Ten myths on WWI - debunked

[Garrette]

Well, this sounds like typical generational historiography where you make name for yourself by overdoing some in itself necessary debunking. The earlier view of absolute evil and incompetent shambles was overly simplified and misleading. But this present "revisionism" about noble and brilliant generals leading a great fight for liberty does go much too far to the other direction.
It was a horror, a suicide of European civilization - and none of the original leaders of the armies got what they wanted out of that nightmare of a war. Though some at the time lesser known figures did: Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini... I think I pretty much would go for Rosenberg and Sorley as judging that war. --snip--

If anyone in this thread has said anything like your highlighted bit then I've missed it. And if anyone in this thread has expressed general disagreement with your statements about it being a horror, then I've missed that, too.

Please let me know where those here have engaged in such over-the-top revisionism.

 

[Border Reiver]

Okay, this doesn't sound right to me. American artillery was more accurate than this during the Civil War with smooth bore "Napoleon" canons. Ranging and flight time was accurate enough that they were able to air burst rounds using precise timing fuses. Also, I saw a demonstration of an 1890 model French gun firing against a modern Army gun. They missed the 10'x20' target with the first shot but hit the target with the next two. The Army team was never able to hit the target. This probably reflects the fact that modern direct fire has been taken over by tanks and TOW missiles instead of field guns. During WWI, direct fire was almost useless until the British fielded tanks. A tank is a very good target for direct fire. The vast majority of fire was indirect.

The Gunners of Canada, Vol. 1 has reasonable summary of some of the issues on this.

Most at the time were anticipating a war along the lines of the ACW, or Franco-Prussian War and had planned their weapons purchases accordingly - primarily direct fire light guns (the French 75mm, German 77mm, and the British 18Pdr are good examples) with limited indirect fire capabilities that were capable of providing direct fire support to units of infantry or cavalry.

What was discovered once indirect fire became "the" method of employing artillery was the "probable error in range" for a shell. Essentially it was determined that even if fired at the same elevation and bearing, with the same weight, and type of projectile with the same powder charge, seemingingly insignificant variations will mean that your cannon will generally not hit the same spot twice. If you're a rifleman, put your rifle in a machine rest, and aim it at a target and fire at least two rounds at the same point - you will note that the rounds will not hit the same point, and that the dispersion gets greater the farther you shoot.

In addition, non-standard conditions such as propellant temperature, humidity, air temperature, barometric pressure and barrel wear have a huge effect on the muzzle velocity of a gun, which in turn effects how far it can shoot for a particular elevation. The US army publication on the creation of firing tables (here) gives a good overview of what factors need to be considered when developing these tables, so that gunners can compensate for them.

To ensure that once fire was lifted the infantry was able to get into the enemy trench system before effective resistance could be mounted they had to be close to the shells - 100 yards back was considered to be close, but achievable.

The problem was that, if uncompensated for, a gun might be firing 100 yards short or more depending on many factors. And of course, you also need to realize that each gun was different, with individual wear and it's effect on muzzle velocity/range. Plus, communications were primitive to say the least - increasing the length of time it took to get corrections to the command posts and then to the guns.

 

[Nessie]

One of my favourite WWI myths - repeated numerous times in this very thread - is the "walk towards the enemy in a line" myth. It's a popular myth, because it reinforces that other great WWI myth - that WWI was a war commanded by brainless upper class idiots who cheerfully marched lower class soldiers to their deaths with no regard for their welfare.

These are two of the most popular, most enduring, and most wrong myths about the entire war. I only want to comment on the first for now though. Such observations about the lunacy of "walking towards the enemy" are made from a place of total ignorance, with zero understanding of the tactical situation, the reasons for the measures taken, or the relative success.

The critical factor missing here is the creeping barrage. Prior to the implementation of the creeping barrage, the standard allied attack tactic was to run towards the enemy, in clumps, moving from shell hole to shell hole, exploiting cover. Prior to assault, the artillery would shell the intervening ground in a deliberate attempt to create shelter.

Using these tactics, allied forces were annihilated. German defensive positions remained intact, and the German gunners were able to fire indscriminately on the hapless soldiers, who took an age to cross the intervening ground.

The creeping barrage changed all that. Concentrated, accurate artillery fire, en masse, was used to create a "screen" in front of the infantry. Not only would these barrages cut barbed wire and other obstacles, but they dramatically reduced the amount of enemy fire that could reach the infantry as the intensity of the barrage was so high that enemy fire simply couldn't get through it.

