A critique of skepticism

Nosho, it seems that your objections to skepticism revolve around the observation that nobody is perfectly skeptical. That is undoubtedly true. We are all influenced by numerous factors which tend to make us more accepting or less accepting of positions or propositions. That's just being human.

One of the ways to be a "good" skeptic, I think is to acknowledge that you have blind spots and even to admit that you may not know what your own blind spots are.

Randi and others have said it, but it should be engraved on the brain of every person who purports to be a skeptic. "There is no one who it is easier to fool than yourself." To me, being a skeptic includes being constantly aware of this.
I entirely agree.

We each carry within us assumptions and values that we haven't questioned because they haven't been challenged. Ideas that appear axiomatic to us. Scepticism means being prepared to examine our axioms and discard them if they don't stand examination. Or at least recognise that they are our axioms, meaning not derivable, and that other people may validly not share them.
 
I think the latter is a better piece, since Gilovitch actually does scientific research in the area of reasoning failure, and many of his findings will be surprising even to Skeptics (eg: we don't have "blind spots", per se: when we hear something that disagrees with our knowledge, we actually devote more attention to it, not less).
Whereas what we should do, as rational beings, is devote at least as much attention to new information or arguments that we're comfortable with. (I'm adding mental quote-marks around "knowledge" as you use it here :) .)
 
Sorry, I didn't mean to ignore the substantive issues.

So, not only does it have no characteristics, but it is impossible for us to have learned a label for it even imperfectly, to even be able to talk about this (no)thing that does not effect us noticeably...

My goal in the opening post was not to convince anyone that this (no)thing, or whatever you want to call it, exists. Rather, in that portion of the post, I was trying to give an example of a claim or proposition that might seem unfamiliar as a tool to help clarify how we think about skepticism, or what we think we're doing when we engage in skepticism.

The point of the OP was to take a closer look at skepticism in practice, because it seems to me that when we're not aware of what we're doing, we end up going all over the map and calling it "skepticism" without realizing how much of ourselves we bring to the equation. And I'm not saying there's necessarily anything wrong with that, but if we're not aware of it, then we're much more likely to make mistakes.

I'm not 100 percent satisfied with the "(no)thing" proposition as I stated it, and I understand that it does not perfectly convey what I had hoped to describe, but rather only points in the direction. I can't call it my firm conviction. I can only call it a proposition that I like, and I think it points in the direction of reality.

Since my personal stake in this particular proposition is tenuous, this might make the discussion uninteresting. The proposition also might be something that many would consider to be beyond the scope of skepticism.

Nevertheless, I'd be happy to clarify the proposition as much as possible. Let's start by calling this (no)thing the "noumena." Now at least it has a name.

My proposition would be that, contrary to our ordinary way of looking at things, "noumena" can indeed be experienced.

That's a lot of imagining. I can see why, too--as you have described it, it would be indistinguishable from imagination, even to oneself. Heck, even "imagination" has enough going for it that we can talk about it--this (no)thing would, by your assumptions, be even less consistent than imagination, or indeed anything imaginable.

This experience of "noumena" would be clearly distinguishable from imagination.

(We shall, for the moment, ignore the internal inconsistency of your having described, for 4 paragraphs, something that is undescribable and without characteristic and beyond language.)

No need to ignore this. The attributes that you have mentioned -- something that is indescribable, without characteristics and beyond language -- is not internally inconsistent. Nevertheless, it may well be valid to think of "noumena" as internally inconsistent, from one perspective. If so, we would have to live with that perhaps uncomfortable reality.

Given how we learn language, a personal experience of this could not possibly be proof of it even for oneself.

I'm not sure how "learning language" relates to whether a personal experience of something would constitute proof.

As I said above, it would be indistinguishable from imagination even to oneself, and impossible to corroborate with any other; there is no characteristic whatsoever, no constant, in your assumptions, that would allow us to label this (no)thing in the first place. Such a (no)thing would never be spoken of or noticed. It could not be.

Why could it not be? Why could it never be spoken of? Why could it never be noticed?

That makes it very different from any of the concepts of spirit, mind, god, love, or anything else ...

Whose? Yours? Maybe so, but I'm sure that at some time in human history, this proposition has been made by others. I'm not so arogant as to believe I'm bringing something fresh and new to the table.

... each of which words does have utility within our language community, even if they (some) are imaginary. We use these words, functionally, to communicate with one another. There are public referents--objects or behaviors, usually, or classes of behaviors or behaviors from which the concept is inferred as an emergent property--for even the most arcane of actually useful words. There is no such thing available for your (no)thing,

Well, sure there are words available. But those words only point in the direction of what we're describing.

so it could never be discriminated, even (again) by oneself, given the way we learn.

Given the way we learn? Who? Different people learn in different ways.

Could such a thing exists? I (nor you) cannot know.

That may well be true. Have you exhausted all paths of inquiry? I certainly haven't.

And it cannot (even possibly) matter, by your description.

That's a judgment call. By my description, touching "noumena" would allow one to see oneself more fully. But you're right, that might not matter.

In a subsequent post, you mentioned that Kant "and I agree that such a thing is unknowable." I think Kant's position was that it was unknowable with the mind. But I'm no expert on Kant.
 
