Ten myths on WWI - debunked

[a_unique_person]

From a BBC article, published a few days ago

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25776836
9. The Versailles Treaty was extremely harsh. Germany was still the biggest and richest country in Europe and much of the reparations went unenforced. It was not as harsh as after WWII.

The Great Depression complicated the reparations issue.

 

[a_unique_person]

From a BBC article, published a few days ago

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25776836
9. The Versailles Treaty was extremely harsh. Germany was still the biggest and richest country in Europe and much of the reparations went unenforced. It was not as harsh as after WWII.

The Great Depression complicated the reparations issue.

 

[Pope130]

So no myths about the aerial part of WWI?

(In terms of casualties, Bloody April was pretty tough on the Royal Flying Corps.)

Well, there is the general belief that the Germans always enjoyed technical superiority (the "Fokker Scourge"). The reality is that it was much more of a see-saw competition with the advantage changing back and forth as each side introduced newer aircraft designs.

Also, not all German fighters were Fokkers, Von Richtofen's Dr.1 was not all red, and most of his victories were not scored with the Dr.1.

 

[Reactor drone]

Well, there is the general belief that the Germans always enjoyed technical superiority (the "Fokker Scourge"). The reality is that it was much more of a see-saw competition with the advantage changing back and forth as each side introduced newer aircraft designs.

Also, not all German fighters were Fokkers, Von Richtofen's Dr.1 was not all red, and most of his victories were not scored with the Dr.1.

Several of the Dr.1s he flew were all red but he did score victories in 6 different Dr.1 aircraft some of which retained large areas of streaky green topside camouflage. He also flew a number of all red Albatros aircraft in his time.

 

[Big Al]

As far as casualty rates. Yes there were a lot of casualties in WW1 but there were big armies involved.
Look at the % rate and it was no worse than many other wars.

Is the % casualty rate really what matters to most people, brother than a huge body count?

How do you count the Flu as war casualties? only if you want to inflate the total to make them stack in your favour.

I only did that because the vast majority of Taiping casualties were due to disease and famine exacerbated by combat conditions.

I merely pointed out that if you really want to count war-exacerbated disease as well as direct combat casualties, bombing casualties etc., then there's a case for including Spanish flu in WWI casualty figures.

I mentioned the flu to point out that comparing all the Taiping Rebellion losses including disease and famine to just the WWI combat casualties was not comparing apples with apples.

 

[jimbob]

Indeed. In fact, if you compare the deaths per division per week, between the Somme (generally seen as a bloody massacre of British troops) and the Normandy campaign (generally seen as a triumph):

The Somme:
Number of weeks 20.5
British divisions engaged: 53
Total dead: 95,000
Dead per division per week: 89

Normandy:
Number of weeks 11.5
British divisions engaged: 19
Total dead: 22,000
Dead per division per week: 100

Of course, there were a greater number, as opposed to rate, of casualualties in WW1... but that happens when you have a bigger army fighting for a more prolonged period of time... which happens when you (and the French) have to do the hard job of breaking the bulk of the German Army instead of having most of the work done by the Russians (which was the case in WW2). (In WW1 the proportion of the German Army assigned to the Western Front was typically 2/3rds to 90%).

There was a difference.

Compare the ground gained by the British in July 1916 to July (or June) 1944.

ETA:

A high casualty rate coupled with little to show for it is different to a similar rate with significant progress. At least in popular memory.

 

[Aepervius]

7. Tactics on the Western Front remained unchanged despite repeated failure. There were significant equipment and tactical changes during the war, from planes to helmets.

and tanks.

 

[TomG]

From a BBC article, published a few days ago

7. Tactics on the Western Front remained unchanged despite repeated failure. There were significant equipment and tactical changes during the war, from planes to helmets.

This is my first post on this site on any forum, hoots to you all!

Point 7 in Nessie’s original post is the most interesting!

I must admit WW1 is a fascinating subject. I have read a few books on Western Front the most memorable of these were “The first day on the Somme” and “The Kaisershlacht” both by Martin Middlebrook. These demonstrate that the tactics used by both sides were changing significantly as time went on therefore it is wrong to say that nothing changed in a tactical sense. However the troops still lived in appalling conditions in almost static lines that never really moved into open country until 1918.

