Merged 2019-nCoV / Corona virus

Status
Not open for further replies.
WHO is concerned about the infection of people who haven't been to China, with the director-general saying those cases could be the tip of the iceberg: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...not-visited-china-could-be-tip-of-the-iceberg

Still so many unknowns, but time will give the answers.

The Guardian numbers differ from the Johns Hopkins dashboard:

Shows mainland China totals at 40.2k (Same as the Guardian) and 39.8k the prior day whereas the Guardian said the count increased 3k. However, previous increases were 3k to 4k each day. Looks like an error. Most likely a Guardian error.

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6
 
Last edited:
I am careful about terminology - that's exactly what I meant.

Viruses often drop in virulence after a few generations, and hopefully that's what's we're seeing.

Is there any evidence for this? There is no reason why viruses should become less virulent. The 1918 flu pandemic initially became more virulent. There is no consistent view on this in the literature.
http://www.virology.ws/2009/06/10/virulence-a-positive-or-negative-trait-for-evolution/
Virulence may be associated with viral load, increased virulence and transmissibility may be positively related. I think the statements by some here that virulence will fall is wishful thinking. This is a seperate issue from saying mortality falls as susceptibles in a population fall, either due to death or recovery with the development of immunity.
 
Is there any evidence for this?
Evidence, yes, but it takes a lot longer than a couple weeks.

It's not like a couple mild cases replace the whole population of circulating viruses.

In this case, people are spreading it before they develop serious disease and die. So the selection pressure for milder disease is there but it's a weak selection pressure. It becomes a greater selection pressure as more unnoticed mild cases spread infection while noticeable symptomatic cases are effectively isolated.


There is no reason why viruses should become less virulent. The 1918 flu pandemic initially became more virulent. There is no consistent view on this in the literature.
http://www.virology.ws/2009/06/10/virulence-a-positive-or-negative-trait-for-evolution/
There is a ton of evidence and you are only looking at a piece of information.

It is thought that the 1918 H1N1 strain did indeed circulate for a year before it returned in the lethal form it did. But it returned in waves. The first wave was the worst and most lethal. The following year there was a smaller wave and by the third year the strain was, for the most part, attenuated.


Virulence may be associated with viral load, increased virulence and transmissibility may be positively related. I think the statements by some here that virulence will fall is wishful thinking. This is a seperate issue from saying mortality falls as susceptibles in a population fall, either due to death or recovery with the development of immunity.
Re the bolded, no it isn't. It's based on a wealth of knowledge about how viral pathogens act.

When it comes to influenza, new strains circulate on average about 18 months before the host population develops enough immunity that the next new strain becomes the predominate strain circulating.

That is an oversimplified version. Multiple strains circulate in a single season. And there are other variables besides the host population susceptibility. Also flu strains drift genetically at a fairly constant rate, while they also shift from time to time as viruses recombine resulting in genetic shifts.


Bottom line, we snuffed SARS out completely through isolation and contact tracing. It's hard to believe that will happen with this strain. More likely it's going to circulate for a while but will eventually become an attenuated strain.
 
This was on the news tonight, nine family members infected through a shared meal. I'm guessing this was the original source:

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/e...g-family-feared-infected-after-sharing-hotpot

Meanwhile, this is being reported by the New York Times:

Coronavirus cases on a cruise ship in Japan nearly double, surpassing 130.

An additional 66 cases of the new coronavirus have been confirmed on a cruise ship quarantined in Yokohama, Japan, raising the total number to 136, the ship’s captain told passengers on Monday.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/world/asia/coronavirus-china.html

Also reported in Japan Times:

Halfway through what is supposed to be a two-week period of quarantine, more than 60 people aboard the Diamond Princess cruise ship in Yokohama have tested positive for the novel coronavirus, bringing the onboard tally to at least 130, a government official said Monday.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2...ers-diamond-princess-cruise-ship-coronavirus/
 
This was on the news tonight, nine family members infected through a shared meal. I'm guessing this was the original source:

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/e...g-family-feared-infected-after-sharing-hotpot

Yep, there's certainly been some less-encouraging news in the past few hours.

UK has declared a "serious and imminent threat to public health".

