics of the brain. Changes to the way the world works, so that the same physics isn't accompanied by consciousness.

Yes, this is Stimpy's idea that we would change the causal laws so that everything looks the same but there is no consciousness. I don't think that's what philosophers had in mind when they invented p-zombies. In particular, where would the "real people" be who could interrogate the p-zombie to see if they could tell the difference?

But no mental experience happens without a corresponding physical process in the brain, and so we can always say that it's that physical process which results in the formation of the memory, rather than the mental experience itself. (By "formation of the memory", I mean a physical change in the brain.) And then, since our brain is different from what it would have been in the absence of that experience-and-corresponding-physical-process, our subsequent behaviour and conscious memories, which depend on our brain, also are different from what they would have been, which difference we describe as remembering and talking "about" the experience.

But how could it evolve that the brain happens to form memories that correspond in any accurate way to the epiphenomenal experience, since evolution would not have the advantage of any "input" from those experiences? It couldn't. But then again, how do we know that our memories have anything at all to do with the epiphenomenal experiences? We might just be spouting rubbish.

Now, you might say that it is the very formation of the memories that produces the qualia in the first place, and so there is no problem of chance correspondence between the memories and the experiences. But it can't be that simple, because we'd have no qualia on memory recall. We might be able to get somewhere on this track, however.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It shows that images are formed in the eyes, not in the brain. It is a metaphor - can someone who is blind have blind sight? They have no visual processing whatsoever, neither conscious nor unconscious.

Therefore, it is a metaphor.

It shows that visual processing goes on somewhere else besides the eyes and the damaged V1 area. There is a nonconscious pathway between the eyes and the muscle control system.

I personally don't at this time, but a baby learning to walk does. As the infant continues to experience qualia, it becomes second-nature - one of those 'unconscious' things.

Also, think of people in rehab after traumatic accidents, who have to learn to re-walk. Isn't quale involved in that process?

Indeed, as qualia is also involved in some driving, but not auto-pilot driving. All I'm saying is that some high-level processes are nonconscious.

~~ Paul

 

[cpolk]

Indeed, as qualia is also involved in some driving, but not auto-pilot driving. All I'm saying is that some high-level processes are nonconscious.

How do they become non-conscious? Through repetition, right? In the beginning, it is just as much a mental effort as it is a physical. Is it not?

Anyway, you are experiencing qualia at traffic lights.

The point is, I'm not certain how p-zombies can possibly exist.

 

[Mercutio]

It shows that images are formed in the eyes, not in the brain. It is a metaphor - can someone who is blind have blind sight? They have no visual processing whatsoever, neither conscious nor unconscious.

Therefore, it is a metaphor.

Um, no. It is one of many clinical examples that show that vision is accomplished through many parallel pathways, each responsible for a part of our visual experience. Motion, color, form, emotional value, associations, all are independently processed. There is no one place where "an image" exists, with the possible exception of the distal stimulus--the image out there in the real world. Individuals with blindsight do process motion; they do have that element of the visual system still working. It is the processing of and reaction to a visual stimulus; it is sight. It is not recognition, it does not process color, shape, distance, anything like that, but it is very much visual.

 

[Mercutio]

How do they become non-conscious? Through repetition, right? In the beginning, it is just as much a mental effort as it is a physical. Is it not?

Not always. Some processes never reach the level of conscious awareness. In Capgras' delusion, for instance, the pathways responsible for emotional value of a visual stimulus are missing, and as a result you recognize a loved one's face, but have no feeling of liking them. You do not realize this consciously, though, as that has never been part of the conscious processing. The percept is of "ah, my loved ones have been replaced with identical strangers".

What you are speaking of is automatization, which also occurs. It does take effort initially. But just because the Stroop effect takes work, does not mean that all non-conscious effects take work.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Interesting Ian :
I believe in free will, remember?

69Dodge
So do you think a p-zombie could exist? It seems to me that you wouldn't think so. Could a p-zombie, which lacks free will, behave the same as a person, who has it? If so, in what way is the person's will free, after all, if his behaviour can be perfectly well described as his physical body following physical laws?

