Continuation Part Seven: Discussion of the Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito case

[Samson]

Both emanate from the same post by Doug. There is no proof.

There is as much proof of this as there was that Amanda participated in a 'rape prank'.

Anne is more than a supporter. She was a TV spokesperson for Amanda (FOA).

People here have bashed Maresca for years as well as all the prosecutors and most of the judges. I wouldn't blame them as much as the Italian system for allowing them to participate in the trial before final conviction.

We are not aware of what 'facts' they have that have not been made public.

I recall Nancy Grace alluding to special information she had. Is this related to the Kercher information? It seems to be getting into unknown unknown territory, but is obviously of vital interest, even a complete refutation of these rumours.

 

[Bill Williams]

Thanks for all that, AmyStrange. The key to not having an extradition request from Italy granted, is that in this case a verdict would be the result of a prosecution appeal of an acquittal. It would have been better for the haters if the prosecution had not submitted appeal papers, but that Cassazione had sent it back.

Here in Canada it would have been different. There is case law which records a successful prosecution appeal, based on a claim that the *prosecution* had not received a fair trial.

If the issue had been first heard in a Canadian court, and someone had been returned to the US following a Canadian acquittal; but a new trial was ordered because the prosecutor felt unfairly treated......

.... I would expect nothing but raspberries from south of the 49th at a Canadian extradition request.

 

[Grinder]

What about the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment prohibition on Double Jeopardy? Well, the short answer is that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Protection doesn’t apply in an extradition proceeding since the U.S. is not the one trying Knox (they are just handing her over). The long answer is that even if the Fifth Amendment did apply, under US law, an appeal that overturns a lower court conviction is not an acquittal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. That is basically what happened here. Knox was convicted, then her conviction was overturned on appeal, and then the appellate court judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered (albeit at the appellate level). This is not double jeopardy, either under Italian law or US law.

While the issue is rare in the United States, several courts have rejected the double jeopardy argument in similar cases. In 2010, a federal court in California found that a man who was acquitted of murder in Mexico and later convicted after prosecutors appealed the acquittal, could not claim double jeopardy to avoid extradition to Mexico. That court cited a 1974 decision from the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, that reached the same conclusion with respect to Canadian law, which also allows the government to appeal an acquittal.
ETA -

If the issue had been first heard in a Canadian court, and someone had been returned to the US following a Canadian acquittal; but a new trial was ordered because the prosecutor felt unfairly treated......

.... I would expect nothing but raspberries from south of the 49th at a Canadian extradition request.

But, alas you instead would have received the perp.

 

[RoseMontague]

BTW, thanks to Machiavelli for his quantity and quality of tweets from the courtroom today (although it might have been slightly more appropriate to leave out the parenthetical personal opinions and criticisms.....).

Yes. He did a good job, even more updates than LaNazione today. He had one gap of about 40 minutes (not during recess) that the others reporting didn't. Other than that and an occasional pro guilt comment I appreciated his efforts to keep everyone informed.

 

[Grinder]

Yes. He did a good job, even more updates than LaNazione today. He had one gap of about 40 minutes (not during recess) that the others reporting didn't. Other than that and an occasional pro guilt comment I appreciated his efforts to keep everyone informed.

Sure hope she showed the Ch. 5 window climb.

 

[Diocletus]

This is from a Senate Executive report regarding the extradition treaty with the UK. Different country, obviously, but this suggests how the Senate thinks foreign retrials should be handled:

The second proviso addresses a provision of recently enacted United Kingdom domestic law that may allow for the retrial in the United Kingdom, in certain limited circumstances, of an individual who has been previously tried and acquitted in that country in a manner that would not be permitted in the United States under the Double Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution. Although U.S. courts have indicated that extradition in such contexts is not barred, and although retrial or prosecution appeal after acquittal is often permitted in European countries with civil law traditions, it is uncommon in the Anglo-American system. Accordingly, the committee sought to call attention to the provision. The proviso notes that, although the Treaty does not address this situation, it is the understanding of the Senate that under U.S. law and practice a person sought for extradition can present a claim to the Secretary of State that an aspect of foreign law that may permit retrial may result in an unfairness that the Secretary could conclude warrants denial of the extradition request. It urges the Secretary to carefully review any such claims involving a request for extradition in the rare case where this provision of United Kingdom domestic law is implicated.

