A problem with metaphysics

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The rather lengthy thread on science and materialism solidified an issue I've had with metaphysics for awhile. Before you can consider a metaphysical position, you have to define some terms. You have to be careful not to define the terms so as to beg the question (mind is separate from brain, thus requiring dualism). You also have to be careful not to define terms to reject the question (mind is brain function, thus disallowing dualism). It sometimes seems that this leaves you in the position of coming up with definitions that don't have much at all to do with the subject at hand.

For example, how can we define mind so that we can have a comparative discussion of metaphysical positions that doesn't immediately descend into chaos?

~~Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

For example, how can we define mind so that we can have a comparative discussion of metaphysical positions that doesn't immediately descend into chaos?

~~Paul

You have to start from everyday common-sense definitions of terms. This doesn't mean that you have to accept that those definitions are correct, but it does mean you have to be careful to justify why you have redefined the term, in order to make sure you are not rigging the terms so they suit your conclusion but no longer make sense.

In the case of mind, I believe my usage is completely justified and the definitions given by reductive materialists are simply dictionary-abuse. Nobody, when using the word "mind", actually means a bunch of brain processes. They might have a sneaking suspicion that "minds are really brain processes" but that doesn't mean this is what they are refering to when they say "mind". They aren't. That's why this particular redefinition causes so much angst. To people who aren't reductive (non-eliminative) materialists it just looks like naked question begging because there is a redefinition going on which helps to defend the materialists position but leaves the word refering to something it's simply not supposed to refer to. Which is why they then wheel out a logical argument to prove it's also incoherent.

You simply have to start from what words actually mean. It doesn't matter what words you use. For example, when I asked you to define your terms it made no difference to me whether you identified "physical" to mean "objects of my perception" or to mean "the nature of mind-independent reality". I was quite happy for you to define it as either of these. What I was not happy with was the definitions of both of these things as "physical" when there is an important difference between the two. So the actual terms don't matter. I don't care how they define their words as long as they define them clearly and use them consistently - the logic will work the same whatever words you define. What matters is that everybody knows what a particular term is supposed to mean and that this term always means that thing and isn't sometimes sneakily used to mean something else. This is exactly why I tried to force people into eliminativism. It does not matter how you define the terms for that particular argument as long the non-eliminative materialist isn't trying to use one word for two different referents or two words for the same referent. This is what happens with the word "mind". The reductive materialist wants to use "mind" to mean both what I mean and "brain processes", but can't logically explain whether these two usages are the same or different. At times, he wants them to be the same, at other times he wants them to be different - so he tries to hide the logical problem by defining his terms ambiguously (he may not even realise he is doing this). As soon as you force him to define his terms unambiguously and use them consistently, then a logical proof against non-eliminativism will rapidly follow.

I think it is neccesary to be quite careful with oneself, so you don't allow yourself to "beg the question" without realising you've done it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't think it's that simple, Geoff. There is no single common sense definition of lots of words we throw around in philosophy discussions. If people don't think mind means brain procsses, then what do they think it means?

Also, please leave your proof out of this discussion. I'm not convinced that your definitions of P1 and P2 are reasonable, or that they exhaust the possibilities. Leave this for the other thread.

~~Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't think it's that simple, Geoff. There is no single common sense definition of lots of words we throw around in philosophy discussions.

In which case we have to first determine what we mean and come to an agreement.

If people don't think mind means brain procsses, then what do they think it means?

They mean their minds, Paul. You know exactly what that word refers to, because that's why you find eliminative materialism absurd. If you really meant "brain processes" when you said "mind" you would find E.M. completely natural.

This is what I mean about being careful with yourself. You didn't need to ask this question.

 

[Skeptic]

For example, how can we... have a comparative discussion of metaphysical positions that doesn't immediately descend into chaos?

Mention Hitler and/or israel/Palestine.

That usually helps.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Actually this deserves a better answer. In a very important sense, you have arrived at the point Kant did, and you may now be better able to see why he did what he did. The abridged version of "A Critique of Pure Reason" is called "Prolegema to any future metaphysics". This book specifies transcendental idealism as a new position opposed to all three of the traditional (transcendental realist) ontologial positions and is designed precisely to solve this sort of problem. He wanted to change the emphasis of the question so instead of going round in circles or flipping backwards and forwards between materialism and idealism we asked ourselves upon what basis knowledge, and human cognition/experience were possible.

Here's his answer to the question "How is metaphysics possible", should you be interested.

http://www.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/phil 306/kant_materials/prolegomena8.htm

It's quite a struggle, so I'm not expecting you to read it but this bit is interesting:

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether, to avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always be metaphysics in the world; nay, every one, especially every man of reflection, will have it, and for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been called metaphysics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore a critique of pure reason itself must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want, which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge.