A Philosophy Professor Discusses Ayn Rand in his Ethics Class

[shuttlt]

It says to sell them (or the rights to use them), and once they are in private hands, the owners will have an incentive to protect them. In such a scheme, someone could, say, buy the rights to fish a particular area of water in perpetuity, and thus would have an incentive not to overfish 'their' water. Of course, policing the boundaries of that water could be tricky.

This sounds tricky. Surely most of the wildlife in the area wouldn't be worth a crap commercially. You might also find that allowing people to dump toxic waste in your area of ocean was more profitable if the fishing wasn't good. Surely you'd need a heck of a lot of regulation to monitor/manage all this?

 

[Mister Agenda]

Thank you for a clear explanation. I clipped just this first part to address what I see as a fundamental problem. You might be able to clear it up.

When we are talking about "rational self interest" I thought I knew what that meant in measurable terms. But now, it seems as if you are saying that internally generated values can set the meter for the self-interest payoff. Which makes me think that underlying the rational bit is an irrational value setting exercise.

Even when (in the part I clipped) you distinguish between needs and wants, I am left wondering why, if self-generated values are the standard, an appeal to life itself isn't merely to a common value and one which I very well may not think much of? Are you claiming there are rationally generated universals hidden somewhere in there that I can base the rational part of my rational self interest on?

The meta exercise here for me is whether or not objectivism can be communicated to another (me) since it is, well, an appeal to an objective standard -- or do I have that wrong?

That's a really good question, and I think the meat of Objectivism when it comes to ethics is that is says you don't have the right to prevent someone from doing something that doesn't harm someone else. An Objectivist probably wouldn't like to admit that their values and what gives them satisfaction can't be grounded in Objectivist philosophical issues, but ethically, under Objectivism, it doesn't matter why you vaue something, it matters whether you are compelled to act as if you value it when you don't. As another poster noted, 'Objectivism' may be a misnomer, as it seems to only apply to the axiom that 'reality is objectively real'.

 

[marplots]

That's a really good question, and I think the meat of Objectivism when it comes to ethics is that is says you don't have the right to prevent someone from doing something that doesn't harm someone else. An Objectivist probably wouldn't like to admit that their values and what gives them satisfaction can't be grounded in Objectivist philosophical issues, but ethically, under Objectivism, it doesn't matter why you vaue something, it matters whether you are compelled to act as if you value it when you don't.

I think there is a further difficulty. Values are transient. I may value something highly at one point and abandon it at another. But the compulsion to act (for example, as made concrete in a contract) might extend past the boundaries of my original values.

Perhaps I shall commit to give you my kidney in five years, provided you finance my college education, which I value quite highly. However, after obtaining my degree in Philosophical Urban Studies, I have come to realize I no longer value the education I received very much and my kidney is now prized because of it's wonderful beer filtering capabilities.

Outside of the practical matters of contract law, this points up how a mismatch can occur as values change. We tend to think of values as either more permanent than they have to be or applicable in the near term, two properties that may not hold. This also arises in "social contract" situations when I no longer believe that supporting my children is worthwhile (the little monsters!) but society and law tells me I must.

One of the benefits of the collective should be a set of rules that apply to all and that all can follow or understand the consequences of not following them.

 

[Mister Agenda]

This sounds tricky. Surely most of the wildlife in the area wouldn't be worth a crap commercially. You might also find that allowing people to dump toxic waste in your area of ocean was more profitable if the fishing wasn't good. Surely you'd need a heck of a lot of regulation to monitor/manage all this?

It doesn't just SOUND tricky. However, in the example I was using, it was just fishing rights that were sold, not dumping rights. If you only have fishing rights, you're likely to bring dumping in your waters to the attention of the authorities very quickly.

I wouldn't say I'm an O'ist, more of a classic liberal, but I did study it carefully decades ago. An O'ist might say someone should own that section of ocean for all purposes, but I don't see any need to, uh, go overboard with that. I don't see anything wrong with tailoring the incentives to get environmentally or socially-desireable outcomes. I suppose you could say that I'm in favor of capitalism, but see the value of gently nudging it in the direction we (collectively) want to go.

 

[Mister Agenda]

I think there is a further difficulty. Values are transient. I may value something highly at one point and abandon it at another. But the compulsion to act (for example, as made concrete in a contract) might extend past the boundaries of my original values.

