Thanks, Chanakya. But defending theism, or at least my ideas about theism, wasn't what I had in mind.
Apologies if I've misunderstood your intent. As far as our discussion on the many-gods counter-argument to Pascal's Wager, we can simply take it forward, if you wish, onward from
my last post addressed to you there.
I was under the impression that, apart from what we were discussing there, you also wanted to talk about your own reasons for turning to theism, that may not necessarily be exactly the same as the reasons covered by the Wager. Basis your last post there, I thought we could simply take that part of the discussion over here.
If that was not your intent, and you do not want to talk about all of that, then we can simply leave this thread be, and just go back to the Wager thread. Or else we could also, if you wish, discuss your particular reasons here, while looking more generally at the many-Gods argument in the other thread. That is, we could do just that thread, or just this one, or both, or neither, just as you wish. Your call entirely.
Once more, my apologies if I'd misread your intent. The only reason why I started this thread, instead of asking you to go ahead and start your own, was simple courtesy, just a wish to go ahead and initiate this discussion that, basis your last post, I believed you yourself wanted to begin on. A "call-out thread" was the furthest thing possible from my own intent, despite what one of the other posters here seems to think!!
-----------------
I've explained what I believe and why a few times on this board. The bottom line is "it's a faith position", which I don't expect anyone other than me to accept.
Instead, it's about the "many gods" objection. From the other thread:
To which I replied:
This is a defence of the idea that Pascal can nominate a specific God for the Wager, using reasoning outside of the Wager.
To bring over some ideas from the other thread:
The two premises in Pascal's Wager
that you listed are:
To get from the God in the Wager to a specifically Catholic God as opposed to, say, a Protestant God or Universalist God, requires more than the Wager.
I agree, going from the Wager to a specific God, and specifically the RCC God, is a bit of a leap. I assumed it is the RCC God that Pascal was championing.
However, my point was, it is an equally wide leap from the Wager to any God, even a "generic" God. For reasons I've already discussed there, and further clarified in my last post addressed to you there.
The Pascal's Wager discussion we could, if you wouldn't mind, take right back to that thread, and resume from that last post onwards.
For example, Pascal's Wager doesn't address whether or not Jesus was born from a Virgin, or whether Mary ascended bodily to heaven, or which group of ancient books should be included in the Bible.
So the question of "Which God? The Protestant God or the Catholic God?" can't be answered by Pascal's Wager itself. So I'll defend the idea that a generic benevolent God as being applicable to the Wager, and then we can take it from there!
My reasoning here is that it's the type of God being used in what's called
"The Atheist's Wager"
The Wager states that if one were to analyze their options in regard to how to live their life, he or she would arrive at the following possibilities:
- You may live a good life and believe in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to heaven: your gain is infinite.
- You may live a good life without believing in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to heaven: your gain is infinite.
- You may live a good life and believe in a god, but no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a positive legacy to the world; your gain is finite.
- You may live a good life without believing in a god, and no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a positive legacy to the world; your gain is finite.
- You may live an evil life and believe in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to hell: your loss is infinite.
- You may live an evil life without believing in a god, and a benevolent god exists, in which case you go to hell: your loss is infinite.
- You may live an evil life and believe in a god, but no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a negative legacy to the world; your loss is finite.
- You may live an evil life without believing in a god, and no benevolent god exists, in which case you leave a negative legacy to the world; your loss is finite.
There are two premises here:
1. That there is such a thing as "living a good life" and "living an evil life"
2. That there may or may not be a benevolent god.
I'll leave the first premise alone for now. But for the second premise: note the use of a generic "benevolent" god.
Does the logic work with a non-specific god? I think it does. You don't need to list a specific known god for this logic to work. I propose the same for Pascal's Wager.
I don't think it does, actually. You'd need to define what a "good" life is, in accordance with which to act (or at least to strive), in the context of a happy ending in the after-life, in every case. And I don't see how you can possibly do that without also defining your particular God, if only functionally. Like I'd said in that post in that other thread.
