Evidence abounds of the existence of behaviour which is contrary to material best interest, stuff that one would be better off not doing, either altruistic or all-round destructive, and sometimes described as irrational. Such behaviour is sufficiently common that few are surprised by it. And many explanations put forward to account for why self-sacrifice prevails have gained acceptance. This book sorts and organises these explanantions, notes that they fail to account for all self-sacrificing behaviour, and fills in the blanks with the elegant "commitment model", in which emotions serve useful purpose and deliver evolutionary superiority. Even in non hunting/gathering times.
Some altruism theories are religious (essentially, god is watching you, so behave). Others attempt to bend self-sacrificing behaviour back around so that it can be interpreted as materially self-serving. Such as kinship-compatible selection (putting family first to promote gene survival, which worker-ants can only do as they cannot reproduce themselves, but people do too). Or reciprocal altruism (which assumes and expects a future payoff from co-operation). Or "tit-for-tat" which is a well documented strategy that tends to dominate iterated prisoners dilemma games (which mimic many real life interactions).
But as Robert Frank writes: all of these theories assume that--contrary to the irrationality supposition--material gain remains the motivating force. Even the religious one does, if material is relaxed a bit to encompass the experience of future expectation of heaven or hell. He therefore calls them soft-core altruism. The hard-core version would be when there can be no rational expectation of benefit, and yet truly virtuous behaviour is still motivated. Such as Lenny Skutnik rescuing an air-crash victim from a freezing river in Washington DC, where there was a low probability he would survive or save her, and still less that she would be in a position to reciprocate in future. Many less-dramatic examples of entirely selfless acts can be reproduced in lab tests.
But if there is no material payoff to truly virtuous action, then rather inexorably and compellingly, by Darwinian logic's stick, and by Smithian self-interest's carrot, virtue would surely be out-competed by opportunism and fall victim to natural de-selection. Put simply, we can't eat moral sentiments (anger, sympathy, guilt, vengeance) but unless they bring about something we can eat, they simply have no (evolutionary) business being there.
And they do actually pay the rent, according to Frank's commitment model. People respond to their emotions (in greater or lesser measure) because these generate their own reward/punishment mechanisms. These mechanisms alter the perceived payoffs. Someone capable of strong sympathy/guilt won't cheat even if he has a golden opportunity to do so with no possibility of detection. Another who gets enraged by injustice will seek revenge because she wants to even if it will not pay her to do so (as in the 19th century Hatfield-McCoy feud in the US). Emotions can thus commit individuals to certain materially costly behaviours. And these commitments are difficult (also costly) to fake, not least because of "preference reversal" which is an evolved phenomenon that occurs under time mismatching of material benefits and costs. So scrutiny of such attributes is affordable and mimicry of them is expensive. A propensity to commit in such ways will therefore often be identifiable and recognisable, and reputations can be credibly established and engender mutual selection for interactions.
So far, this doesn't get to why such a model would flourish. It does, says Frank, via a paradox: although moral behaviour is not (and in hard-core form can not be) motivated by material gain, it opens up opportunities for such gain that do not get visited upon the less moral. If Smith doesn't cheat, more people will rationally enter profitable contracts with her that are not ex-ante 100% monitorable/enforcable (and most transactions aren't). If Jones always sues for damages, then fewer folks will violate his land and he therefore doesn't need to fence and guard it so heavily in the first place. If Bloggs always walks away from unequal profit shares, then she routinely attracts more generous offers than she otherwise would. Moral behaviour confers material benefits on the very people who practice it, as a direct result of them eschewing material benefit. The conscious pursuit of self interest is in some ways incompatible with its attainment (as it is sometimes with happiness, despite America's 1776 declaration).
