I am curious: What do you suppose ... They do not seem to be very knowledgeable about physics and cosmology, other than having mastered a lot of jargon.
I wish this were true! Unfortunately, some very knowledgeable physicists go crackpot. Brian Josephson, of the "Josephson effect" fame, is one example. John Wheeler, with his "It from bit" idea has done more damage to rational physics than any crackpot you can think of!
I believe that the "crackpottery" of professionals is the most dangerous thing that can happen to the rationality of the public. Look at the destructive effect the The Tao of Physics has had on even the more intellectual segment of the population. And don't forget the Templeton Prize - intentionally monetarily larger than Nobel Prize - and its affiliate FQXI, which are attracting many, otherwise brilliant, physicists.
The mind boggles. Let's review: you are unable to state clearly what you think a physics manager should do. Your critics think no reasonable pro-revolutionary instructions are possible, or that such instructions simply re-describe what's already done. That's a criticism. You suggest that research including "process concepts" should be concentrated on. Your critics think "process concept" is a vague and useless generalization that vaguely describes a completely random set of research topics, and does not narrow things down to potentially-revolutionary ones. You think that physicists are insufficiently aware of the Copernican principle; your critics think that's idiotic. You offered quaternions, fractal dimensions, and (in your FXQI document) "dimensional analysis" as things physicists should (or need to) examine; your critics point out that you're unaware of how these things have already been examined. You linked to the negative-Grassmanian "amplitudahedron" as a positive development; your critics pointed out that this is easy to see after it succeeds, and I challenged you to apply some of your concepts to the pre-success version of the idea. And so on and so on. Does any of this sound familiar? Work with that.
You are welcome to quote old posts if you want to revive some of these abandoned discussions.
Your failure to "work with" those topics, over the past months, led to my conclusions. Do I need to repost the executive summary for you?
Your analysis highlighted instances of disagreement with various ideas they've put forward, which in no way undermines the claim ABC's model is important. If we were unable to find any fights over their model, it would be much stronger evidence against the plausibility of the importance claim. This didn't help me, support your position, and you clearly put in a significant effort - so I thought it was a lose-lose dialogue...not what we would hope for.
Your analysis highlighted instances of disagreement with various ideas they've put forward, which in no way undermines the claim ABC's model is important. If we were unable to find any fights over their model, it would be much stronger evidence against the plausibility of the importance claim. This didn't help me, support your position, and you clearly put in a significant effort - so I thought it was a lose-lose dialogue...not what we would hope for.
I think you're unfamiliar with how academics treat important ideas.
If something is actually thought to be important, you find followup papers---lots of them---saying "This view is now discredited by the analysis of ABC ... ", "We apply the methods of AB&C to ... ", "AB&C's definitive treatment of ... " and eventually "We question the overreliance on AB&C ...". I am an academic. I read academic papers all the time. I know what this looks like. Papers that are thought to be important are treated as important and used to spawn additional study.
My reading of the literature suggests, as a positive conclusion, that cog-sci/history-of-science academics (even those studying revolutions) do NOT view ABC's analysis as particularly important or firm. The one paragraph of disagreement, IMO, supports this view rather than undermining it.
My reason is that I'm skeptical such digression will help obtain good criticism. If you would like to present something plausible, I'll be as happy and grateful to correct my preconception as I am for the Anubis correction.
Number of BS posts acknowledging criticism of the idea behind his mention of Anubis (i.e., physicists have documented and reexamined inherited ideas about dimensions): zero.
Number of BS posts acknowledging the utterly-irrelevant correction of the date he cited in an mention of Anubis: three.
Number of BS posts providing carefully-reasoned, detailed explanations of management techniques for accelerating physics revolutions: between 0 and 3, I'd guess.
Number of BS posts providing carefully-reasoned, detailed explanations of his previous refusal to explain something: <a large number that just went up by one>
As rhetorical devices go, name-dropping is pretty lame. The following example has more to do with crackpot mathematics, crackpot logic, and crackpot philosophy than with crackpot physics, but the perpetrator believes this all has something to do with undocumented assumptions in physics, which he believes to be a major risk.
For my claim to be invalidated however, it would seem necessary to demonstrate how the much stronger and well-established claims of Godel, Kitcher, and standard undergraduate philosophy of science pedagogy are wrong.
