Why is there so much crackpot physics?

[Perpetual Student]

No it isn't.



I'm sure I've said this before, but perhaps you shouldn't bother asking questions if you're just going to argue with and insult the people who actually take the trouble to answer them for you.

No insult was intended. My question had to do with Tegmark's MUH conjecture. Your naïve view of mathematics does not even allow for any discussion of that question. Perhaps if you gained a little perspective concerning the richness and scope of mathematics, you might be able to have an informed opinion. This might be a good place to start: LINK
Let me know if I can be of any assistance.

 

[The Man]

But the mathematics does describe electric charge and all its consequences. Do not the quantum field equations for electrons apply to all situations describing the underlying behavior of electrons, not just limited and idealized ones? Isn't the idealization you mention used for clarity and computational purposes?

Ok, so what math describes what the value of the electron (or elemental) charge is actually? Currently (no pun intended) it is a measured value and given aspects of quantum field theory the value we do measure is shielded to some degree (by virtual pairs) and less than the value the electron carries. How much less we just don’t know. Cuddles is quite correct above, math is essentially just a language, a formalized, standardized and logically consistent language but a language none the less. I actually considered making the “electron is the English” remark in my previous post but decided instead to just focus on what the isomorphic descriptor explicitly excludes. Namely the very differences that make a description (even mathematical) of an electron just a, well, description and not an electron. To try to put it more succinctly it would be an extremely crappy description of an electron that didn’t map to the electron, or the electron to it, in some ways or others. So that there is a morphism between them should not only be of no surprise but is the actual intent of and how we gain that description (by examining the electron’s properties). Between the two, one being the objective and observed object, the electron, and the other being the “category” ”object” of its mathematical description. The only way to lose that distinction is to deliberately ignore it and how that description was obtained (by objectively observing the electron).

 

[BurntSynapse]

That sentence is not bafflegab. It is, however, completely wrong...Consider, for example, the rules that specify the context-free syntax of a programming language.

I read this to stipulate a programming language context. If you don't, why not?

 

[Perpetual Student]

Cuddles is quite correct above, math is essentially just a language, a formalized, standardized and logically consistent language but a language none the less.

Therein lies the problem. Your view of mathematics is uninformed. Perhaps you too might benefit from this:
LINK

 

[steenkh]

Therein lies the problem. Your view of mathematics is uninformed. Perhaps you too might benefit from this:
LINK

Sure, mathematics is complex, but could you point out precisely what you find of relevance in this article?

 

[The Man]

Therein lies the problem. Your view of mathematics is uninformed. Perhaps you too might benefit from this:
LINK

What problem would that be, the question you asked about or just something else? That we might hold different views in no way makes either of those views necessarily uninformed. Did your question benefit from that article? If not (and I suspect not) then your view remains uninformed to that question even by that article. As such, you sought additional information elsewhere. If you feel that article or a particular view of mathematics is relevant to the question you asked you could try to be more specific (as a steenkh suggests) and you may just answer your own question in a way that you do feel more satisfying. Otherwise a slightly different view may be the only way to answer your question.

Frankly I don't see the view of mathematics as being all that important to the distinguishing factor between a description and that which is described (unless of course one is describing a description). A similar distinction is between having a fever and being diagnosed with a fever in a response to a question from BurntSynapse before. While perspectives such as mathematics as more of a philosophy, a mental process, natural process or natural order of things can obscure that distinction they can't eliminate it. Mathematics as a language does help make the distinction obvious but I don't see that perspective as being required. That is in fact the primary reason I didn't reference mathematics as a language or make the 'electron is the English' remark I had considered making in my response to your question.

 

[BurntSynapse]

Your mention of fever got my curiosity.

Once a paradigm shift is complete, a scientist cannot, for example, reject the germ theory of disease to posit the possibility that miasma causes disease or reject modern physics and optics to posit that aether carries light.

If you see anything in that or any other generally accepted definition which includes a "past-only" restriction, please cite it.