No doubt on the back of the bloke known to have infected the seven in the ski chalet, who then went on to spend a night at a crowded pub.

Meanwhile, this is being reported by the New York Times:

And that's the even worse news - doubling of cases isn't a good look.

The potential good news earlier is far outweighed by the later bad, and the odds of a major global pandemic just got a lot shorter.
 
And here's some more terrible news - Singapore has an outbreak at their financial centre, so we can expect a load of cases to come out of that: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...-emerge-in-financial-center?srnd=premium-asia

I think the most chilling point is the 6/22 cases listed as critical, which bears a very close resemblance to the official Chinese figures. Small sample in Singapore, but based on the large Chinese sample, the fact that it's carrying on at all outside China is truly scary.

If the disease goes wild at that level of virulence, hospitals around the world will collapse under the strain and we'll be seeing millions of deaths. My 3,000,000 early estimate will be very much on the low side.
 
The Guardian numbers differ from the Johns Hopkins dashboard:

Shows mainland China totals at 40.2k (Same as the Guardian) and 39.8k the prior day whereas the Guardian said the count increased 3k. However, previous increases were 3k to 4k each day. Looks like an error. Most likely a Guardian error.

https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

The Guardian referred to the previous 24 hours, which is different from the time since end of day 09/02/20.
 
Latest numbers are a daily growth if only 7.7%

AND, cure rate vs death rate, 75% of hospitalized patients get better. So far.

Do you have a source for this?

If this is true, that's a terrible percentage. I suppose it depends on how these cases are being counted.

75% of those infected already getting better is not the same thing as if 75% of those infected ever get better. The rapid growth in the numbers means that most of the people identified as infected were only identified a few days or a week or so ago. Therefore they haven't "had a chance" to get better yet.

If one doesn't understand the numbers it looks like 25% admitted are dying. That is not the case at all, one is comparing numbers from different time frames in the course of the infection.

That is exactly my point when I said, "I suppose it depends on how these numbers are counted".

I think, right now, we don't really have a way of knowing how many people will end up recovering if they are admitted to hospital because it is too soon.

My point is that if this is taken at face value, according to the grammar of the phrase - 75% of hospitalized patients get better - then it would be a terrible percentage, because it would mean that 25% do not recover.

In other words, it is a meaningless statistic because we don't know how many will recover.
 
I've been hearing on the news that the company that runs the Diamond Princess wants to pay everyone back double what they paid to begin with, as well as all expenses that might be needed to get back home.

Could be PR, but I wonder also if they are trying to arrange an agreement whereby the passengers promise not to sue them for allowing the spread to occur in the first place.
 
The number of people infected by the coronavirus in the UK has doubled to eight - after four more patients tested positive for the virus.

It comes as the government issued new powers in England to keep people in quarantine to stop the virus spreading.

On Monday, the Health Secretary Matt Hancock announced new regulations in England as "the transmission of coronavirus would constitute a serious threat".

Under the Department of Health measures people will not be free to leave quarantine, and can be forcibly sent into isolation if they pose a threat.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51442314
 
A GP practice in Brighton has been temporarily closed after a staff member tested positive for the coronavirus.

Patients at the city's County Oak medical centre have been advised to contact the NHS 111 phone service if they have concerns.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51447761
 
Well, we are 6 days after the ship was quarantined with 10 diagnosed and it just doubled since yesterday to 136.

Strong evidence of how infectious this puppy is.

Odds of global containment failure and becoming a pandemic seem very high at this point
It suggests people are contagious before symptoms develop, and it's interesting the incubation period seems consistent for that many people to show symptoms at about the same time.
 
Evidence, yes, but it takes a lot longer than a couple weeks.

It's not like a couple mild cases replace the whole population of circulating viruses.

In this case, people are spreading it before they develop serious disease and die. So the selection pressure for milder disease is there but it's a weak selection pressure. It becomes a greater selection pressure as more unnoticed mild cases spread infection while noticeable symptomatic cases are effectively isolated.


There is a ton of evidence and you are only looking at a piece of information.

It is thought that the 1918 H1N1 strain did indeed circulate for a year before it returned in the lethal form it did. But it returned in waves. The first wave was the worst and most lethal. The following year there was a smaller wave and by the third year the strain was, for the most part, attenuated.