These hold not only that such lack of documentation occurs in specific, easily documented cases (any math by any physicist, for example), but the infinite regress of complete documentation (for assump/aux hyp) makes such omission unavoidable and universal.
Several of us guessed that BurntSynapse was alluding to (his misinterpretation of) Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. BurntSynapse confirmed those guesses:
If you believe "a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency" makes no claim regarding unavoidable assumptions in relation to the execution of math & science processes, I've no problem agreeing to disagree.
Note how BurntSynapse has dropped the word "undocumented" here. A review of BurntSynapse's previous posts will show he had been concerned about "undocumented" assumptions, not the unavoidable assumption that's explicitly documented within correct statements of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem and is explicitly constructed within proofs of that theorem.
If BurntSynapse was aware that Gödel's theorems do not imply the existence of undocumented assumptions, then his argument has been thoroughly dishonest, and his mention of Gödel to support his claim was especially dishonest.
I will therefore assume BurntSynapse's omission of the word "documented" here was accidental, and that he has been working under the mistaken impression that Gödel's theorems imply unavoidable assumptions that aren't documented.
So BurntSynapse believes Gödel's second incompleteness theorem implies undocumented assumptions that pose a significant risk to physics.
That's pretty funny, but not everyone will get the joke.
To explain the joke, I will quote parts of these textbooks:
George S Boolos, John P Burgess, and Richard C Jeffrey. Computability and Logic, Fifth Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2007. (The previous editions came out in 1974, 1980, 1990, and 2002. The parts I will quote were rewritten for the fifth edition.)
Willard Van Orman Quine. Set Theory and its Logic, Revised Edition. Harvard University Press, 1963, 1969.
To show the above books aren't outliers, here are several other books whose statements of Gödel's incompleteness theorems are consistent with what I'm about to say. Since BurntSynapse has mentioned Quine on several occasions, it may be worth noting that Wang Hao was one of Quine's PhD students.
George Boolos. The Unprovability of Consistency: An Essay in Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Geoffrey Hunter. Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic. University of California Press, 1971.
Hartley Rogers, Jr. Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability. McGraw-Hill, 1967.
Alec Fisher. Formal Number Theory and Computability: a Workbook. Clarendon Press, 1982.
Wang Hao. Popular Lectures on Mathematical Logic. Van Nostrand Rhinehold, 1981.
J N Crossley, C J Ash, C J Brickhill, J C Stillwell, and N H Williams. What is Mathematical Logic? Oxford University Press, 1972.
In logic, a "sentence" is a well-formed formula with no free variables. In logic and mathematics, the word "theory" means a set T of sentences that is closed under deduction, which means T contains all of the sentences that can be proved from T. A theory T is said to be axiomatizable if and only if there is a recursive (i.e. decidable) subset of T from which every sentence in T can be proved.
Gödel's first incompleteness theorem applies to any axiomatizable extension of an extremely weak theory Q of minimal arithmetic on natural numbers (the non-negative integers), and Gödel's second incompleteness theorem applies to any axiomatizable extension of a stronger theory P known as Peano arithmetic. The sentences of Q and P are written in the language of standard first order logic with equality (=) and less-than (<) predicates and three functions: successor (addition of 1, indicated by postfix ′), addition (+), and multiplication (∙). Q consists of the logical consequences of these ten axioms (with universal quantification of variables understood in each case, but omitted for notational simplicity):
0 ≠ x′
x′ = y′ → x = y
x + 0 = x
x + y′ = (x + y)′
x ∙ 0 = 0
x ∙ y′ = (x ∙ y) + x
¬ (x < 0)
x < y′ ↔ ((x < y) ∨ (x = y))
0 < y ↔ y ≠ 0
x′ < y ↔ ((x < y) & (y ≠ x′))
The full theory Q is the set of sentences that can be proved from the above ten axioms.
The axioms of P consist of the ten axioms of Q together with all of the infinitely many sentences of the form
(A(0) & ∀ x (A(x) → A(x′))) → ∀ x A(x)
where A(x) is an arbitrary formula that may contain other variables in addition to x, in which case universal quantifiers for those variables would be added to the front of the formula. If you think of A(x) as an induction hypothesis parameterized by x, then the entire formula above expresses the principle of mathematical induction for that particular induction hypothesis.