As the infantry advanced the barrage would "lift", moving ahead of the infantry. As the infantry were nearing the enemy trenches, the enemy would be receiving this murderous barrage, and would be unable to perform defensively. Then, the barrage would lift to behind the enemy front line, in order to prevent counter attacks or secondary trench lines from firing on the allies. This would leave the allied soldiers with a short sprint to reach the enemy trenches, and they could be in them before the Germans had time to return to their guns.

The catch is, an effective creeping barrage relies on precise timing. If the barrage gets too far ahead of the infantry, the German defences can get inside it, and cut down the soldiers. If the barrage gets too far behind, your own men will be hit by it.

The question then, is how do you coordinate a creeping barrage in a time that lacks the kind of sophisticated communication equipment that would allow for accurate real time adjustments? You have to have the entire thing perfectly timed out from the outset. To the second. And to make that work, the infantry have to maintain a slow, careful pace. So they walked.

And the thing is, when the plan worked, casualties were remarkably low. After the creeping barrage was introduced, and the allies started "walking at the enemy" casualty rates dropped, and where we got spikes in the casualty rate, like at Passchendaele, it was because the creeping barrage wasn't implemented effectively.

Fascinating post, thanks.

 

[barehl]

To ensure that once fire was lifted the infantry was able to get into the enemy trench system before effective resistance could be mounted they had to be close to the shells - 100 yards back was considered to be close, but achievable.

300' from a French 1897 model 75 artillery blast is right up against the wounding radius for shrapnel. That might work with HE rounds.

The problem was that, if uncompensated for, a gun might be firing 100 yards short or more depending on many factors. And of course, you also need to realize that each gun was different, with individual wear and it's effect on muzzle velocity/range. Plus, communications were primitive to say the least - increasing the length of time it took to get corrections to the command posts and then to the guns.

Except no one fired that way. As an artillery officer with a brain you ranged all of your guns first and each gun crew noted the adjustment. The compensation charts were only used for first action ranging. A typical barrage required two shots to establish ranging, firing for effect on the third shot.

However, the walk does make sense. It could easily take 1 minute to adjust ranging. If your troops were doing a slow run, they would be 300 yards closer when a typical barrage step was only 100 yards. At a normal walk, they would only move up 50 yards.

 

[Polaris]

Well, you can judge the truth of this fairly easily by looking at events.

May 7, 1915: The Lusitania is sunk by torpedo.

During 1915, the Germans sunk 1.3 million tons of merchant ships.

July 9, 1916: The unarmed 2,300 ton submarine Deutschland arrives in Baltimore on a trading mission.
Public domain photo.
[qimg]http://s2.hubimg.com/u/6746455_f1024.jpg[/qimg]

November 1916: Deutschland arrives in New London, Connecticut for a second trading mission.

During 1916, the Germans sunk 2.3 million tons of merchant ships.

January 1917: A third trip is canceled. In February, Deutschland was fitted with six torpedo tubes and two 150mm canons. On March 28, 1917, it became U-155.

In January 1917, Germany's 150 divisions of troops faced 190 divisions. The British blockade was effective and Germany lacked enough surface strength to break it.

February 1, 1917: Unrestricted German U-boat warfare resumes.

February 3, 1917: The US breaks off diplomatic relations with Germany.

April 6, 1917: The US declares war.

****

From this timeline, it is clear that the Lusitania did not precipitate the American entry into WWI (as I was told in high school). The US was still allowing German trading more than a year later. The precipitating event does seem to be the move back to unrestricted submarine warfare.

Also have to mention that Woodrow Wilson won the 1916 election while using the slogan "He kept us out of war".

 

[Border Reiver]

300' from a French 1897 model 75 artillery blast is right up against the wounding radius for shrapnel. That might work with HE rounds.

Minor quibble - What you are refering to as "shrapnel" is actually the fragments from a shattered shell casing.

Actual shrapnel shells are shells filled with thousands of round metal balls (similar to canister from the ACW and earlier era) and were designed to function blowing the balls out in a conical spray from the front of the projectile. Wiki's got fairly good article on it, and the reasons for its replacement.

Shrapnel is just one of those terms that entered common usage and refers to something different than what it actually is.

Except no one fired that way. As an artillery officer with a brain you ranged all of your guns first and each gun crew noted the adjustment. The compensation charts were only used for first action ranging. A typical barrage required two shots to establish ranging, firing for effect on the third shot.