Clarity. The degree to which one hopes for truth. Does one hope to reach a conclusion that supports expectations? Is there a reluctance to let go of preconceived notions? Does one's inquiry contain a hint of hostility toward the subject of inquiry? Even overt hostility? Is there an agenda? When we have an agenda, our skepticism is clouded by our own ego, and clarity is low.
I can see your 'cloudiness' analogy there at the end, but the word 'clarity' does a poor job of describing the concept. You've basically described the confirmation bias.
 
Nosho, it seems that your objections to skepticism revolve around the observation that nobody is perfectly skeptical. That is undoubtedly true. We are all influenced by numerous factors which tend to make us more accepting or less accepting of positions or propositions. That's just being human.

That's exactly right. I also was trying to specifically identify some ways in which we might knowinlgy or unknowingly "adjust" our approach to skepticism. These various dials, I think, could be a useful tool, because I think they shed light on how certain problems might arise, such as straw-man arguments or hostility toward those with differing views.
 
I don't think you're contributing anything new here. Skeptics are all over this concept. The two relevant publications that should be in every Skeptic's library are: Michael Shermer's Why we believe weird things and Thomas Gilovitch's How we know what isn't so.

You're probably right. It's pretty hard to contribute anything that's completely new. And I appreciate the references to those two publications.

But I hope this discussion of "dials" provides a fresh framework for looking at these issues more closely, at least for those who are interested in doing so.
 
You're probably right. It's pretty hard to contribute anything that's completely new. And I appreciate the references to those two publications.

But I hope this discussion of "dials" provides a fresh framework for looking at these issues more closely, at least for those who are interested in doing so.

One of the things that impressed me with the paranormal investigation society I joined that specializes in ghost investigations is that they had a handbook and a screening test. I think this type of thing would serve skeptical societies well.

We had a meeting a couple of weeks ago, and this one guy was a one-topic machine: atheism. My wife should not be allowed to work as a psychiatrist, apparently, because she's religious. Religious people should not be allowed to hold positions of public office. Should not be allowed to have access to children. Skeptics shouldn't waste their time with healthfraud, ufos, ghosts, psychics and so on... they should be like him, 100% dedicated to converting the world to atheism.

I'd rather have a beer with Sylvia Browne.

Holy shinkie. After two hours of this, I thought I was going to have to sock him one.
 
Nevertheless, I'd be happy to clarify the proposition as much as possible. Let's start by calling this (no)thing the "noumena." Now at least it has a name.

My proposition would be that, contrary to our ordinary way of looking at things, "noumena" can indeed be experienced.
Your OP defines it as "beyond our experiences". Which is it? As long as we define things this way, we can circularly argue just about anything.
This experience of "noumena" would be clearly distinguishable from imagination.
Clearly? How? (seriously, how?) It is "beyond our skills of language to describe adequately", and yet clearly distinguishable from imagination. And it both can and cannot be experienced.

In the words of Bill Cosby..."riiiight...."
No need to ignore this. The attributes that you have mentioned -- something that is indescribable, without characteristics and beyond language -- is not internally inconsistent. Nevertheless, it may well be valid to think of "noumena" as internally inconsistent, from one perspective. If so, we would have to live with that perhaps uncomfortable reality.
It's only inconsistent if you believe you are actually describing it. You describe it as being indescribable. At times.
I'm not sure how "learning language" relates to whether a personal experience of something would constitute proof.
We learn language from others, from a language community. The fact that you expect me to understand what you are saying implies that there is some commonality of experience. If something cannot be experienced, is beyond our powers of speech to describe, it is not something which one person can teach another, nor something that we can be assured any two people who use the same term actually agree upon.
Why could it not be? Why could it never be spoken of? Why could it never be noticed?
I was simply applying the definition you gave in the OP. As you describe it, there is no "there" there. Absolutely no way for 2 people to check their concepts against one another.
Whose? Yours? Maybe so, but I'm sure that at some time in human history, this proposition has been made by others. I'm not so arogant as to believe I'm bringing something fresh and new to the table.
Again, I was applying your OP definition. These other words I used are not defined a priori as beyond experience.
Well, sure there are words available. But those words only point in the direction of what we're describing.
Your OP defined this thing/nothing as beyond experience and beyond language. If you retreat from that, you may find an answer, but it will not be to the question as you asked it.
Given the way we learn? Who? Different people learn in different ways.
Unless you have evidence of direct mind-to-mind communication, bypassing publicly available referents for language, the "different ways" have enough in common for my criticism to remain in play. If you do have such evidence, let me suggest you apply for the million.
That may well be true. Have you exhausted all paths of inquiry? I certainly haven't.
Again, I am merely applying your OP definition. If you wish to change it, you are asking a completely different question.
That's a judgment call. By my description, touching "noumena" would allow one to see oneself more fully. But you're right, that might not matter.
How do you suppose it would allow one to see anything, let alone oneself, more fully, when it is beyond experience and words? How would one know one had experienced it? Perhaps I just experienced it while writing this sentence? Can you confirm or deny it? How?
In a subsequent post, you mentioned that Kant "and I agree that such a thing is unknowable." I think Kant's position was that it was unknowable with the mind. But I'm no expert on Kant.
:D Don't get me started on "mind". But given the commonly accepted concept of mind... if it is unknowable with the mind, how is it knowable?
 
Your OP defines it as "beyond our experiences". Which is it? As long as we define things this way, we can circularly argue just about anything.