Re the bolded, no it isn't. It's based on a wealth of knowledge about how viral pathogens act.

When it comes to influenza, new strains circulate on average about 18 months before the host population develops enough immunity that the next new strain becomes the predominate strain circulating.

That is an oversimplified version. Multiple strains circulate in a single season. And there are other variables besides the host population susceptibility. Also flu strains drift genetically at a fairly constant rate, while they also shift from time to time as viruses recombine resulting in genetic shifts.


Bottom line, we snuffed SARS out completely through isolation and contact tracing. It's hard to believe that will happen with this strain. More likely it's going to circulate for a while but will eventually become an attenuated strain.

I think our differences on this are just generational. As the paper discusses below the idea that pathogens would evolve towards less virulence was widely believed and taught last century. The idea probably is still found in textbooks.

Why do parasites harm their host? On the origin and legacy of Theobald Smith's "law of declining virulence"--1900-1980.
Methot PO.
Pubblicazioni della Stazione Zoologica di Napoli - Section Ii: History & Philosophy of the Life Sciences. 34(4):561-601, 2012.

Why do parasites harm their host? The persistence of this question in the history of the life sciences rests partly on a seeming biological paradox. In effect, although the annihilation of the host by a parasite could be depicted as a crude example of "the survival of the fittest," situations where the host dies rapidly often amount to a pyrrhic victory because parasitic colonies harboured within it may die as well before the transmission stage. So why would natural selection favour high virulence if this results in both the host's and the pathogen's deaths? From the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the late 1970s, it was often considered that, all else being equal, pathogen's evolution towards harmlessness was the expected outcome of long-term biological associations, as it would ensure the survival of both species. Frequently dismissed today as naively adaptationist, this perspective was however widely defended by some of those who pioneered an ecological, even evolutionary view of disease in the early-twentieth century, and was often ascribed to American bacteriologist and comparative pathologist Theobald Smith (1859-1934). Since the early 1980s, the mathematical model of the trade-off--based on the idea that pathogens face several compromises between their mode of transmission, the level of virulence, and the cost of resistance--has challenged the assumed tendency towards harmlessness and has gained currency. This paper first analyzes Theobald Smith's conception of disease, his experimental work on Texas cattle fever, and his formulation of the "law of declining virulence." The following sections then trace the legacy of this model of disease evolution from circa 1900 to its widespread acceptance in the mid-twentieth century and until its downfall in the 1980s. Particular attention is given to the case of the myxoma virus and how it acted as an empirical confirmation of Smith's model in the 1950s. Finally, the paper examines both significant empirical and theoretical challenges to the avirulence model. The present study not only fills a gap in the history of disease transmission and ecology but also sheds light on the intermingled relationship between bacteriology, evolutionary biology, and public health in the past century.

More modern views are that epidemics are associated with evolutionary pressures to increase virulence, (this is NOT that the epidemic is a consequence of increased virulence but it provides an opportunity to increase virulence).

Transient virulence of emerging pathogens.
Bolker BM; Nanda A; Shah D.
Journal of the Royal Society Interface. 7(46):811-22, 2010 May 06.

Should emerging pathogens be unusually virulent? If so, why? Existing theories of virulence evolution based on a tradeoff between high transmission rates and long infectious periods imply that epidemic growth conditions will select for higher virulence, possibly leading to a transient peak in virulence near the beginning of an epidemic. This transient selection could lead to high virulence in emerging pathogens. Using a simple model of the epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics of emerging pathogens, along with rough estimates of parameters for pathogens such as severe acute respiratory syndrome, West Nile virus and myxomatosis, we estimated the potential magnitude and timing of such transient virulence peaks. Pathogens that are moderately evolvable, highly transmissible, and highly virulent at equilibrium could briefly double their virulence during an epidemic; thus, epidemic-phase selection could contribute significantly to the virulence of emerging pathogens. In order to further assess the potential significance of this mechanism, we bring together data from the literature for the shapes of tradeoff curves for several pathogens (myxomatosis, HIV, and a parasite of Daphnia) and the level of genetic variation for virulence for one (myxomatosis). We discuss the need for better data on tradeoff curves and genetic variance in order to evaluate the plausibility of various scenarios of virulence evolution.