For those atheists who believe that there is reason to lack belief in all gods, the Atheist's Wager is moot. Similarly, committed Christians, atheists, etc, will find Pascal's Wager unnecessary. Obviously wagering is not necessary when you are sure of the result already!
And note that we are starting to eliminate gods here. Logically, malevolent gods are eliminated, since wagering will be of no use: we are screwed whatever we choose.
I don't see that. Even in the reign of a malevolent God, one may (strive to) "act" one's way to a gentler screw-over. Besides, logically it might well be possible to actually attain even to bliss/beatitude/whatever even under a malevolent God, if you play your cards right.
If it comes to that, isn't the OT God uncommonly "malevolent"? And aren't there entire doctrines that try to bring about a personal happy ending given that malevolent God?
(But this is random nitpicking, I'm afraid. On my part, I mean to say; random responses on my part to some of the things you're saying, so that our discussion looks like going "all over the place" one more time. Like I said, if we're on a general Pascal Wager discussion as far as the many-gods counter-argument, then we can take it from my last post on that other thread. And/or we can discuss your own, personal reasons here, if you'd like to.
If you want to argue that "reason tells us all gods are fictitious", then the Wager is no longer applicable, since it falls afoul of the first premise.
So can we can eliminate other gods as well? Yes: people who have pretended to be gods, like
Sathya Sai Baba, whose "acts were based on sleight of hand though his devotees believe them signs of his divinity."
So,
in principle, we can say that some gods are more likely than other gods. But if some gods are more likely than other gods, then it is logical to say that there may be one or more gods who are the MOST likely. And you would gamble based on that outcome.
Some gods can be ruled out directly. Others cannot directly be ruled out, but can still be set aside for want of evidence.
However, I don't think the latter are "more likely" than the former. All of them, unless there's evidence for them, are equally and entirely "unlikely".
But sure, while some Gods do admit of direct "disproving", others don't. That much at least we can agree on.
As I said: this may become a long discussion, so I will stop here, and please let me know what you think so far.
For what it's worth, you have my views now. I'm interested in both discussions, but again, if we're to focus on a generic Pascal's Wager argument, then we can simply resume that where we'd left off.
Let me just note one thing here, though. (This is kind of a building-upon of what I'd said in the other thread.) A sifting through of all Gods that we know of and can think of, in order to decide which Gods (if any) might be "likely" and which not, is probably a colossal project. Its scope, as well as the import of its actual outcome, probably far outstrip anything in the Wager itself. And this is the discussion that Pascal seems to have handwaved away in his Wager.
As you've yourself made clear, many times, Pascal's Wager is not about establishing truth value, it's about acting such that one's happiness/fulfilment is optimized/maximized. Even should you accept Pascal's argument, doing this necessarily entails understanding what kind of actions lead one to that happiness/fulfilment; and doing that necessarily entails at least a functional definition of this God; which in turn opens up the whole many-Gods counter-argument (so that you cannot provisionally accept one God, even an abstract God, unless you also provisionally accept all Gods, as the starting point of your argument) -- and the elimination process you mention, as well as its end-result, become the central point of the whole Wager.
Remember, the Wager is for those people who believe that reason can't tell us whether there is a god or not.
Agreed. But again, I draw your attention to the special-pleading fallacy that Pascal seems to have been wallowing in. What you say applies to all Gods, unless you do use reason and evidence to argue in individual Gods back into reckoning for the Wager!
The two points here are:
1. Some gods may be more likely than other gods, leading to the idea that there may be a "most likely" god (of course that DOESN'T necessarily mean that that particular "god is likely!")
2. We can talk about gods in groups like "benevolent" gods.
(Edited to add: Just reading some comments: Yes, we can add the FSM to the list of gods more unlikely to exist. Or can we?!?)
Sure, I take your point.
But again, you simply cannot even say "God X is more likely than God Y" without first justifying that statement. That justification, that discussion of specific Gods, is ...everything, and it simply CANNOT be handwaved away.
