A problem with materialism

[Interesting Ian]

From here .

Another problem with materialism is that it ultimately leads to the denial of our knowledge of the external world. This is especially difficult for materialism, because the atoms and molecules that comprise the external world are the only entities that the materialist believes are real. The problem stems not from materialism per se, but with its corollary doctrine of sensationism, which says we can know things outside ourselves only via the five senses. If all our knowledge of the external world must come through the senses, we cannot know the external world as it is in itself at all, but only as it appears to us. The simple process of seeing an object across the room is a complex chain of physical and physiological events. Light rays ricochet from the object to the retinas of the eyes, and signals traverse the optic nerves towards the brain. At the end of the physical process, we have neurons firing in the brain. At each step, what actually occurs becomes less and less like the original object, or at least, further and further removed from it. Then, a miracle happens -- "a miracle," as Griffin quipped, "performed by an illusion."(177) The mind somehow extracts a reasonably accurate mental image of the external object from the firing neurons! The event is almost supernatural, because, for the materialist, the mind is but an epiphenomenon, a supervenient quality, or an outright illusion. Yet, it is able to fabricate an accurate picture of an external object from a bunch of firing neurons. This is an impressive feat, especially for something that does not actually exist, or, at the very most, exists without any power of causation.

Now if our illusory mind has the power to create mental images of physical objects from nerve impulses, why would it need the external objects in the first place? Who is to say that the mind is not dreaming or hallucinating the whole scene? Thus, our "knowledge" of the external world is reduced to speculation, and we have solipsism. (In fact, as I argue later, it becomes a solipsism of the present moment.) Reality, as molecules in motion and the physical laws the govern them, is lost completely. Given solipsism, we can ask, along with Berkeley, of what use is the concept of matter, an entity existing outside our perception of it? The only reality with which we have contact is our own mind, and we get idealism, materialism's exact opposite.

Does the foregoing consideration not make the materialist metaphysic a rather implausible hypothesis?

Comments please

 

[Silicon]

All that exists is matter and energy.

The rest is just opinion.

 

[Ratman_tf]

Comments please

The simple process of seeing an object across the room is a complex chain of physical and physiological events. Light rays ricochet from the object to the retinas of the eyes, and signals traverse the optic nerves towards the brain. At the end of the physical process, we have neurons firing in the brain. At each step, what actually occurs becomes less and less like the original object, or at least, further and further removed from it. Then, a miracle happens -- "a miracle," as Griffin quipped, "performed by an illusion."(177) The mind somehow extracts a reasonably accurate mental image of the external object from the firing neurons! The event is almost supernatural, because, for the materialist, the mind is but an epiphenomenon, a supervenient quality, or an outright illusion. Yet, it is able to fabricate an accurate picture of an external object from a bunch of firing neurons. This is an impressive feat, especially for something that does not actually exist, or, at the very most, exists without any power of causation.

Disagree. Perception can be acurate or inacurate depending on the knowledge and experience of the perciever. If I had never seen a stone before (quite a feat, but bear with me) I would have less of a 'perception' of said stone compared to a geologist, or a quarry worker. By only looking at the stone, I might conclude that it's a sugary confection, until I tired to eat it. Then my knowledge of the subject (and my perception of it.) would increase. (and my teeth might get chipped. )

So, I might see a sugary confection, while Mr. Quarry Worker sees a rock. But we'd both agree on it's inpalatability if we tried to take a bite out of it.

That's my take on it, anyway.

My 2 cents.

 

[Yahweh]

So, how does sensory representation of the external world = No external world/Solipsism?

And how do other apparently "less flawed" Philosophies get passed the problem the author is putting up for materialism?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Bah. That article doesn't understand the first thing about computer science, neurology, or cognitive psychology.

The "mind" does not construct a working model of the world from neuronal firing. The working model of the world is the neuronal firing.

Why don't we just go back to the argument that devices can't do arithmetic, because it requires a consciousness to know what rules to apply and when? Sheesh.

 

[Hexxenhammer]

More philosophical mental masturbation.

 

[!Xx+-Rational-+xX!]

Awareness is a delusion we are nothing but p-zombies and robots! Though skeptics have transcended the delusional aspects of awareness in a mundane way still reducible to material values!

There is no self we are constantly becoming different people with changing mental states! Atheists just happen to be at all times a vastly superior always changing sentient being, which is a whole lot better than being a consistently changing idiot (believers)!



It's a fact that everything is material! Studying the brain proves this because correlation proves the cause of the mind! Science tells us this!

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Does the foregoing consideration not make the materialist metaphysic a rather implausible hypothesis?

Metaphysical materialism is an implausible hypothesis. As are metaphysical idealism, metaphysical dualism, and all other metaphysical 'isms.

