This is what comes of Doron using logic notations for what should be regarded as pre-logic relations.
It's not clear to me what could come before logic. Logic is the meta-level of mathematics; it's the fabric that mathematical proofs are made from, the language they are stated in. Mathematics is about deriving theorems from initial assumptions: the axioms we first lay down in a (new) field of mathematics. Logic deals with the ways
how we may derive theorems, lemmata, etc. from those axioms. Let's have a look at the most basic theory of logic.
Propositional logic
Propositional logic
WP doesn't deal at all with the mathematical content of propositions. It just studies how we may reason with propositions to form new ones. To abstract away from the mathematical content, we work with a list of atomic formulae A1, A2, A3, ... Think of those as truth values. From those, you can form more complex formulae by using the usual logical connectives.
Now there are two possible approaches to see which formulae are true. One is to draw up truth tables. Then you'll see that, e.g. A1 OR (NOT A1) is true for whatever truth value of A1; or that A1 AND (NOT A1) is false for whatever truth value of A1.
The other is to analyse what steps we take in actual proofs and draw up rules according to which we may infer true formulae. A couple of examples.
Modus ponens. Suppose we have derived a formula X -> Y from a list of assumptions Gamma, and suppose we have also derived the formula X from the same list of assumptions Gamma. Then we may conclude that the formula Y follows from that same list of assumptions. In a formula, we have as inference rule:
[latex]$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash X \Rightarrow Y ~~~~~ \Gamma \vdash X}{\Gamma \vdash Y}$$[/latex]
The list of assumptions Gamma is needed because we always derive in real life formulae in a context: the axioms which we've taken up as assumptions in the theory we're developing.
ETA: The format of a clause X1, X2, ..., Xn |- Y may look familiar to programmers; indeed, when you turn around the clause, you recognize the Horn clauses
Y :- X1, X2, ..., Xn
as they are used in logic programming languages such as Prolog.
Case distinction. Suppose we have derived a formula X OR Y from a list of assumptions Gamma. What do you do in a mathematical proof? Well, you make a case distinction. First you go on reasoning from Gamma plus X and then you derive a new formula Z. Then you reason from Gamma plus Y and try to reach the same formula Z. Again, as an inference rule:
[latex]$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash X \vee Y ~~~~~ \Gamma, X \vdash Z ~~~~~ \Gamma, Y \vdash Z}{\Gamma \vdash Z}$$[/latex]
This way, you can draw up some eleven inference rules: basically, for each connective an introduction rule which introduces the connective in the conclusion, and an elimination rule which has the connective in the antecedent but not in the conclusion. All those rules are intuitively obviously correct. A last rule I'd like to mention is the introduction rule for the implication:
[latex]$$\frac{\Gamma, X \vdash Y}{\Gamma \vdash X \Rightarrow Y}$$[/latex]
The notation I used above is from the Sequent calculus
WP, but then restricted to having only consequent; the rules are those from Natural deduction
WP.
When you can derive a formula X from a list of assumptions Gamma, it is said to be
provable.
The wonderful thing about propositional logic is that it is both consistent (sound) and complete. Consistent means that every formula X that is provable is also true (whenever the assumptions are true) according to the truth tables. Complete, on the other hand, means that every formula X that is true according to the truth tables is also provable by means of the inference rules.
Thus far, we've essentially only analyzed the structure of mathematical proofs and the way such a proof may be built.
I see no room here, whatsoever, for any other notion which may influence our logic.
He's trying to define his Non-Locality.
It's like this:
If you draw a boundary of enclosure (say a circle) on an empty plane and give the interior a different content than what is exterior, the distinction creates a Local configuration or value. X is the contrasting value within. Without is not X. This is Local.
Okay. Let's say X is orange (sorry for the chauvinism; it'll be over in two weeks

). So the interior of the circle is orange - for the sake of argument, I restrict your "content" to the colour aspect of the content. But what colour does the exterior have? It can be blue, yellow, green, black, etc. So "not X" is not "not X" in a logical sense. On a logical level, there are only two values: true and false. In a real mathematical setting, we have of course many values, but that's on another level. It is wrong to speak of the content of the exterior as "not X"; you should label it Y, and then you may indeed claim that those are different: NOT (x=y). That brings us to the next chapter in mathematical logic.