 

[AmyStrange]

Thanks for all that, AmyStrange. The key to not having an extradition request from Italy granted, is that in this case a verdict would be the result of a prosecution appeal of an acquittal. It would have been better for the haters if the prosecution had not submitted appeal papers, but that Cassazione had sent it back.

Here in Canada it would have been different. There is case law which records a successful prosecution appeal, based on a claim that the *prosecution* had not received a fair trial.

If the issue had been first heard in a Canadian court, and someone had been returned to the US following a Canadian acquittal; but a new trial was ordered because the prosecutor felt unfairly treated......

.... I would expect nothing but raspberries from south of the 49th at a Canadian extradition request.

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Absolutely Bill and you're welcome.

Some of the experts argued it isn't double jeopardy because there was no jury trial, but are there ever actual US-like jury trials in Italy? And, just about every re-trial in the US I've ever heard of was after a conviction, not an acquittal just like you noted.

Thank you,

d

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[Grinder]

This is from a Senate Executive report regarding the extradition treaty with the UK. Different country, obviously, but this suggests how the Senate thinks foreign retrials should be handled:

Quote:

The second proviso addresses a provision of recently enacted United Kingdom domestic law that may allow for the retrial in the United Kingdom, in certain limited circumstances, of an individual who has been previously tried and acquitted in that country in a manner that would not be permitted in the United States under the Double Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution. Although U.S. courts have indicated that extradition in such contexts is not barred, and although retrial or prosecution appeal after acquittal is often permitted in European countries with civil law traditions, it is uncommon in the Anglo-American system. Accordingly, the committee sought to call attention to the provision. The proviso notes that, although the Treaty does not address this situation, it is the understanding of the Senate that under U.S. law and practice a person sought for extradition can present a claim to the Secretary of State that an aspect of foreign law that may permit retrial may result in an unfairness that the Secretary could conclude warrants denial of the extradition request. It urges the Secretary to carefully review any such claims involving a request for extradition in the rare case where this provision of United Kingdom domestic law is implicated.​

This describes a retrial not an ongoing trial with an appeal sending it back to a lower court.

If they deny extradition on the basis of double jeopardy it will be precedent setting and not something currently part of the system.

I believe that they will have a better chance of beating it on the basis of a kangaroo court being the trier.

Perhaps Amanda's remark about going fugitive tells us what she thinks the chances of applying DJ is.

 

[Grinder]

-

Absolutely Bill and you're welcome.

Some of the experts argued it isn't double jeopardy because there was no jury trial, but are there ever actual US-like jury trials in Italy? And, just about every re-trial in the US I've ever heard of was after a conviction, not an acquittal just like you noted.

Thank you,

d

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It isn't double jeopardy because they have a three part system. The US has already ruled on this with the Canadian and Mexican cases cited above.

 

[AmyStrange]

It isn't double jeopardy because they have a three part system. The US has already ruled on this with the Canadian and Mexican cases cited above.

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Neither of them are Italy, although you did not state if the one wanted for extradition was a US citizen or not.

d

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[AmyStrange]

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Neither of them are Italy, although you did not state if the one wanted for extradition was a US citizen or not.

d

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Plus neither of these cases seemed to involve the Secretary of State, nor was it stated that either defendant was actually extradited. You only cited cases where lower courts affirmed the extradition, not what the upper courts did or even if the defendant was ACTUALLY extradited due to these decisions.

