[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[John Jones]

- It seems to me that this issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.
- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.
- Cutting back to the chase, I'll tackle #1 first -- unless a majority would like me to tackle #2 first.
- I'm telling you this just to let you know that I'm still around, and I'm working on my explanation for why I am (and, you guys are) special.

How many times do you expect us to fall for that same schtick?

 

[Ladewig]

If nobody has a better idea I'll answer the question about the ducks first.

Why a Duck?

Finally, someone in this thread is talking sense.

 

[Akhenaten]

- It seems to me that this overall issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.

Then you need to re-assess.

There are numerous sub-issues - not the least of which is a complete dearth of evidence for immortality.

- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.

No.

- Cutting back to the chase, I'll tackle #1 first -- unless a majority would like me to tackle #2 first.

You haven't learned a thing from the recent attempts to accommodate your bizarre methods of discussion, have you?

- I'm telling you this just to let you know that I'm still around, and I'm working on my explanation for why I am (and, you guys are) special.

Why? Do you really not understand that the 'debate' is over and that you lost?

 

[dafydd]

- It seems to me that this overall issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.
- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.
- Cutting back to the chase, I'll tackle #1 first -- unless a majority would like me to tackle #2 first.
- I'm telling you this just to let you know that I'm still around, and I'm working on my explanation for why I am (and, you guys are) special.

You lost. Game over.

 

[Slowvehicle]

A mallard ?

Canard!

 

[Agatha]

If Jabba weighs the same as a duck, can he turn any of us into newts? Are newts special?

 

[dafydd]

If Jabba weighs the same as a duck, can he turn any of us into newts? Are newts special?

An African or a European duck?

 

[trebor]

...Are newts special?

How about a bacterium? Are they 'special' do you think?

Perhaps bacteria are immortal.

 

[dafydd]

Is my cat immortal?

 

[godless dave]

- It seems to me that this overall issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.
- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.
- Cutting back to the chase, I'll tackle #1 first -- unless a majority would like me to tackle #2 first.
- I'm telling you this just to let you know that I'm still around, and I'm working on my explanation for why I am (and, you guys are) special.

Another sub-issue would be the one Loss Leader highlighted in the one-on-one debate:

Let us turn to p and ~p. You have set up two conditions: Either you are mortal in a random universe or you are immortal in a random universe. You are, however, wrong about the definition of ~p. If P is "I am mortal in a random universe," then ~p is any possibility other than that you are mortal in a random universe.

The universe could be nonrandom. It could be that, were we to run the universe from the beginning, it would necessarily produce you. Just because you are a small part in the universe doesn't mean you are not necessary. So, you need evidence that the universe is random and not wholly deterministic if you want to rule that out.

 

[Olowkow]

-My sincere "apologies". I don't know what I was "thinking".

FIFY.

 

[aggle-rithm]

Another sub-issue would be the one Loss Leader highlighted in the one-on-one debate:

Yep, I think this one goes beyond the validity of the numbers used. Numbers become quickly irrelevant if the logic is warped.

 

[aggle-rithm]

Is my cat immortal?

There is a non-zero chance that he is, so...sure, why not.

 

[dafydd]

There is a non-zero chance that he is, so...sure, why not.

He's already a blacksmith. If I show him a red hot poker he makes a bolt for the door.

 

[jsfisher]

- It seems to me that this overall issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.

The validity of your interpretation of the model is also at issue, the complement of the so-called scientific model.

- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.

And 3) the validity of the number you assigned to the likelihood of your current existence given the complement of the "Scientific Model" (or the likelihood of your current existence, period--that will server equally well in the end).

- Cutting back to the chase, I'll tackle #1 first -- unless a majority would like me to tackle #2 first.

Well, since you are offering me a choice, #3, please.

- I'm telling you this just to let you know that I'm still around, and I'm working on my explanation for why I am (and, you guys are) special.

Thanks. Now, if you could get back to us on #3, that would be super.

 

[Loss Leader]

- It seems to me that this overall issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.
- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.

That is absolutely not the overall issue. The fatal issue that you must deal with in order for anything you say to have meaning is the definition of the condition and the negation of the condition.

You have defined the condition, p, as your being mortal in a random universe.

The negation of that condition, ~p, has been defined by you as your punctuated or continuous immortality in a random universe. However, the correct definition of ~p should be ANYTHING OTHER THAN p. That includes: your mortality in a deterministic universe, the mortality of anyone else in a random universe, the chance that the universe was created 30 minutes ago, and everything else that isn't p.

Otherwise, you cannot say that p V ~P = 1. And you did say that the two conditions are complimentary to each other:

- “NSM” is the complement to SM.

Unless you can show why everything other than your immortality is impossible, your proof is illogical. For example: if we live in a deterministic universe, you are wrong. But your probabilities don't account for the chance that the universe is deterministic.

This is absolutely fatal to your argument. Playing with the probability that you are mortal is meaningless. It is shuffling deck chairs. The complimentary condition must be properly defined.

Can you do this?

 

[Slowvehicle]

- It seems to me that this overall issue boils down to one basic sub-issue -- the validity of the numbers I've inserted into the Bayesian formula.
- This divides into two critical sub-sub-issues -- 1) the validity of the number I assign to the likelihood of my current existence given the "Scientific Model," and 2) the validity of the numbers I assign to the prior probabilities of the two models.
- Cutting back to the chase, I'll tackle #1 first -- unless a majority would like me to tackle #2 first.
- I'm telling you this just to let you know that I'm still around, and I'm working on my explanation for why I am (and, you guys are) special.