Perhaps I shall commit to give you my kidney in five years, provided you finance my college education, which I value quite highly. However, after obtaining my degree in Philosophical Urban Studies, I have come to realize I no longer value the education I received very much and my kidney is now prized because of it's wonderful beer filtering capabilities.

Outside of the practical matters of contract law, this points up how a mismatch can occur as values change. We tend to think of values as either more permanent than they have to be or applicable in the near term, two properties that may not hold. This also arises in "social contract" situations when I no longer believe that supporting my children is worthwhile (the little monsters!) but society and law tells me I must.

One of the benefits of the collective should be a set of rules that apply to all and that all can follow or understand the consequences of not following them.

O'ists are all about adhering to contracts. If it's an obligation you entered into freely, it's binding. While your values may have changed, you are now in a position to harm someone else by not fulfilling your obligation in good faith. A similar situation applies to the raising of your own children, particulary in an age when having them is a choice.

 

[Mister Agenda]

I'm getting confused. Situations keep being brought up where people do bad things and it is in their interests to pay for what they have done because of externally imposed consequences. Surely one of the places ethics comes in is when the possibility of doing bad things and getting away with it is available. If it's in my companies interest to pollute and I'm confident I can get away with it, perhaps because I don't think anybody will find out, or because I'm sufficiently well connected, what is the objectivist position on that? Is it good or bad ethically to harm other people if you can get away with it?

In O'ism, it is wrong to harm other people, period, except in defense or retaliation. Which is where they start to get into weird taxation conundrums.

 

[marplots]

O'ists are all about adhering to contracts. If it's an obligation you entered into freely, it's binding. While your values may have changed, you are now in a position to harm someone else by not fulfilling your obligation in good faith. A similar situation applies to the raising of your own children, particulary in an age when having them is a choice.

I think I've heard this before. What I've never heard is the basis for this part: "If it's an obligation you entered into freely, it's binding." Why should that be?

I don't mean that facetiously. How is it that I can simultaneously act in my own self interest and be bound by a contract that now seems to be against my self interest? To make it work, I have to invoke a higher power or principle -- one that trumps what should be an individual's own sense of moral right. How is it that what is moral (acting in my own self interest) in one case is now immoral because we have a document before us?

 

[Mister Agenda]

I think I've heard this before. What I've never heard is the basis for this part: "If it's an obligation you entered into freely, it's binding." Why should that be?

I don't mean that facetiously. How is it that I can simultaneously act in my own self interest and be bound by a contract that now seems to be against my self interest? To make it work, I have to invoke a higher power or principle -- one that trumps what should be an individual's own sense of moral right. How is it that what is moral (acting in my own self interest) in one case is now immoral because we have a document before us?

Because your self-interest is not the governing moral principle of O'ism. Not harming others is. If I've taken your money and fail to give you what I promised in exchange, I've harmed you. I don't have the right to do that.

 

[marplots]

Because your self-interest is not the governing moral principle of O'ism. Not harming others is. If I've taken your money and fail to give you what I promised in exchange, I've harmed you. I don't have the right to do that.

Thanks. Now I have to think more.

 

[shuttlt]

In O'ism, it is wrong to harm other people, period, except in defense or retaliation. Which is where they start to get into weird taxation conundrums.

interesting. thank you.

 

[Akri]

In O'ism, it is wrong to harm other people, period, except in defense or retaliation. Which is where they start to get into weird taxation conundrums.

That's not entirely true. You can also harm people if they've consented to it (but we're talking actual consent here, not consent through coercion or similar).

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Well, this thread certainly took off. See what happens when you remove Rand as the subject of conversation? Imagine how much more productive discussions could be if you never invoked her at all!

Why didn't John Galt take Wesley Mouche's job?

No. After the hissy fit you threw on the first page to get us posing specific things we find at fault, I'll thank you to have the courtesy to respond to them directly. To marplots, at least; I've been talking to Akri, with whom it's becoming increasingly hard not to reference Gaetan's long-running clusterthread, wherein the world will be perfect with his no-money system and anyone who may abuse it doesn't count because they have no place in his perfect world.

Because your self-interest is not the governing moral principle of O'ism. Not harming others is. If I've taken your money and fail to give you what I promised in exchange, I've harmed you. I don't have the right to do that.

