A definition of free will

Anders Lindman

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Anders Lindman
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Is there such a thing as free will? The following hypotheses establish a framework within which the concept of free will is defined:

Hypothesis 1: Reality is a deterministic process.

Hypothesis 2: Reality is a computationally irreducible process.

With hypothesis 1 and 2 as a foundation free will is recognized as being the choice-making in the moment that is a direct consequence of the computational irreducibility which means that the future cannot be fully predicted and that the actual process of the choice-making has to be performed as an integrated part of the deterministic unfolding of reality.
 
Anders Lindman said:
Is there such a thing as free will? The following hypotheses establish a framework within which the concept of free will is defined:

Hypothesis 1: Reality is a deterministic process.

Hypothesis 2: Reality is a computationally irreducible process.

With hypothesis 1 and 2 as a foundation free will is recognized as being the choice-making in the moment that is a direct consequence of the computational irreducibility which means that the future cannot be fully predicted and that the actual process of the choice-making has to be performed as an integrated part of the deterministic unfolding of reality.
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Just a little bit more than the law will allow.
 
Something related to determinism is randomness.

Theorem 1: A truly random process is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom process.

Proof: All physical processes can be described as a sequence of numbers, and a pseudorandom generator can generate the same sequence of numbers.

So even randomness is included in the deterministic process since a pseudorandom generator runs according to a deterministic algorithm.
 
Theorem 2: A person is a process.

Proof: If a person was a fixed object, then he or she would be a static unchanging thing, incapable of doing anything. And an object that changes over time is called a process.

Theorem 2 shows how choice-making is a process within a larger process called a person. So there is no doer as a fixed entity.
 
This is what is known as "affirming the consequent". Determinism states that "everything, including one's choice of action, is the necessary result of a sequence of causes". Thus, determinism is the opposite of free will so we need go no further if one accepts hypothesis 1. I don't. I think it is unknown and unknowable. The only way to know if everything in the universe has a cause is to know everything in the universe.
 
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Tricky said:
This is what is known as "affirming the consequent". Determinism states that "everything, including one's choice of action, is the necessary result of a sequence of causes". Thus, determinism is the opposite of free will so we need go no further if one accepts hypothesis 1. I don't. I think it is unknown and unknowable. The only way to know if everything in the universe has a cause is to know everything in the universe.
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Then you need to define what free will is in positive terms. To define something in negative terms is incomplete logic if I have understood it correctly.
 
Anders Lindman said:
Then you need to define what free will is in positive terms. To define something in negative terms is incomplete logic if I have understood it correctly.
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The definition I have is "The ability to choose between multiple, perceived options."

You have more free will than a dog, because you can perceive more options. This definition works fine, though there are determinists who say, "Ah, but you are not really choosing. It is predefined." To them I say, "prove it." Show me that you can perfectly predict the choices a person will make and I'll accept determinism. "Oh", they will say, "We can't do that right now, but it is theoretically possible." With that, they leave the question in the realms of a useless, unprovable philosophical exercise in which your "conclusion" will be the result of the beliefs you already hold. If you believe in determinism, then you will, by definition, not believe free will exists.
 
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Anders Lindman said:
Hypothesis 1: Reality is a deterministic process.
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Anders Lindman said:
Theorem 1: A truly random process is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom process.
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I was going to object to your Hypothesis 1, because it doesn't account for the randomness we observe. You've tried to get around this with your Theorem 1, but your proof is flawed. A truly random process is distinguishable from a pseudorandom process, because if one finds the algorithm, a pseudorandom process is completely deterministic.

But in any case, even if consciousness is dependent to a small degree on truly random processes, that still ain't free will as most people would define the term.
 
Theorem 3: Free will as something other than a deterministic process is impossible.

Proof: According to theorem 2, a person is a process. A process X can only be affected by another process Y when both X and Y are parts (subprocesses) of a larger process Z. Otherwise process X would require another causing process X2 which in turn would require yet another process X3 and so on in an infinite regression. This means that the choices a person makes are determined by the overall process of the universe. And the universe existed before the person appeared as a subprocess within the universal process.
 
There is no free will.

