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[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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Yes, which is why Jabba's argument immediately fails.

He rolls the billion-face die, and is astonished at the outcome, no matter what the outcome happens to be. But P(outcome) = 1.

I still see no evidence that there is any part of Jabba's formula that you understand. You continue to consistently misrepresent and misapply it.

This is the fatal flaw in your argument. Under hypothesis A, Every possible outcome except 1 excludes Jabba from ever seeing anything. One unique brain had to occur at one time and one place, or there is no unique Jabba-brain, ever.

There is no reason to believe your claim that Jabba is astonished at his existence, or to think any feelings of 'astonishment' or 'specialness' are in any way relevant. Since Jabba doesn't believe hypothesis A explains his existence, he simply thinks the hypothesis is wrong.

The only thing you're right about is that Jabba's formula is meaningless to you when Jabba applies it to himself. Which only shows that you don't understand the application of the formula.

If you apply the formula, the (me) is (you). Not (someone), not (Jabba).

Your entire argument is straw.
 
- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?


Disagree with what? You've asked two completely different questions.

Although as it turns out, both of them have been answered numerous times.
 
Jay,
- I suspect that you have already answered the following question in the negative, but I can't remember that you did. Do you agree that P(me|A) = 1/∞? (I accept that P(me|A) may not be the proper term to use in my attempt to 'prove' immortality -- the proper term might be P(some(non-specific) one|A).)
Jabba, no-one agrees that P(me|A) = 1/∞. Furthermore, no-one agrees that the value of P(me|A) is relevant.

If you replace your term P(me|A) with P(someone|A), you would immediately remove one of the biggest problems we have with your argument.

However, this would present an even bigger problem for your argument, because P(someone|A) ≈ 1.
 
- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?
If you mean a duplicate of the person in a different location, then the answer is you would have two distinct brains generating two distinct consciousnesses.

If you mean a duplicate of the person in the same location, that is not possible, even in principle. Such a question has no value.
 
I see the difference, but I don't see why it's relevant.



Unlikely, not prohibitively unlikely. My conditional perspective does not matter, because I am not a narcissist and I know how to be objective.

If it were prohibitively unlikely from my conditional perspective, it would be prohibitively unlikely from any perspective.

If you know how to be objective, then try that. Because I still see no evidence that you understand how the formula is intended to be applied.

Given the hypothesis A assumption, "it" is prohibitively unlikely from any perspective. That is precisely why anyone can apply the formula and arrive at the same conclusion, and is precisely how the formula is intended to be used.

Did Jabba not make this clear? I don't kniow. I saw at first glance that is the only way to apply the formula.
 
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- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?

As we've already discussed, nobody disagrees with that, and we don't see how it's relevant.
 
If you know how to be objective, then try that. Because I still see no evidence that you understand how the formula is intended to be applied.

Given the hypothesis A assumption, "it" is prohibitively unlikely from any perspective.

Then why did you bring up conditional perspectives? Why did you say it wasn't prohibitively unlikely for an arbitrary sentience, but is from a particular sentience's conditional perspective?
 
Jabba, no-one agrees that P(me|A) = 1/∞. Furthermore, no-one agrees that the value of P(me|A) is relevant.

If you replace your term P(me|A) with P(someone|A), you would immediately remove one of the biggest problems we have with your argument.

However, this would present an even bigger problem for your argument, because P(someone|A) ≈ 1.

IOW, if Jabba will only be reasonable and sabotage the argument, then all this misunderstanding will be resolved.

Just stick some bogus values in it and blow it up.
 
Jay,
- I suspect that you have already answered the following question in the negative, but I can't remember that you did. Do you agree that P(me|A) = 1/∞? (I accept that P(me|A) may not be the proper term to use in my attempt to 'prove' immortality -- the proper term might be P(some(non-specific) one|A).)

Is "Jay" jt152, jsfisher, or someone else? It might help if you used people's usernames, Jabba.
 
Then why did you bring up conditional perspectives? Why did you say it wasn't prohibitively unlikely for an arbitrary sentience, but is from a particular sentience's conditional perspective?

Because that's the way it is. From my conditional perspective, the expectation that unique brains of some kind will exist somewhere in the universe converges on 1

And, also from my conditional perspective, the expectation that this particular unique brain would occur at these particular spacetime coordinates was prohibitively remote. And hypothesis A says, by definition, that this is precisely what must happen if sentience is ever to be experienced from the perspective it is currently being experienced. Not your perspective. Not someone's perspective. THE perspective, the only one I have. The only one I could ever have, given hypothesis A.

The use of which you've declared invalid, unobjective, and narcissistic. By decree, as nearly as I can tell.
 