Considering the one-sided nature of most contracts today, being in them is quite often harmful in itself. "Coercion" is not an imaginary term, and funnily enough it pairs very well with "monopoly." Do you think we can expect Objectivist courts to rule egregious contracts void? I'm not talking first born children or kidneys here, just simple extortion.

 

[Mister Agenda]

As I understand it, being extorted into signing a contract would void it at the least, and probably incur damages on the extorter.

 

[Earthborn]

That's not entirely true. You can also harm people if they've consented to it (but we're talking actual consent here, not consent through coercion or similar).

That raises the questions: would a "rational self-interested person" ever consent to be harmed?

If so, doesn't that mean the "harm" done to this person is actually something they value and therefore no harm at all? If someone wants to be hurt, and you hurt them in the way they want, have you hurt them at all? Or have you done them a favour?

If not, does Objectivism allow people to take advantage of the "irrationality" or "non-self-interestedness" of others? Is it moral for a Randian hero get rich by exploiting the irrationality and willingness of self-sacrifice of others, despite disapproving of those things?

 

[Akri]

That raises the questions: would a "rational self-interested person" ever consent to be harmed?

For a sport (many sports carry a risk of causing injury to one another, such as boxing), for sexual pleasure (masochism), to impress a chick (I believe Dinwar has a story on that--I'll leave it to him to decide if he wants to share), and probably other reasons I'm not thinking of.

If so, doesn't that mean the "harm" done to this person is actually something they value and therefore no harm at all? If someone wants to be hurt, and you hurt them in the way they want, have you hurt them at all? Or have you done them a favour?

It depends on how you want to define the terms. For instance, I know a masochist who considers it "hurt" when it's consensual, and "harm" when it's non-consensual.

If not, does Objectivism allow people to take advantage of the "irrationality" or "non-self-interestedness" of others? Is it moral for a Randian hero get rich by exploiting the irrationality and willingness of self-sacrifice of others, despite disapproving of those things?

I'm not sure about that one. Hopefully someone more knowledgeable will weigh in.

 

[MontagK505]

<snip>
If not, does Objectivism allow people to take advantage of the "irrationality" or "non-self-interestedness" of others? Is it moral for a Randian hero get rich by exploiting the irrationality and willingness of self-sacrifice of others, despite disapproving of those things?

In the "Fountainhead" the architect hero, Howard Roark is offered several jobs if he would only subordinate his esthetic sense to appease the public. It's implied that giving in would cost his integrity more than he would gain. He also regards his choice as a selfish act. There are references in the novel where those who seek power over others are the worst kind.

I imagine that a "true believer" in Objectivism would their find sense of self worth compromised if they exploit the irrationally of others.

Obviously, we start skirting around the "No True Scotsman Fallacy" here.

 

[Dinwar]

For a sport (many sports carry a risk of causing injury to one another, such as boxing), for sexual pleasure (masochism), to impress a chick (I believe Dinwar has a story on that--I'll leave it to him to decide if he wants to share), and probably other reasons I'm not thinking of.

I've got several. Most of the SCA is honestly about impressing chicks, and I've got a deformed shoulder thanks to that. Then there was that time I let a girl cut my arm because she wanted to see blood. Honestly, that's the story--she said "I want to see blood." She was hot, and I'd just gotten a black eye from practicing fencing with Gateraid bottles (I at least emptied mine first), and thought why not? It's not like I don't bleed on a regular basis anyway (no genetic disorder, my family simply doesn't consider bleeding to be worth worrying about). So I let her cut my arm.

Consent to be harmed goes beyond that, however. There's also assumed risk. Doing things like swordplay or hiking in mountains in deserts is inherently hazardous. By doing those things I consent to taking those risks--meaning that if I get harmed, I have no one to blame but myself. This is not hypothetical, by the way--when I got my shoulder busted in the SCA they asked if I was going to press charges, and I honestly had to ask "Against who?" I knew the risk, and did it anyway. I may not have been the one that hit my shoulder to make it break, but I was just as at fault as I would have been if I were alone and did it to myself.

The issue for a rational person is that one must look at the potential benefits, and the potential costs, and see if one can afford it. The benefits of fighting in the SCA are well worth a few medical bills. Seeing that girl naked was well worth the inconsequential blood loss (honestly, I've lost more making my bed than she drew). The benefits from hiking in the desolate mountains are worth the occasional moment of sheer, unbridled terror.