The “Bruchmuller” artillery tactics of using a cocktail of high explosive, tear gas, poison gas, and incendiary shells switching from target to target with great accuracy in the German offensive in 1918 was a huge improvement on the hit and miss tactics used in Somme battle by the Brits in 1916. The German stormtrooper tactics of using small groups of highly trained troops probing for weak points was another massive improvement in gaining a breakthrough, while 18 months earlier the Brits had used line formations at walking pace laden with equipment against well-positioned machine gun fire.

When you consider that the early battles in 1914 were fought with cavalry while the breaking of the Hindenburg line in 1918 was achieved by using coordinated tanks, planes, and even the modified use of the German stormtrooper tactics by the allies, it’s clear that WW1 was very tactically innovative.

 

[Garrison]

and tanks.

One of the ironies of the criticism of Haig; he's been denounced as a boneheaded cavalry officer who ignored innovations AND he's been criticized for insisting on using tanks as soon as possible rather than holding back and using them in mass numbers.

There still seem to be an awful lot of people here in the UK who regard 'Blackadder Goes Forth' as a documentary.

 

[Giz]

The “Bruchmuller” artillery tactics of using a cocktail of high explosive, tear gas, poison gas, and incendiary shells switching from target to target with great accuracy in the German offensive in 1918 was a huge improvement on the hit and miss tactics used in Somme battle by the Brits in 1916.

1916 was while the British econmy was still moving to a total war footing. There were still too many shrapnel shells being produced and not enough HE. Try comparing the effectiveness of the artillery used by Britain in the Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917 (the next big British offensive after the Somme) to that on the Somme the prior year. There was a dramatic difference in effectiveness (higher proportion of HE, higher proportion of heavy guns, hurricane barrages, false stops etc).

even the modified use of the German stormtrooper tactics by the allies, it’s clear that WW1 was very tactically innovative.

Actually, after the Somme in 1916 the British had issued a memorandum on what had been learned from the battle, which prescribed various "stormtrooper"esque tactics (i.e. advancing as "blobs" rather than as a line).

 

[azzthom]

One of the ironies of the criticism of Haig; he's been denounced as a boneheaded cavalry officer who ignored innovations AND he's been criticized for insisting on using tanks as soon as possible rather than holding back and using them in mass numbers.

There still seem to be an awful lot of people here in the UK who regard 'Blackadder Goes Forth' as a documentary.

A point that was debated rather vociferously by British politicians (and actors) very recently when it emerged that schools were using 'Blackadder Goes Forth' to teach children about the First World War.

 

[Giz]

There was a difference.

Compare the ground gained by the British in July 1916 to July (or June) 1944.

ETA:

A high casualty rate coupled with little to show for it is different to a similar rate with significant progress. At least in popular memory.

On the other hand, the Somme saved the French Army, under huge pressure at Verdun, (and therefore saved the war) and (in the memorable words of one of the German officers there) "the Somme was the muddy grave of the German field army".

 

[jimbob]

On the other hand, the Somme saved the French Army, under huge pressure at Verdun, (and therefore saved the war) and (in the memorable words of one of the German officers there) "the Somme was the muddy grave of the German field army".

This book review suggests that it is a bit more complicated than that.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3599398/Back-to-old-battles.html

The accusation which is most frequently levelled at Haig
is that the offensives of 1916 and 1917, the battles of
the Somme and Ypres, were badly managed, far too
costly in lives, and continued long beyond the point
where they should have been broken off. Like Terraine,
Corrigan justifies Haig's conduct by reference to what
was happening to the French: Haig, he says, had to
fight the Somme battle to relieve the French at Verdun .
However, the origins of the offensive lie in December
1915, two months before the Germans attacked at
Verdun . By June 16, 1916, when Haig was saying that
the Somme had to go ahead to relieve the French, the
Russians had already provided that relief with Brusilov's
dramatic victory in Galicia. By October, when Haig was
still pressing on the Somme, the French themselves had
moved from the defence to the attack at Verdun .
Corrigan repeats the trick for the third battle of Ypres in
1917. This, he says, had to be fought because the
French army was debilitated by mutiny and unable to
attack. But Haig planned the battle oblivious of what
was happening on the French sector, and the French
themselves did not urge him to do so.