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Because that's the way it is. From my conditional perspective, the expectation that unique brains of some kind will exist somewhere in the universe converges on 1

And, also from my conditional perspective, the expectation that this particular unique brain would occur at these particular spacetime coordinates was prohibitively remote.

You realize those two statements contradict each other, right?
 
As we've already discussed, nobody disagrees with that, and we don't see how it's relevant.
Dave,
- Sorry for my forgetfulness, but it takes up less time to simply ask my questions than it does to search for the answers.
- Can we switch to "observer" rather than "self"? I think that "observer" makes for a better indicator of the concept I'm trying to discuss.
 
Dave,
- Sorry for my forgetfulness, but it takes up less time to simply ask my questions than it does to search for the answers.
- Can we switch to "observer" rather than "self"? I think that "observer" makes for a better indicator of the concept I'm trying to discuss.

It really doesn't make a difference. Either way, in the scientific model, the observer, the self, is the brain.
 
- I think that most everyone here accepts that total replication of a physical person (including the person's brain) would not produce a replication of the self -- i.e., this total physical replication would not produce one consciousness overseeing both bodies.
- Anyone disagree with that?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage.

My disagreement is, as usual, somewhat nuanced.

Like your "infinite resources" (in a finite universe) hypothetical, your "total replication" hypothetical is not (even theoretically) possible--at best, you would be producing a similar copy, made of different atoms (as the atoms of the original would be busy being the original), and even that is not possible given what we know.

Granting, purely for the sake of argument, an "exact" copy of a particular moment in the life of an organism, would not that "exact copy" be no more than a meat sculpture? How do you propose to "bring it to life", as it were? It will not do to propose some as-yet-not-possible energizing process ("It...Is...ALIVE"), unless the original had also been brought to life by the same process, as consciousness is, apparently, an emergent property of a neurosystem--and the experiences of the neurosystem are formative in the nature and identity of the consciousness that emerges.

Which brings me, inevitably, to the point that I have raised, and others have raised, and you have ignored: That "exact copy", even if brought to life, would be subject to different experiences, different conditions, from the original; and, as such, would inevitable develop into a different consciousness. Why is it that you have never responded to this argument?

There is an even deeper, and more fatal flaw, to your idea of a "shared consciousness". There is no known or proposed mechanism whereby such a consciousness might be "shared".

If it is a radiant effect, it would obey the inverse cube law (if it were a strong enough signal to be received across a state, it would be physically dangerous in the proximity of the same room)--not to mention there is no proposed mechanism by which such a radiant carrier wave might be generated by the body, nor received.

If it is supposed to be some ectoplasmic effect, or some aethereal effect, none such has ever been demonstrated; nor has any plausible mechanism for any such been proposed.

If it is supposed to be some supernatural effect of "souls", then you are in the wrong forum, and should petition to have this moved to Religion, instanter.

In that light, what is the mechanism by which you propose that consciousness might be shared between two discrete neurosystems? Please explain, and consider presenting practical, empirical, objective evidence of the existence and functioning of your proposed mechanism.

Lastly, why are you, the source of so many complaints about civility and disrespect, content to leave your dealings with Dr. Hoerl based upon a lie you have told? I am very disappointed with the degree of honesty, much less accuracy, you are demonstrating.
 
Dave,
- Sorry for my forgetfulness, but it takes up less time to simply ask my questions than it does to search for the answers.
- Can we switch to "observer" rather than "self"? I think that "observer" makes for a better indicator of the concept I'm trying to discuss.

Good Morning, Mr. Savage:

Is the "observer" you are now postulating synonymous with the "self", or the "consciousness", or the "soul" you have previously postulated? If they are identical, why cavil at which word is used? if they are not identical, please explain what advantage you think is to be derived form using "observer" rather than one of the other terms.

Is it the "observer" that you propose is, in fact, "immortal"?
 
Good Morning, Mr. Savage:

Is the "observer" you are now postulating synonymous with the "self", or the "consciousness", or the "soul" you have previously postulated? If they are identical, why cavil at which word is used? if they are not identical, please explain what advantage you think is to be derived form using "observer" rather than one of the other terms.

Is it the "observer" that you propose is, in fact, "immortal"?
Slowvehicle,
- I use the terms synonymously -- but, I think that one captures the concept better than the other.
 
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- Is the particular observer continuous through a lifetime?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage.

I find this question odd, given that you, its author, use your advancing age as a reason for your fading faculties. Has your consciousness altered as you have aged? Are your thought process, your memory, your reason, undimmed from the prowess you experienced in the blush of your salad days?

Or do you mean something else by "continuous"?

What about sleep? What about anaesthesia? What about traumatic coma? What about intoxication?

What, in fact, do you mean by "continuous"?
 
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