Another problem with materialism is that it ultimately leads to the denial of our knowledge of the external world. This is especially difficult for materialism, because the atoms and molecules that comprise the external world are the only entities that the materialist believes are real. The problem stems not from materialism per se, but with its corollary doctrine of sensationism, which says we can know things outside ourselves only via the five senses. If all our knowledge of the external world must come through the senses, we cannot know the external world as it is in itself at all, but only as it appears to us.

This is exactly why metaphysics is pointless. Pay attention, Ian. This is an argument about both epistemology and metaphysics, and is essentially the same thing I have been saying to you for a long time. Since our only source of knowledge is through our sensory perceptions, we cannot know the external world "as it is" (meaning metaphysically). This means that we cannot know whether it is metaphysically "material", "mental", dualistic, or something we never even thought of. All we can do is epistemologically study that sensory information.

The simple process of seeing an object across the room is a complex chain of physical and physiological events. Light rays ricochet from the object to the retinas of the eyes, and signals traverse the optic nerves towards the brain. At the end of the physical process, we have neurons firing in the brain. At each step, what actually occurs becomes less and less like the original object, or at least, further and further removed from it. Then, a miracle happens -- "a miracle," as Griffin quipped, "performed by an illusion."(177) The mind somehow extracts a reasonably accurate mental image of the external object from the firing neurons! The event is almost supernatural, because, for the materialist, the mind is but an epiphenomenon, a supervenient quality, or an outright illusion. Yet, it is able to fabricate an accurate picture of an external object from a bunch of firing neurons. This is an impressive feat, especially for something that does not actually exist, or, at the very most, exists without any power of causation.

Here we see quite clearly that the author is attacking some form of epiphenomenalism, which is a highly metaphysical position, and is not taken seriously by any modern scientists who are studying the mind. If you think Chalmer's is a materialist, then maybe this makes sense to you. But none of the materialists I know of consider epiphenomenalism to even be a coherent position, much less their position.

Now if our illusory mind has the power to create mental images of physical objects from nerve impulses, why would it need the external objects in the first place? Who is to say that the mind is not dreaming or hallucinating the whole scene? Thus, our "knowledge" of the external world is reduced to speculation, and we have solipsism. (In fact, as I argue later, it becomes a solipsism of the present moment.) Reality, as molecules in motion and the physical laws the govern them, is lost completely. Given solipsism, we can ask, along with Berkeley, of what use is the concept of matter, an entity existing outside our perception of it? The only reality with which we have contact is our own mind, and we get idealism, materialism's exact opposite.

He is correct in rejecting the metaphysical concept of matter. So do I. He seems to completely fail to realize that idealism makes just as many unverifiable, and thus unknowable, metaphysical assumptions. Unfortunately, he does not even seem to understand that his argument against epiphenomenalism is actually an argument against all metaphysical positions, nor does he seem to understand that abandoning metaphysics does not only leave us with solipsism. Epistemology does not require metaphysics.


Dr. Stupid

 

[anduin]

From here .
Another problem with materialism is that it ultimately leads to the denial of our knowledge of the external world. This is especially difficult for materialism, because the atoms and molecules that comprise the external world are the only entities that the materialist believes are real.

This is the statement at the heart of the comment, and it is a horrendous over-simplification of materialism. Materialism, put broadly, affirms that all phenomena are physical. Notice that the operative here is “physical”. In other words, any physical phenomenon is part of materialism. This is in no way reduced to “atoms and molecules” as the author says, but is also energy, space-time, particles, and any other physical effect.

Most attacks against materialism tend to miss this very basic definition, and the scenario described in the quote that you have provided is another straw man argment because it is attacking a view of materialism that doesn’t really exist.

If you want to read more about materialism and its many philosophical definitions, see here:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: A problem with materialism

This is the statement at the heart of the comment, and it is a horrendous over-simplification of materialism. Materialism, put broadly, affirms that all phenomena are physical. Notice that the operative here is “physical”. In other words, any physical phenomenon is part of materialism. This is in no way reduced to “atoms and molecules” as the author says, but is also energy, space-time, particles, and any other physical effect.

I agree.

Most attacks against materialism tend to miss this very basic definition, and the scenario described in the quote that you have provided is another straw man argment because it is attacking a view of materialism that doesn’t really exist.

But his simplification doesn't seem to me to be relevant. I have said essentially the same thing myself many times on here. All we know of the world is through our sensory perceptions. But the material world is not to be equated with such sensory perceptions. So the material world is something which we are not acquainted with. Its nature therefore is wholly mysterious. And it is the sole existent! Is this entirely satisfactory to you??

If you want to read more about materialism and its many philosophical definitions, see here:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html [/B]

Yes sure, will read it now.

