A Critical Examination of Values and Their Relation to Morality

[rocketdodger]

This is partially a response to the recent morality thread that quickly regressed into flame.

Define "value" as the weight one gives to a certain action/behavior or group of actions/behaviors according to how well they think those actions/behaviors will serve their needs.

Define "morality" as the aggregate system of all the values one holds.

Define "moral" or "morally right" as an action/behavior that is in accordance with one's morality.

Define "immoral" or "morally wrong" as an action/behavior that is not in accordance with one's morality.

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Axiom: Any action/behavior one exhibits must be in full accordance with the net sum of their instantaneous values, or their instantaneous morality.

Axiom: People often act/behave in ways that don't appear to be in accordance with their self-proclaimed morality.

Theorem: People often exhibit instantaneous moralities that differ from their self-proclaimed morality. This must be because of either 1) their instantaneous morality is actually different from their normal morality (I.E. "fight or flight" type reactions, like otherwise good soldiers loosing control and killing a village family in vietnam) or 2) their instantaneous morality is not different from their normal morality, but their self-proclaimed morality is (I.E. people who delude themselves into thinking they hold values they really don't).

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If the above is true (and I think it is), it suggests a way to objectively measure the morality of a given individual. Does their exhibited morality lead them to actions/behaviors different than their self-proclaimed morality? If so, then they must hold a different set of values than they think they do. If they find that their desired values are different from their actual values, and they want to change, then clearly their current morality is not ideal for them.

Note: I realize that this is a tautology according to the definitions I gave above.

Thoughts?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I know this can be covered to some degree under your definition of 'morality', but what about values that conflict?

For instance, under utilitarianism, we can hold pleasure as the supreme value and wish to maximize it for all.

But we can also value other things that lead to pleasure -- like freedom and equality. Trying to maximize freedom impacts equality. Trying to maximie equality impacts freedom. How do we reconcile two positive values that come into conflict with any simple system?

Alternatively, I recognize that I subject my values to utilitarian principles sometimes and deontologic priniciples at other times. If I have to decide if five guys get it from the runaway train rather than one, I'm pulling the switch and taking out the one (really we should do what my 13 year old said the other day -- "why don't you just tell everyone to get off the track?").

But, for most situations, the end's principle (treat everyone as an end rather than a means to an end) seems to work.

I don't follow these principles all the time, though. I'm human and slip up as much, or more, as the next guy -- so it is definitely the case for me that my morality is not ideal by that scheme. I prefer to just admit that I'm an ******* sometimes, though.

 

[rocketdodger]

How do we reconcile two positive values that come into conflict with any simple system?

You start by realizing that you have these values that conflict. Thats my main point -- you need to critically analyze the values you really have, rather than just the values you think you have or just the values you want to have.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You start by realizing that you have these values that conflict. Thats my main point -- you need to critically analyze the values you really have, rather than just the values you think you have or just the values you want to have.

A very good place to start. I'm a little uncertain how consistent I would be in deciding between these values in different situations. I must use some sort of mechanism to decide, but I'll be damned if I know what it is.

I guess that most of our decision making occurs unconsciously.

 

[MG1962]

I think that somewhere in the brain, our morals are controled by some sort of heirachial thinking. As example I abhore the death penalty, yet I fully support the actions of the Allies in WW2.

So on one hand I can condone and live with the murder of millions, while protesting the murder of one. Thinking as I type, perhaps our morality has two setting, one that affects us as individuals, one that accepts different values as being needed for the group good

 

[rocketdodger]

A very good place to start. I'm a little uncertain how consistent I would be in deciding between these values in different situations. I must use some sort of mechanism to decide, but I'll be damned if I know what it is.

I guess that most of our decision making occurs unconsciously.

I agree. The simplistic formalism of the OP should in no way be taken to suggest that things are that simple

I just wanted to put out a logical measurement that can be used to show that some moralities are "worse" than others. My assertion is that the moral systems used by many people (in particular, the religious) are in fact not representative of their desired values.

 

[MG1962]

I agree. The simplistic formalism of the OP should in no way be taken to suggest that things are that simple

I just wanted to put out a logical measurement that can be used to show that some moralities are "worse" than others. My assertion is that the moral systems used by many people (in particular, the religious) are in fact not representative of their desired values.

But to argue that, would be to argue their is a differential between thesist and atheist moral sets, and in Western society I am not sure I see that

 

[rocketdodger]

But to argue that, would be to argue their is a differential between thesist and atheist moral sets, and in Western society I am not sure I see that

Well you have to remember that "moral set" includes everything, so here in the west the difference might be something like theists opposing birth control, stem cell research, equality of the sexes, whatever. Certainly the differences between western theists and atheists are not nearly as great as those between eastern fundamentalists and atheists.

