[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Garrette]

--snip--

- But then, my argument will take awhile to compose.

--snip--

Why will it take a while? Have you not gone through it already? If so, it should be near to hand. If not, then why are you stating this with certainty?

To put it another way: How did you arrive at your conclusion if you have not done the math and completed the argument?

 

[Toontown]

...and it also relates just as much to all the other potential outcomes. You're drawing a target around your own existence and saying "wow! that's unlikely". It's no more unlikely than anything else.

But nothing else is a Jabba.

From Jabba's presumably preselected perspective, it was the universe that drew the target around his body - if that's the only way a Jabba could ever see the light of day.

 

[Toontown]

I think we need a song.

A Galaxy Song, in fact.

​

I think this one is appropriate.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Mojo,
- I wouldn't use the word "purpose" -- but, however the universe relates to me, it relates to you also (unless you're an android).

Yes, puddle: your hole is special, and it fits you perfeckly!*

So would any other hole you found yourself in.

You still seem to be missing a biiiig step between, "I'm nearly infinitely special", and "I'm (therefore) going to live forever".

When are you going to get to that part?

*Behole! El Texas Sharpshooter in action!

 

[Toontown]

Yes, puddle: your hole is special, and it fits you perfeckly!*

So would any other hole you found yourself in.

What other hole might a Jabba be found in?

Careful how you answer that. You might inadvertently make his argument for him.

 

[Toontown]

Amazingly, you guys still aren't getting it. The uniqueness assumption is Jabba's primary target. It is the uniqueness assumption which implies the giganogargantuan prior odds against a unique Jabba-puddle.

He isn't arguing for a unique Jabba-puddle. He's arguing against a unique Jabba-puddle.

Jabba hopes to offer a less improbable alternative to the unique Jabba-puddle.

This is not rocket science, boyz n gurls.

 

[Jabba]

So, here’s my story…

- The appropriate Bayes formula for determining the posterior probability of the scientific model – given my existence -- is:
- P(SM|me) = P(me|SM)P(SM)/(P(me|SM)P(SM)+P(me|NSM)P(NSM))- “SM” is the current consensus “Scientific Model”; “NSM” is any possible explanatory model other than the “SM.”
- Inserting my estimates into the formula, I get:

- P(SM|me) = (~.0000…1)*(.99)/(~.0000…1)(.99)+(.9)(.01)
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.0000…1+.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1

- In other words, the posterior probability of the scientific model being correct -- given me – is EXTREMELY small. It is MUCH smaller than the posterior probability that one of the other models is correct.

 

[carlitos]

Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

Here's your one chance, fancy, don't let me down. Oh, too late…

Jabba, with your understanding of statistics, I might suggest professional poker, but you have to read people.

 

[jt512]

So, here’s my story…

- The appropriate Bayes formula for determining the posterior probability of the scientific model – given my existence -- is:
- P(SM|me) = P(me|SM)P(SM)/(P(me|SM)P(SM)+P(me|NSM)P(NSM))- “SM” is the current consensus “Scientific Model”; “NSM” is any possible explanatory model other than the “SM.”
- Inserting my estimates into the formula, I get:

- P(SM|me) = (~.0000…1)*(.99)/(~.0000…1)(.99)+(.9)(.01)
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.0000…1+.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1

- In other words, the posterior probability of the scientific model being correct -- given me – is EXTREMELY small. It is MUCH smaller than the posterior probability that one of the other models is correct.

It seems to me that if the world was designed especially to give rise to a person who would eventually use Bayes' Rule to examine the probability that the world was designed especially to give rise to him, then it would have designed that person with a better grasp of Bayesian inference.

 

[Toontown]

It seems to me that if the world was designed especially to give rise to a person who would eventually use Bayes' Rule to examine the probability that the world was designed especially to give rise to him, then it would have designed that person with a better grasp of Bayesian inference.

That's not much of an alternative. Maybe that plus every other idea everyone can conjure up, combined, might reasonably be argued to have a combined probability greater than Jabba's estimated probability for what he calls the scientific model.

Frankly, I wasn't aware that anything akin to a broadly accepted "scientific" model exists. I had always called the object of Jabba's disdain the materialist model, if I called it anything at all. Which is not necessarily "scientific" at all.

 

[Toontown]

- In other words, the posterior probability of the scientific model being correct -- given me – is EXTREMELY small. It is MUCH smaller than the posterior probability that one of the other models is correct.

Right. That's the inevitable conclusion when the prior probability of the observation is very nearly zero.

But I presume we're not finished yet. You still have that little matter of immortality to prove. Seems to me that accomplishing that goal will require very strongly supporting a specific alternative hypothesis.

 

[jt512]

Right. That's the inevitable conclusion when the prior probability of the observation is very nearly zero.

What exactly is this so-called "prior probability of the observation"? There is no term in Bayes' Rule with that name. There are just the prior probabilities of the two hypotheses, the likelihoods of the observation under each of the two hypotheses, and the posterior probability of the hypotheses.