Could you please at least give me the names of the defendants for these cases or a link so I can look them up.

d

 

[Diocletus]

Quote:

The second proviso addresses a provision of recently enacted United Kingdom domestic law that may allow for the retrial in the United Kingdom, in certain limited circumstances, of an individual who has been previously tried and acquitted in that country in a manner that would not be permitted in the United States under the Double Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution. Although U.S. courts have indicated that extradition in such contexts is not barred, and although retrial or prosecution appeal after acquittal is often permitted in European countries with civil law traditions, it is uncommon in the Anglo-American system. Accordingly, the committee sought to call attention to the provision. The proviso notes that, although the Treaty does not address this situation, it is the understanding of the Senate that under U.S. law and practice a person sought for extradition can present a claim to the Secretary of State that an aspect of foreign law that may permit retrial may result in an unfairness that the Secretary could conclude warrants denial of the extradition request. It urges the Secretary to carefully review any such claims involving a request for extradition in the rare case where this provision of United Kingdom domestic law is implicated.​

This describes a retrial not an ongoing trial with an appeal sending it back to a lower court.

If they deny extradition on the basis of double jeopardy it will be precedent setting and not something currently part of the system.

I believe that they will have a better chance of beating it on the basis of a kangaroo court being the trier.

Perhaps Amanda's remark about going fugitive tells us what she thinks the chances of applying DJ is.

Amanda Knox has been submitted to multiple jury determinations in a manner that would be prohibited under US law. I think that the concept mentioned above applies to this situation. I think that this issue really only comes up in this context.

 

[katy_did]

This is from a Senate Executive report regarding the extradition treaty with the UK. Different country, obviously, but this suggests how the Senate thinks foreign retrials should be handled:

This is about the situation in the U.K. and some Australian states where you can be retried if new evidence emerges years after a final acquittal. That's genuine double jeopardy (and even then, it wouldn't automatically bar an extradition). It's not about jeopardy attaching at a different stage during the legal process due to another country having a different legal system.

I've posted this previously, but this response to a question on the same treaty referred to in your quote is more applicable here:

Generally, U.S. extradition courts do not inquire into questions of application and propriety of foreign procedural laws and rights or require that they comport with our own. This is true even with respect to procedural guarantees, such as our double jeopardy rules. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). Moreover, it would be both difficult and inappropriate to strictly apply U.S. law regarding double jeopardy in the extradition context because there is considerable variation among nations in how and when double jeopardy concepts may apply. For example, while U.S. double jeopardy concepts bar the government from appealing a judgment of acquittal, such appeals by the prosecution are in fact quite common abroad, particularly among countries with a civil law tradition. See, e.g., Sidali v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 107 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, U.S. courts have correctly held that even where foreign procedures would have violated our double jeopardy bar had they occurred in the context of a U.S. criminal prosecution, this was not a basis for denying extradition. U.S. ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming extradition to Canada where Canadian trial court had dismissed charges against defendants after presentation of all evidence, but prosecution appealed and appellate court entered judgment of conviction).

Thus, neither the terms of the proposed treaty or any other U.S. extradition treaty, nor U.S. caselaw, would per se bar extradition because procedures in the UK (or other foreign state) would not comport with U.S. double jeopardy requirements.

As Grinder says, denying extradition on the basis of double jeopardy would be precedent-setting, and would potentially affect extradition to any other country where prosecution appeals are allowed (like Canada).

 

[Wildhorses]

Hello, I've missed this entire trial. At the moment, I know less about the status of this case than I've known in six years.

I hadn't known there was a hearing yesterday.

Can someone give me mach's twitter handle so I can see his hearing tweets?

I see serious-looking talk about extradition issues. I take it the trial isn't going well?

I know nothing. I doubt anyone will answer these questions, but have there been any major events in the past 4-5 months? How bout any fascinating minor events?

Coverage of this case is strange. To get info, seems to me one must resign one's self to mainstream news blurbs (which aren't terribly informative) OR wade through 20,000+ comments per month (which consumes a LOT of time). I miss Perugia Shock's middle ground.

 

[AmyStrange]

You may be right Grinder...

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It isn't double jeopardy because they have a three part system. The US has already ruled on this with the Canadian and Mexican cases cited above.