I'm not arguing in favor of anything with regard to this notion of noumena. Rather, I'm offering a proposition, one that can be explored in any number of ways. The way in which you're exploring it now (by asking me to clarify what I meant) is one way.

The way I'm framing the proposition might not be very skillful. I might not be giving you the tools you need to at least contemplate what I'm pointing toward. After you read this post, if you think you have any idea of what I'm trying to convey, maybe you could describe those aspects of the proposition that seem to make sense, and I could build on that. If none of this makes any sense, then I'm just not doing my job of explaining it well.

I described noumena in the OP as "beyond our experiences and ideas but simultaneously at the very core of our being." So there's a twofold way of looking at this. Noumenon is apparently "beyond our experiences," but since it is at the core of our being, we experience it by definition. We can't help but experience it. Problem is, we're not aware of it. Thus, in a very real way, we fail to experience it (in one sense) even as we experience it constantly (in another sense).

When I was a child, I thought that the space around me was empty. I thought there was nothing there. In reality, I was surrounded by a heavy layer of atmosphere, but I didn't experience it that way. If the wind blew, I thought it was just "wind," and when the wind was gone, I thought there was nothing there again. I was in the atmosphere, yet in a sense I didn't experience the atmosphere (although in another sense of course I was constantly experiencing it). I was unaware of the atmosphere. Roughly, that's what I was trying to describe in the OP.

In my previous post, I wrote that the experience of noumena would be clearly distinguished from imagination, and you asked: "Clearly? How? (seriously, how?)"

I can't tell you how. A premise of this proposition is that it would be possible to make this differentiation. Maybe we could use the analogy of atmosphere again. If the wind blows and you feel it on your skin, that's not your imagination. Most of the time, we don't pay any attention to the sensation of air on our skin. If you sit quietly in a still room and pay attention to the sensations on your skin, you might notice a subtle draft that ordinarily you would not notice at all. You know it's not your imagination; it's a very slight movement of air. I'm trying to describe something like that.

If something cannot be experienced, is beyond our powers of speech to describe, it is not something which one person can teach another, nor something that we can be assured any two people who use the same term actually agree upon.

In my OP, I wrote: "Imagine that direct experience is possible." The fact that something is "beyond our experiences" does not mean that it cannot be experienced. I also wrote that "it's beyond our skills of language to describe adequately," but then I gave several words that people might use in their attempts to describe it. So it can be described, but just not fully or perfectly.

This would make it something that people could talk about, but that discussion would never be the same as direct observation. You could hear about it from someone else, but that would not provide you with full understanding until you experience it directly yourself.

This also might raise the possibility of two people disagreeing or even arguing about noumena, or trying to convince one another who is right and who is wrong. You can see how such conversations probably could never subsitute for finding out for oneself. I can tell you what chocolate mint ice cream tastes like, but you won't really know what it tastes like until you taste it yourself.

As you describe it, there is no "there" there. Absolutely no way for 2 people to check their concepts against one another.

I don't think that's how I described it.

These other words I used are not defined a priori as beyond experience.

The words you used were "spirit, mind, god, love." I believe many people have conceptualized some of those things (particularly god) as being beyond experience in the sense that our conditioned, day-to-day method of experiencing "reality" may exclude an experience of "spirit" or "god" or whatever.

So the language and social precedent does indeed exist to conceptualize this proposition and talk about it.

Your OP defined this thing/nothing as beyond experience and beyond language. If you retreat from that, you may find an answer, but it will not be to the question as you asked it.

If that is so, then I did not ask the question skillfully.

Unless you have evidence of direct mind-to-mind communication, bypassing publicly available referents for language, the "different ways" have enough in common for my criticism to remain in play. If you do have such evidence, let me suggest you apply for the million.

Well, I'm not talking about anything supernatural here. It is possible to learn about our world all by oneself, without relying on what others tell us. For example, I might wonder about a strange sound outside. One way I could learn about the sound is to ask someone, "What is that sound?" Another way I could learn would be to go outside and look for the source of the sound. If I learn by looking for myself, then language doesn't really come into play.

How do you suppose it would allow one to see anything, let alone oneself, more fully, when it is beyond experience and words? How would one know one had experienced it? Perhaps I just experienced it while writing this sentence? Can you confirm or deny it? How?

I have no method of understanding your experiences, except through what you tell me here in the forum. How would one know when one has experienced noumena? Again, go back to the analogy of atmosphere. If you pay attention, you can tell when moving air touches your skin. It's a matter of learning how to pay attention.

How would this allow one to see oneself more fully? Well, the proposition assumes that one encounters "noumena" at the core of being.

Don't get me started on "mind". But given the commonly accepted concept of mind... if it is unknowable with the mind, how is it knowable?

I can't tell you how. The proposition is that it is in fact possible.

I'm also not sure which commonly accepted concept of mind your are thinking of. Maybe we have different ideas about what "mind" is.

When I think of "mind," I think of all of those little interpretations that I apply to my direct experience. My expectations, categories, judgments. I see a tree, and I label it "tree" and compare it with my expectations of what a "tree" is supposed to be, all in a split second. This is my mind at work, interpreting my direct experience.

So there is a relationship between our conditioned "mind" and "direct experience." They are not necessarily the same thing.

I don't know if any of this has helped you to understand the proposition, or if at this point you think there is no meaningful proposition. Or it could be that you understand the proposition but feel it falls outside the scope of skepticism.