Right it says:

So materialism has always inferred its theories from the best empirical evidence at hand and has as a result always had its metascientific hypotheses scientifically confirmed, because the basic assumption of valid science has also always been that nature is governed by coherent, discoverable physical laws. Indeed, the triumphs of science in the 20th century have been so stunning that today a majority of professional philosophers, at least in the English-speaking world, identify themselves as materialists of one kind or another

Unfortunately the stunning success of science has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with materialism. Science is more consonant with idealism.

Obviously, modern reductive and eliminative materialists are allies in believing, as pre-20th century materialists did, that science has always confirmed and will most probably always continue to confirm the basic hypotheses of materialist philosophy: that is, first, that all reality is essentially a material reality and that therefore, second, no supernatural or immaterial reality can exist;

This is a flat out lie. It's a completely unsubstantiated assertion. How can science confirm that there exists a wholly mysterious unknowable reality which moreover constitutes the totality of reality?? What complete and absolute nonsense.

The so-called mind-brain problem refers to the question of whether or not human consciousness is reducible in all respects to scientific laws. In the 1960s and 1970s those materialists who said it is, known as identity theorists (i.e. the mind is identical to the brain in all respects), were challenged by other materialists known as property dualists[7], functionalists[8], or supervenience[9] theorists. What all of these challengers had in common was a belief that in some way human consciousness was irreducible to or inexplicable in terms of natural processes[10]. They held, for example, that so-called qualia -- a person's experience of pain or of after-images of color, for example -- were unique to that person and incommunicable and unknowable to any one else. They argued further that such properties of consciousness as qualia could not be translated into the terms of physical science in any meaningful way and hence represented a reality not amenable to the laws of nature.

Functionalists consider that human consciousness is inexplicable in terms of natural processes?? First time I've heard of this. They simply define consciousness as functions.

To these objections, current eliminative and reductive materialists make the following reply. First of all, they argue that qualia, or the private feels of one's own experience, are no more incorrigible -- no more infallibly known by the individual -- than one's experience of the external world[12]. One's body and brain is just as likely to misrepresent internal as external experience. Pain can be anaesthetized and disappear, even though the same knife continues to cut your skin. One can hallucinate colors privately as well as publicly, and in fact the brain's moment-to-moment reconstruction of the external world is arguably just as private an experience as that of one's qualia, yet no one claims one's knowledge of the external world is infallible or incorrigible.

This is so completely wrong I scarcely know where to start! It's completely wrong headed from start to finish! The fact that our knowledge of the external world might be "wrong" is neither here nor there. He's clearly talking about some abstract external world which no-one ever directly experiences, but which we build up and infer from our collective experiences, and which people refer to as a material reality. But we have absolutely no reason to suppose this abstract external world actually exists. Anyway, none of this entails that our experience of that external world is not incorrigible. Indeed, I don't know what it could possibly mean to claim otherwise. How can my experience of the external world be in error??? My experience, is my experience, is my experience. It is literally incoherent to say that my experience is in error. You could only say it is in error by hypothesising this wholly unknowable abstract reality

And really none of this has anything to do with qualia anyway. There is no real abstract qualia which my personal qualia is supposed to represent, and therefore my particular raw experience at any particular time cannot be said to be in error. Indeed the author seems to fail to understand what is meant by qualia. Take my experience of redness. What could it conceivably mean to say that it is in error?? I have never read such unadulterated complete and utter nonsense in my life!!

Since how the brain actually works is today one of the least-understood and most hotly-debated subjects in science, I'd like to explain briefly the most promising of these theories and in the process finish my discussion of philosophical materialism.

It doesn't matter how the brain works. It cannot achieve the miraculous and explain consciousness.

How can something oblivious of the world become conscious of the world? Though theoretical neuroscience is still in its infancy, furiously boiling with new ideas, some likely answers are emerging from the steam. One promising theory is that networks of neurons in the brain consist of subsidiary groups of neurons or even individual neurons that serve as the axes of a multi-dimensional system of coordinates that can mathematically translate one kind of value to another kind of value. For example, someone sees an apple hanging from a tree. His brain locates the apple in an abstract visual space calculated in terms of how many degrees above a distant horizon the apple is, how close to him the focusing of his eyes tells him the apple is, and so on. But in order to pick the apple, his brain must translate its abstract visual calculation of the apple's location into an abstract motor-muscular space which will tell the muscles of his arm at which angle they will have to set themselves in order to approach the apple. What happens here, it is theorized, is that an array of neuronal networks transforms the values of his visual space into those of his motor space by means of a mathematical tensor, or formula, that translates the multi-dimensional coordinates, or vectors, of visual space into the vectors of motor space -- all the angles of sight are translated into angles of arm-bending. Although it does not seem so to the person reaching for the apple, his behavior is the result of a vast number of mathematical computations in his brain, which, because of its parallel computing capacity, it is able to carry out almost instantly.