First-order Logic
In First-order Logic
WP (FOL), we combine the logic language of propositional logic with the language of some mathematical theory. A FOL consists of the kind of logic formulae we built in propositional logic, but now we don't build them up from some atomic formulae A1, A2, ..., but from terms from a mathematical theory. That theory has a
structure, i.e., it is built from some atomic terms t1, t2, ..., some function symbols f1, f2, ... and some relation symbols R1, R2, ... Each mathematical theory has prescribed in its structure how many terms there are, how many functions and how many relations (and how many arguments each function/relation has). For instance, the (simplest) theory of natural numbers has
- one atomic term, 0
- one unary function succ
- one binary relation =
whereas set theory has one term (the empty set) and one binary relation (membership).
Furthermore, we introduce variables x1, x2, ... which range over values of the domain of discourse. With this, we can build further terms of our domain of discourse; say, with the natural numbers,
succ(x) is again a natural number; and we can build logical formulae, e.g.
succ(x)
= succ
Note that we thus have two kind of values: terms denote values in the domain of discourse, whereas formulae denote truth values. To sum it up, a term is built by the following rules:
- an atomic term is a term
- a variable is a term
- a function symbol with the correct number of terms as arguments, makes a term
and logical formulae are built by the following rules:
- a relation symbol with the correct number of terms as arguments makes a formula
- one or two formulae connected with a logical connective make a formula
- a quantifier (see below) with a variable and a formula makes a formula
Finally, FOL introduces the quantifiers "forall" and "exists" which range over values in the domain of discourse, so we can make formulae as:
[latex]$$\forall x: \forall y: \mbox{\textbb{succ}}(x) \mathbb{=} \mbox{\textbb{succ}}

\Rightarrow x \mathbb{=} y$$[/latex]
and some extra inference rules for those quantifiers.
In FOL, we now again can use inference rules to prove all kinds of theorems from assumptions - the assumptions typically being the axioms of the theory in question. An example of such an axiom is the reflexivity of equality:
[latex]$$\forall x: x \mathbb{=} x$$[/latex]
or the formula two paragraphs above which states that
succ is injective.
In propositional logic, we had "provable" on the one hand, and "truth tables" on the other hand. In FOL, we still have "provable", but on the other hand, there can be all kinds of models of the theory: an actual set, with an actual element 0 and an actual function succ and an actual relation =. In theory, you can check for each such model whether a certain formula is true. From that, we can extend to saying if a formula is true in
all models of the theory. That is the counterpart of "truth tables" in FOL.
However, it is obvious that it would be very tedious to check if a formula is valid in one model of the theory, let along in all models. The great thing about FOL is that we still have both consistency and completeness!
Consistency now thus means that every provable formula is valid in all models of the theory. Completeness means that every formula that is valid in all models of the theory is also provable. The completeness theorem is due to Gödel.
Gödel, completeness - I hear you mutter - didn't that guy prove
incompleteness? Yes, he did too. There is one proviso to the completeness theorem I mention. It says that valid formulae are only provable if you have a
finite list of assumptions (axioms). The theory of natural numbers, however, needs an infinite list of axioms.
If the there is a contrast in value where X is the value for the exterior while the interior is not X, this distinction too amounts to a Locality.
But if the interior and exterior both have the value of X, there is no distinction and no boundary. There is just same old space. This is the Non-Local. There's no contrast to be found, so no place to be recognized, so no Locality.
The same is the case if the interior and exterior have the same value of not X. There is no contrast, no interior vrs, exterior, no Locality.
If there is no contrast between the interior and the exterior, there is a symmetry of value. So another disignation he gives for Non-Locality is Symmetry.
If the interiior and exterior are of contrasting value, there is an asymmetry of Value. So another designation he gives the Locality is Asymmetry.
I see in this exposé (and the following parts I culled) no reason to put "locality" before logic. It seems to me to be just part of the mathematical language in the FOL framework. Just introduce a relation "local" on the values of your domain of discourse.
Just like a sphere is a unity with two polar opposites, all complementary poles are the the extremes of a single Unity he calls "The VALUE."
The VALUE has no characteristics of its own. Characteristics are the result of the relations of polar contrasts. The VALUE is the Unity of all complements, so it has no identifying or locating features, as these are all matters of contrast, and it contains all contrasts.
He goes on to frame a Logic where A is one pole and ~A another. In The VALUE, A = ~A is a given as one combination, but only as one, not the whole ballgame.
I can only take words like "THE VALUE" at face value - if there's only one value in your domain of discourse, it is utterly uninteresting. As to in Doron's logic being A and ~A being poles: wherever he does say things about his logic, he firmly sticks to classical two-valued truth tables, so I don't see anything modal or otherwise revolutionary about them. A formula and its negation simply cannot be true at the same time.