If I have failed to communicate the proposition in a way that makes it understandable for you, then for the purposes of the OP, you could consider some other proposition involving something like god or whatever, and then think about how adjusting the "dials" might influence how one applies skepticism to that proposition. In some cases, people believe they are applying pure skepticism (if there is such a thing) even as they add other considerations to their skepticism without realizing it.
 
I'll start with part of it, and if you want me to address something more, just ask.
I described noumena in the OP as "beyond our experiences and ideas but simultaneously at the very core of our being." So there's a twofold way of looking at this. Noumenon is apparently "beyond our experiences," but since it is at the core of our being, we experience it by definition. We can't help but experience it. Problem is, we're not aware of it. Thus, in a very real way, we fail to experience it (in one sense) even as we experience it constantly (in another sense).
You would have liked Iacchus.

If we cannot experience anything without this core, we cannot discriminate between its always being around and its never being around. You are defining something that can only be a matter of faith. This does not mean it does not exist (indeed, it is defined as existing in your problem), but it means that we cannot know.

Since you are defining it as at the core of our being, but unexperienceable, let me tell you one other small detail about this noumena. It has, at its core, something that it can't experience--a meta-noumena! It cannot experience it, but of course cannot help but experience it, since it is at its very core. And this meta-noumena, although it would not be able to tell you, has an ultra-meta-noumena at its core. None of these, of course, can be experienced, but each of them is the very essence of turtles all the way down.

You are defining this core in your problem. This is the only way we can possibly know it exists. Faith, not evidence, is bedrock here.
When I was a child, I thought that the space around me was empty. I thought there was nothing there. In reality, I was surrounded by a heavy layer of atmosphere, but I didn't experience it that way. If the wind blew, I thought it was just "wind," and when the wind was gone, I thought there was nothing there again. I was in the atmosphere, yet in a sense I didn't experience the atmosphere (although in another sense of course I was constantly experiencing it). I was unaware of the atmosphere. Roughly, that's what I was trying to describe in the OP.
Who has seen the wind? Neither I nor you: But when the leaves hang trembling, the wind is passing through. Who has seen the wind? Neither you nor I: But when the trees bow down their heads, the wind is passing by. (Christina Rosetti)

You have loads of evidence for atmosphere, for wind. This is a sort of argument from ignorance--a child's view of air is ignorant of what evidence there is, but your OP demands that there is no evidence for this noumena, none that we can experience, at any rate.
In my previous post, I wrote that the experience of noumena would be clearly distinguished from imagination, and you asked: "Clearly? How? (seriously, how?)"

I can't tell you how. A premise of this proposition is that it would be possible to make this differentiation. Maybe we could use the analogy of atmosphere again. If the wind blows and you feel it on your skin, that's not your imagination. Most of the time, we don't pay any attention to the sensation of air on our skin. If you sit quietly in a still room and pay attention to the sensations on your skin, you might notice a subtle draft that ordinarily you would not notice at all. You know it's not your imagination; it's a very slight movement of air. I'm trying to describe something like that.
There is a world of difference between "subtle evidence" and "no evidence at all." If there is evidence, even the slightest, for this noumena, we can systematically investigate it--under what conditions is it present or absent, what are its characteristics, all sorts of things. Indeed, over a century ago, the early psychologists argued at length over whether there was indeed anything remotely resembling the concept. Their introspective accounts were quite thorough, quite detailed...and inconsistent enough that the methodology was abandoned. If there was enough there for us to be able to experience it, shouldn't it have shown up when it was systematically sought? If it is as you describe it, that methodology should have worked. If it as you originally described it, no methodology at all should have worked.
In my OP, I wrote: "Imagine that direct experience is possible." The fact that something is "beyond our experiences" does not mean that it cannot be experienced. I also wrote that "it's beyond our skills of language to describe adequately," but then I gave several words that people might use in their attempts to describe it. So it can be described, but just not fully or perfectly.
Indistinguishable from random noise, then. Once again, there is a discrepancy between the two descriptions you give. For something real, our descriptions converge on a consistent pattern. We test one another's descriptions against that actual real thing. For something unreal, our continued tests show no convergence. It may take a while, but the subtle evidence for N-rays (which French scientists saw, but English and Germans did not) were eventually seen as the product of expectancey.
This would make it something that people could talk about, but that discussion would never be the same as direct observation. You could hear about it from someone else, but that would not provide you with full understanding until you experience it directly yourself.
Yet you said it was clearly different from imagination.
This also might raise the possibility of two people disagreeing or even arguing about noumena, or trying to convince one another who is right and who is wrong. You can see how such conversations probably could never subsitute for finding out for oneself. I can tell you what chocolate mint ice cream tastes like, but you won't really know what it tastes like until you taste it yourself.
Thank you for illustrating my point. And your example, with no experienceable way of verifying, is more like one person, blind from birth, talking with another person, also blind from birth, about what the colors of the sunset must look like. Your definition demands that noumena actually exist--like sunset colors--but we have no way of experiencing them (like blind people). If we are all blind, what color is the sunset?

Of course, this example, like your OP, presupposes that it does exist, independent of any means whatsoever of the observer to know this. The case, though, is utterly indistinguishable from another example--one in which there is no sunset, and the two blind people are discussing the color of a sunset, while pointing to the backside of an elephant.