I'm sorry, how is this supposed to lead to consciousness?? Why does the author believe it will lead to any more than a p-zombie??

The biggest complaint I have of this article is that the author is identifying materialism with scientific progress. It would be more plausible if I identified Berkeleyian subjective idealism with the progress of science.


Anyway anduin, you have not addressed the point made by the author I originally quoted. How is his conclusion in error?

 

[Interesting Ian]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Does the foregoing consideration not make the materialist metaphysic a rather implausible hypothesis?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Metaphysical materialism is an implausible hypothesis. As are metaphysical idealism, metaphysical dualism, and all other metaphysical 'isms.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another problem with materialism is that it ultimately leads to the denial of our knowledge of the external world. This is especially difficult for materialism, because the atoms and molecules that comprise the external world are the only entities that the materialist believes are real. The problem stems not from materialism per se, but with its corollary doctrine of sensationism, which says we can know things outside ourselves only via the five senses. If all our knowledge of the external world must come through the senses, we cannot know the external world as it is in itself at all, but only as it appears to us.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



This is exactly why metaphysics is pointless.

No, it's just very difficult. Try to understand the difference.

Anyway, this is what materialism entails. So if it's pointless, then so is materialism

Pay attention, Ian. This is an argument about both epistemology and metaphysics, and is essentially the same thing I have been saying to you for a long time.

I know what you've been saying to me. And you completely fail to understand that materialism is an ontological position. This is inconsistent with some of your other claims such that consciousness is reducible to the physical.

Since our only source of knowledge is through our sensory perceptions, we cannot know the external world "as it is" (meaning metaphysically). This means that we cannot know whether it is metaphysically "material", "mental", dualistic, or something we never even thought of. All we can do is epistemologically study that sensory information.

Can we know that there is something beyond our sense experiences?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The simple process of seeing an object across the room is a complex chain of physical and physiological events. Light rays ricochet from the object to the retinas of the eyes, and signals traverse the optic nerves towards the brain. At the end of the physical process, we have neurons firing in the brain. At each step, what actually occurs becomes less and less like the original object, or at least, further and further removed from it. Then, a miracle happens -- "a miracle," as Griffin quipped, "performed by an illusion."(177) The mind somehow extracts a reasonably accurate mental image of the external object from the firing neurons! The event is almost supernatural, because, for the materialist, the mind is but an epiphenomenon, a supervenient quality, or an outright illusion. Yet, it is able to fabricate an accurate picture of an external object from a bunch of firing neurons. This is an impressive feat, especially for something that does not actually exist, or, at the very most, exists without any power of causation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Here we see quite clearly that the author is attacking some form of epiphenomenalism, which is a highly metaphysical position, and is not taken seriously by any modern scientists who are studying the mind.

I do not believe he is necessarily using the word epiphenomenon in the sense of epiphenomenalism. He's simply stating that mind is not a reality in its own right. I feel he was ill-advised to use the word epiphenomenon.

If you think Chalmer's is a materialist, then maybe this makes sense to you. But none of the materialists I know of consider epiphenomenalism to even be a coherent position, much less their position.

I don't believe any materialist based metaphysic to be a coherent position. This includes epiphenomenalism, eliminitivism, reductive materialism, functionalism, or whatever.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now if our illusory mind has the power to create mental images of physical objects from nerve impulses, why would it need the external objects in the first place? Who is to say that the mind is not dreaming or hallucinating the whole scene? Thus, our "knowledge" of the external world is reduced to speculation, and we have solipsism. (In fact, as I argue later, it becomes a solipsism of the present moment.) Reality, as molecules in motion and the physical laws the govern them, is lost completely. Given solipsism, we can ask, along with Berkeley, of what use is the concept of matter, an entity existing outside our perception of it? The only reality with which we have contact is our own mind, and we get idealism, materialism's exact opposite.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



He is correct in rejecting the metaphysical concept of matter. So do I. He seems to completely fail to realize that idealism makes just as many unverifiable, and thus unknowable, metaphysical assumptions.

Oh? That's interesting. Please do enlighten me. What unknowable metaphysical assumptions does idealism make?

Unfortunately, he does not even seem to understand that his argument against epiphenomenalism is actually an argument against all metaphysical positions, nor does he seem to understand that abandoning metaphysics does not only leave us with solipsism. Epistemology does not require metaphysics.

In common with anduin and everyone else who has responded on this thread, you have failed to address the authors argument. How can materialism justify the existence of a material world?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

This is exactly why metaphysics is pointless.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No, it's just very difficult. Try to understand the difference.

So you disagree with the claim that our only source of information about anything is our senses? If not, then clearly obtaining knowledge about metaphysical things is not just difficult, but impossible. If you do think there are other sources of information, then perhaps you would like to give a demonstration?