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I may be wrong about double jeopardy and retrials, but the problem with your cite is I can't find the specific cases anywhere, but it is interesting that many of my cites do say "double jeopardy" is the way to go and NONE of these lawyers cite the case you talk about.

PLUS, even though your quote is everywhere, they are all copy and paste (word for exact word) jobs without any type of specific information regarding the specific reasons double jeopardy had no merit, plus no specific case is ever cited or where the original quote comes from. This is troubling for me, because it reminds me of all the cut and paste jobs Harry Rag was involved with.

I've also seen this kind of thing when investigating unexplained phenomena where a quote about a specific event is word for word pasted in books and websites for years, but when we (me and my website co-writer) went to find the original source (old newspapers etc.) dates and general information were drastically wrong (The whole "Jacko" fiasco in Canada for example, where the year of the article quoted everywhere was off by one year exactly). You can read about our exploits and conclusions in that case here:

http://www.amystrange.org/UNX-sasquatch.html#1884

I'm now going to see if I can find the original source for this specific case by seeing if there is a website documenting the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York. If that fails, there is a free law library downtown open to the public that I'll visit when I have the chance. The librarians there are very friendly and helpful. It's a pleasure to talk to them about things like this.

Until then, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt, and I will apologize if I am wrong. It's too bad very few people here or anywhere (esp. PGP sites) do this kind of thing, especially if their investigation proves them wrong,

d

-

 

[Diocletus]

This is about the situation in the U.K. and some Australian states where you can be retried if new evidence emerges years after a final acquittal. That's genuine double jeopardy (and even then, it wouldn't automatically bar an extradition). It's not about jeopardy attaching at a different stage during the legal process due to another country having a different legal system.

I've posted this previously, but this response to a question on the same treaty referred to in your quote is more applicable here:


As Grinder says, denying extradition on the basis of double jeopardy would be precedent-setting, and would potentially affect extradition to any other country where prosecution appeals are allowed (like Canada).

Please explain how these two situations are different:

1. Case One: You are retried because new evidence has emerged years after acquittal by a jury.

2. Case Two: You are acquitted by a jury, and then there is an appeal, and you go before a new jury several years later in a proceeding that allows new evidence.

The argument that one country likes to call its "retrial" a part of a multi-part proceeding is to me just semantics. The bottom line is that the defendants in both cases are being subjected to a subsequent jury trial after acquittal.

 

[HumanityBlues]

What about the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment prohibition on Double Jeopardy? Well, the short answer is that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Protection doesn’t apply in an extradition proceeding since the U.S. is not the one trying Knox (they are just handing her over). The long answer is that even if the Fifth Amendment did apply, under US law, an appeal that overturns a lower court conviction is not an acquittal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. That is basically what happened here. Knox was convicted, then her conviction was overturned on appeal, and then the appellate court judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered (albeit at the appellate level). This is not double jeopardy, either under Italian law or US law.

While the issue is rare in the United States, several courts have rejected the double jeopardy argument in similar cases. In 2010, a federal court in California found that a man who was acquitted of murder in Mexico and later convicted after prosecutors appealed the acquittal, could not claim double jeopardy to avoid extradition to Mexico. That court cited a 1974 decision from the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, that reached the same conclusion with respect to Canadian law, which also allows the government to appeal an acquittal.
ETA -

But, alas you instead would have received the perp.

FWIW, here is a snippet of the relevant part of the case. It's actually from 2012. The whole text can probably be found on line somewhere. The case isFeusier-Marquez v. Torres 2012 WL 1203360. It is an unpublished decision.

Background:

II. Background1
In September 2001, Mexican police officers apprehended Petitioner as he drove down a highway with a dead woman in the rear of the vehicle. (Petition, Exhibit 4 at 2). The woman was scantily clad, had a plastic bag around her head, and a rope around her neck. Id. On two separate occasions, Petitioner admitted to drugging and strangling the woman, though he later recanted at trial. Id.
Petitioner was brought to trial and acquitted by the trial judge. (Id. at 4, Pet. at 7.) The government appealed the acquittal, and prevailed. (Pet. Ex. 4 at 3.) The appellate court found Petitioner guilty of aggravated homicide and imposed a twenty-seven year sentence. (Id.) By the time the appellate court rendered a decision, however, Petitioner had left Mexico and returned to the United States. (Id.)
Mexican authorities issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest and made a provisional arrest request to the United States Government. Pursuant to that request, Petitioner was arrested in the United States in January 2009. (Id. at 1.) A magistrate judge subsequently found Petitioner extraditable and certified the matter to the United States Secretary of State. (Id. at 12.) This petition followed.

" B. Petitioner also argues that extradition would violate Article 6 of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, which, applying the international law analogue of the double jeopardy principle, “non bis in idem,” prohibits extradition “when the person sought has been prosecuted ... by the requested Party for the offense for which extradition is requested.” (Pet. at 3.) Because Petitioner was acquitted at trial in Mexico, he argues, he cannot now be extradited for the aggravated homicide offense. (Id.)
As Petitioner appears to acknowledge, however, the requested Party here is the United States, which has never prosecuted Petitioner for the homicide. (Pet. at 4:4–5). Alternatively, Petitioner appears to argue that the appealability of his acquittal in Mexico is itself a violation of double jeopardy and due process. (Id. At 4–5.) Petitioner provide no authority, however, to support his argument. Indeed, the Second Circuit addressed, and rejected, a similar argument made with respect to Canadian law, which also permits the government to appeal an acquittal. See Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 927 (2nd Cir.1974). The fact that Petitioner was acquitted at trial in Mexico before he was then convicted on appeal therefore does not remove the aggravated homicide offense from the penumbra of the extradition treaty."

Here is some of the language from the 2nd Circuit case that was cited, U.S. ex. rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler.

U. S. ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925 (2nd Cir. 1974) (this is the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.:

Appellants claim that the applicable treaty does not provide for their extradition; that, in view of the Canadian procedures underlying their conviction, extradition would result in a violation of the guarantee to them of due process of law under the United States Constitution; and that there is insufficient evidence *927 to find probable cause of their guilt. The case comes to us by way of an appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, William C. Conner, Judge, denying petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and adopting the opinion of Gerard L. Goettel, United States Magistrate, holding that there were ‘no valid grounds for refusing the petition for extradition to the Dominion of Canada.’ We agree with Magistrate Goettel and accordingly affirm Judge Conner's orders.
There is need for little discussion of appellants' treaty and sufficiency points. The appellants were convicted by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, Appeal Division, of conspiring to import hashish, a violation of § 423(1)(d) of the Canadian Criminal Code.

1 Under the provisions of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Art. X, 8 Stat. 576, the United States is required to deliver to justice all persons found in the United States who were convicted of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of Canada.

provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed . . ..1

Appellants argue that if they had been acquitted in a New York state or federal court for the offenses charged in the Canadian indictment, the double jeopardy clauses of the New York state constitution and the federal constitution would have barred the Government's appeal of the acquittal. From this, appellants argue, in effect, that the treaty confers upon them the extraterritorial protection of these double jeopardy clauses and that extradition is improper.

2 Appellants' position, to paraphrase the language of the treaty, is that a full application of the laws of the place where the fugitives were found would not justify their apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had there been committed.2 That is to say, in New York there could have been no conviction after an acquittal and for that reason no grounds for their apprehension. We decline to adopt this rather novel reading of the treaty. We note in passing our agreement with the appellants that, even though no final judgment of acquittal had been entered, there would have been double jeopardy in the United States, United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 302-307, 90 S.Ct. 2117, 26 L.Ed.2d 608 (1970); *928 Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962), a rule of federal constitutional law applicable to the states under Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). See generally Note, Government Appeals of ‘Dismissals' in Criminal Cases, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1822 (1974).
Their argument, nevertheless, does not take away from the proposition that appellants were convicted under Canadian law, that under existing federal law conspiracy to import hashish is criminal, and that the record evidences sufficient ‘evidence of criminality’ to have justified a trial of the case. This is all that the treaty requires. Since appellants have not served their sentences, they are extraditable under the Extradition Convention between the United States and Great Britain, Art. VII, 26 Stat. 1508 (1899),3 and 18 U.S.C. § 3184.