Really?!?! It’s the very distinction you and apparently Kuhn are citing, “Once a paradigm shift is complete”.

Generally, distinguishing a type of X (the completed paradigm shift) is not defining X (the paradigm shift).

Paradigm shifts are processes over time, and it would seem very strange not to allow consideration of what is going on during that process. Discussing the state "after a process is complete" seems common & ordinary.

We may use process verbs as nouns, referring to things such as "a birth" in the past, but there's nothing inherent in most definitions that prohibit us from saying a birth will be like this in the future, is proceeding like that right now, or took place some other way a century ago.

If there are examples of such definitions, I'm not aware of them. There are some who argue they're only identifiable in the past, but these seem only to apply to successful paradigm changes, such as for the scientific community overall.

 

[The Man]

Your mention of fever got my curiosity.

Glad to hear it.

Generally, distinguishing a type of X (the completed paradigm shift) is not defining X (the paradigm shift).

Are incomplete paradigm shifts, you know where the paradigm hasn’t actually shifted, a paradigm shift? If that is the case then they happen all the time. Often it is a distinguishing feature that, well, defines X.

Paradigm shifts are processes over time, and it would seem very strange not to allow consideration of what is going on during that process. Discussing the state "after a process is complete" seems common & ordinary.

While attempting to discuss paradigm shifts where the paradigm hasn’t shifted makes them so “common & ordinary” as to be meaningless. If you don’t like the definition you gave then get a new one but don’t try to make it meaningless or try claim that anyone intends “not to allow consideration of what is going on during that process”.

We may use process verbs as nouns, referring to things such as "a birth" in the past, but there's nothing inherent in most definitions that prohibit us from saying a birth will be like this in the future, is proceeding like that right now, or took place some other way a century ago.

If there are examples of such definitions, I'm not aware of them. There are some who argue they're only identifiable in the past, but these seem only to apply to successful paradigm changes, such as for the scientific community overall.

I just used the definition you gave. Funny how that part of what I quoted from you is missing from your quote above. Heck, take all the unsuccessful “paradigm changes” you want, stack them up against the definition you gave and see how they fare.

 

[Max Tegmark]

Thanks Cuddles for raising this important question about whether mathematics is invented or discovered - a famous controversy among mathematicians and philosophers. You’re quite right we humans invent the *language* of mathematics (the symbols, our human names for the symbols, etc.), but it’s important not to confuse this language with the *structures* of mathematics that I focus on in the book. For example, any civilization interested in Platonic solids would discover that there are precisely 5 such structures (the tetrahedron, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron and icosahedron). Whereas they’re free to invent whatever names they want for them, they’re *not* free to invent a 6th one – it simply doesn’t exist. It's in the same sense that the mathematical structures that are popular in modern physics are discovered rather than invented, from 3+1-dimensional pseudo-Riemannian manifolds to Hilbert spaces.

 

[BurntSynapse]

Are incomplete paradigm shifts, you know where the paradigm hasn’t actually shifted, a paradigm shift?

AFAIK, the term "incomplete paradigm shift" is most often used to refer to a situation where some, but not all members of the community adopt a new cognitive frame. I think it also could apply to intermediate models of an individual where a researcher's conceptualizations are in flux during what Nersessian calls a "bootstrapping process".

If that is the case then they happen all the time. Often it is a distinguishing feature that, well, defines X.

Recategorization of exemplars is regarded by some as an internal characteristic that while not entirely undisputed (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848612000593), seems as good as any for distinguishing the "duck-rabbit gestalt switch", with Resident Evil example, see: http://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/21/20

The figure doesn't change, but we see a rabbit, then a duck.

While attempting to discuss paradigm shifts where the paradigm hasn’t shifted makes them so “common & ordinary” as to be meaningless.

I'm not entirely sure what is meant here by common & ordinary, but the lack of clarity on the term seems to be cited as leading to replacement of the term "paradigm" itself by more technical terms.