 

[Agatha]

So, here’s my story…

- The appropriate Bayes formula for determining the posterior probability of the scientific model – given my existence -- is:
- P(SM|me) = P(me|SM)P(SM)/(P(me|SM)P(SM)+P(me|NSM)P(NSM))- “SM” is the current consensus “Scientific Model”; “NSM” is any possible explanatory model other than the “SM.”
- Inserting my estimates into the formula, I get:

- P(SM|me) = (~.0000…1)*(.99)/(~.0000…1)(.99)+(.9)(.01)
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.0000…1+.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1/~.009
- P(SM|me) = ~.0000…1

- In other words, the posterior probability of the scientific model being correct -- given me – is EXTREMELY small. It is MUCH smaller than the posterior probability that one of the other models is correct.

Can you justify your figures?

Why is the probability of 'you' given the 'non-scientific model' 0.9?

Why is the probability of the 'non-scientific model' 0.01?

Don't justify them by saying they are the 1-(the probability you guessed for you given the scientific model) and 1-(the probability you guessed for the scientific model); I realise that is how you arrived at the numbers. I am asking you to justify the numbers as if you had started at this side of the equation, not the other side.

Explain why you think the 'non scientific model' has a one in a hundred chance of being the correct explanation. Explain why you think the chance of you (your consciousness) existing given the 'non scientific model' is an enormous 9 in 10 chance.

 

[Toontown]

What exactly is this so-called "prior probability of the observation"? There is no term in Bayes' Rule with that name. There are just the prior probabilities of the two hypotheses, the likelihoods of the observation under each of the two hypotheses, and the posterior probability of the hypotheses.

In this context, think of it as the probability, at t=0+10^-43, that a Jabba experience would occur, given the hypothesis that the Jabba experience can occur if and only if a unique organization of mass/energy occurs at unique spacetime coordinates, resulting in the physical body in which the Jabba experience is observed (by Jabba himself) to be occurring.

Obviously I was not referring to a probability we can evaluate with much precision here. Nor would I consider the use of Bayes theorem necessary or particularly useful in this context. I would consider it sufficent to acknowledge that the prior probability of the observation is very nearly zero, given the described hypothesis. Which I did.

 

[jt512]

In this context, think of it as the probability, at t=0+10^-43, that a Jabba experience would occur, given the hypothesis that the Jabba experience can occur if and only if a unique organization of mass/energy occurs at unique spacetime coordinates, resulting in the physical body in which the Jabba experience is observed (by Jabba himself) to be occurring.

Obviously I was not referring to a probability we can evaluate with much precision here. Nor would I consider the use of Bayes theorem necessary or particularly useful in this context. I would consider it sufficent to acknowledge that the prior probability of the observation is very nearly zero, given the described hypothesis. Which I did.

I think there are serious theories of cosmology in which time is infinite and in which the probability of Jaba is 1, because there are finitely many physical configurations of the universe, and that in infinite time all of them must occur, repeatedly indeed.

 

[Toontown]

I think there are serious theories of cosmology in which that probability is 1; that there are finitely many physical configurations of the universe, and that in infinite time all of them must occur, repeatedly indeed.

There is only one way what I specifically described can happen, because it must happen at a specific time in a specific place. That is the scientific definition of a unique object. Given the uniqueness assumption, the size of the universe and how long it lasts matters not. You have one chance, at one time, at one place. And it's not much of a chance.

If you disagree that we are necessarily unique objects, then you are kind of on the same page as Jabba, and I'm kind of on that same page, simply because of the vanishingly small probability the uniqueness assumption gives my observed existence.

What alternative explanations may be is a whole nother discussion.

 

[jt512]

There is only one way what I specifically described can happen, because it must happen at a specific time in a specific place. That is the scientific definition of a unique object. Given the uniqueness assumption, the size of the universe and how long it lasts matters not. You have one chance, at one time, at one place. And it's not much of a chance.

I suspect that your definition of time is not meaningful if "time" is infinite and our big bang was just one of an infinite number of them.

 

[Toontown]

I suspect that your definition of time is not meaningful if "time" is infinite and our big bang was just one of an infinite number of them.

It wouldn't break my heart if you turned out to be right about that. That would mean I can happen infinitely many times in infinitely many contexts. But each time would seem like the first time.

Because unique is unique, and variable is variable.

 

[Pixel42]

Explain why you think the 'non scientific model' has a one in a hundred chance of being the correct explanation. Explain why you think the chance of you (your consciousness) existing given the 'non scientific model' is an enormous 9 in 10 chance.

Good questions, but I'm still waiting for Jabba to tell us what this "non scientific model" actually is.

 

[Jabba]

- This is really getting interesting.
- Unfortunately, I'll be babysitting two year olds for most of the day, so won't be able to add much to the discussion today.
- But, I'll do what I can.


Toontown,

- Bak in 651, you said, "But I presume we're not finished yet. You still have that little matter of immortality to prove. Seems to me that accomplishing that goal will require very strongly supporting a specific alternative hypothesis."
- While there is a LOT more to say, your position is sort of confusing and I suspect that I'm not quite understanding it. I say that because
1) The scientific model to which I'm referring holds that we each live but one finite life.
2) If that model is not correct, we are either not finite, or we live more than once.
3) Once we accept that we each live at least twice, where do we stop?

- In other words, it seems to me that (essentially) disproving that scientific model (essentially) proves that we are immortal.