What you CANNOT do is violate anyone's rights. That is an absolute that cannot be circumvented by pragmatic post-hoc justifications.

If so, doesn't that mean the "harm" done to this person is actually something they value and therefore no harm at all?

No, of course not. Sometimes, yes--in the case of a sexual masochist, for example. In other cases, no--it's merely a potential natural consequence of the action, and has no greater significance.

If not, does Objectivism allow people to take advantage of the "irrationality" or "non-self-interestedness" of others?

It doesn't forbid it, but all O'ist philosophers (yes, there are multiple; published in peer-reviewed journals and everything!) agree that doing so intentionally is self-destructive. You're basically rewarding irrationality, which will necessarily harm you in the long run. Now, this does NOT mean that we all agree on what actions ARE rational or in our self-interest; it merely means that intentionally pandering to irrationality is self-destructive. There is a difference between an error of knowledge and a moral failing.

Is it moral for a Randian hero get rich by exploiting the irrationality and willingness of self-sacrifice of others, despite disapproving of those things?

Dr. Simon Pritchet illustrates the flaw in that reasoning. So, for that matter, did the former chair of the Fed.

Obviously, we start skirting around the "No True Scotsman Fallacy" here.

First, O'ism is a philosophy; while there may be some that hold to it irrationally, to term us "True Believers" is a misnomer and slanderous. Many of us believe this philosophy for entirely rational reasons--same as you people believe in skepticism for what you hold to be rational reasons.

Second, no, we're not. If you violate fundamental principles of a philosophy it is no fallacy to say you're not following that philosophy. To say "You're no true Scotsman" to a man who's never been to Scotland and who is in fact an American citizen is not a fallacy.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

If your time is so valuable why do you waste time repeating yourself. You've already stated this once.

I'm not putting my time on a pedestal. I'm just saying that engaging in a philosophical discussion with committed Rand followers is unproductive.

One of the odd things about Rand is the effect she has on both her followers and her detractors. Many of her followers are fanatics. But her detractors aren't much better.

Her ideas have no large scale political influence.

Conservatives don't like her. Liberals don't like her. Whats to be afraid of?
Her detractors act like religious fundamentalists confronted with an atheist but with less reason.

Here on the JREF forums we often encounter bad ideas which aren't new or widely popular. Perpetual motion, telepathy, Objectivism, you name it. Few of them have large scale political influence.

If a religious fundamentalist makes disagreeable statements, most critics will at least state specifically why they disagree. But with Rand it's: "I'm not terribly interested in giving Rand followers oxygen by treating them as if they were worth engaging with on a philosophical level."
There is a nastiness here that goes beyond merely disagreeing with an idea.

As Earthborn has already pointed out, the foundations of Rand's philosophy are silly to begin with. The rest of their philosophy is a set of elaborations on, or defences of, that silly foundation.

Suppose there were a bunch of people, let's call them Objectarians, who had a bunch of dumb ideas about physics. They started from dumb foundations, built a complex edifice of stupidity, and then built a complex set of defensive rationalisations for their stupid ideas. This made them feel good about themselves, because they thought they had an insight into physics which lesser mortals lacked. Then they wanted to debate with people who had Ph.D.s in physics about their ideas.

Such a debate would be completely unproductive. The physicists aren't going to learn anything because Objectarianism is idiotic, and the Objectarians aren't going to learn anything because they are a self-selecting group who are highly resistant to learning things which contradict their idiotic opinions. The Objectarians should just go away and read a first year physics textbook, and come back if and when they have some competence in the area.

Objectivists should go away and read a first year moral philosophy textbook. If and when they realise Objectivism is silly then maybe there can be a useful conversation.

 

[MontagK505]

I'm not putting my time on a pedestal. I'm just saying that engaging in a philosophical discussion with committed Rand followers is unproductive.

<snip>
Objectivists should go away and read a first year moral philosophy textbook. If and when they realise Objectivism is silly then maybe there can be a useful conversation.

"You can't be moral if you don't believe in God. Take a course in Theology. If and when you agree with me then we can have a discussion."

And the witchdoctor retreats behind his voodoo mask.

Got it.

BTW If my doctor fed me a line of poop like this I would find a new doctor.

 

[Akri]

I'm not putting my time on a pedestal. I'm just saying that engaging in a philosophical discussion with committed Rand followers is unproductive.

So why are you in this thread?