(If you try to state the principle of mathematical induction within a single axiom that applies to all possible induction hypotheses, then you have to quantify over induction hypotheses, which makes the axiom second order. That would render the system non-axiomatizable, which would make it impossible to decide whether arbitrary inferences are sound, which is why logicians and mathematicians don't want to use the second order version.)
It's easy to see that every axiom of Q holds for the natural numbers, and it's easy to see that the induction schema holds for the natural numbers as well. The natural numbers with which we are familiar are the "standard interpretation" of the theories Q and P.
There are non-standard models as well, and they gum up the works. (Quine says as much near the top of page 305 of Set Theory and its Logic, Revised Edition.)
By the way, "model" is a technical term in logic, and model-based reasoning originally referred to using those models to improve the performance of theorem provers. That meaning of "model-based reasoning" was generalized somewhat by the artificial intelligence community, from which it passed into the larger cognitive sciences community, where its meaning devolved further. By the time the project managers had heard of it, it was little more than a metaphor. Meanwhile, model-based reasoning in the form of model checking has become an important technology for hard computer science.
For our purposes, the Gödel number of a formula can be defined as the positive integer obtained by interpreting its UTF-8 representation as a big-endian binary representation of an integer.
Here are the major incompleteness theorems, as stated by Boolos et al.:
17.3 Theorem (Tarski's theorem). The set of Gödel numbers of sentences of the language of arithmetic that are correct, or true in the standard interpretation, is not arithmetically definable.
17.4 Theorem (Undecidability of arithmetic). The set of Gödel numbers of sentences of the language of arithmetic that are correct, or true in the standard interpretation, is not recursive.
17.5 Theorem (Essential undecidability theorem). No consistent extension of Q is decidable (and in particular, Q itself is undecidable).
17.6 Theorem (Church's theorem). The set of valid sentences is not decidable.
17.7 Theorem (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem). There is no consistent, complete, axiomatizable extension of Q.
18.1 Theorem (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, concrete form). Let T be a consistent, axiomatizable extension of P. Then the consistency sentence for T is not provable in T.
The consistency sentence for T is not some mysterious thing that's beyond human comprehension. It's a very specific large formula that can be constructed, via a standard algorithm, from the recursive set of axioms for T.
From the proof of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, the consistency sentence for T will be true (because it asserts the consistency of T, and because that consistency is a documented assumption that's explicit in the statement of Gödel's theorem).
Furthermore, the consistency sentences for Q and P will be true because the standard model is a model for those theories, and any theory that has a model is necessarily consistent. (Quine says as much at the top of page 305 of Set Theory and its Logic, Revised Edition.) The consistency sentence for Q cannot be proved from Q, however, which means Q is incomplete. Similarly, the consistency statement for P cannot be proved from P, which means P is incomplete.
Because the consistency sentence for P is true, there is absolutely no additional risk involved in adding that consistency sentence as a new axiom. Doing so gives you a stronger theory T, but T will be a consistent extension of P, so (by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem) the consistency sentence for T (which is different from the consistency sentence for P) will not be provable within T. Because the consistency sentence for T is true, there is absolutely no additional risk involved in adding that consistency sentence as yet another new axiom. And so on. From page 325 of Quine's Set Theory and its Logic, Revised Edition:
Quine said:
A method then comes ready to hand for generating, from any given set theory, an endless series of further ones, each stronger in the proof-theoretic sense than its predecessors, and each consistent if its predecessors were consistent. All you have to do is add a new arithmetical axiom, via Gödel numbers, to the effect that the previous axioms were consistent.
There is absolutely no risk in any of that. Every added axiom will be a risk-free documented assumption.
The only possible risk here is that P itself might already be inconsistent. For BurntSynapse to cite Gödel's second incompleteness theorem as proof of risk, therefore, BurntSynapsemust argue that Peano arithmetic is inconsistent.
At this point, BurntSynapse has three options:
Admit that Gödel's incompleteness theorems do not imply any risk for physics.
Explain why he believes there is a serious risk of Peano arithmetic being inconsistent.
Pretend his bafflegab and name-dropping have been misunderstood.
Errors here appear to include equivocation: using skeptic as "a person with a generally questioning attitude" vs. my use of skeptic here as "a person in this forum vocally opposing my claims".