Indeed the development of immunity in the host population may be an evolutionary driver to increased virulence.
Genetic analysis of post-pandemic 2010-2011 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 hemagglutinin virus variants that caused mild, severe, and fatal infections in Northern Greece.
Melidou A; Gioula G; Exindari M; Chatzidimitriou D; Malisiovas N.
Journal of Medical Virology. 87(1):57-67, 2015 Jan.

Since its appearance, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 caused considerable morbidity and mortality in Northern Greece. Genetic analysis of post-pandemic circulating strains scoped to investigate any correlation between genetic variations that emerged during viral evolution and severity of infection. Pharyngeal swabs/aspirates (n = 1,870) were examined with real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. Hemagglutinin sequences were analyzed on 110 strains (37 fatal/73 non-fatal cases), followed by statistical and phylogenetic analysis. Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was detected in 848 samples. Coexistence of clusters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 indicated co-circulation of lineages in Northern Greece. Genetic analysis showed that HA sequences had 96-99% sequence similarity with the vaccine strain and that there was no association between any co-circulating lineage and severity. Several viruses accumulated variations in HA antigenic sites. D222G was significantly associated with fatal infections, supporting its association with increased viral pathogenesis. On the other hand, four variations were associated with milder disease outcomes. Certain signature amino acid changes persisted during and/or after the pandemic, indicating their offer of selective advantages to the virus. Negative selection was observed in 70% of pandemic variations as they probably did not contribute to the virus fitness. It is of interest that persistent variations were highly identified in the vicinity of antigenic or receptor-binding sites. Of those, K171R was associated only with fatal infections. Also of interest, only strains that were isolated from fatal infections had variations that altered both their acid-base and polarity properties. Genetic changes that may alter the antigenicity, pathogenicity and transmissibility of circulating virus variants need to be determined and closely monitored.

Trade offs between host and parasite and environment may result in shifting of virulence both more and less. Viruses may evolve to be less virulent under some circumstances but other circumstances such as a well connected naive population favour increased virulence. There is no natural law that pathogens evolve to be less virulent.

Large shifts in pathogen virulence relate to host population structure.
Boots M; Hudson PJ; Sasaki A.
Science. 303(5659):842-4, 2004 Feb 06.

Theory on the evolution of virulence generally predicts selection for an optimal level of virulence determined by trade-offs with transmission and/or recovery. Here we consider the evolution of pathogen virulence in hosts who acquire long-lived immunity and live in a spatially structured population. We show theoretically that large shifts in virulence may occur in pathogen populations as a result of a bistability in evolutionary dynamics caused by the local contact or social population structure of the host. This model provides an explanation for the rapid emergence of the highly virulent strains of rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus.

Apologies if this is seen as pasting too much text, but I thought some might like to read the abstracts.
 
Last edited:
China changes the counting of the infected – and thus causes falling case numbers

The Chinese National Health Commission (CNHC) on February 7th their “Prevention and Control Plan” changed the definition of what should be considered a “confirmed coronavirus case”. So far, everyone who has been diagnosed with the coronavirus has been counted as infected. However who shows no symptoms despite positive results should no longer be classified as a confirmed infection. This emerges from a CNHC document. This means that the number of cases will decrease soon due to this changed definition.
https://www.bccourier.com/china-cha...-people-and-thus-causes-falling-case-numbers/


And more good news...

Coronavirus could have incubation period of 24 days — 10 days longer than previously thought

Medical researchers in China have found the incubation period for coronavirus ranges up to 24 days — 10 days longer than experts previously thought.

The research was co-authored by Dr Zhong Nanshan, who discovered the SARS coronavirus in 2003 and has been appointed as a leading advisor in managing the current coronavirus crisis.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/...oms-china-sars-length-days-time-a9326591.html
 
I think our differences on this are just generational. As the paper discusses below the idea that pathogens would evolve towards less virulence was widely believed and taught last century. The idea probably is still found in textbooks.
Oh Puhleese. :rolleyes: You think I read something in school years ago and never read anything since? Don't insult me. The difference is you don't have enough information about the state of genetic research on viruses like flu.