Anyway, this is what materialism entails. So if it's pointless, then so is materialism

No, this is what metaphysical materialism entails, and I agree it is pointless. But your stubborn refusal to accept that most people who call themselves materialists are not referring to the same thing by that term that you are, does not automagically make epistemological materialism a metaphysical position. And you continued insistence on claiming that this is what materialists actually believe, when you know perfectly well that it is not, just demonstrates your immense intellectual dishonesty.

Pay attention, Ian. This is an argument about both epistemology and metaphysics, and is essentially the same thing I have been saying to you for a long time.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I know what you've been saying to me. And you completely fail to understand that materialism is an ontological position.

What you call materialism is an ontological position. I completely understand that. I have told you many times, that I do not subscribe to that philosophy. Enough with the strawmen already.

This is inconsistent with some of your other claims such that consciousness is reducible to the physical.

I have also explained to you many times that I only making a claim about explanatory, or epistemological reductionism, not ontological or metaphysical reductionism. Again, enough with the dishonesty.

Since our only source of knowledge is through our sensory perceptions, we cannot know the external world "as it is" (meaning metaphysically). This means that we cannot know whether it is metaphysically "material", "mental", dualistic, or something we never even thought of. All we can do is epistemologically study that sensory information.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Can we know that there is something beyond our sense experiences?

Of course we can. We can never obtain absolute certainty, but we can certainly construct a purely epistemological framework which allows us to conclude that our sensory experiences are explainable in terms of interactions between our minds, and a larger world which our minds are a part of. It just does not allow us to claim to know anything about this world that does not express itself via those sensory experiences. In other words, we cannot know anything about purely metaphysical entities.

The simple process of seeing an object across the room is a complex chain of physical and physiological events. Light rays ricochet from the object to the retinas of the eyes, and signals traverse the optic nerves towards the brain. At the end of the physical process, we have neurons firing in the brain. At each step, what actually occurs becomes less and less like the original object, or at least, further and further removed from it. Then, a miracle happens -- "a miracle," as Griffin quipped, "performed by an illusion."(177) The mind somehow extracts a reasonably accurate mental image of the external object from the firing neurons! The event is almost supernatural, because, for the materialist, the mind is but an epiphenomenon, a supervenient quality, or an outright illusion. Yet, it is able to fabricate an accurate picture of an external object from a bunch of firing neurons. This is an impressive feat, especially for something that does not actually exist, or, at the very most, exists without any power of causation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Here we see quite clearly that the author is attacking some form of epiphenomenalism, which is a highly metaphysical position, and is not taken seriously by any modern scientists who are studying the mind.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I do not believe he is necessarily using the word epiphenomenon in the sense of epiphenomenalism. He's simply stating that mind is not a reality in its own right. I feel he was ill-advised to use the word epiphenomenon.

He specifically stated that, at most, it exists without any power of causation. That is epiphenomenalism, and furthermore, is a claim which no materialist I have ever heard of, supports.

He is correct in rejecting the metaphysical concept of matter. So do I. He seems to completely fail to realize that idealism makes just as many unverifiable, and thus unknowable, metaphysical assumptions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Oh? That's interesting. Please do enlighten me. What unknowable metaphysical assumptions does idealism make?

It makes several.

1) It assumes that reality is fundamentally mental, that is that everything that exists is ontologically reducible to mind.

2) It assumes that no other ontological existants could possible exist.

And every specific form of it I have ever heard of makes additional metaphysical assumptions, such as the existence of a metamind, or that human minds create the rest of reality.

In common with anduin and everyone else who has responded on this thread, you have failed to address the authors argument. How can materialism justify the existence of a material world?

The author has attacked a position I do not hold, so the point is moot. Nobody here (that I know of) is a metaphysical materialist, nor an epiphenomenalist. If you want somebody to try to defend the position he has attacked, go find somebody who actually thinks it is a defensible position.


Dr. Stupid

 

[anduin]

Re: Re: Re: A problem with materialism

But his simplification doesn't seem to me to be relevant. I have said essentially the same thing myself many times on here. All we know of the world is through our sensory perceptions. But the material world is not to be equated with such sensory perceptions. So the material world is something which we are not acquainted with. Its nature therefore is wholly mysterious. And it is the sole existent! Is this entirely satisfactory to you??

It is, because our perceptions are a result of the material world, and they are part of it. Consciousness is caused by the material world, just like light and sound are caused by the physical world, our thoughts and perception then are part of it.

Unfortunately the stunning success of science has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with materialism. Science is more consonant with idealism.

Hogwash. Science and the scientific method are one with materialism because they study the effects of the physical world. This is the very definition of materialism.