However, the walk does make sense. It could easily take 1 minute to adjust ranging. If your troops were doing a slow run, they would be 300 yards closer when a typical barrage step was only 100 yards. At a normal walk, they would only move up 50 yards.

Having seen WWI gun programs for individual guns within a battery I know that centralized production of firing data within batteries for individual guns was in use from late 1916, and was definitely being used by the Battle of Vimy Ridge by Canadian and other Commonwealth gunners.

 

[gumboot]

Okay, this doesn't sound right to me. American artillery was more accurate than this during the Civil War with smooth bore "Napoleon" canons.

You're comparing two totally different weapons and scenarios. The standard field gun of the American Civil War was the 12-pounder Napoleon which fired a 4.1kg shell, ball or canister and had an effective range of less than 1.5km. It was primarily used as very close range, for direct fire into enemy troops.

The standard field gun of the British Army in WWI was the QF18-pounder which fired a shell of up to 10kg of various types including armour piercing, gas, smoke, star, incendiary, shrapnel and HE. The earlier variants had an effective range of a little under 6km while the later models had a range in excess of 10km. It was primarily used for indirect fire at enemy fortified positions.

A 12-pounder Napoleon would be utterly useless for firing a creeping barrage in front of an infantry advance.

 

[gumboot]

To ensure that once fire was lifted the infantry was able to get into the enemy trench system before effective resistance could be mounted they had to be close to the shells - 100 yards back was considered to be close, but achievable.

Actually they used 100yds at the Somme (because that was at the time the standard minimum safe separation for artillery) and it proved too great a margin (in some places no man's land was less than 100yds so the troops had no protection as they went over the top).

The ideal separation became 50yds. Which shows how precise the fire had to be. At Vimy Ridge the Canadians extensively practiced advancing at the specific pace (the "Vimy Glide") of 100yds every 3 minutes, enabling them to confidently remain right behind the barrage without getting caught in it.

The barrage itself also became increasingly complex with back-barrages, sweeping curtain barrages, multiple lines of advance, back barrages, and other innovations.

 

[gumboot]

Except no one fired that way. As an artillery officer with a brain you ranged all of your guns first and each gun crew noted the adjustment. The compensation charts were only used for first action ranging. A typical barrage required two shots to establish ranging, firing for effect on the third shot.

However, the walk does make sense. It could easily take 1 minute to adjust ranging. If your troops were doing a slow run, they would be 300 yards closer when a typical barrage step was only 100 yards. At a normal walk, they would only move up 50 yards.

The ranges for creeping barrages were preset (registered) in advance. There were not ranging shots fired. The lifting pace was determined based on the maximum speed at which the infantry could be expected to advance in good order, given the specific terrain, obstacles, weather, and equipment being carried by the soldiers.

The practise of firing ranging rounds came in once infantry were carrying radios and calling in artillery themselves onto specific targets.

 

[barehl]

The ranges for creeping barrages were preset (registered) in advance. There were not ranging shots fired.

I find that hard to believe. Ranging shots were common during WWII. There had to be ranging of some kind.

The practise of firing ranging rounds came in once infantry were carrying radios and calling in artillery themselves onto specific targets.

No. Ranging was done much earlier than this using a spy glass and flag signals. By WWI, they would have used binoculars.

 

[gumboot]

I find that hard to believe. Ranging shots were common during WWII. There had to be ranging of some kind.

Did you not see "in advance"? These set piece battles were planned weeks in advance, and the barrage lines established long before the attack. Part of the reason for the perpetual exchange of artillery fire was to disguise ranging fire so the enemy didn't work out what the targets were in advance.

No. Ranging was done much earlier than this using a spy glass and flag signals. By WWI, they would have used binoculars.

I mean on-the-fly ranging fire. WWI artillery was used on pre-set targets, it wasn't used for fire support, so there was no need to establish ranging on the fly. They were established days before the attack. That's why Passchendaele was such a disaster, because they didn't allow time for the guns to establish new positions after the advances during the Battle of Broodseinde.

 

[Giz]

I find that hard to believe. Ranging shots were common during WWII. There had to be ranging of some kind.



No. Ranging was done much earlier than this using a spy glass and flag signals. By WWI, they would have used binoculars.

One of the major advances between the Somme (1916) and Arras (1917) was that artillery had moved from a "register while in place on the battlefield" (which, when registering 1500 guns on the Somme, takes about a week and kinda gives the game away) to a "all guns are pre-registered and the Germans only find out about the huge bombardment when it actually hits them".