More modern views are that epidemics are associated with evolutionary pressures to increase virulence, (this is NOT that the epidemic is a consequence of increased virulence but it provides an opportunity to increase virulence).

Indeed the development of immunity in the host population may be an evolutionary driver to increased virulence.

Trade offs between host and parasite and environment may result in shifting of virulence both more and less. Viruses may evolve to be less virulent under some circumstances but other circumstances such as a well connected naive population favour increased virulence. There is no natural law that pathogens evolve to be less virulent.

Apologies if this is seen as pasting too much text, but I thought some might like to read the abstracts.
I did not say selection to milder strains was the only selection pressure. It isn't. If that were true we'd never have incredibly virulent flu epidemics.

But when a virulent strain of flu does enter the human population, then there is a selection pressure toward attenuation. Otherwise we'd have the same number of mild and severe flu epidemics, randomly, and we don't. What happened to the 1918 flu strain if it didn't become attenuated?

First, you can't lump all viruses together. So let's look at two examples: measles and flu.

Before measles vaccine, epidemics over baseline endemicity occurred every few years. Why? Because measles is so efficient that after a surge in cases, the host population develops a high degree of immunity. After a few years, a new crop of kids are born and at some point the threshold of population susceptibility is reached and we get a new surge of cases.

There is no mechanism for selecting either more or less virulent strains. And over time measles virulence remains about the same. Most people developed measles before they reached adulthood. (Antivaxxers have changed that and cases are occurring in all age groups, but that's a different subject.) Unlike flu, measles only infects people one time with rare exceptions. It evolved to infect a new crop of kids rather than evolving to get around the host immune system.


Now take influenza. It evolved multiple mechanisms of mutation. Milder and more severe epidemics occur quite randomly. However, you don't see strains randomly developing more virulence through genetic drift. Rather most strains just drift toward avoiding recognition while severe strains drift toward milder disease. New severe strains usually emerge from new species transfers or new recombinant strains.

If strains drifted randomly to more or less virulent strains then we would see that in the genetic history. But we don't. Strains with changes in the envelope evolve by being selected to avoid recognition thus they can reinfect a person who had flu a year or two ago.

IOW strains not selected by more or less virulence but rather they are selected to avoid the initial immune response and reinfect the population:

Evolution of Influenza A Virus by Mutation and Re-Assortment
There are three main characteristics which contribute to the rapid evolution of these viruses: large populations, short generation times, and high mutation rates. Every mutation, which helps the virus to evade the host immune system, may be positively selected, passed on to the next generation, and distributed more widely.
Genetic drift.


Genetic shift:
Studies have shown that duck 3286/H7N9 virus PB2 gene mutation enhances polymerase activity and viral replication in human cells [63]. The data reveal that the E627K substitution in the PB2 polymerase protein appears to be one of main determinants of the avian influenza virus host range [64]. ...

In addition to mutation and re-assortment, IAVs still have another relatively rare means of evolution called recombination. Genetic recombination is one of the primary processes that produce the genetic diversity upon which natural selection acts.
So random mutations in a non-human species is one source of new human strains. Another is recombination and re-assortment. Strains occur randomly but were not selected to be more virulent. But when a virulent strain emerges, it's not through genetic drift.

IOW the virus' genetics drift and after ~18 months (I don't know the range) it can circulate again in people previously infected.


So what happens to these highly virulent strains once they enter the population? They don't keep changing to avoid host immunity and recirculate.
Over the past 100 years, there have been four flu pandemics: 1918 H1N1 Spanish flu [6], which has been described as "the greatest medical holocaust in history" [7], 1957 H2N2 Asian flu, 1968 H3N2 Hong Kong flu, and 2009 H1N1 swine flu. The most serious pandemic occurred in 1918, killing more than 50 million people worldwide [8]. Since 1996, the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus (H5N1) has caused more than 1000 deaths, resulting in a mortality rate of about 55% [9]. Recently, a low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus (H7N9) identified first in the East China region caused an outbreak in humans, with a mortality rate as high as 40% [10].
So where are those strains?

Highly virulent strains drift genetically toward attenuation. We know this from genetic analysis of flu mutations.
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom