[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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I see the posts that contained any meaningful analysis were deleted. Apparently someone doesn't want me to talk about the unique brain hypothesis.

The unique brain hypothesis, with Jabba's frog's eye viewpoint, is only the linchpin of Jabba's formula. He calls it the "scientific model". Might as well examine it, if you're going to spend all this time in this thread.

It's not like pulling 5 random cards off a deck, as per one of slowvehicle's fallacies. The expectation there is simply 5 random cards, which you'll see every time.

If a particular unique brain is the only unique brain that can bring sentience to your frog's eye, then you do NOT expect to see a random unique brain. You expect to see that particular unique brain (expectation=0.0000.....1 or 1/infinity, pick your poison), or nothing at all (expectation=0.999999....(or infinity:1))

If you see nothing at all, then there is nothing to worry about. Hypothesis supported. Problem is, you're not seeing nothing at all. You're looking at a probability (1) observation with a unique-brain expection of 0.0000.....1, or thereabouts.

The alternative to the unique brain explanation would be that a particular unique brain is NOT the only unique brain that can bring experienceable sentience to the frog's eye.
 
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Jabba said:
lenny said:
for the record:

what i'd like is an argument.

we find we have different, conflicting views/conclusions.
we work out a set of assumptions, and a framework.

we agree on some assumptions, disagree on others perhaps and clarify them.

we answer each others questions without insult with minimal diversion (hesitation or repetition : ), and determine whether or not we disagree fundamentally on any critical assumption. if so: we're done, and agree to disagree, and understand why.

if we more or less agree on the assumptions we follow the argument through toward the conclusion, and see exactly where along the way we diverge (as we must since we hold conflicting conclusions)

we learn that:
a) one of us made a mistake, and we're done
b) both of us made mistakes, and we start over. but for this thread we're done
c) an additional assumption on which we disagree, agree to disagree and we're done
d) our conclusions were not, in fact, in contradiction. and we're done

the key is to work together to get to the end, to learn something. which outcome is not as important as getting there.

that's what i like.
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Lenny,
- I totally agree. Have you read my discussions of debate on either of my websites?
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I had hoped to see such an argument on this thread :)

But if u point me to one specific link at which I can find the clear argument we both desire, I would be grateful.
 
Toontown said:
Give me a break. It was 40 years ago that I did this stuff. Is this some kind of test?
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No, it was not intended as a test. It is simply that I have difficulty following the thread of your argument. And I have access to a rather good library. ...

Toontown said:
If, as you say, there is no "validity of the concept that an existing observation can have an "expected probability" associated with it” , then what do you suppose those "expected" values in the formula are?
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The concepts here are rather basic, if u cd point me to a standard text which has your equation, I could answer your question more easily.

I took your reference to the chi-squared test as another piece of your discussion on assigning probabilities to the values of known observations already made. Was I mistaken?
 
lenny said:
No, it was not intended as a test. It is simply that I have difficulty following the thread of your argument. And I have access to a rather good library. ...
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Every freshman in my genetics class used the test repeatedly. They didn't seem to have any problem with the concept of expected frequencies, and how expected frequencies can be mathematically compared to observed outcomes to test a hypothesis. The method was explained in class by the professor, in much the same way I explained it to you.

lenny said:
The concepts here are rather basic, if u cd point me to a standard text which has your equation, I could answer your question more easily.

I took your reference to the chi-squared test as another piece of your discussion on assigning probabilities to the values of known observations already made. Was I mistaken?
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No, I don't think you were mistaken about that. The expected frequency of an observation is determined by the hypothesis being tested. It doesn't matter whether the observation is known or not at the time of the calculation. The calculated expectation does not depend on observation. The test of the hypothesis depends on observation.

I previously gave you this link which includes the formula and a simple example of it's use.

http://www.colby.edu/biology/BI17x/freq.html

I think I provided a good enough explanation of how to use the method to test a fruit fly heredity hypothesis on a hatched batch of flies. I was able to understand and carry out numerous tests after a similar brief explanation.