And here is one last on from In re Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia, 118 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

Moreover, constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceedings have been held inapplicable in the context of extradition. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth Amendment right against undue delay are inapplicable to an extradition. Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d at 829; In re Burt, 737 F.2d at 1486. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel does not apply to extradition proceedings. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d at 868–69. The Supreme Court has found no constitutional infirmity where those subject to extradition proceedings have been denied an opportunity to confront their accusers. Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. at 517, 36 S.Ct. 634. See also Esposito v. Adams, 700 F.Supp. 1470, 1476 (N.D.Ill.1988). Finally, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and the right to a Miranda warning are inapplicable to an extradition proceeding. In re Extradition of Powell, 4 F.Supp.2d 945, 951 (S.D.Cal.1998).
Courts have also declined to apply American procedural constraints and constitutional rights prospectively in extradition proceedings. Most directly on point are the facts in Caputo v. Kelly, 19 F.Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y.1937). In that case, a Frenchman shot his common law wife and fled to the United States. Id. at 732. He contested the extradition on the ground that the sole evidence against him was the deathbed accusation of his deceased wife, and such hearsay was not competent evidence sufficient to commit him to trial under the laws of New York. Id. at 734. The court first suggested that such evidence might indeed be admissible under the laws of New York, under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 736. Specifically, the court found that the circumstances surrounding her accusation seemed to indicate that she was likely to have believed her death was imminent at the time. Id. However, the Court ultimately found that the precise applicability of the dying declaration exception was not a pertinent issue in an extradition proceeding. Id. at 736. Noting that extradition proceedings are not criminal proceedings, the court found that “[t]he hearsay character of a statement is of course a factor to be considered in determining the weight to be accorded it, but that is as far as the hearsay objection goes in a proceeding like the present.” Id. at 737 (quoting United States ex rel. Klein v. Mulligan, 50 F.2d 687 (1931)). In the end, the Court found that the depositions of the police officers attesting to the accusations of the deceased wife were competent evidence sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to extradite Caputo. Id. at 728–39.
This same principle has also been applied in more contemporary cases. For example, in In re Burt, the extradition of an America soldier accused of murdering a West German taxi driver was initially waived, allowing the crime to be prosecuted by American authorities. 737 F.2d at 1479. However, the American authorities subsequently declined to prosecute when they discovered that the soldier's confession would be inadmissible in an American criminal trial because he had not been properly Mirandized. Id. at 1480. Nonetheless, when the government of West Germany renewed its request for extradition, that request was granted. Id. at 1481. Likewise, in Bloomfield v. Gengler, the Court dealt with treaty language substantially similar to that at issue here in that it required the evidence to be assessed as if the crime had occurred here. 507 F.2d 925, 927 (2d Cir.1974). Appellant noted that his case had initially been dismissed on procedural grounds in the foreign court and argued that if the crime had occurred in the U.S. double jeopardy would have attached. Id. The Court agreed that double jeopardy would have *934 attached if the dismissal had occurred in the United States, but declined to construe the treaty language so literally as to require the application of American constitutional and procedural protections prospectively in an extradition proceeding. Id. at 927–28.

I don't have time to post anymore, but the main point, a finding that someone is extraditable is very hard to argue against.

 

[katy_did]

Please explain how these two situations are different:

1. Case One: You are retried because new evidence has emerged years after acquittal by a jury.

2. Case Two: You are acquitted by a jury, and then there is an appeal, and you go before a new jury several years later in a proceeding that allows new evidence.

The argument that one country likes to call its "retrial" a part of a multi-part proceeding is to me just semantics. The bottom line is that the defendants in both cases are being subjected to a subsequent jury trial after acquittal.