You can't know that you know chocolate mint ice cream until you try it...and in your OP example...you can never try it.
 
If we cannot experience anything without this core, we cannot discriminate between its always being around and its never being around.

True.

You are defining something that can only be a matter of faith.

How do you know that?

This does not mean it does not exist (indeed, it is defined as existing in your problem), but it means that we cannot know.

Why not?

Since you are defining it as at the core of our being, but unexperienceable ...

I don't think that's how I defined it.

... let me tell you one other small detail about this noumena. It has, at its core, something that it can't experience--a meta-noumena! It cannot experience it, but of course cannot help but experience it, since it is at its very core. And this meta-noumena, although it would not be able to tell you, has an ultra-meta-noumena at its core. None of these, of course, can be experienced, but each of them is the very essence of turtles all the way down.

This is very clever, and I like it. You've illustrated very well the absurdity of applying the notion of "noumenon" to itself, over and over.

The problem with doing this is that it treats "noumenon" as if it is the same as "phenomenon." You're going to run into all kinds of absurdities if you mix the two up like that. For the purpose of discussing this particular proposition, we have to be clear about when we're talking about "noumena" and when we're talking about "phenomena."

This is one problem with talking about the noumenal at all. As soon as we talk about it, we treat it as though it is phenomenon. So right off the bat, no matter what we say, we're at least a little bit off. That doesn't mean we can't ever talk about it at all. It just means we have to realize that the words we use are pointing in the direction of the noumenal, not defining it. I tried to make that point in the OP when I wrote: "Imagine that people have no idea how to talk about this 'thing.' Imagine that it's beyond our skills of language to describe adequately. Some people might call it 'god.' Others might call it self, or non-self, or nirvana, or noumenon, or love."

You are defining this core in your problem. This is the only way we can possibly know it exists. Faith, not evidence, is bedrock here.

I'm not necessarily going to disagree with you, but how do you know that? How do you know there is not some humanly accessible method of discerning such evidence? As I put is in the OP, "A personal experience of this 'thing' will never be scientific proof for anyone but oneself." Does that mean it can only be faith?

Maybe it does. But how do you know that? As you note later, "There is a world of difference between 'subtle evidence' and 'no evidence at all.'"

You have loads of evidence for atmosphere, for wind. This is a sort of argument from ignorance--a child's view of air is ignorant of what evidence there is ...

I didn't intend the analogy as an argument in favor of the existence of noumena. Rather, I intended the analogy as a method of helping the reader to wrap his or her mind around the concept.

But the analogy works along the lines you describe: Just as a child's view of air is ignorant of what evidence there is, so too one's view of noumena would be ignorant of what evidence there is. But one's ignorance would be temporary.

..., but your OP demands that there is no evidence for this noumena, none that we can experience, at any rate.

I don't think that's what I said.

There is a world of difference between "subtle evidence" and "no evidence at all."

True.

If there is evidence, even the slightest, for this noumena, we can systematically investigate it ...

True.

--under what conditions is it present or absent,

But as you pointed out at the beginning of your last post, "If we cannot experience anything without this core, we cannot discriminate between its always being around and its never being around." It is always present, never absent.

... what are its characteristics, all sorts of things.

That would make it "phenomenon."

Indeed, over a century ago, the early psychologists argued at length over whether there was indeed anything remotely resembling the concept. Their introspective accounts were quite thorough, quite detailed...and inconsistent enough that the methodology was abandoned.

Can you direct me to source material about these events? I'm not familiar with the details.

If there was enough there for us to be able to experience it, shouldn't it have shown up when it was systematically sought?

Maybe it has.

If it is as you describe it, that methodology should have worked.

You mean the methodology that was abandoned? Well, if it was based on inconsistent introspective accounts, as you describe, then the methodology was probably flawed.

If it as you originally described it, no methodology at all should have worked.

How do you know that?

Indistinguishable from random noise, then. Once again, there is a discrepancy between the two descriptions you give. For something real, our descriptions converge on a consistent pattern. We test one another's descriptions against that actual real thing. For something unreal, our continued tests show no convergence. It may take a while, but the subtle evidence for N-rays (which French scientists saw, but English and Germans did not) were eventually seen as the product of expectancey.

N-rays. Noumena. Hmmmm.

What if thousands of people conducted the same tests and experienced very much the same thing? Even then, it might still be just a product of expectancy. So one would try to design controls.

What if the "tests" could only be carried out by oneself, the controls only applied by oneself? The evidence only experienced by oneself? In other words, theoretically anyone and everyone could do it, but only for oneself?

If that were the case, would it then be an exercise in futility, condemned from the beginning to produce results that could never be distinguished from faith?

How would you possibly ever know until you tried it for yourself?

Then I talked about tasting ice cream, and you responded:

Thank you for illustrating my point. And your example, with no experienceable way of verifying, is more like one person, blind from birth, talking with another person, also blind from birth, about what the colors of the sunset must look like.

Not quite. Because someone blind from birth would not have the capacity to recognize color, but in this proposition, we would all have the capacity to touch noumena.

Your definition demands that noumena actually exist--like sunset colors--but we have no way of experiencing them (like blind people). If we are all blind, what color is the sunset?