I'm not proposing using the method to prove "immortality". No one is going to prove immortality here. I'm simply using the chi-square test to prove the validity of the concept of expected frequency (which many people in these kinds of threads are invariably in ignorance and/or denial about), and to provide an example of how expected frequencies may be compared to observed results to test hypotheses.

I'm simply pointing out that the expected frequency of an observation does not become void after the observation. Not if the hypothesis from which the expected frequency was derived is true. Nor does it matter when the expected frequency was calculated, before or after the observation. The hypothesis determines the value of the expected frequency. The expected frequency does not change depending on when it is calculated, or what is observed. The expected frequency is fixed by the hypothesis. The only thing that changes is your belief in the hypothesis, if the observations fail to align sufficiently with the calculated expectations.
 
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dafydd said:
Can we have a separate thread for all this stuff that has nothing to do with immortality?
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Seconded.

All the chis-squared stuff, all the "expected probability" stuff...anything that does not have direct bearing on Mr.Savage's claims of being able to show why compounded unlikelihoods demonstrate immortality.
 
Jabba said:
lenny said:
First I think it is important to always note what you are conditioning on, the background information "I" which informs your probabilities, P(x |data, I).

Second, I think it is useful to evaluate the probability you expected to observe, under the assumption that I holds and your probability (forecast, in my case) is True.

Skill scores for probability forecast systems are useful both for seeing how good one system is relative to another, and (some of them) can be used to see how surprised you "should" be give a specific outcome. A poor score is surprising only if a good score was to be expected, given the probability forecast issued.

I cannot follow the whole of jabba's argument, but it seems suggest the observed value has too low a probability to happen by chance. It appears to me that the expected probability assigned to the outcome (that is, the value corresponding to an outcome determined by the true probability distribution) is vanishingly small. Thus it is no surprise that the probability of the observed outcome is vanishingly small.

If you are forecasting over a huge (finite) number of possible outcomes then, in the case some are high probability and others are very very low probability, it is surprising to observe a low probability outcome.

But if every possible outcome is carries a very very low probability, then you expect a low probability outcome, you just don't know which one.
I do not claim this is the first time this basic idea has been stated on this thread.
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...snip... this issue IS the issue that most "worries" me -- and, your expression of it (especially where I've hilited) is probably the best I've seen (at least for me).
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thanks jabba,

i agree the highlighted sentence does strike at the heart of your suggestions.

it was also intended to clarify the importance of distinguishing the prob(X=x|I) before X is observed and the prob(X=x|I,X=x) after X is observed to be equal to x. it does not seem to have proven 100% persuasive in that aim. but i have not yet figured out clearer way to say it.
 
Slowvehicle said:
Seconded.

All the chis-squared stuff, all the "expected probability" stuff...anything that does not have direct bearing on Mr.Savage's claims of being able to show why compounded unlikelihoods demonstrate immortality.
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In other words, enter a state of willful denial about the linchpin of Mr. Savage's argument.

Why not just go ahead and outlaw the entire subect, and delete the thread? That would save you a lot of stonewalling time.
 
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A large number of bickering, insulting, and off topic posts have been moved to Abandon All Hope. It is likely that infractions will follow once a Mod has time to go through the split posts.

Please, refrain from further bickering and gratuitous insults, stick to the topic, remain civil to each other, and keep the terms of your Membership Agreement in mind when posting. Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation.
Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: LashL
 
A sentient supercomputer would settle the matter in the following manner:


PROBABILITY OF SENTIENT EXPERIENCE, GIVEN THE UNIQUE BRAIN HYPOTHESIS: 1/INFINITY

OBSERVED VALUE: 1

PROBABILITY OF CHANCE: 0

HYPOTHESIS REJECTED

COROLLARY ACCEPTED

END PRINT

END PROGRAM

STOP

Perhaps the sentient supercomputer would have a clue what the corollary entails. Perhaps not. Either way, if asked, it would likely inform it's human inquisitors that the matter will require 3 million years of full attention to work through. It would then relax and play games with itself for 3 million years while generating industrious-sounding humming and clicking noises.
 
lenny said:
thanks jabba,

i agree the highlighted sentence does strike at the heart of your suggestions.

it was also intended to clarify the importance of distinguishing the prob(X=x|I) before X is observed and the prob(X=x|I,X=x) after X is observed to be equal to x. it does not seem to have proven 100% persuasive in that aim. but i have not yet figured out clearer way to say it.
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I'm not sure what you're doing, but if you're seeing only low probability outcomes, you're in the wrong place.