Case One happens after a final verdict, Case Two before. The problem in Case One is that you're never actually free from the threat of conviction for a particular offence, whereas in the other case, you can't be retried once you're finally acquitted (key word being "finally").

Different countries have different systems - some allow for prosecution appeals and so on - and so inevitably the point where a person is finally acquitted or convicted differs between countries.

 

[katy_did]

FWIW, here is a snippet of the relevant part of the case. It's actually from 2012. The whole text can probably be found on line somewhere. The case isFeusier-Marquez v. Torres 2012 WL 1203360. It is an unpublished decision.

Nice one. I tried looking for that when the Mexican case was first mentioned a while back and couldn't find it anywhere (I guess the 'unpublished' part might explain that).

 

[Bill Williams]

Hello, I've missed this entire trial. At the moment, I know less about the status of this case than I've known in six years.

I hadn't known there was a hearing yesterday.

Can someone give me mach's twitter handle so I can see his hearing tweets?

I see serious-looking talk about extradition issues. I take it the trial isn't going well?

I know nothing. I doubt anyone will answer these questions, but have there been any major events in the past 4-5 months? How bout any fascinating minor events?

Coverage of this case is strange. To get info, seems to me one must resign one's self to mainstream news blurbs (which aren't terribly informative) OR wade through 20,000+ comments per month (which consumes a LOT of time). I miss Perugia Shock's middle ground.

As short as possible....

Trial started Sept 30. Kerchers wrote a heartfelt letter to the court asking that all evidence be tested. Incredibly not only were most retesting requests denied, Maresca, the Kerchers' lawyer, also opposed some testing.

First item was the con Aveillo, who had once said that his brother had done the deed. Prosecutors had claimed the Sollecito family had paid off Aveillo. Aveillo showed up in court midway through a sex-reassignment, and basically told the same story, denied being paid off by the Sollecitos.

Next up was the RIS Carabinieri being tasked with finding the composition and ownership of sample 36i on the kitchen knife. They said it belonged to Amanda Knox, ending the forensic interest of that knife. More importantly, the RIS Carabinieri brought to court all their work, including the EDFs, which they did not need to be asked for. Implication is that Stefanoni's still-missing EDFs from 2009 are NOT the way to do things....

My opinion is that in response to this, Prosecutor Crini then claimed that the kitchen knife is a match for the bedsheet outline in blood of what Mignini had called, the second knife. Even though that knife matches no wounds, Crini for some reason still needs it as part of his case. Other guilters don't use the word "match", but just that the outline (now) cannot be ruled out as belonging to the kitchen knife. Still, why that keeps that knife in this case is beyond me.

Crini also seemed to waver on time-of-death, not ruling out an early one. AFAIK he presented no evidence on TOD, just made assertions. If true, then why the need even to listen to Curatolo?

Amanda Knox from Seattle had a letter to the court read protesting her innocence. Raffaele appeared in court (Nov 5?) and exercised his right to speak. He was in court again on Jan 9.

On Nov 6, when Raffaele was heading out of Italy, the airplane was briefly held on the tarmac pending info on his mobility rights. No less than prosecutor Crini said that Raffaele was free to come and go from the country as he pleased, and the plane took off out of the country.

Despite Cassazione quashing the Hellmann acquittals partly on the grounds that the "sex game gone wrong" motive/scenario had not been properly investigated/ruled out, Prosecutor Crini reinvented the whole crime with yet another scenario/motive. He ventured the opinion that the dispute between Meredith and Amanda (leading to murder) began with Rudy's pooh in Filomena's/Laura's toilet. AFAIK Crini presented no evidence that this, yet another motive was true. Prosecutors, it seems, get to play fantasy. Like seems to happen in Italy he said it and said it could not be ruled out. Why prosecutor's are allowed to say things like that is beyond me - it also cannot be ruled out that travel faster than the speed of light is possible either.

Very little, really, of the points set out by last March's Cassazione quashing has made it, publically, into court. Prosecution gets a final closing on Jan 20, and verdict is scheduled for Jan 30.

That's as short as I can make it - others can add or correct as necessary.