I will not defend the article as it was not my intention to offer it as a refutation of the one you posted, I only offered it as a more comprehensive definition of different types of materialism. More sites are more detailed:

http://www.materialism-1.com/
http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MATERIALISM_MIND.html
http://faculty.washington.edu/himma/phil463/fodor.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

This is offered because the vviews in the article that you posted were completely simplified.

It doesn't matter how the brain works. It cannot achieve the miraculous and explain consciousness.

This is just an argument from ignorance. There is a growing body of evidence that supports the fact that conciousness is directly caused by the brain, evidenced by the many anomalous phenomena that are experienced by those with brain damage. For more on this, I recommend "Phantoms in the Brain" by V.S. Ramachandran.

Anyway anduin, you have not addressed the point made by the author I originally quoted. How is his conclusion in error?

The first problem with the article that you cited is that it was a straw man argument. It attacked a version of materialism that does not exist. But I will criticise it in more detail. To me this is the vital argument:

Materialism is the only worldview that seems to conflict with the evidence for mental healing directly, because, at least under most formulations, materialism denies that the phenomena observed can occur.

This is utterly wrong. The placebo effect can be true and materialism can be true as well. The author relies on his straw man view of materialism to knock it down. The problem is that the author suffers from your same problem, and it is that it fails to recognise that many of the phenomena that are being offered as examples are not understood yet, but then the author goes on to assume that if neuroscience cannot explain how it happens, then materialism has to be wrong.

This is of course ludicrous, and it is common of those who attack science. We still do not know for sure how gravity works, but it would be ridiculous to assume that only because we don't know how it works, science must be wrong and it is probably caused by some paranormal effect. This is precisely what the author is doing when he says that:

To demonstrate adequacy, one would have to explain how the brain actually accomplishes these things. The difficulty of explaining all mental functions in terms of the brain has been one of the major problems with materialism from the outset.

This is common throughout this article. The article first assumes that some phenomena are true, and then offers that because they cannot be explained, they refute materialism, which is entirely wrong. If the phenomena described really exist, then science must find the causes and adjust the existing theories to accommodate the evidence in another scientific paradigm.

I am sorry but I am not particularly impressed with this simple-minded and misinformed refutation, I have read much better ones.

 

[anduin]

Ian,
The author has attacked a position I do not hold, so the point is moot. Nobody here (that I know of) is a metaphysical materialist, nor an epiphenomenalist. If you want somebody to try to defend the position he has attacked, go find somebody who actually thinks it is a defensible position.
Dr. Stupid

I agree. I notice that Ian is very fond of using strawmen arguments, he appears to be in some sort of philosophical warp time, it is typical of paranormalists to ignore all recent debates and discussions and attack opinions that almost nobody holds anymore. He also appears to have missed the last 20 years of neuroscience research.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: A problem with materialism

Re: Re: Re: A problem with materialism

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Interesting Ian

But his simplification doesn't seem to me to be relevant. I have said essentially the same thing myself many times on here. All we know of the world is through our sensory perceptions. But the material world is not to be equated with such sensory perceptions. So the material world is something which we are not acquainted with. Its nature therefore is wholly mysterious. And it is the sole existent! Is this entirely satisfactory to you??

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------





It is, because our perceptions are a result of the material world, and they are part of it. Consciousness is caused by the material world, just like light and sound are caused by the physical world, our thoughts and perception then are part of it.

Well not just like it. Light and sound can be detected, consciousness cannot be. A huge difference I think

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unfortunately the stunning success of science has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with materialism. Science is more consonant with idealism.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Hogwash.

LOL What?? We now see how completely hopelessly clueless you really are

Science and the scientific method are one with materialism because they study the effects of the physical world. This is the very definition of materialism.

The very definition of materialism is the effects of the physical world?? And what, pray, is the "physical world" when it's all at home?? A more circular definition one could not hope to find!

I will not defend the article as it was not my intention to offer it as a refutation of the one you posted, I only offered it as a more comprehensive definition of different types of materialism. More sites are more detailed:

http://www.materialism-1.com/
http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MATERIALISM_MIND.html
http://faculty.washington.edu/himma/phil463/fodor.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

Oh dear me! I comprehensively refute the nonsense that you linked to, and you provide umpteen more links How pathetic can you get??

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It doesn't matter how the brain works. It cannot achieve the miraculous and explain consciousness.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



This is just an argument from ignorance.

Nope, I'm afraid not. Allow me to repeat what I have said on the subject before.

What we need to do is take a look at materialism to see if it is internally consistent. Now the particular question I would like to address is why should we suppose that other peoples’ bodies are "inhabited" by conscious minds (or why phenomenal consciousness is associated with brains). Your argument no doubt will be that materialism stipulates this to be so; it is an axiomatic premise of materialism. But this makes your definition of materialism an arbitrary one. A metaphysic which glosses over awkward facts. Allow me to explain.