 

[gumboot]

I recently read a paper that argued quite eloquently that our perception of WW1 as static trench warfare and stalemate is skewed by the Western Front.

Even on the Western Front it was only during 1915 and 1916 that the front lines remained relatively static.

 

[gumboot]

One of my favourite WWI myths - repeated numerous times in this very thread - is the "walk towards the enemy in a line" myth. It's a popular myth, because it reinforces that other great WWI myth - that WWI was a war commanded by brainless upper class idiots who cheerfully marched lower class soldiers to their deaths with no regard for their welfare.

These are two of the most popular, most enduring, and most wrong myths about the entire war. I only want to comment on the first for now though. Such observations about the lunacy of "walking towards the enemy" are made from a place of total ignorance, with zero understanding of the tactical situation, the reasons for the measures taken, or the relative success.

The critical factor missing here is the creeping barrage. Prior to the implementation of the creeping barrage, the standard allied attack tactic was to run towards the enemy, in clumps, moving from shell hole to shell hole, exploiting cover. Prior to assault, the artillery would shell the intervening ground in a deliberate attempt to create shelter.

Using these tactics, allied forces were annihilated. German defensive positions remained intact, and the German gunners were able to fire indscriminately on the hapless soldiers, who took an age to cross the intervening ground.

The creeping barrage changed all that. Concentrated, accurate artillery fire, en masse, was used to create a "screen" in front of the infantry. Not only would these barrages cut barbed wire and other obstacles, but they dramatically reduced the amount of enemy fire that could reach the infantry as the intensity of the barrage was so high that enemy fire simply couldn't get through it.

As the infantry advanced the barrage would "lift", moving ahead of the infantry. As the infantry were nearing the enemy trenches, the enemy would be receiving this murderous barrage, and would be unable to perform defensively. Then, the barrage would lift to behind the enemy front line, in order to prevent counter attacks or secondary trench lines from firing on the allies. This would leave the allied soldiers with a short sprint to reach the enemy trenches, and they could be in them before the Germans had time to return to their guns.

The catch is, an effective creeping barrage relies on precise timing. If the barrage gets too far ahead of the infantry, the German defences can get inside it, and cut down the soldiers. If the barrage gets too far behind, your own men will be hit by it.

The question then, is how do you coordinate a creeping barrage in a time that lacks the kind of sophisticated communication equipment that would allow for accurate real time adjustments? You have to have the entire thing perfectly timed out from the outset. To the second. And to make that work, the infantry have to maintain a slow, careful pace. So they walked.

And the thing is, when the plan worked, casualties were remarkably low. After the creeping barrage was introduced, and the allies started "walking at the enemy" casualty rates dropped, and where we got spikes in the casualty rate, like at Passchendaele, it was because the creeping barrage wasn't implemented effectively.

 

[gumboot]

This book review suggests that it is a bit more complicated than that.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3599398/Back-to-old-battles.html

That account is pretty weak. To begin with, it makes no account of the possibility that the objectives of an offensive can change as the situation changes. The idea that Haig pressed ahead without regard for French interests is particularly absurd when you consider that the British had wanted to make their main offensive at Flanders, and only agreed to a combined offensive at Somme because of French insistence. Then when a week after that strategy was conceived, the French were attacked at Verdun, the British were left to carry most of the weight of the French plan on their own, and it became about relieving pressure on the French rather than actually achieving a breakthrough.

In late October the French went on their first offensive in the Verdun, but by this time the allies were thoroughly committed to the third stage of their offensive in the Somme, which ended a few weeks later.

The final stage of the Somme was opposed by Haig, but the French applied pressure to have it happen to prevent the Germans from transferring forces to Russia and Italy. Because the French were very much in control on the Western Front, Haig had no choice but to comply.