The proposition was that we do indeed have a way of experiencing the noumenal. It is "beyond our experiences" even as "direct experience is possible," as I wrote in the OP. In other words, one learns a new way of experiencing or perhaps becomes aware of what one unknowingly has been experiencing all along (like the child who becomes aware of atmosphere).

Of course, this example, like your OP, presupposes that it does exist, independent of any means whatsoever of the observer to know this.

It wouldn't be independent of any means whatsoever of the observer to know about it.

The case, though, is utterly indistinguishable from another example--one in which there is no sunset, and the two blind people are discussing the color of a sunset, while pointing to the backside of an elephant.

I think it is distinguishable from the "blind from birth" example, insofar as the proposition assumes a capacity to touch the noumenal, whereas "blind from birth" assumes no capacity to see color.

You can't know that you know chocolate mint ice cream until you try it...and in your OP example...you can never try it.

Why not?

You've repeated your assertion that I've defined noumena as unexperiencable. A lot of your analysis is pinned to that misunderstanding of the proposition.

I'm not trying to convince you of anything, my friend Mercutio. I would be astonished if you or anyone read my proposition and concluded, "Oh yes, the noumenal exists, and I can touch it." Or god. Or whatever.

Rather, I was hoping the reader would be able to hold the proposition in mind and think about whether skepticism, as he or she practices it, opens the door to meaningful inquiry into this type of proposition, or slams it shut.

I gather from what you've written that you do not believe I've presented a meaningful proposition, in other words, one that makes sense and could be the starting point for any meaningful inquiry at all. Have I understood you?

Also, thanks for your invitation:

I'll start with part of it, and if you want me to address something more, just ask.

As I wrote earlier, maybe you could describe those aspects of the proposition that seem to make sense (if there are any), and I could build on that. Think of it as a reverse-straw-man exercise.

Thanks.
 
Hmmm...you admit that we cannot distinguish between its always being around and its never being around...and yet you do not see how we cannot know if it exists. I don't know how I can put it more clearly. If we cannot distinguish between its presence and its absence, it is not known by evidence; it is believed through faith, defined as "belief, in the absence of evidence."

You say you don't think you defined it as both unexperienceable and at the core of our being; from your OP, "let's pretend for a moment that there is some "thing" beyond our experiences and ideas but simultaneously at the very core of our being..." You verify that its presence or absence cannot be known just above, before switching to say that we have a "capacity to touch the noumenal" (I assume that "touch" is metaphor).

Anything that gives us the capacity to touch (metaphor) it , makes it a phenomenon. By definition, though, it is not a phenomenon. This appears to be the "element of consciousness" version of a square circle.

I was hoping the reader would be able to hold the proposition in mind and think about whether skepticism, as he or she practices it, opens the door to meaningful inquiry into this type of proposition, or slams it shut.

I gather from what you've written that you do not believe I've presented a meaningful proposition, in other words, one that makes sense and could be the starting point for any meaningful inquiry at all. Have I understood you?
It puts me in mind of the distinction, in testing and measurement, between reliability and validity. A test is valid if it measures what it says it measures. A test is reliable if it gives consistent results. (yes, I am oversimplifying.) A test can be reliable without being valid (say, shoe size as a measure of intelligence), but a test cannot be valid unless it is reliable. A scale that gives me a different weight every time I step on it (even if I step on it 10 times in one minute) is not measuring my weight; I don't know what it is measuring (I base this on a scale my in-laws had). Anyway...this noumenon is not, cannot be, reliably detected. We cannot inquire about it in any valid fashion whatsoever. In order to talk about it at all, you are forced to treat it as a phenomenon, not a noumenon, which renders anything said about it...frankly, irrelevant. Again, it is a square circle. By definition, it is beyond experience and we cannot talk about it, but by definition, it exists and we can talk about it.

I do think it was a perfectly good thing to apply skepticism to--a critical examination of the definitions, assumptions, logical consequences of the definitions and assumptions...

Oh, because you asked...any History of Psychology book would have a nice discussion of it; there are several nice websites if you google "history of psychology" and introspection....but here's a nice classic paper addressing introspection.
 
Thanks for the link. I don't see any reference to the methodology you discussed earlier, but maybe I could find that elsewhere. This article seems to be mostly about opinions with regard to the definition and use of the word "introspection" in the field of psychology in the 1910's. It's a somewhat different discussion than the one in which we've been engaged.

One interesting paragraph:

We wonder indeed what the 'mind' is which 'one' attends to ('Manual,' Introd., 2) and we might indeed wonder what the 'one' who attends is: these apparently simple assumptions become exceedingly complicated and shaky when introspection is included. Surely the mind is not the mere sum of the processes, for we are told that "the most important drawback is that the mind, in watching its own workings must necessarily have its attention divided between two objects," implying that it is only one process after all which cognizes both objects; for that there should be any difficulty in one process cognizing one object and another process cognizing another object, whether the second object is or is not the first process, does not seem reasonable. Without question, Stout is bringing in here illicitly the concept of a single observer, and his introspection does not provide for the observation of this observer; for the process observed and the observer are distinct.

I love that part, "We wonder indeed with the 'mind' is which 'one' attends to, and we might indeed wonder what the 'one' who attends is."

But eventually, the writer concludes that "introspection" might be a useful term when it comes to observing sensations:

We might keep the word to apply to the processes we have described above (observation of feelings, and of kinesthetic and cœnesthetic sensations); a term by which to designate the observation of these factors would be very useful, and 'introspection' is the legitimate term for the purpose, since these factors are the real 'inner' ones of which psychology has been talking for so long a time ...