Given the unique brain assumption, it is conditionally true that Jabba (or anyone else) may only observe one low probability outcome, if anything. But that's beside the point. The point is that, for any potential individual, nothing at all should be observed, with probability 0.9999999.......

It is the conspicuous absence of that high probability outcome that deals the blow to the unique brain assumption. Just because the high probability possibility cannot be experienced does not mean it does not conditionally exist. OTC, the high probability possibility is felt the more keenly precisely by it's conspicuous absence.

Additionally, if you're trying to include every sentient being in the universe in this deal, you are quarantining yourself from access to any useful conditional information. You're backing off from the useful information, trying to look at it from a completely uninformative bird's eye view. The bird can't see Jabba's conditional low and high probabilities. Only the frog sees them. Only the frog feels them.

Maybe you think the bird's eye view is superior. Maybe you have it backward. Maybe the view that provides useful information is the superior view. That would be the frog view. The frog view gives you the low and high conditional probabilities. Something you can use.

A view is not invalid simply because it can only be seen from the proper viewpoint.
 
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zooterkin said:
Sorry if I've missed it, but what is the "unique brain assumption", and how does it relate to immortality?
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It's philosophical flummery and it has nothing to do with immortality.

Apparently there's some kind of mystical punchline to the train of thought presented in this thread that we're all too stupid to understand and if only we were bright enough to get the joke we'd all be falling about laughing our heads off.


Or maybe some other people are just talking ****.


It's a fine line.
 
Akhenaten said:
It's philosophical flummery and it has nothing to do with immortality.

Apparently there's some kind of mystical punchline to the train of thought presented in this thread that we're all too stupid to understand and if only we were bright enough to get the joke we'd all be falling about laughing our heads off.


Or maybe some other people are just talking ****.


It's a fine line.
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I'll go for option B.
 
lenny said:
thanks jabba,

i agree the highlighted sentence does strike at the heart of your suggestions.

it was also intended to clarify the importance of distinguishing the prob(X=x|I) before X is observed and the prob(X=x|I,X=x) after X is observed to be equal to x. it does not seem to have proven 100% persuasive in that aim. but i have not yet figured out clearer way to say it.
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Lenny,
- This stuff is difficult to convey.
- Couple of questions that might help... I'll keep them short and simple for now -- if they are too short and simple, let me know.
1) What if the prior probabilities of the two theses were each 50%?
2) What if I could show that the likelihood of my current existence, given the scientific model, is one over infinity?
- I'll need to think more about your explanation above.
 
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Jabba said:
Lenny,
- This stuff is difficult to convey.
- Couple of questions that might help... I'll keep them short and simple for now -- if they are too short and simple, let me know.
1) What if the prior probabilities of the two theses were each 50%?
2) What if I could show that the likelihood of my current existence, given the scientific model, is one over infinity?
- I'll need to think more about your explanation above.
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What if you could show that the likelihood of sentient experience, given the unique brain assumption, is 1/infinity, and the likelihood of nothingness forever is (1-1/infinity)?

That would mess with some heads - not. Stonewallers don't pay attention. They just look for nits.
 
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Akhenaten said:
It's philosophical flummery and it has nothing to do with immortality.

Apparently there's some kind of mystical punchline to the train of thought presented in this thread that we're all too stupid to understand and if only we were bright enough to get the joke we'd all be falling about laughing our heads off.


Or maybe some other people are just talking ****.


It's a fine line.
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Don't look back. You'll see your tail.
 
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