Also a non-sequitur of unrelated premises: A person can be a skeptic and yet unable to provide any examples for an infinite number of reasons. Those examples may or may not be acceptable for another infinite number of reasons. Skeptic status and example acceptance status are uncorrelated.
Nope not a "non-sequitur of unrelated premises" as that was the reason you stated. Though I did expect that wasn't actually the reason. So the "non-sequitur of unrelated premises" remains yours as does the pretend equivocation.
Evidently you have learned nothing from your "says nothing about example" as you continue to try to just pawn off your own assumptions to others.
My reason is that I'm skeptical such digression will help obtain good criticism. If you would like to present something plausible, I'll be as happy and grateful to correct my preconception as I am for the Anubis correction.
Sure I'll present something plausible, you just don't want to provide examples of your claim and will make up any excuse you can instead of simply stating that fact. You came here for criticism, now you don't want it, fine, it's no skin off anyone's nose but yours.
Nope not a "non-sequitur of unrelated premises" as that was the reason you stated. Though I did expect that wasn't actually the reason. So the "non-sequitur of unrelated premises" remains yours as does the pretend equivocation.
Evidently you have learned nothing from your "says nothing about example" as you continue to try to just pawn off your own assumptions to others.
Sure I'll present something plausible, you just don't want to provide examples of your claim and will make up any excuse you can instead of simply stating that fact. You came here for criticism, now you don't want it, fine, it's no skin off anyone's nose but yours.
As rhetorical devices go, name-dropping is pretty lame. The following example has more to do with crackpot mathematics, crackpot logic, and crackpot philosophy than with crackpot physics, but the perpetrator believes this all has something to do with undocumented assumptions in physics, which he believes to be a major risk.
In PM we call them undocumented assumptions, physics is not where such problems would come up because physics doesn't analyze strategic organizational risk from a perspective of administration (of a physics research portfolio).
The existence of the risk was not identified by either PM or physics groups. It was philosophy of science people, as you listed earlier. Quine's justification for his underdetermination theory showed that "no matter how much data comes in, it doesn't force us to a unique theory". If any web of belief we have can be adjusted to remain intact despite any falsifying evidence, it becomes very difficult to formally demonstrate one theory (Zeus) is better or worse at explaining falling than a theory of gravity. Instead, we apply informal "simplicity" like Occam, and "conservatism", which lead to complex issues for theory assessment, and the error bars go way up for these assessments.
What I'm calling undocumented assumptions would be things Quine, James Burke (Connections, the Day the Universe Changed), and others point out with the example of geo-centrists before Copernicus. Those pre-Copenicans made zillions of calculations measurements, and observations, but these were made with an assumption underlying a very large web of belief they all shared - their paradigm.
I don't side with either of the radical positions adopted in the controversy that Quine generated, but the debates still going on now suggest to me a) this is generally accepted in that community as being a real problem, and b) we may consider the jury still out on the details.
If there is a more proper interpretation of this history, I'd like to know what exactly you'd propose and why.
...
What I'm calling undocumented assumptions would be things Quine, James Burke (Connections, the Day the Universe Changed), and others point out with the example of geo-centrists before Copernicus. Those pre-Copenicans made zillions of calculations measurements, and observations, but these were made with an assumption underlying a very large web of belief they all shared - their paradigm.
...
You persist in presenting very poor analogies, with no regard to historical context.
Before Copernicus, inductive experimental physics and the integration of deductive and inductive methods did not exist. Consequently we had the undocumented assumption of celestial circles. Astronomical bodies moving in "perfect" circles had a quasi-religious basis -- hence, epicycles. It was not science.
You have used the example of FTL travel. The basis for "assuming" that FTL travel is not possible is not quasi-religious; it is scientific and quite well documented by experiment and a thoroughly documented mathematically based theory.
You really do need to present a genuine "undocumented assumption" in some area of physics research to have any credibility here. Hand-waving references to quaternions, Gödel, Quine, et al have no traction in a real discussion about science. Let's have a specific example where "undocumented assumptions" are a risk in some area of physics research.
You persist in presenting very poor analogies, with no regard to historical context.
Before Copernicus, inductive experimental physics and the integration of deductive and inductive methods did not exist. Consequently we had the undocumented assumption of celestial circles. Astronomical bodies moving in "perfect" circles had a quasi-religious basis -- hence, epicycles. It was not science.
