[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Slowvehicle]

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

I do not pretend to speak for anyone but myself, but, no.

I do not accept that you have demonstrated that there are, or could be, different baramin of finitivity.

 

[carlitos]

No.

 

[zooterkin]

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

No. And neither of them is infinite.

 

[Mojo]

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

Probably not, but even if we could they would still be finite, not infinite.

 

[godless dave]

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

No.

 

[Akhenaten]

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

Of course they bloody don't.

By the way, have you ever read the Pasiong Mahal?

 

[Jabba]

Slowvehicle,
- But, if we were able to reproduce a physical neurosystem, would we get the same self?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

If your Auntie had wheels and a chain, would she be a bicycle if she had a handlebar moustache?

IMO, no...

Slowvehicle,
- I assume that your answer applies to both questions -- mine, as well as yours. Is that true?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Slowvehicle,
- I assume that your answer applies to both questions -- mine, as well as yours. Is that true?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

Here it is, again, without the distraction:

If you were able, somehow, to reproduce a neurosystem precisely (even if you were able to reproduce a neurosytem precisely, at a precise moment), the same consciousness would not be expressed as an emergent property, because, among other reasons, beginning from the instant of duplication, the duplicate would be subject to a different set of experiences and influences. Even if, arguendo, the duplicate was identical at a given moment, it would, inevitably, diverge.

Something so simple as being the one on the right instead of the one on the left is enough of a difference to obviate the claim that the two neurosystems would be identical.

Not only that, even if the duplicate were constructed to a strict atom-to-atom correspondence with the original, it would be a...well, a duplicate...of the original. It would not be a second iteration of the original. It would not, in fact, be "identical", but a copy.

And before you go there, do remember that a finite number multiplied by a finite number can only result in a finite number

 

[carlitos]

Jesuchristo, this is really not funny anymore.

 

[Loss Leader]

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

No. It is taxonomically imprecise and mathematically meaningless.

 

[Akhenaten]

Slowvehicle,
- I assume that your answer applies to both questions -- mine, as well as yours. Is that true?

Isis wept, Jabba. You aren't just out of your depth here - you're in the wrong ocean.

 

[Jabba]

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

I do not pretend to speak for anyone but myself, but, no.

I do not accept that you have demonstrated that there are, or could be, different baramin of finitivity.

Slowvehicle,
- I didn't know the meaning of "baramin," but having looked it up, I don't think that it applies to my question (as you might have guessed that I wouldn't).
- I think that Dave keeps saying that selves couldn't be infinite, because we have only a finite amount of material, and perhaps time, to work with. But, hands of Texas Poker couldn't be infinite even if we had the necessary time and material to work with.

 

[godless dave]

- I think that Dave keeps saying that selves couldn't be infinite, because we have only a finite amount of material, and perhaps time, to work with.

That's exactly what I'm saying. I'm also saying that to calculate the prior probability of something, you have to specify the time for the event you are calculating the probability for, because the probability for that event depends on previous events.

 

[jsfisher]

Slowvehicle,
- I didn't know the meaning of "baramin," but having looked it up, I don't think that it applies to my question (as you might have guessed that I wouldn't).

That must be an odd dictionary you have, then.

- I think that Dave keeps saying that selves couldn't be infinite, because we have only a finite amount of material, and perhaps time, to work with. But, hands of Texas Poker couldn't be infinite even if we had the necessary time and material to work with.

No, both selves and poker hands are limited for the same reasons. There are finite supplies of materials (be they molecules or distinct playing cards) and have a finite number of possible arrangements. (Time is irrelevant.)

 

[Slowvehicle]

Slowvehicle,
- I didn't know the meaning of "baramin," but having looked it up, I don't think that it applies to my question (as you might have guessed).
- I think that Dave keeps saying that selves couldn't be infinite, because we have only a finite amount of material, and perhaps time, to work with. But, hands of Texas Poker couldn't be infinite even if we had the necessary time and material to work with.

Good morning, Mr. Savage!

Although I was, in fact, trying to be funny, you were, in fact, postulating two different kinds of "finiteness". "Baramin" are supposed, by anti-evolutionists, to be the different kinds of created animals, distinguished by tortuous definitions intended to exclude the possibility of the concept of "species".

You have invented new kinds of "finiteness", in what looks like an attempt to rescue your claim that the number of "selves" that could be realized, even in a finite universe, should be considered at least a "kind" of infinite (a kind of infinite, that is, evidently, indistinguishable from a kind of finite).

My example of my Auntie Schwinn was intended to get you to consider your resistance to the idea that, given that consciousness is, evidently, an emergent property of neurosystems, and, given that neurosystems are material objects, and, given that there is a finite amount of matter out of which to fashion neurosystems and a finite amount of time in which to do so, the number of "potential" selves (or "souls", or "consciousnesses") is not, cannot be, infinite.

Great big numbers are not infinite. Great big numbers raised to the power of a great big number are not infinite.

 

[Giordano]

Good morning, Jabba,

I regret I have gotten confused reading the last few posts (I think the discussion of your views of the scientific model, vs your own views, became unclear) and I wonder if you would be willing to answer a few specific questions about your beliefs (proof or no proof, accurate or not; just what you believe). Your answers, I think, would greatly help the discussion here. Knowing your time problems, I've tried to simplify and list the likely answers so you could easily respond. I am expressly interested in YOUR model, not what you think the standard model might me:

1. Do you believe your current consciousness came from a prior existence (i.e. was it in a previous body before your current body)? a) yes b) no

2. Do you believe your current consciousness will continue into a future existence (i.e. will it be linked to a new body after your current body dies)? a) yes b) no

3. Are consciousnesses (some or all) created new, or are all consciousnesses reused from links to bodies in to prior physical existences? a) reused b) all newly created

4. Whatever their source, once here, will a consciousness continue forever (i.e. until the end of the universe, or longer)? a) yes b)no

5. Can consciousness exist unlinked to a physical body (i.e. is there a "pool" of consciousnesses not linked to a physical body that can be used as a source of consciousnesses when a new physical body occurs? a) yes b) no

To make it easy and quick for you to respond, if you wish you can simply answer 1a, 2a, 3b, 4a, 5a, or whatever you wish to say.

Thanks.

 

[Agatha]

Slowvehicle,
- But, if we were able to reproduce a physical neurosystem, would we get the same self?

No, as long as the 'self' to which you refer includes the experiences and memories of the person to whom the brain belongs. Perhaps you need to define 'self' so that we can see where this is going.

- Does anyone here accept that we can make a distinction between two kinds of finiteness along the dimension of extrinsic/intrinsic?

Nein. Non. Niet. Nej. Nu. Nee. Nai. Aniyo. Não. Na. Nie. Bù. Nid oes. Nei. NO!

 

[jsfisher]

Nein. Non. Niet. Nej. Nu. Nee. Nai. Aniyo. Não. Na. Nie. Bù. Nid oes. Nei. NO!

You seem uncertain.

 

[Akhenaten]

Just for laughs, would someone whom Jabba isn't ignoring like to suggest that he should refer to his two kinds of infinity as ∞ and ~∞?

 

[Loss Leader]

But, hands of Texas Poker couldn't be infinite even if we had the necessary time and material to work with.

Actually, the only difference between human lives and hands of poker is that, in the poker analogy, you have already accepted certain limiting factors - the number of cards, the rules of the game, the legal obligations of the casino.

Human lives also have a set of limiting factors - the number of humans alive before then, the number of distinct genes in the population, the amount of matter available to make humans out of. The difference is that you have yet to acknowledge these factors.

Once you realize that there are limits on the number of people that can be created, you'll see that there is no difference between people and hands of poker.