Good afternoon, Mr. Savage!

I do hope you will read, and take to heart, Loss Leader's post, quoted below:

That is absolutely not the overall issue. The fatal issue that you must deal with in order for anything you say to have meaning is the definition of the condition and the negation of the condition.

You have defined the condition, p, as your being mortal in a random universe.

The negation of that condition, ~p, has been defined by you as your punctuated or continuous immortality in a random universe. However, the correct definition of ~p should be ANYTHING OTHER THAN p. That includes: your mortality in a deterministic universe, the mortality of anyone else in a random universe, the chance that the universe was created 30 minutes ago, and everything else that isn't p.
Otherwise, you cannot say that p V ~P = 1. And you did say that the two conditions are complimentary to each other:

Unless you can show why everything other than your immortality is impossible, your proof is illogical. For example: if we live in a deterministic universe, you are wrong. But your probabilities don't account for the chance that the universe is deterministic.

This is absolutely fatal to your argument. Playing with the probability that you are mortal is meaningless. It is shuffling deck chairs. The complimentary condition must be properly defined.

Can you do this?

The highlighted bit has been pointed out to you in multiple threads by multiple posters. Please read what Loss Leader has said, and respond to it.

Thanks!

 

[Jabba]

That is absolutely not the overall issue. The fatal issue that you must deal with in order for anything you say to have meaning is the definition of the condition and the negation of the condition.

You have defined the condition, p, as your being mortal in a random universe.

The negation of that condition, ~p, has been defined by you as your punctuated or continuous immortality in a random universe. However, the correct definition of ~p should be ANYTHING OTHER THAN p. That includes: your mortality in a deterministic universe, the mortality of anyone else in a random universe, the chance that the universe was created 30 minutes ago, and everything else that isn't p.

Otherwise, you cannot say that p V ~P = 1. And you did say that the two conditions are complimentary to each other:





Unless you can show why everything other than your immortality is impossible, your proof is illogical. For example: if we live in a deterministic universe, you are wrong. But your probabilities don't account for the chance that the universe is deterministic.

This is absolutely fatal to your argument. Playing with the probability that you are mortal is meaningless. It is shuffling deck chairs. The complimentary condition must be properly defined.

Can you do this?

Loss Leader,
- I'll give it my best shot.
- A deterministic universe wouldn't make any difference re the prior probabilities. Prior Probabilities are based upon the information we have prior to the event -- allowing that we don't have all the relevant info.

 

[Loss Leader]

Loss Leader,
- I'll give it my best shot.
- A deterministic universe wouldn't make any difference re the prior probabilities. Prior Probabilities are based upon the information we have prior to the event -- allowing that we don't have all the relevant info.

So what? I didn't say anything about what the probability of any event might be. I said that you've identified two conditions as covering ALL possibilities: Either you are mortal or immortal. However immortality IS NOT the complement of mortality. The complement is "any possibility other than your mortality in a random universe." You have not explained how you've separated out immortality from any other possibility.

All that you've computed is the chance that you are not the only mortal alive in a random universe. You haven't separated out any of the possible reasons why you are not the only mortal in the universe. You've just declared that the reason is that you're immortal. But literally any other thing is part of your number, including that there are other mortals in the universe besides you.

The best way to demonstrate how wrong you are is to calculate your probabilities backwards. Since your two conditions are complements of each other, the probabilities should work out both ways. So, what is the chance that you are an immortal being, living forever through reincarnation in a random universe? What forces would have had to come together over how long and under what circumstances to create you in a continuous form? How many times would the universe have to start from the beginning until it made you again? Now consider the odds of anything other than that.

The numbers don't work backwards, do they? That's because your two conditions do not cover all possibilities.

 

[Jabba]

That is absolutely not the overall issue. The fatal issue that you must deal with in order for anything you say to have meaning is the definition of the condition and the negation of the condition.

You have defined the condition, p, as your being mortal in a random universe.

The negation of that condition, ~p, has been defined by you as your punctuated or continuous immortality in a random universe. However, the correct definition of ~p should be ANYTHING OTHER THAN p. That includes: your mortality in a deterministic universe, the mortality of anyone else in a random universe, the chance that the universe was created 30 minutes ago, and everything else that isn't p.

Otherwise, you cannot say that p V ~P = 1. And you did say that the two conditions are complimentary to each other:





Unless you can show why everything other than your immortality is impossible, your proof is illogical. For example: if we live in a deterministic universe, you are wrong. But your probabilities don't account for the chance that the universe is deterministic.

This is absolutely fatal to your argument. Playing with the probability that you are mortal is meaningless. It is shuffling deck chairs. The complimentary condition must be properly defined.

Can you do this?

LL,

- Previously, I couldn't figure out why you were saying a "random" universe. Now I think that you were implying "as compared to a deterministic universe."

- As for my definitions of p and ~p -- assuming that P is what I'm calling the "Scientific Model" -- specifically, this model holds that my self will exist for only one finite life at most. The complementary model is that my self will exist and it will exist continuously, or for multiple lifetimes.
- At this point, I have to admit that my model is not quite complementary. My model is that I am immortal -- that I will exist continuously or periodically ... forever.

- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably small -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.