If you don’t like the definition you gave then get a new one but don’t try to make it meaningless or try claim that anyone intends “not to allow consideration of what is going on during that process”.

New, better definitions are available, but feature terms unknown to most audiences.

I just used the definition you gave. Funny how that part of what I quoted from you is missing from your quote above. Heck, take all the unsuccessful “paradigm changes” you want, stack them up against the definition you gave and see how they fare.

Fair enough, I should not have used the original definition for modern uses it can't support.

 

[W.D.Clinger]

pointlessness

That sentence is not bafflegab. It is, however, completely wrong...Consider, for example, the rules that specify the context-free syntax of a programming language.

I read this to stipulate a programming language context. If you don't, why not?

Who would have stipulated that? I haven't. Have you? If so, where?

You made a general claim. Any counterexample refutes your general claim. That's critical thinking 101.

My first counterexample was Gödel's completeness theorem. When you wrote "Even if true", you revealed your ignorance of Gödel's completeness theorem. I then provided an entire class of mundane counterexamples drawn from the familiar world of programming languages (which, by the way, is closely connected to the world of logic and mathematics).

It's possible, of course, that your general claim wasn't intended to be general. You phrased it as a general claim, but you often say things you later reject as misinterpretations of or irrelevant to your position.

By the way, why do you write so much about matters you later claim are irrelevant to your position? I have no idea, for example, why you think your "stipulate" question could have any bearing on your position or mine.

(Pro tip: When you ask irrelevantly silly questions, or express doubt ("Even if true") about well-known facts, you can appear quarrelsome.)​

Most of your claims seem quite silly to me: Whether true or false, they seldom advance your argument.

In this case, I think you were still trying to pretend you understood some basic idea of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, even within a post in which you disclaimed real knowledge of those theorems and revealed complete ignorance ("Even if true") of Gödel's completeness theorem. But why?

For that matter, why did you drag Gödel into this conversation at all? You did so because you thought his incompleteness theorems somehow supported your claim of undocumented assumptions creating risk that's somehow related to the risk of vector math you hallucinated. All of that has been thoroughly debunked, yet you cling to your conviction that quaternions are somehow safer, based on your own (clearly uninformed) reading of "experts" you have never named or cited. You are now on the defensive about Gödel, but you have only yourself to blame for that. Had you not tried to attach your argument to Gödel's prestige through name-dropping, your ignorance of Gödel's theorems would never have come to light.

And why did you drag Quine into this conversation? You didn't know about his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and you cling to a grotesquely distorted view of his theory of underdetermination. With such a poor understanding of Quine's philosophy, what did you hope to accomplish by dropping his name?

You're still dropping names, but they're becoming more and more obscure. In your recent posts, you've mentioned Kassler six times, apparently because you believe he/she is an authority on Quine. To give you some idea of Kassler's obscurity: a Google search on "Kassler"+"Quine" yields this thread as the top hit.

It's possible, of course, that you misspelled this person's name all six times.

(Pro tip: Misspelling the names you drop does not create an impression of superiority or competence.)​

 

[The Man]

AFAIK, the term "incomplete paradigm shift" is most often used to refer to a situation where some, but not all members of the community adopt a new cognitive frame. I think it also could apply to intermediate models of an individual where a researcher's conceptualizations are in flux during what Nersessian calls a "bootstrapping process".

So that would not meet the definition of a paradigm shift that you cited.

Recategorization of exemplars is regarded by some as an internal characteristic that while not entirely undisputed (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848612000593), seems as good as any for distinguishing the "duck-rabbit gestalt switch", with Resident Evil example, see: http://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/21/20

The figure doesn't change, but we see a rabbit, then a duck.

So what, the definition you gave has a defining feature.

I'm not entirely sure what is meant here by common & ordinary, but the lack of clarity on the term seems to be cited as leading to replacement of the term "paradigm" itself by more technical terms.