You have used the example of FTL travel. The basis for "assuming" that FTL travel is not possible is not quasi-religious; it is scientific and quite well documented by experiment and a thoroughly documented mathematically based theory. You really do need to present a genuine "undocumented assumption" in some area of physics research to have any credibility here. Hand-waving references to quaternions, Gödel, Quine, et al have no traction in a real discussion about science. Let's have a specific example where "undocumented assumptions" are a risk in some area of physics research.
The general definition actually was from a dictionary that popped up when I googled "skeptic".
My usage (which you call a definition) of "skeptics who are critical of my position in this forum" should obviously not be expected to appear in the dictionary.
A Quine example was the assumed meanings of "copper", "conducts" and "electricity" in the physics statement: "All copper conducts electricity." The assumed meaning of "sunrise" in the Pre-Copernican view seems most famous. The assumed meaning of "species" to pre-Darwinians is another.
The general definition actually was from a dictionary that popped up when I googled "skeptic".
My usage (which you call a definition) of "skeptics who are critical of my position in this forum" should obviously not be expected to appear in the dictionary.
A Quine example was the assumed meanings of "copper", "conducts" and "electricity" in the physics statement: "All copper conducts electricity." The assumed meaning of "sunrise" in the Pre-Copernican view seems most famous. The assumed meaning of "species" to pre-Darwinians is another.
Exactly in what manner are the meaning of the words "copper," "conducts" and "electricity" undocumented. Provide evidence. How does it lead to risk? Please be specific. You are not dealing with production managers; you should have learned by now that hand-waving won't work with people who are scientifically savvy.
Is "all copper conducts electricity" a statement research physicists have actually made, in the context of their research?
Or is it simply a hypothetical physics statement invented by Quine, as an example of something that implies undocumented assumptions?
I guess what I would be interested in, would be a example of an actual physics experiment or hypothesis, that actually happened, that had demonstrable specific undocumented assumptions, those assumptions leading to demonstrable, quantifiable risk, and for which you can show in some detail how an application of your proposed project management principles would have revealed the assumptions and mitigated the risk.
In PM we call them undocumented assumptions, physics is not where such problems would come up because physics doesn't analyze strategic organizational risk from a perspective of administration (of a physics research portfolio).
a) It's not clear that this sort of risk actually bears this sort of analysis. Remember that you (and you alone) are extrapolating the language of project management (the engineering practice of using known techniques to get to desired goals) and guessing that it can be applied to physics (the science practice of pushing up against the edge of human understanding and feeling into the complete darkness beyond). You say physics DOESN'T "analyze strategic organizational risk" but you have no idea if it's POSSIBLE to "analyze strategic organizational risk".
A well-informed concrete example of how to do it would go a long way towards convincing me that you could be right.
If any web of belief we have can be adjusted to remain intact despite any falsifying evidence, it becomes very difficult to formally demonstrate one theory (Zeus) is better or worse at explaining falling than a theory of gravity.
a) This a fundamental fact about logic. Different management can do absolutely nothing about it. Do you think different management can state the truth or falsehood of A from the premises "A -> B", "C -> B", "NOT (A && C)" and "B"? If not, you haven't solved the problem of distinguishing indistinguishable theories.
b) Welcome to science! Where we attempt to make true statements and avoid false statements! Where we have actual scientific methods for finding new forms of evidence that make previously-unfalsifiable statements falsifiable! Where we have statistical/logical tools for understanding whether a "web of belief" is falsifiable or not! In some sense, modern Bayesian methods mean that we're better equipped to discuss Occam's-Razor-like problems now than at virtually any previous moment in history. If you think this is an actual problem in practice, please say where. Please note that crackpots (with complete ignorance of the facts of the matter) frequently complain that dark matter, dark energy, Higgs bosons, etc., are unfalsifiable.
c) What I'm calling undocumented assumptions would be things Quine, James Burke (Connections, the Day the Universe Changed), and others point out with the example of geo-centrists before Copernicus. Those pre-Copenicans made zillions of calculations measurements, and observations, but these were made with an assumption underlying a very large web of belief they all shared - their paradigm.
Yeah. You've said this before. It still doesn't help. You're still pointing of fragments of history and implying that we need to learn a lesson from it, but ... well, you're missing something important. Three comments.
First, you have a shaky understanding of the history.