It seems to me that materialism should stipulate that the physical exhausts reality. That once we have completely described the Universe in physical terms then we have said all that can be said about the Universe or reality.

But what is the physical? It seems to me that it should be everything, that, at least in principle, can be observed by anyone with appropriate faculties and suitable instruments. In other words all that is objective exists, or to put it another way, all that is discernable from the third person perspective exists. This will also include things which can only be indirectly seen (although strictly speaking I reject the direct/indirect dichotomy). This then includes such entities as electrons, because although they can only be "indirectly" seen they nevertheless play fruitful roles in our theories describing the world ie we need to hypothesise electrons in order to explain certain aspects of reality.

Now there is something peculiar about conscious experience which marks it off from all other existents. It is simply this. It cannot be observed or detected by anyone with appropriate faculties and/or suitable instruments! Thus according to my prior definition of the physical it is not a physical existent. Thus I may have toothache to take an arbitrary example. But you cannot observe that toothache, all you can observe is the effects of the toothache, the grimace of pain for example. Conscious experiences in other words are irreducibly private.

Now you will no doubt say that by observing the grimace, or at least by observing the neurons fire, then you are observing the toothache since materialism holds that the toothache and its neural correlates are one and the same thing, or at least aspects of the same thing. But an objective examination of this toothache will necessarily leave out the subjective irreducibly sensation of pain. The actually sensation of pain does not figure into the physical facts about the pain according to our prior definition of the physical. Nor can we infer the sensation of pain since, unlike an electron, the (phenomenological) pain does not play a part in any description of our behaviour. The pain per se cannot play a part because pain per se is not part of the objective publically accessible realm. Only the neural correlates of the pain can play any fruitful role in our theories.

In short then either a materialist has to concede his metaphysic is internally inconsistent, or he must arbitrarily include phenomenological consciousness within his world picture. But if he opts for the latter then the whole prima facie plausibility of his world view crumbles away. No longer can he say that for something to exist it must be in principle be directly observable or play a fruitful role in some theory about the world, because this then necessarily precludes phenomenological consciousness. He
has to expand the notion of the physical to even include things that cannot be directly or even indirectly detected, even in principle!

This is what materialism entails and is just one of many reasons why we should reject this metaphysic.

There is a growing body of evidence that supports the fact that conciousness is directly caused by the brain, evidenced by the many anomalous phenomena that are experienced by those with brain damage. For more on this, I recommend "Phantoms in the Brain" by V.S. Ramachandran.

The evidence does not establish that consciousness originates from the brain. It does not establish a causal link either if you would take the time to try and understand what causality means. See my argument above regarding materialism. All we can say is that the brain modifies conscious states. OK, that's fine. To suppose only the brain generates consciousness hypothesis is consonant with this data, demonstrates your lack of imagination.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Anyway anduin, you have not addressed the point made by the author I originally quoted. How is his conclusion in error?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The first problem with the article that you cited is that it was a straw man argument. It attacked a version of materialism that does not exist.

What other versions of materialism could they conceivably be?? Please answer. I challenge you to refute the arguemnt posed. I don't believe you can do it. Prove me wrong.

OK, let's see what else you have to say.

But I will criticise it in more detail. To me this is the vital argument:

Materialism is the only worldview that seems to conflict with the evidence for mental healing directly, because, at least under most formulations, materialism denies that the phenomena observed can occur.

This is utterly wrong. The placebo effect can be true and materialism can be true as well.

This isn't in what I quoted and therefore is not relevant. Personnally I doubt that materialism can accommodate the placebo effect, but this was not the argument.

I'm extremely disappointed in you anduin. Your arrogance is seriously at odds with your intelligence and understanding.

The author relies on his straw man view of materialism to knock it down. The problem is that the author suffers from your same problem, and it is that it fails to recognise that many of the phenomena that are being offered as examples are not understood yet, but then the author goes on to assume that if neuroscience cannot explain how it happens, then materialism has to be wrong.

I certainly do not agree with everything he says, so please do not claim our views are identical. I agree with the bit that I quoted.

And get it through your head.

Consciousness is not the type of existent that can be physically scientifically explained. I have my arguments to back this up. Refute them if you can

This is of course ludicrous, and it is common of those who attack science.

LMAO!! No, trust me, I think science is wonderful. But it sure as hell don't give any support for materialism

Don't believe me??

Then show I'm wrong

We still do not know for sure how gravity works,

There is no such thing as the existent "gravity", dimwit. It is simply a mathematical device in order to compartmentalise reality so as we can understand it. There is no such thing as the existent gravity in the world.

but it would be ridiculous to assume that only because we don't know how it works, science must be wrong and it is probably caused by some paranormal effect. This is precisely what the author is doing when he says that:

WOW! You really must be desperate dragging the paranormal into this. Dear me!