Okay.

Getting back to our discussion ...

If we cannot distinguish between its presence and its absence, it is not known by evidence ...

So you're saying the proposition doesn't make sense on its face, right? The proposition stipulates that the noumenal is ever-present, and that evidence for it can be found in oneself. That's how it was presented in the OP.

Apply your reasoning to phenomena. If we cannot distinguish between the presence or absence of phenomena, it is not know by evidence. Does that make sense? Can you point to any real place or situation where phenomena would be absent? Does that means we have to take all phenomena on faith?

Or apply the same reasoning to one's own awareness. If we cannot distinguish between the presence or absence of awareness, it is not known by evidence. Is my only option to take it on faith that this experience of awareness is real? Maybe I'm not really aware, but I only think I am.

I'm sure people could argue those points of view very convincingly, but they're not particularly practical.

You say you don't think you defined it as both unexperienceable and at the core of our being; from your OP, "let's pretend for a moment that there is some "thing" beyond our experiences and ideas but simultaneously at the very core of our being..." You verify that its presence or absence cannot be known just above, before switching to say that we have a "capacity to touch the noumenal" (I assume that "touch" is metaphor).

I'm not sure why you continue to assert that "unexperiencable" was part of the proposition as presented in the OP.

"Beyond our experiences" is not the same thing as unexperiencable. The OP stated that it is "beyond our experiences" even as "direct experience is possible." This does not mean "unexperiencable."

I'm sorry if my first presentation of the proposition did not state that distinction clearly enough. I thought it did, but maybe it didn't.

Anyway...this noumenon is not, cannot be, reliably detected.

The proposition is that it could be reliably detected.

We cannot inquire about it in any valid fashion whatsoever.

If inquiry means just talking about it, you're probably right.

In order to talk about it at all, you are forced to treat it as a phenomenon, not a noumenon, which renders anything said about it...frankly, irrelevant.

True. Thus, direct experience is necessary. Which is what the proposition stated in the OP.

Again, it is a square circle. By definition, it is beyond experience and we cannot talk about it, but by definition, it exists and we can talk about it.

Well, by definition it is "beyond experience" yet "direct experience is possible." And by definition, none of the words we use would describe it adequately, yet there are words people use to try to describe it. So people can talk about it, even though what they say won't ever be quite the same thing as what they experience.

I do think it was a perfectly good thing to apply skepticism to--a critical examination of the definitions, assumptions, logical consequences of the definitions and assumptions...

I'm not convinced that a critical examination of the definitions, assumptions and logical consequences constitutes the full application of skepticism.

Here's one test: As a skeptic, I've talked about it, discussed it, thought it through, and I've concluded the the proposition about noumena is not supported.

Another test would be to actually seek that direct experience. Because what if our intellectual gymnastics are somehow flawed? What if, despite what we've come to expect about the world, the noumenal does exist, is ever-present, and is accessible through direct experience?

Would your particular method of inquiry provide you with the tools you would need to find out?
 
So you're saying the proposition doesn't make sense on its face, right? The proposition stipulates that the noumenal is ever-present, and that evidence for it can be found in oneself. That's how it was presented in the OP.
We can stipulate a square circle. Doesn't make it coherent.
Apply your reasoning to phenomena. If we cannot distinguish between the presence or absence of phenomena, it is not know by evidence. Does that make sense? Can you point to any real place or situation where phenomena would be absent? Does that means we have to take all phenomena on faith?
For any given phenomenon, we do distinguish between its presence and absence. If there are different degrees of something, we can distinguish among them (colors, sounds, textures...). For "all phenomena", yes, that is a judgment of faith; we have seen many debates here as to whether these phenomena are material or mental...pragmatists among us merely note that either monism must be axiomatically assumed, reduces to the other, and cannot be evidenced. So, yes, the very existence of "all phenomena", since I cannot point to a place where they are absent, is taken on faith.

If there are varying degrees of noumena, and we can distinguish among them, then they are phenomena, as they are not "beyond experience".
Or apply the same reasoning to one's own awareness. If we cannot distinguish between the presence or absence of awareness, it is not known by evidence. Is my only option to take it on faith that this experience of awareness is real? Maybe I'm not really aware, but I only think I am.
Same argument applies. It is quite possible, even fruitful, to doubt awareness.
I'm sure people could argue those points of view very convincingly, but they're not particularly practical.
On the other hand, failing to recognize the assumptive nature of the "existence" of these things leads to ... frankly silly questions. More unanswerable stuff.
I'm not sure why you continue to assert that "unexperiencable" was part of the proposition as presented in the OP.

"Beyond our experiences" is not the same thing as unexperiencable. The OP stated that it is "beyond our experiences" even as "direct experience is possible." This does not mean "unexperiencable."

I'm sorry if my first presentation of the proposition did not state that distinction clearly enough. I thought it did, but maybe it didn't.
The only way that I can see a clear distinction is also the way in which I see a clear contradiction in definitions of noumena.
The proposition is that it could be reliably detected.
The proposition is that the circle is square.

If it is square, it cannot be a circle, by definition. If it is reliably detectable, it is phenomenal, not noumenal.
If inquiry means just talking about it, you're probably right.

True. Thus, direct experience is necessary. Which is what the proposition stated in the OP.