(this thread is too painful to read - I have far too much respect for mathematics)
 
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CurtC said:
A truly random process is distinguishable from a pseudorandom process, because if one finds the algorithm, a pseudorandom process is completely deterministic.
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But if one doesn't find a pseudorandom algorithm that matches the observed randomness one can develop one.
 
Tricky said:
The definition I have is "The ability to choose between multiple, perceived options."

You have more free will than a dog, because you can perceive more options. This definition works fine, though there are determinists who say, "Ah, but you are not really choosing. It is predefined." To them I say, "prove it." Show me that you can perfectly predict the choices a person will make and I'll accept determinism. "Oh", they will say, "We can't do that right now, but it is theoretically possible." With that, they leave the question in the realms of a useless, unprovable philosophical exercise in which your "conclusion" will be the result of the beliefs you already hold. If you believe in determinism, then you will, by definition, not believe free will exists.
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In post #12 I show why this is not possible. And you mention prediction here. Hypothesis 2 says that reality is a computationally irreducible process which means that it cannot per definition be fully predicted.

"In cases of computational irreducibility, only observation and experiment can be used. Computational irreducibility may also provide a scientific based resolution for free will." -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility
 
Anders Lindman said:
Is there such a thing as free will? The following hypotheses establish a framework within which the concept of free will is defined:

Hypothesis 1: Reality is a deterministic process.

Hypothesis 2: Reality is a computationally irreducible process.

With hypothesis 1 and 2 as a foundation free will is recognized as being the choice-making in the moment that is a direct consequence of the computational irreducibility which means that the future cannot be fully predicted and that the actual process of the choice-making has to be performed as an integrated part of the deterministic unfolding of reality.
Click to expand...


I don't see what any of this has to do with free will. I'd define free will as...

The capacity to act based on internal decision-making processes which are free from outside control or influence.​

Tricky said:
This is what is known as "affirming the consequent". Determinism states that "everything, including one's choice of action, is the necessary result of a sequence of causes". Thus, determinism is the opposite of free will so we need go no further if one accepts hypothesis 1. I don't. I think it is unknown and unknowable. The only way to know if everything in the universe has a cause is to know everything in the universe.
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Why do you make this claim? Determinism only means that if someone knew (literally) everything about the internal processes of your brain (including memories), they'd theoretically be able to predict your behavior in given circumstances.

Note, that's only the capacity to predict your behavior, not control it. Sure, they might know what you'd do in a given situation, or even deliberately set up a situation with the foreknowledge of how you're going to react to it, but you're still the one deciding how to act. It's still your choice to act in that manner.

In what way is determinism incompatible with free will?
 
Brian-M said:
I don't see what any of this has to do with free will. I'd define free will as...

The capacity to act based on internal decision-making processes which are free from outside control or influence.​
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Ok, but the person is still a process within a larger process. And it's that which animates the larger process that also animates the subprocess, i.e. the person with his or her free will. So, yes, the choice may be done as an entirely internal process, but in reality it's still just a subprocess of the universal process, which in terms points back to theorem 3.
 
It's fun to try to create dry definitions, but an example is useful as an illustration. Let's say that I make a choice between A) having a sandwich before going to bed and B) not having a sandwich before going to bed.

How is that choice between A and B an act of my own free will? A choice is a transition from uncertainty to certainty. So what I'm doing is simply reducing the state A&B to only either A or B. What determines the actual outcome is my free will.

The actual outcome of a choice is a result of an action in the moment. That action is a process. The choice is a subprocess within the process of me as a person which in turn is a subprocess within the universal process. Therefore, what runs the actual process of the choice-making is the universal process.

It's not the universal process that makes the choice for me. I am a part of the universal process in action, not separate from it. So it's me who makes the choice with my own free will. And the choice is a true free will choice since not even the universe knows what the choice will be. Only when I have made my choice is the outcome determined.

My choice cannot be fully predicted in a general sense even by the universe itself knowing all the positions of all existing particles! This is so because of the computational irreducibility. So it's not the simple determinism Laplace talked about.

This is NOT computational irreducibility:

"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes." -- Pierre Simon Laplace
 
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