JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
OK, you appear to differ in stance from your fellow nonspiracists.
Not really; he pretty much stands right next to me. If you wade through my philosophical tome above, you'll see why. A common "broken" pattern of argumentation in JFK conspiracism is to create the illusion of rigor for a case in chief by solely attacking rebuttals and failing to support affirmative claims.
Darby arrived at a 14 point match, to which he was willing to swear an affidavit, thus making it both admissible and court-ready.
But that's a uselessly low standard for this purpose, at least in the United States. Merely "admissible" doesn't say anything about it being true, or even especially strong. It merely passes the gatekeeper test for being shown to a judge or jury to be evaluated. Don't mistake "admissible in court" for "strong." The two aren't the same concept.
Swearing an affidavit that, in one's professional judgment, a certain thing seems true is not proof that it is true, or even proof that the statement of belief would stand up under any level of scrutiny. In conspiracism, swearing something before a notary is the equivalent of free-energy proponents patenting their various inventions. A patent is no guarantee that the device works, just as an affidavit is no guarantee that a statement is true. But these notary mechanisms are often employed by unscrupulous proponents and authors to bolster public confidence in the statement, among those readers who don't know what the notarization means.
Putting an expert's opinion in an affidavit is a little like putting whipped cream on a lily pad. There simply is no point. Affidavits are meant to record attestations of putative fact under oath, for lay witnesses. Eyewitness testimony is a different kind of thing than expert testimony. When you say fingerprint matching is more art than science -- regardless of whether that's factually the case -- it logically follows that two qualified experts could look at the same set of fingerprints and undeceptively draw two different conclusions. Each could set his opinion down in an affidavit and neither would have perjured himself.
Now let me raise another issue. There is an historical standard of proof and a mode of arguing it, and separately a legal standard of proof and a very different mode of arguing it. One of the dubious approaches JFK conspiracy advocates take is to characterize the debate as a criminal case against Oswald, in which they act in loco curiae to exonerate him. But in doing so, they take advantage of easy "outs" and other concepts of law that lighten the defense's burden of proof. And this makes their arguments unconvincing in an historical sense, which ultimately is a more suitable standard because it more directly addresses the question, "Who, of all people, is mostly likely to have killed Kennedy?"
Be careful that your invocation of legal concepts doesn't disserve a rigorous examination of your claims.
I don't think the photocopy issue is a crucial point. It would have been better if the ID was made from an original, but the fact that it wasn't doesn't utterly condemn it.
It doesn't have to be utterly condemned to be rendered less credible than some other explanation that leaves fewer loose ends.
And again, what are the odds that the vagaries of photocopying would randomly produce 14 or 36 apparent loci that matched...
What are the odds? Do you know how to compute them? If not, then here you're just begging the question. Specifically the question you're begging is that loss of fidelity in the source materials would necessarily reduce the chance of a false-positive in one expert's judgment rather than possibly increasing it.
...a convicted murderer with ties to the assassination's chief benefactor? This is stretching your case a bit imho.
No, this is you reasoning in circles. You're looking at one tiny point of the evidentiary puzzle and formulating global hypotheses based on that tiny view. Step back and look at the hypothesis in the scope where it exists.
You're assuming Johnson wanted Kennedy out of the way, the "chief benefactor" assertion. Based on that, you assume further that Kennedy's death had to occur, as opposed simply to defeating him politically. Based on that, you assume further that Johnson would send someone with a verifiable criminal record to commit the murder. At this level you also assume the planned murder would be messy and public and attract a lot of attention from all sources, as opposed to being more sensible. Based on all that, you assume further that Wallace -- the professional killer -- would be so stupid as to leave fingerprints at the scene of the very public crime he had orchestrated.
Do you see how this really amounts to a long chain of assumption and speculation? And when you realize that your chain of assumption is only one of many possible explanations and outcomes, you understand why we don't necessarily follow you. What's required on your end is belief in a lengthy, incredible chain of events that is improbable on its face, for reasons I discussed yesterday. What's required on our end is that one fingerprint examiner, working with unsure data, made an error.
The notion of parsimony applies here. But the circularity is that you're using Wallace's character and connections from the conspiracy theory you're trying to prove as additional reasons to believe that the only physical evidence in favor of your theory must be interpreted to support it. You can't taint the fingerprint identification question with what arises from your assumptions elsewhere. That's bad science.
Clear enough, but not soundly reasoned. The fact that fingerprint verification is not an exact science does not make it unimportant from a legal point of view. In your haste to junk the Wallace ID, you are throwing out the entire field of fingerprint forensics, which I am sure you do not intend.
No, he didn't intend that. So don't push him there. Yours is a classic straw-man response, expressed as a false dilemma.
In one sense, you're simply being asked to reconcile your premises with the claims you base on them, regardless of whether the premise is true. The nature of your evidence here is a varied expert judgment applied to ambiguous data. Hence you supply the premise that ambiguity is inherent to the fingerprinting field, so that variance in the evidence can't be used as a refutation. But in doing so you omit that a rising tide raises all boats, so that ambiguity also explains why one outlying expert can reach a different conclusion. In this sense your argument is internally inconsistent.
In another sense you're being presented with middle ground. Fingerprint forensics can be rigorous enough to serve a legal purpose. But that doesn't mean all examples of its use are so rigorous. It's not the art-versus-science debate; it's simply that any expression of scientific inquiry, no matter how theoretically or procedurally rigorous, will contain some measure of ambiguity for reasons including, but not limited to, quality of the input data. It is possible to reject one outlying analysis without condemning the entire field as bogus.