I could claim that the reason for this is that here in the west the theists have had a chance to undergo this introspection -- they have tossed aside many of the moral rules included in the older versions of their religion that they felt did not accurately represent their desired values.

 

[athon]

Define "value" as the weight one gives to a certain action/behavior or group of actions/behaviors according to how well they think those actions/behaviors will serve their needs.

I think this complicates what a value really is. It doesn't necessarily need to be a behaviour, nor serve their needs. It is simply the weight attributed to how much you might desire something within a given context.

It could be a desire for good health, for wealth in provision of security, wealth in provision of social status, a respect from peers, a sense of physical gratification...all of these things are things that are valued, hence are basic values.

The problem is that values are rarely described as contextual, or rather are rarely defined according to a hierarchy. I value a sense of security provided for by wealth. I also value owning a television. On top of that, I value having technology which is relatively up-to-date, and have a value in communicating effectively with my wife. Viewed in the context of 'buying a news television', those values exist in a complex network which has a hierarchy - some values will be higher than others, and will ultimately contribute to how I will behave in purchasing a new tv.

Define "morality" as the aggregate system of all the values one holds.

Morality is the behaviour which arises according to that hierarchy of values external to a context. It basically assumes that some values will always be more important than others.

In a given situation, you might commit an action based on the values you have at that time, without taking into account repercussions. For instance, you sleep with your neighbour's wife. The value of physical gratification is higher at that moment than the value of having trust in your relationship with your own wife. Later, when the value of trust is higher and gratification lower, you feel guilt.

Morality is assumed from your social group and allows one to judge how certain actions might be assessed later. I'm not saying it's a cognitive system of decision making, but it does allow one to predict behaviours within their social group.

Define "moral" or "morally right" as an action/behavior that is in accordance with one's morality.

Morally right would be an assessment of the values outside of a specific context. That is what gives them the illusion of being objective, and also what creates arguments in a community.

Theorem: People often exhibit instantaneous moralities that differ from their self-proclaimed morality. This must be because of either 1) their instantaneous morality is actually different from their normal morality (I.E. "fight or flight" type reactions, like otherwise good soldiers loosing control and killing a village family in vietnam) or 2) their instantaneous morality is not different from their normal morality, but their self-proclaimed morality is (I.E. people who delude themselves into thinking they hold values they really don't).

If we relate your 'instantaneous morality' to simply being the context of a situation and its comparison to one's morals, and 'self-proclaimed morality' as being simply an individual's or a communities moral code, I would agree.

If the above is true (and I think it is), it suggests a way to objectively measure the morality of a given individual. Does their exhibited morality lead them to actions/behaviors different than their self-proclaimed morality? If so, then they must hold a different set of values than they think they do. If they find that their desired values are different from their actual values, and they want to change, then clearly their current morality is not ideal for them.

This is true. However, it's not as simple as simply shopping for new morals. We inherit morals from our social group in order to fit in with their behaviours. Social groups do vary for individuals at any given moment, more today than ever before in history. I might have a dozen social groups, all with varying moral codes. Knowing our own values might help in analysing our moral codes, but I don't know if it is an easy thing to change.

Athon

 

[MG1962]

Well you have to remember that "moral set" includes everything, so here in the west the difference might be something like theists opposing birth control, stem cell research, equality of the sexes, whatever. Certainly the differences between western theists and atheists are not nearly as great as those between eastern fundamentalists and atheists.

I could claim that the reason for this is that here in the west the theists have had a chance to undergo this introspection -- they have tossed aside many of the moral rules included in the older versions of their religion that they felt did not accurately represent their desired values.

Thats an interesting point actually. In a fundamentalist society it could actually be the athiest that lead to adjustment in morals. As in the example you suggested, equality of the sex's.

I wonder if any feminists are looking on, might suggest what was the root behind the change in morals for women that led from being the delicate fairer sex, to equal partners in many societies.

 

[rocketdodger]

I think this complicates what a value really is. It doesn't necessarily need to be a behaviour, nor serve their needs. It is simply the weight attributed to how much you might desire something within a given context.

It could be a desire for good health, for wealth in provision of security, wealth in provision of social status, a respect from peers, a sense of physical gratification...all of these things are things that are valued, hence are basic values.

Yes I fully agree, but the only observable attributes of a mind are its actions/behaviors, so to simplify things I stopped there.