 

[Corsair 115]

Did you not see "in advance"? These set piece battles were planned weeks in advance, and the barrage lines established long before the attack. Part of the reason for the perpetual exchange of artillery fire was to disguise ranging fire so the enemy didn't work out what the targets were in advance.

And in turn that was part of the reason for the war in the air war: keeping the enemy's observation aircraft away from one's lines while forces built up for an attack.

 

[Garrison]

Well, this sounds like typical generational historiography where you make name for yourself by overdoing some in itself necessary debunking. The earlier view of absolute evil and incompetent shambles was overly simplified and misleading. But this present "revisionism" about noble and brilliant generals leading a great fight for liberty does go much too far to the other direction.

And if you could point to a volume that actually did that?

 

[llwyd]

And if you could point to a volume that actually did that?

Well, isn't it the "Myriad Faces of War" which ends with the words "one of freedom's wars"?

edit: Of course it can often be done more subtly too: if we only see warfare tehnically, as in many current generation of studies, as a rational business judged by reaching reasonably expected levels of "efficiency" and ending up with the argument that the level of efficiency was what could have been expected we have gone a long way of, well, disposing of the WWI as a historical tragedy and horror, which, I repeat, it was.

 

[gumboot]

disposing of the WWI as a historical tragedy and horror, which, I repeat, it was.

All war is "historical tragedy and horror". I'm not sure how anyone could think that human beings using technology to maim and kill each other en masse could be anything else. I hard needs saying, really.

 

[Damien Evans]

A wee WWI myth...

The name "digger" is most commonly applied to Australian soldiers, and less commonly, to New Zealand soldiers. The theory is that the name came about because the Australians spent so much time desperately digging trenches in Gallipoli.

In fact, the name "Digger" developed on the Western Front, and was first used by the New Zealanders to refer to the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, because so many of them had been gum diggers in their previous life. (Likewise, the Rifle Battalion were known as "Dinks").

In short time, the name "digger" came to be associated with all New Zealand soldiers, and from there all ANZAC soldiers (as they tended to stick together and the other allied soldiers frequently confused the two).

Australia embraced the name more readily than New Zealand, so now it's synonymous with Australian soldiers.

That's a good one.

 

[llwyd]

All war is "historical tragedy and horror". I'm not sure how anyone could think that human beings using technology to maim and kill each other en masse could be anything else. I hard needs saying, really.

Well, one does wonder - maybe I read too many conservative historians and know too well modern conservative interpretations of history. And I do seriously think that though the very critical previous historiography went partially overboard, it was essentially more accurate than this "freedom's war business" type of latter day rhetorics or overly technocratic views of warfare.

 

[llwyd]

All war is "historical tragedy and horror".

I have to say that perhaps not in equal amounts though. I really did intend to argue that - especially from the perspective of European civilization and certain optimistic belief in progress that it did contain - that war was particularly tragic and horrendous. The West has never been the same again.

 

[gumboot]

I have to say that perhaps not in equal amounts though.

Of course.

I really did intend to argue that - especially from the perspective of European civilization and certain optimistic belief in progress that it did contain - that war was particularly tragic and horrendous. The West has never been the same again.

The funny thing is, western civilisation (and the whole world) have actually benefited from the scale of destruction in WWI and WWII (and let's not forget that WWII dwarfed WWI for sheer destructiveness).

Prior to WWI, world history had been an unending parade of world powers engaging in direct, destructive wars with each other. The scale never approached modern war because the civilisations themselves were so much smaller.

People speak of the UK taking some 57,000 casualties on the First Day of the Somme. Yet black powder battlefields had produced similar casualty figures and similar casualty rates for a century before this, as the great industrial powers clashed head on. World War One simply continued a long-established trend. The only difference, really, between WWI and previous wars is that the mass media reported the progress of the war on a daily basis, stirring up a nationalist fervor which ensured the armies were supplied a near perpetual supply of soldiers.

We like to think World War One changed things, but it didn't really. Like clockwork, half a generation later the great powers were engaged in even more destructive warfare on an even greater scale. It was really World War Two that changed society's attitude to war, and I think it only happened because of the single characteristic of WW2 that was unique; there was no "safe ground", back home, away from the war. London and Berlin were as much battlefields as the fields and beaches of France. That made all the difference. And that's why, since World War Two, the world powers have refrained from direct conflict against each other, and we've experienced what is almost certainly the most peaceful century in world history.