To demonstrate adequacy, one would have to explain how the brain actually accomplishes these things. The difficulty of explaining all mental functions in terms of the brain has been one of the major problems with materialism from the outset.

This is common throughout this article. The article first assumes that some phenomena are true, and then offers that because they cannot be explained, they refute materialism, which is entirely wrong. If the phenomena described really exist, then science must find the causes and adjust the existing theories to accommodate the evidence in another scientific paradigm.

Yeah sure. What the hell has the materialist metaphysic have to do with anything??

I am sorry but I am not particularly impressed with this simple-minded and misinformed refutation, I have read much better ones.

Well anduin, you don't really seem to comprehend a great deal. So what you consider to be impressive arguments or not impressive arguments, really means jack sh!t No??

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
Ian,
The author has attacked a position I do not hold, so the point is moot. Nobody here (that I know of) is a metaphysical materialist, nor an epiphenomenalist. If you want somebody to try to defend the position he has attacked, go find somebody who actually thinks it is a defensible position.
Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I agree.

Get your bum against the wall Stimp!

I notice that Ian is very fond of using strawmen arguments, he appears to be in some sort of philosophical warp time, it is typical of paranormalists to ignore all recent debates and discussions and attack opinions that almost nobody holds anymore. He also appears to have missed the last 20 years of neuroscience research.

So, science can produce the miraculous.

Get it though your head that science only deals with the objective world; that which can have an effect in terms of the 3rd person perspective. It cannot in prionciple distinguish between real people and p-zombies. How came you and Stimp and others are too stuopid to understand this??

 

[Interesting Ian]

I agree. I notice that Ian is very fond of using strawmen arguments, he appears to be in some sort of philosophical warp time, it is typical of paranormalists to ignore all recent debates and discussions and attack opinions that almost nobody holds anymore. He also appears to have missed the last 20 years of neuroscience research.

Hmmmmm

Let's see now. Either our sensory perceptions are to be equated with the external world, or they are not.

Yes?

If the former, this is idealism.

If the latter, then you are advocating a reality, which we are not, in an immediate sense, directly acquainted with. This is certainly a very dodgy ontological commitment (yes Stimp, that's right!, ontological! LOL).

One wonders how your science allows you to subscribe to a highly questionable ontological position? Scientific progress?? Well no. If you think this, then you fail to understand what science is about. Science is concerned with the information presented to our senses. Not the experiencer who has such experiences, nor to any putative reality supposedly responsible for such experiences.

It becomes rather tedious to belabour the obvious.

Stimp and auduin, your metaphysic cannot be justified by science, and considered from a philosophical basis, is unintelligible.

Don't worry, you can still both be robots.

And have a nice time together

Just subscribe to naturalism.

Materialism though?? Nope, afraid not

 

[!Xx+-Rational-+xX!]

Critical thinking reveals the truth of reality albeit a reality necessitating scientific materialism!


!Xx+-Rational-+xX! has found irrefutable proof of materialism! I'm talking about frickin infallible proof! Even the immaterialists will become fanatical debunkers after seeing this one! PROOF...!

http://www.abarnett.demon.co.uk/atheism/brain.html

OMG (god doesn't exist because of science)! That really is infallible proof! It proves that correlation is cause! Like what has been proven through hard evidence in that infallible article if 2 things are correlated they must be exactly the same thing! Proving materialism!

There is nothing else to say! I have just ended the mind/brain debate! The proof has been established!

Nobody can question this evidence that I have shown!

Science has been searching for proof of materialism for centuries and I have just found it! It has now been scientifically shown that there is no soul!

http://www.abarnett.demon.co.uk/atheism/brain.html
http://www.abarnett.demon.co.uk/atheism/brain.html
http://www.abarnett.demon.co.uk/atheism/brain.html

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

This is utterly pointless, Ian. You are clearly not listening to a word any of us say. You quote our statements, and then write replies to them, but your replies have nothing to do with our statements, and attack positions we have just said we don't hold.

If you want to argue about the validity of metaphysical materialism or epiphenomenalism, go find somebody who believes in that crap to argue with.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

This is utterly pointless, Ian. You are clearly not listening to a word any of us say. You quote our statements, and then write replies to them, but your replies have nothing to do with our statements, and attack positions we have just said we don't hold.

If you want to argue about the validity of metaphysical materialism or epiphenomenalism, go find somebody who believes in that crap to argue with.


Dr. Stupid

Do you agree that materialism asserts the existence of a material world and that it comprises the totality of reality?

I don't think you do. I think you're basically espousing naturalism.

I demand to know why you describe your position as materialism rather than naturalism.