Well, what did you mean by that phrase?

New, better definitions are available, but feature terms unknown to most audiences.

Great, so cite one that you would actually want to use instead of one you evidently just don't like anymore. Don't worry, some of us here know a whole crap load of terms and are quite good at helping others get to know them.

Fair enough, I should not have used the original definition for modern uses it can't support.

"modern uses it can't support."? Is it now used to support something other than a paradigm shift? Are paradigm shifts different now in some critical way than they were before? In either case that would make applying aspects from the history of paradigm shifts less relevant as they similarly wouldn't "support" these purported "modern uses".

 

[BurntSynapse]

...it’s important not to confuse this language with the *structures* of mathematics that I focus on in the book. For example, any civilization interested in Platonic solids would discover that there are precisely 5 such structures (the tetrahedron, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron and icosahedron).

It seems odd to claim such broad reach for ideas that apply to such restricted domains. Stipulating "Platonic solids" seems artificially narrow. We would have to rule out infinities of other conditions, like pi dimensions, wouldn't we?

The fact that counting things on our fingers was an evolutionary advantage seems a suspiciously weak foundation for assuming reality is ultimately structured that way. I'm not saying we should toss the SM, but it does seem wise to be on the lookout for contextual assumptions which are natural for us to ignore, often all-but impossible to recognize. I can't say what makes me see a duck or a rabbit first, or what exactly prompts a change. When we've never seen lines, planes, or Platonic solids in nature, caution seems warranted.

Whereas they’re free to invent whatever names they want for them, they’re *not* free to invent a 6th one – it simply doesn’t exist. It's in the same sense that the mathematical structures that are popular in modern physics are discovered rather than invented, from 3+1-dimensional pseudo-Riemannian manifolds to Hilbert spaces.

What about polychorons - could they count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polychoron

It seems to me "understanding" only occurs within some framework, somewhat like "parenthood" is understood in terms of having children.

As I understand science, such frameworks should (at least in in principle), always be subject to revision.

From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/ Quine argues: "...even of pure mathematics and logic, [it] is a man-made fabric...".

 

[TjW]

"modern uses it can't support."? Is it now used to support something other than a paradigm shift? Are paradigm shifts different now in some critical way than they were before? In either case that would make applying aspects from the history of paradigm shifts less relevant as they similarly wouldn't "support" these purported "modern uses".

So there's been a paradigm shift in paradigm shifts?

 

[BurntSynapse]

So that would not meet the definition of a paradigm shift that you cited.

Correct. Kassler quotes some author as finding 26 different meanings of "paradigm" in Kuhn's work - perhaps even with just SSR.

Well, what did you mean by that phrase?

That the usage I describe seems very common in HPS material I've read...like "problem". I've heard different reasons for moving away from "paradigm shift" that have convinced me that more technical concepts and jargon enable better analysis, more detailed understanding, and more precise reasoning we are getting into. Since my field is application, my interest in definitions leans more toward lexicographers, and whether that sort of definition meets acceptable scoping criteria.

Great, so cite one that you would actually want to use instead of one you evidently just don't like anymore.

My current preference for distinguishing potentially revolutionary cognitive frames by whether and how they tend to recategorize exemplars in ways impossible in previous frames. I suspect HPS people will continue improving and expanding on that, if they haven't already. Perhaps its already frowned on by some, but the last critique I read seemed weak.

"modern uses it can't support."? Is it now used to support something other than a paradigm shift?

The meanings and use have changed, and current uses seem different (and better) than uses from decades ago.

Confusion over whether some meanings of 'paradigms" & "shifts" support or should support various claims is exactly the kind of confusion that lead to clarifications like development of the recategorization criterion in the late 90's & early 2000's.

Are paradigm shifts different now in some critical way than they were before?

To dive into that, we should probably use more modern, precise terms and concepts. Human cognitive processes are regarded as utilizing the same basic mental machinery, and as Nersessian points out, external cultural resources and other factors change.