This reviewer has not seen an explaination of self-sacrificing behaviour extended to this level elsewhere, although she has read and reviewed plenty on the subject matter before this. There is far more buried throughout this rich volume that she can't cover in a short review, but which is fascinatingly brilliant. The practical punchline reflected at the end: if it is true that adopting moral values is beneficial, then surely it is useful to know this, and it might make a difference to a person facing a choice of what kind of person she may become. Even though, if this reviewer has understood correctly, it sort-of shouldn't.
Some altruism theories are religious (essentially, god is watching you, so behave). Others attempt to bend self-sacrificing behaviour back around so that it can be interpreted as materially self-serving. Such as kinship-compatible selection (putting family first to promote gene survival, which worker-ants can only do as they cannot reproduce themselves, but people do too). Or reciprocal altruism (which assumes and expects a future payoff from co-operation). Or "tit-for-tat" which is a well documented strategy that tends to dominate iterated prisoners dilemma games (which mimic many real life interactions).
But as Robert Frank writes: all of these theories assume that--contrary to the irrationality supposition--material gain remains the motivating force. Even the religious one does, if material is relaxed a bit to encompass the experience of future expectation of heaven or hell. He therefore calls them soft-core altruism. The hard-core version would be when there can be no rational expectation of benefit, and yet truly virtuous behaviour is still motivated. Such as Lenny Skutnik rescuing an air-crash victim from a freezing river in Washington DC, where there was a low probability he would survive or save her, and still less that she would be in a position to reciprocate in future. Many less-dramatic examples of entirely selfless acts can be reproduced in lab tests.
But if there is no material payoff to truly virtuous action, then rather inexorably and compellingly, by Darwinian logic's stick, and by Smithian self-interest's carrot, virtue would surely be out-competed by opportunism and fall victim to natural de-selection. Put simply, we can't eat moral sentiments (anger, sympathy, guilt, vengeance) but unless they bring about something we can eat, they simply have no (evolutionary) business being there.
And they do actually pay the rent, according to Frank's commitment model. People respond to their emotions (in greater or lesser measure) because these generate their own reward/punishment mechanisms. These mechanisms alter the perceived payoffs. Someone capable of strong sympathy/guilt won't cheat even if he has a golden opportunity to do so with no possibility of detection. Another who gets enraged by injustice will seek revenge because she wants to even if it will not pay her to do so (as in the 19th century Hatfield-McCoy feud in the US). Emotions can thus commit individuals to certain materially costly behaviours. And these commitments are difficult (also costly) to fake, not least because of "preference reversal" which is an evolved phenomenon that occurs under time mismatching of material benefits and costs. So scrutiny of such attributes is affordable and mimicry of them is expensive. A propensity to commit in such ways will therefore often be identifiable and recognisable, and reputations can be credibly established and engender mutual selection for interactions.
So far, this doesn't get to why such a model would flourish. It does, says Frank, via a paradox: although moral behaviour is not (and in hard-core form can not be) motivated by material gain, it opens up opportunities for such gain that do not get visited upon the less moral. If Smith doesn't cheat, more people will rationally enter profitable contracts with her that are not ex-ante 100% monitorable/enforcable (and most transactions aren't). If Jones always sues for damages, then fewer folks will violate his land and he therefore doesn't need to fence and guard it so heavily in the first place. If Bloggs always walks away from unequal profit shares, then she routinely attracts more generous offers than she otherwise would. Moral behaviour confers material benefits on the very people who practice it, as a direct result of them eschewing material benefit. The conscious pursuit of self interest is in some ways incompatible with its attainment (as it is sometimes with happiness, despite America's 1776 declaration).
This reviewer has not seen an explaination of self-sacrificing behaviour extended to this level elsewhere, although she has read and reviewed plenty on the subject matter before this. There is far more buried throughout this rich volume that she can't cover in a short review, but which is fascinatingly brilliant. The practical punchline reflected at the end: if it is true that adopting moral values is beneficial, then surely it is useful to know this, and it might make a difference to a person facing a choice of what kind of person she may become. Even though, if this reviewer has understood correctly, it sort-of shouldn't.