I don't believe our physical bodies completely follow physical laws*. There is an input from the self which guides much of our behaviour.

In which case something which is absolutely physically identical to us would not behave as we do. Indeed it would be a corpse. Thus a p-zombie would be nomonologically (physically) impossible.

I of course accept that an android could be so programmed so that the entirety of its behaviour would be indistinguishable from a human being's. But in order to create such an android it wouldn't simply be the case of simulating the function of the brain since the brain by itself does not result in our behaviour. The android's "brain" would have to be vastly more complex than our brains (although of course our brains would be more "complex" in the sense that the particular physical constitution of brains allows influence from the non-physical self).

* I don't know if QM would allow certain outcomes to be influenced by a non-physical self. In which case we would follow physical laws but which would still accommodate a non-physical influence.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Um, no. It is one of many clinical examples that show that vision is accomplished through many parallel pathways, each responsible for a part of our visual experience. Motion, color, form, emotional value, associations, all are independently processed. There is no one place where "an image" exists, with the possible exception of the distal stimulus--the image out there in the real world.

Of course. And thus under materialism there is no self which is the author of all these experiences. The self under materialism (and any position which holds that consciousness is wholly dictated by brain processes) does not exist but is merely an illusion brought about by successive similar psychological states from second to second.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Not always. Some processes never reach the level of conscious awareness. In Capgras' delusion, for instance, the pathways responsible for emotional value of a visual stimulus are missing, and as a result you recognize a loved one's face, but have no feeling of liking them. You do not realize this consciously, though, as that has never been part of the conscious processing. The percept is of "ah, my loved ones have been replaced with identical strangers".

Is this kinda like "invasion of the body snatchers"?

 

[cpolk]

Um, no. It is one of many clinical examples that show that vision is accomplished through many parallel pathways, each responsible for a part of our visual experience. Motion, color, form, emotional value, associations, all are independently processed. There is no one place where "an image" exists, with the possible exception of the distal stimulus--the image out there in the real world. Individuals with blindsight do process motion; they do have that element of the visual system still working. It is the processing of and reaction to a visual stimulus; it is sight. It is not recognition, it does not process color, shape, distance, anything like that, but it is very much visual.

Um. Yes. Blindsight implies that you can see without your eyes - when you're blind. This is obviously not is what is meant, therefore "blind" is a metaphor.

I have no doubt whatsoever that our sensory perception and brain react without the "I", such as when we touch something sharp or hot and jerk away before the "I" is aware of the sensation. That is not what I am disputing.

I am saying that the word "blind" is used as a metaphor. If you believe it is not, can you please provide evidence?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now, you might say that it is the very formation of the memories that produces the qualia in the first place, and so there is no problem of chance correspondence between the memories and the experiences. But it can't be that simple, because we'd have no qualia on memory recall. We might be able to get somewhere on this track, however.

No, hold on, this doesn't help. It might explain a quale such as red, but it does not explain our ability to discuss qualia. That would require the brain to spontaneously form memories about qualia (meta-memories, so to speak) so that we could subsequently recall those memories and discuss qualia. But the brain would have no reason to form such memories.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I of course accept that an android could be so programmed so that the entirety of its behaviour would be indistinguishable from a human being's. But in order to create such an android it wouldn't simply be the case of simulating the function of the brain since the brain by itself does not result in our behaviour. The android's "brain" would have to be vastly more complex than our brains (although of course our brains would be more "complex" in the sense that the particular physical constitution of brains allows influence from the non-physical self).

And so the point of postulating a soul at all is what, exactly?

Of course. And thus under materialism there is no self which is the author of all these experiences. The self under materialism (and any position which holds that consciousness is wholly dictated by brain processes) does not exist but is merely an illusion brought about by successive similar psychological states from second to second.

There is no self that is the author under your metaphysic, either. You have said that the Metamind plays the external world on my senses. Any self I might have is at the mercy of the Metamind. I am a puppet.

Is this [Capgras Syndrome] kinda like "invasion of the body snatchers"?