Geocentrists before Copernicus were not "scientists stuck in an old solar-system paradigm", they were barely recognizable as scientists at all. The number of people thinking about stars and planets at all was small; the number of people able to use sine tables and equants was even smaller; and the intersection was basically zero. For example, it is not clear that any Ptolemaic model calculations whatsoever were done anywhere in Europe between Alfonso X (1200s) and Regiomontanus (1400s). Zero. That's what "stuck in an old paradigm" looks like. It's not that medieval astronomers were happily using Ptolemy's model and repeatedly failing to rework it. It's that there were no astronomers, no modelers, no nothing. Ptolemy's model was "the current paradigm" in the sense that there were manuscript copies of a Ptolemaic almanac floating around Europe, and that astrologers used these manuscripts for their astrology.
(If you read your history-of-science books, this is very clear. When discussing pre-Newton/Einstein/QM work, historians look at scientists and scientific methods and discuss whether these methods missed something (or asked the wrong questions, or got stuck in a paradigm, etc.) When discussing pre-Copernicus work, you'll notice, historians start talking about Christianity, Rome, culture, literacy, and Petrarch---NOT about scientists and their pre-paradigm models. Puerbach and Regiomontanus are virtually the only Europeans who can be named as having an old-paradigm model and the math skills to do anything about it. "Zillions of calculations" my foot.)
(The Arabic astronomers/astrologers are a different story, which I don't know particularly well.)
Anyway: the main lesson of the Copernican revolution is not "don't spend centuries thinking within an old scientific paradigm!" but rather "don't spend centuries not thinking about science". This is why it is not just called "the Copernican paradigm shift" but also the scientific revolution. Lesson learned! This is the 21st century. The human race has probably 500,000 people whose job title is "scientist" and whose main job description is "think". I hope that was not your management-suggestion, BS, because that has already been done. We do not need you, nor the PMBOK, to tell us "there should be scientists whose job is science."
Second: Let's pretend that you said "the Einsteinian revolution" rather than "the Copernican revolution"; in this case, unlike Copernicus', there were professional scientists trying to build and fine-tune models in E&M and light propagation (Maxwell, Lorentz, Poincare, Michaelson, Fresnel, Stokes, Fizeau, Cohn, Bucherer, etc.) all of which failed until Einstein came along.
You still do not have an actual management suggestion. If I teleport you to the 19th century, and remove your hindsight, you do NOT have a method that would sift through the riotous profusion of experiments and ideas, and single out "aether" or "spacetime" as important undocumented assumptions. If I teleport you to 1925, you do NOT have a method for sifting through nuclear physicists' vast profusion of ideas and getting anyone to think twice about why they rejected Otto Hahn's first reports of barium detection in uranium samples. We're sitting here talking today, and you have not moved one millimeter towards (a) pointing out an undocumented assumption, (b) delineating a method for identifying "undocumented assumptions", (c) explaining how to get from a list/table/etc. of such "undocumented assumptions" to a set of research actions to take in response, or (d) generally making any actionable suggestions whatsoever. Make concrete management suggestions already please.
Third: I repeat, modern physicists are trained by saturation-diving into the histories of Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, Rutherford, Planck, etc.. The basic lesson---"sometimes you to rethink/reinvent something you thought you knew"---is 100% standard off-the-shelf physics thinking these days. The idea, is, more or less, that fame and fortune await the person who finds a good idea in a previously-unexamined spot. Thousands and thousands of grad students---very clever people, by the way---have been let loose with exactly that as their motivation. (Imagine looking at a room full of large, hungry dogs. "Those dogs are sniffing around very unsystematically," you say, "so perhaps a systematic end-to-end sweep of the room will turn up a previously-undiscovered rabbit.") You are not merely arguing that this is inefficient---too large a workforce, for example---but that it has actually missed (or overlooked) things that your methods would find. Justify this claim.
Fourth: (OK, four points.) Please note that you're not citing some obscure cog-sci literature---where you had a chance (now missed) to tell physicists something we didn't already know---but rather are citing James Burke's immensely popular 30-year-old television miniseries. Geez. This is sort of like walking into a neurology ward and saying "I have some ideas about this because I've read an Oliver Sacks book or two." It's like walking into the FDA and saying "This would all be managed better if you read 'The Jungle' by Upton Sinclair."
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