As for 3rd Ypres, that was the Flanders campaign Haig had wanted to conduct in 1916 instead of the Somme, and it's true that the French had opposed it. But to consider the wisdom of the 3rd Ypres you have to factor in that The Ypres Salient was unsustainable. It was a bulge in the German lines surrounded on three sides by high ground covered with German artillery. Even during times of "quiet" the daily losses in the Salient were appalling, and it was a devastating drain on allied resources. They either had to withdraw (which neither the French nor the British politicians would allow) or they had to capture the high ground.

Had the French allowed Haig to conduct his Flanders campaign when he wanted, in mid 1916, it might have worked. As it was, he wasn't allowed to conduct it until late 1917, at which point the weather turned and guaranteed a costly battle. He was then further undermined when forces were withdrawn to Italy, forcing him to halt the campaign.

 

[gumboot]

There was a difference.

Compare the ground gained by the British in July 1916 to July (or June) 1944.

ETA:

A high casualty rate coupled with little to show for it is different to a similar rate with significant progress. At least in popular memory.

Until the 1930s the Somme was seen as a heroic (but costly) British victory.

 

[Garrison]

Until the 1930s the Somme was seen as a heroic (but costly) British victory.

Perception of the war really shifts in the 30s. The failure to deliver on the promises of a 'land fit for heroes', economic downturn that culminates in the Great Depression, and of course by the end of the decade the clear sense that it was not the 'war to end all wars'.

 

[Corsair 115]

While I understand the focus on the ground campaigns, I can't but help feel the aerial and naval campaigns of WWI are being overlooked...

 

[Border Reiver]

The creeping barrage changed all that. Concentrated, accurate artillery fire, en masse, was used to create a "screen" in front of the infantry. Not only would these barrages cut barbed wire and other obstacles, but they dramatically reduced the amount of enemy fire that could reach the infantry as the intensity of the barrage was so high that enemy fire simply couldn't get through it.

As the infantry advanced the barrage would "lift", moving ahead of the infantry. As the infantry were nearing the enemy trenches, the enemy would be receiving this murderous barrage, and would be unable to perform defensively. Then, the barrage would lift to behind the enemy front line, in order to prevent counter attacks or secondary trench lines from firing on the allies. This would leave the allied soldiers with a short sprint to reach the enemy trenches, and they could be in them before the Germans had time to return to their guns.

The catch is, an effective creeping barrage relies on precise timing. If the barrage gets too far ahead of the infantry, the German defences can get inside it, and cut down the soldiers. If the barrage gets too far behind, your own men will be hit by it.

The question then, is how do you coordinate a creeping barrage in a time that lacks the kind of sophisticated communication equipment that would allow for accurate real time adjustments? You have to have the entire thing perfectly timed out from the outset. To the second. And to make that work, the infantry have to maintain a slow, careful pace. So they walked.

In addition to communications/coordination, the other bit that a creeping barrage depended on was being able to precisely calibrate where the shells from each gun would land. Planners were quite aware that new artillery barrels delivered higher velocities, and thus greater range, but the creators of artillery firing tables hadn't reached the stage by WWI of calculating for barrel wear (and other non-standard conditions, such as differences in projectile weight, atmospheric conditions, and in really big pieces, rotation of the earth) as most light artillery was invisaged as a direct fire weapon where the gunners would be shooting over open sights (French 75mm, British 13 pdr, and the German 77mm guns demonstrate this philosphy), and so the need to be able to compensate for the non-standard conditions wasn't needed for those pieces as the layer could simply compensate for them with the next shot, like a rifleman could. Using them as indirect fire weapons required being able to compensate for these conditions, and no real research had been done on what non-standard conditions would do to artillery projectiles until 1915/16 and for the British Commonwealth weren't ready until late 1916.

Without being able to compensate for non-standard conditions, the creeping barrage was ineffective, as there were lots of "holes" in the curtain of fire for enemy fire to get through, and there was that rather unfortunate problem of rounds landing on your own troops - and while gunners use black humour to describe this as "spurring the infantry on to early victory" we rather don't like the idea of doing the enemy's job for him.