Yes, it is.

http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/PICKOVER/pc/capgras.html

~~ Paul

 

[Z]

Not any machine that we could currently build, no. But it's silly to approach a philosophical argument on the basis of current technology. At least in theory, we could store a near-infinite amount of information in the quantum levels of a single electron in a single hydrogen atom (I'll leave the engineering details to you to work out), which certainly means that we could store enough information for a table-lookup approach to a finite game like chess or go. In fact, since there are really only 10^43 or so different chess positions, we could even go for a fairly gross kind of storage -- one atom, one position, one move -- and store the entire chess problem in only 10^16 tonnes of metallic hydrogen, an amount so small we could harvest it from the oceans of the Earth without having to look to other planets. (Again, I'll leave the engineering details to you).

Well yes.. for something like chess. But for regular life no. Not that we won't someday have memory capacities in machines capable of holding all that data... but who would take the time and effort to program it?

OK yeah - some geek in SoCal would. He'd spend fifty years programming the sum of human knowledge into it and then someone next door would make an actual learning machine and he'd feel like he wasted his life.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Um. Yes. Blindsight implies that you can see without your eyes - when you're blind. This is obviously not is what is meant, therefore "blind" is a metaphor.

No, blind is a complex word, because there are many ways to be blind. Blindsight shows that I can have no conscious visual processes, yet still be able to see and react. I am blind in one visual pathway, sighted in another.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't believe our physical bodies completely follow physical laws. There is an input from the self which guides much of our behaviour.

In which case something which is absolutely physically identical to us would not behave as we do. Indeed it would be a corpse. Thus a p-zombie would be nomonologically (physically) impossible.

How would the components of the brain that accept inputs from the self react when the self was turned off? Why can't we find these components? Why can't physics devise laws for the portions of our brains that aren't completely under the control of the known laws? What's the interface between the soul and the brain?

~~ Paul

 

[cpolk]

No, blind is a complex word, because there are many ways to be blind. Blindsight shows that I can have no conscious visual processes, yet still be able to see and react. I am blind in one visual pathway, sighted in another.

~~ Paul

blind ( P ) Pronunciation Key (blnd)
adj. blind·er, blind·est

a. Sightless.
b. Having a maximal visual acuity of the better eye, after correction by refractive lenses, of one-tenth normal vision or less (20/200 or less on the Snellen test).
c. Of, relating to, or for sightless persons.

www.dictionary.com

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.

Sure, when you admit that "sight" is also used as a metaphor.

Cpolk: Are you blind?

Blindsighted person: Yes and no.

Cpolk: Can you see?

Blindsighted person: I already answered that.

If I didn't know better, I'd infer that you think the only way a person is "really blind" is if their eyes don't work.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

blind ( P ) Pronunciation Key (blnd)
adj. blind·er, blind·est

a. Sightless.
b. Having a maximal visual acuity of the better eye, after correction by refractive lenses, of one-tenth normal vision or less (20/200 or less on the Snellen test).
c. Of, relating to, or for sightless persons.

www.dictionary.com

Just admit that "blind" is used as a metaphor and move on.

Is this person sightless? No. They can react to the movement of a visual stimulus. Do they have the same sight that you do? No. Neither does a color-blind person, and neither do I.

"Sight" is more complex than a yes-no proposition.

 

[Mercutio]

Um. Yes. Blindsight implies that you can see without your eyes - when you're blind. This is obviously not is what is meant, therefore "blind" is a metaphor.

No. Blindsight is defined as Paul and I have said. It is not "without your eyes". Please do not redefine words.

I have no doubt whatsoever that our sensory perception and brain react without the "I", such as when we touch something sharp or hot and jerk away before the "I" is aware of the sensation. That is not what I am disputing.

Nor is anyone else.

I am saying that the word "blind" is used as a metaphor. If you believe it is not, can you please provide evidence?

blindsight. it is a technical term.

 

[Mercutio]

Of course. And thus under materialism there is no self which is the author of all these experiences. The self under materialism (and any position which holds that consciousness is wholly dictated by brain processes) does not exist but is merely an illusion brought about by successive similar psychological states from second to second.

Correct.

Is this kinda like "invasion of the body snatchers"?

Did you look at those videos I linked? One of the presenters (I forget which one) actually made the "body snatchers" comparison, if I recall.