At this stage I'm still working on whether we need to engage him.
And that's some classical cold war politics right there: What
the Soviet Union Russia does in its own back yard is its own business. Besides, whatever outcome we'd like to see, we're in no position to make it happen. Best to let Russia come to the table just the way they are, and negotiate on things for which we actually have some leverage.
That is what I mean by "cold war politics". And it seems like you feel much the same.
Aside from a resurgence of the Domino Theory
You say that like Domino Theory is discredited, but far from it: It's obvious that Russia is going to test its limits as much as it can, and that with each new test, the results will inform their future decisions. Georgia, Chechnya, Crimea--each success suggests that the West is willing to let them go at least a little bit further than they've gone already. Call it "domino theory" if you like. I call it, "the West has been pretty tolerant so far, it's probably worthwhile to see if they'll tolerate eastern Ukraine".
and a bunch of thinly or not so thinly veiled references to Chamberlain by the usual chickenhawks
The similarities between the Crimea and Osterreich/Sudetenland should be obvious. But so too should the differences. For one thing, the world is not so fortunate to have today a Chamberlain who is actually in a position to choose between appeasement and resistance. The advent of nuclear weaponry changed that calculus completely.
Chamberlain's decision to sell out Czechoslovakia was despicable because
he had a choice. If Nazi Germany had already been armed with nuclear weapons, Hitler's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia would have been a foregone conclusion. Probably his settlement of the Polish question, too.
There's that cold war politics again. And again, if you have a better idea than letting Putin have his way as much as possible, there's a Nobel peace prize in it for you, I'm sure.
I haven't seen very many compelling arguments.
You seem entirely uncompelled, so I assume you didn't mean to say that you think "resurgence of the Domino Theory" and "thinly veiled references to Chamberlain" are compelling arguments.
For what it's worth, I think that "domino theory" is absolutely a compelling argument, but that doesn't mean there's a feasible solution. Probably the best we can do is cold war politics. Red Baron Farms seems to have strong objections to cold war politics. You also seemed to, but the more you discuss it, the more it seems like your preferred course of action is, in practical terms, exactly cold war politics.
I think that comparisons to the Sudetenland are only thinly veiled references to Chamberlain if you believe there's someone in the West today who is in a position to make a real choice that would change the outcome for Crimea and the Ukraine.
I don't see anybody like that. Do you? I see people who are in a position to engage in cold war politics. History will judge them on how well they did
that, not on how well they avoided Chamberlain's mistake.
Chamberlain's mistake, incidentally, was to be so concerned with keeping the peace, that he misunderstood and underestimated Adolf Hitler. Do you think any leader in the West today wants peace so much that they misunderstand and underestimate Vladimir Putin?
Tell me again, what was different about Georgia in '08? How did we choose to engage Putin then?
Nothing. We engaged Putin with cold war politics. What else would you have us do?
Of course we could be stand-up about it like we've been with Chechnya.
I'm telling you it's
turtles cold war politics all the way down.
Wait for what? You're preaching to the choir. Tell it to
Red Baron Farms.
That's entirely different of course.
Seems like more of the same cold war politics to me.
They're just a bunch of raghead trouble makers. Nearly 2% of the country are ethnic Russians. They have a right to self-determination.
Sarcasm or strawman?
Look,
if Bush had sanctioned Russia over the Georgia thing;
if those sanctions had remained in place over the Chechnya thing;
if Obama had taken the lead in Libya, had chosen sides early, had put planes in the air and boots on the ground;
if he had responded swiftly and forcefully to the enormity perpetrated against the American state in Benghazi;
if he had responded swiftly and forcefully over Russian objections to pursue a decisive result in the Syrian crisis;
if he had convened NATO to mobilize forces in on the Polish border with the Ukraine
before the crisis progressed;
if he had, on the basis of that robust NATO response, called upon Putin before the world to respect the sovreignty of the Ukraine and of the Crimea, and to pursue a multilateral solution to the problem there... Then
maybe Putin might be thinking twice about his current course of action.
But that's a lot of ifs, and at least one too many maybes. It would bring Europe closer to the brink of war with Russia. But Europe and the US have been a lot closer to the brink of war than that, during the cold war. So it's not like a statesman with a decent pair of stones can't pursue outcomes with Russia even in the context of cold war politics. Which,
contra Red Baron Farms, is the only kind of politics available "in this day and age" (as Kerry put it).
I don't pretend to have all the answers. But I do think a couple things are obvious: One, I think it's obvious that Putin rightly believes that America is, if not weak, at least reluctant to use its strength against him, anywhere his own strength can be brought to bear. In practical terms, that's equivalent to American weakness.
And two, I think it's obvious that the best and only engagement model we have for Russia is "cold war politics".