Well, by definition it is "beyond experience" yet "direct experience is possible." And by definition, none of the words we use would describe it adequately, yet there are words people use to try to describe it. So people can talk about it, even though what they say won't ever be quite the same thing as what they experience.
And yet you did say that it was distinguishable from imagination. I am continuing to fail to see how. Well, I can see one reason--by definition. Which brings us back to the (by definition) square circle.
I'm not convinced that a critical examination of the definitions, assumptions and logical consequences constitutes the full application of skepticism.
I'm not certain that it has to be. More than one way to skin a noumenon, there is.
Here's one test: As a skeptic, I've talked about it, discussed it, thought it through, and I've concluded the the proposition about noumena is not supported.

Another test would be to actually seek that direct experience. Because what if our intellectual gymnastics are somehow flawed? What if, despite what we've come to expect about the world, the noumenal does exist, is ever-present, and is accessible through direct experience?
If it does exist, is ever-present, and is accessible, then it does not fit the other parts of the definition (beyond experience, etc.). And then, it is a trivial question. It is a part of our experience, like everything else. Not noumenal at all.
Would your particular method of inquiry provide you with the tools you would need to find out?
If I reject square circles based on a logical examination, and someone approaches me and says she actually has one, I will not refuse to look. The empirical trumps the logical; if logic tells me that heavier-than-air flight is impossible, and then I weigh a bird and find it is indeed heavier than air, my logic was based on faulty assumptions, or employed faulty reasoning. However... I still need to see the square circles. I ain't holding my breath. What you are asking in this problem reminds me of one of Mary Calkins' philosophical questions: "Can you conceive of something that cannot be conceived of?" Only you are asking me to experience something that is beyond experience.
 
If something cannot be experienced, is beyond our powers of speech to describe, it is not something which one person can teach another, nor something that we can be assured any two people who use the same term actually agree upon.
A koan! Or the teaching of a master?

The same problem applies even to those things/perceptions/thoughts we do experience, does it not?


We can stipulate a square circle.
We can? How?

If I reject square circles based on a logical examination, and someone approaches me and says she actually has one, I will not refuse to look.
To laugh would be better than taking a look. Unless one can 'see' things with eyes open one cannot 'see' in, shall we say, private behavior.



You have loads of evidence for atmosphere, for wind.
Flag? Wind? Mind? ;)

That is, so it is assumed.
 
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A koan! Or the teaching of a master?

The same problem applies even to those things/perceptions/thoughts we do experience, does it not?
Yes. The short answer is "intersubjective validation", but the longer answer is that we cannot know. Hmm...something I wrote here about 3 years ago addressed this question, and is the only post ever to win both the language award and BillHoyt's logic award. Here it is! I would have bet it would have been pruned.
We can? How?
Thusly: "Given a square circle..."
Flag? Wind? Mind? ;)

That is, so it is assumed.
Or one can simply let others assume such things, and spend one's time on questions that do have answers.

ETA--hey, you added to your response! I would argue that it is not necessarily better to simply laugh. We can indeed (and do) study private behavior; after Fechner, many things thought impossible to study became quite appropriate targets for research. All it takes is the right methodology...given that the thing in question can be known. Which is the part of the definition that squares the circle.
 
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"Laugh" was not really the key idea in
To laugh would be better than taking a look. Unless one can 'see' things with eyes open one cannot 'see' in, shall we say, private behavior.

Also, is noumena the same kind of ~phenomena that a "squared circle" is? I realize Jung is long-discredited, but how do behaviorists explain what he called archetypes?
 
"Laugh" was not really the key idea in


Also, is noumena the same kind of ~phenomena that a "squared circle" is? I realize Jung is long-discredited, but how do behaviorists explain what he called archetypes?
Give me a coherent definition of noumena and I will try to answer.

I don't, off the top of my head, know of any behaviorists who have undertaken the task (although it may have been written--I do know of a few serious behavioral analyses of Freudian concepts. History makes for strange bedfellows.). Now that you ask, though, I think I will go have a look-see.

Not behavioral, but both cognitive and comparative psychologists would explain it in terms of pattern perception and confirmation bias. Don't we all see animals in clouds? Constellations in stars? Axe-murderers in inkblots? ...or is that just me?
 
Give me a coherent definition of noumena and I will try to answer.
As we both know, any definition exceeds the limits of human to human communication, yet the concept remains. Is noumena more real, or no more real, than a square circle?

Not behavioral, but both cognitive and comparative psychologists would explain it in terms of pattern perception and confirmation bias. Don't we all see animals in clouds? Constellations in stars? Axe-murderers in inkblots? ...or is that just me?
Genetics becomes more and more important as long-term observations are made and data analyzed, as I understand the situation.

That is, confirmation bias is just more hardwiring ala fight/flight & "us"/"them".
 
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As we both know, any definition exceeds the limits of human to human communication, yet the concept remains. Is noumena more real, or no more real, than a square circle?
Perhaps the very prototypical example of the unanswerable question. What does it mean to say that "the concept remains"? Do purely fictional concepts also "remain"?
Genetics becomes more and more important as long-term observations are made and data analyzed, as I understand the situation.

That is, confirmation bias is just more hardwiring ala fight/flight & "us"/"them".
But the mechanism behind this is quite different from a circularly defined "collective unconscious".
 

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