"My lot"? Although a majority of US citizens believe there was a JFK conspiracy, this is a widely scattered field with many competing theories...
That's why the statistic is a meaningless appeal to the gallery. I know I sound like a broken record, but I discuss this at some length above. Also, I don't think it's the point you want to discuss at this moment.
So I think it's unfair to suggest all conspiracy theorists think or behave alike.
Yes, it would be unfair. Nevertheless there are identifiable patterns of faulty reasoning and rhetoric that seem to apply to most of the theories, if not all of them. So the fairest way I can say it is that JFK conspiracy theories are all alike in some ways, but different in other ways.
You fail to understand what I have stated repeatedly, that a non-confirmed match does not become a negated match.
No, but a non-confirmed match is less likely to be believed than a confirmed one. In terms of science the procedure is clear: the null hypothesis is that any two given fingerprint specimens are not from the same person. Hence we hold as presumption that they are not identical, which is not the same as having proved that they aren't. But in the face of failing to prove they are identical to some suitable standard, the presumption remains the rational belief.
So the fingerprint itself is one strand in a larger evidence set, and can't really be considered in isolation.
But as many have shown, as soon as you expand the scope of inquiry, the hypothesis that Wallace killed Kennedy from the depository at Lyndon Johnson's orders fails badly for easy reasons. Thus, the more parsimonious answer is that the fingerprint identification known to be ambiguous is, in fact, mistaken.
I would refer you to my original challenge. Calculate the odds of an unidentified individual with fingerprints that match a convicted murderer's prints, being present at the crime scene on the day of the assassination, with an innocent reason for being there.
Too many variables with uncomputable values. But let's decompose the problem anyway.
"[F]ingerprints that match" skips over an important calculation: the probability that the prints do, in fact, match. Calculating odds of one outcome means calculating its likelihood among all other possible outcomes, including mistaken fingerprint identification. In the case of a mistake, the alternative hypothesis is simply that someone with suitably similar fingerprints touched the box within the appropriate time window, and we end the equation right there.
"[C]onvicted murder... with an innocent reason" begs the question of all that person's intent. It absurdly presumes that an offense someone once committed must be all his business at all times hereafter. Even criminals released from prison go about other activities besides repeating the offense for which they were once imprisoned. You cannot presume that someone with a criminal record always has nefarious intent or is always employed in that capacity.
"[A]t the crime scene" has two possible motives. Being there before the crime is committed, i.e., to set it up, has one connotation. Being there afterward because it is a crime scene and therefore interesting and attractive is another connotation.
Now on to the variables you don't state, but which I believe pertain.
You have to consider the probability that Wallace was there under Johnson's orders as opposed to his own reasons. Since there's only very scant evidence (mostly claims from other problematic figures) that Wallace was ever Johnson's "crony," that claim is dubious. And you have to consider other orders besides, "Go kill Kennedy." Johnson was indeed a shrewd political schemer, and I can easily imagine him calling up Wallace and saying, "Hey Mac, git over there to the building and see what the hell is going on, and see if this is gonna make trouble for me." That would make sense, and would probably be done "under the table" even if Johnson had no direct involvement. Your assessment of the relative probabilities seems heavily biased by opinions such as Barr McClellan's -- i.e., presuming that Johnson was criminally involved.
What is the probability that Johnson -- assuming he wanted Kennedy out of the way in order to assume the Presidency himself -- would have him murdered (thus implicating himself in a first-degree felony) rather than employ a Francis Urquhardt style political trap for which Johnson was justly famous?
What is the probability, if murder were the choice, that Johnson would mandate it done in such a sloppy, public way as opposed to any number of ways that would have been available to Johnson but to few else?
What is the probability he would hire Mac Wallace -- a man who got caught and was therefore a poor murderer, to do this most important crime? Johnson would have had access to any number of professional hit men. Wallace's crime had likely been one of jealousy (he and his victim were seeing the same woman, Johnson's sister), not the elaborate, unevidenced blackmail theory. Wallace, having a criminal record, would have been much easier for the police to identify, track down, and arrest.
All these variables except the first one are conditional probabilities, the condition being the match of the fingerprint. The combinatorics of the "tree" of alternatives stemming from that fairly guarantee a small probability for your hypothesis. That's before we add the entire other branch of the tree stemming from a false positive fingerprint match.
Or, if you prefer to dwell on the second-best nature of the evidence's quality, calculate the odds of a photocopier randomly producing a match to that same unidentified individual.
This is more tractable.
"[R]andomly" is unwarranted. Photocopiers do not alter images in random ways, but in predictable ways including spatial distortion (linear and nonlinear), luminosity distortion, and preferential deposition of contaminants on optical and electrostatic surfaces.
Fingerprints are not random; they are geometrically patterned information. In most forensic contexts, data sets are not complete. In this case explicitly so. The introduction of noise into an interpretive context where pattern-matching is somewhat extrapolatory in the best case indeed has the potential to convolve two ordered systems in way to create a confident impression of non-existent patterns. The Moire effect is a rudimentary example of how that arises.
"[P]roducing a match" skips over the important subjective elements, which you have already stipulated. Noise doesn't have to "produce a match," as if this were an objectively indicated outcome. It has to produce the impression of a match in the subjective interpretation of the examiner. When this happens to only one examiner and is not confirmed, the probability does not favor your hypothesis.