In either case that would make applying aspects from the history of paradigm shifts less relevant as they similarly wouldn't "support" these purported "modern uses".

That conclusion hits the nail quite squarely, I'd say.

 

[BurntSynapse]

So there's been a paradigm shift in paradigm shifts?

Nice

 

[BurntSynapse]

Who would have stipulated that? I haven't. Have you? If so, where?

Referring to "X of Y" seems to specify instance X within the context of domain Y.

Consider, for example, the rules that specify the context-free syntax of a programming language.

We are asked to consider things that fall within the category of what we might call "rules".

The rules category seems here further qualified by stipulating we are only considering rules that "specify".

The domain is then further narrowed to only those specifying rules which apply to "syntax".

The kind of syntax under consideration is further refined to those in "context-free" categories...and so on.

This seems like providing alot of (IMO necessary) contextual support for whatever claims are going to be made, and it seems like this is needed for the claim to be interpreted and meaningful. "Meaning" certainly seems like it has to be relative to something, and Quine's "web of belief" seems like a good model for that.

It may well be wrong, but it it intelligible?

 

[Perpetual Student]

It seems odd to claim such broad reach for ideas that apply to such restricted domains. Stipulating "Platonic solids" seems artificially narrow. We would have to rule out infinities of other conditions, like pi dimensions, wouldn't we?

The fact that counting things on our fingers was an evolutionary advantage seems a suspiciously weak foundation for assuming reality is ultimately structured that way. I'm not saying we should toss the SM, but it does seem wise to be on the lookout for contextual assumptions which are natural for us to ignore, often all-but impossible to recognize. I can't say what makes me see a duck or a rabbit first, or what exactly prompts a change. When we've never seen lines, planes, or Platonic solids in nature, caution seems warranted.

The point is that the platonic solids are the only regular, convex polyhedrons with congruent faces of regular polygons that can exist within the context of three dimensional Euclidean geometry. Change the context and some other mathematical realities and relationships will result.

What about polychorons - could they count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polychoron

It seems to me "understanding" only occurs within some framework, somewhat like "parenthood" is understood in terms of having children.

As I understand science, such frameworks should (at least in in principle), always be subject to revision.

From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/ Quine argues: "...even of pure mathematics and logic, [it] is a man-made fabric...".

The same would be true of polychorons, in that any civilization interested in polychorons would discover the same characteristics we have.

 

[Dancing David]

Maybe any or all. I'm willing to take any of the 3 and let you pick which. All I need is to understand what is meant by the term "your pet theory", assuming this refers to concept(s) I actually believe...

Also, we'd probably need to have a shared definition of "show", so that we agree on whether something explains something else adequatlely.

I tend to use possible worlds semantics for justification but here, larger issues of modal logic looms large and consistently present the greatest obstacles. I'm not sure how to overcome those.

Ideas?

Hi BurntSynapse

Please explain exactly how the many pet theories you have would have helped Edwin Hubble and his research assistant in their paradigm shift. Actually two paradigm shifts but teh Hubble constant is teh big one.

Then explain how your pet theories would have helped Alan Guth (which is unfair), so I will say Ernest Rutherford instead who was involved in a huge paradigm shift.

I am asking how all the different things you claim would help research and in particular paradigm shift would have any practical application.

Guth was unfair because it is a theoretical paradigm shift, so i chose two very utilitarian examples of research Hubble and the spectroscopy and then Rutherford and the alpha particle experiment.

These are two of the biggest paradigm shifts in the last century, my point being you have a bad understanding of what leads to paradigms shifts, which is why i think you should read Kragh's Quantum generations.

 

[Dancing David]

Not confused, nor do I think it funny, nor do I think including a name leaves a person unable to ask for any details about which they have any question.

So ask the name you dropped in the Plato's cave has any real bearing on research.

And then ask them the difference between a poetic allusion in an interview and something with practical applications.