Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape Challenge

[kellyb]

We have to define "moral" and "morality".

Case in point:

The work of evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers on reciprocal altruism has gone a long way toward explaining cooperation among unrelated friends and strangers. Trivers’s model incorporates many of the psychological and social factors related to altruism and reciprocity, including friendship, moralistic aggression (i.e., the punishment of cheaters), guilt, sympathy, and gratitude, along with a tendency to deceive others by mimicking these states. As first suggested by Darwin, and recently elaborated by the psychologist Geoffrey Miller, sexual selection may have further encouraged the development of moral behavior. Because moral virtue is attractive to both sexes, it might function as a kind of peacock’s tail: costly to produce and maintain, but beneficial to one’s genes in the end.

"Altruism" is a behavior, but it's not morality itself.
"Cooperation" is a behavior, but it's also not morality itself.

But Harris takes these and other measurable behaviors and equates them with "moral behavior" and "moral virtue", thus creating his own definition of "moral".

 

[mumblethrax]

I am not claiming or assuming these things. You are assuming that I must take this position, like everybody else apparently, just because the position is clearly stupid and easy to attack. But that does not mean I have to actually hold that position.

I'm assuming that because you want to say that you can derive morality from described preferences. You can't do that without some prevailing prescriptions, any more than you can derive morality from the theory of evolution. You've just got a pile of facts and nothing to do with them. You can't get from a description of a preference like "Peter doesn't want to get punched in the nose" to a prescription like "We ought not punch Peter in the nose" without an adjudicating norm--an ought. At the very least, you'd need something like "Preferences ought to be satisfied."

Once again, in case it helps: I am not arguing in favour of universally compelling moral arguments.

If you don't want to say that you can get to objective, universal moral arguments, you should probably steer well clear of statements like "We can derive morality from reality."

Quite the opposite in fact. I am saying that this desire for universally compelling morality is silly.

Well, you're also saying that we have to ignore the is-ought problem because we'd otherwise be stuck with "bogus circular moral reasoning". You'll have to forgive me for thinking you're all over the place here.

 

[jiggeryqua]

In my experience, engaging with someone who starts a discussion with sarcasm and in bad faith, with as only purpose to convince the other that they are wrong since they couldn't possibly be wrong themselves, never results in anything good.

I'm not sure how one judges the faith of another poster, though a personal aversion to sarcasm is quite understandable. I'm not convinced I used any, but that was yesterday and maybe we define the word differently. An example of what I consider 'bad faith posting' might include the following: "As opposed to, oh, I don't know, throwing out fictional gods and then maintaining most of the virtue/duty based morality that it imparted?", which is a sarcastic strawman by my reckoning.

As is often the case in a discussion, I entered into it because I'm pretty sure you're wrong. I would, as you suggest, like to convince you of that. I could, possibly, be wrong myself - I am at least willing to engage with the possibility. I think (although I may be wrong here) that you want to convince others that they are wrong (inasmuch as you want to convince them you're right). I hope something good results from it.

But fine, I will engage your serious question. Science can be used to objectively measure moral preferences. One can then measure whether those preferences are being satisfied by existing moral systems. This does not mean that science can dictate what preferences you "ought to have" in the first place, which is a nonsensical notion that I would never defend. But science can certainly be used to point out that an existing moral system does not do what it purports to do.

Well, is that all? I honestly thought the claim 'science can answer moral questions' amounted to more than 'science can measure the things involved in answering moral questions according to a predetermined morality arrived at, necessarily, without the aid of science'. Because really that's just 'science can measure things', and the word 'moral' is just a red herring.

And in case your reply is "well is that all?", please consider that a combination of being able to measure the goal and being able to measure whether it is being achieved... gives you pretty much everything you need. Nothing is 'up for grabs' at that point, and you certainly could not justify statements like 'Oh it's all opinion anyway', which is what people on JREF tend to do.

'Everything you need', for a meaningful discussion of morality, includes a morality. I believe we've just agreed that science can't furnish anyone with a morality. So what is the claim? That if your morality says "thou shalt not kill", science can objectively, factually, accurately and unarguably measure whether someone's dead and you did it? That's not answering a moral question.

 

[Kahalachan]

I can disprove Sam Harris with just a one-word essay.

Masochists.

We can't determine what is good for everyone simply because there is way too much diversity in our world to objectively measure such a quantity.

 

[Sophronius]

Kellyb: I am using morality to mean: Those rules that are derived from moral preferences, specifically a desire to satisfy other people's preferences. You can define morality as something else I suppose, but I don't see why it matters since using different definitions won't change the underlying reality.

I'm assuming that because you want to say that you can derive morality from described preferences. You can't do that without some prevailing prescriptions, any more than you can derive morality from the theory of evolution. You've just got a pile of facts and nothing to do with them. You can't get from a description of a preference like "Peter doesn't want to get punched in the nose" to a prescription like "We ought not punch Peter in the nose" without an adjudicating norm--an ought. At the very least, you'd need something like "Preferences ought to be satisfied."

Ok, I see where the problem lies. You seem to think that a desire to satisfy preferences is not sufficient a reason to be moral. I ask you: What other reason could there be? There is no such thing as an outside source of morality, I am sure we agree. So the only meaningful kind of morality is the kind that comes from human preferences. After all, there is literally nothing else that could possibly motivate us. So claiming that a desire to be moral is not sufficient reason to be moral is the same as claiming that a desire to eat ice cream is not sufficient reason to eat ice cream. You seem to be laying the bar for morality at an unreasonably high level.

If you don't want to say that you can get to objective, universal moral arguments, you should probably steer well clear of statements like "We can derive morality from reality."

Why? Saying that morality is part of our universe (it is, since we are in it) is entirely different from saying that there is morality in the universe that is universally compelling. I am merely arguing in favour of logically deducing human morality.


@Jiggeryqua: You don't seem to understand what it is I am trying to argue here. I presume you came into the discussion halfway through and missed earlier posts, which is understandable. Please go to http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=9471634#post9471634 to see what I am actually claiming and tell me if you disagree with any of it.

 

[jiggeryqua]

@Jiggeryqua: You don't seem to understand what it is I am trying to argue here. I presume you came into the discussion halfway through and missed earlier posts, which is understandable. Please go to http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=9471634#post9471634 to see what I am actually claiming and tell me if you disagree with any of it.

Well I am trying to understand what it is you're trying to argue, which is why I just presented what I currently understand to be what you're claiming. Here it is again:

'Science can accurately and objectively measure things. Those measurements are the only reliable input we can use in answering questions that can be answered objectively. Moral questions are a sort of question. Therefore, assuming you have a morality with rules against which a given or hypothetical result can be compared, science is able to provide measurements which can tell us whether that given or hypothetical result is moral.'

If that's what you're arguing, I can't see much reason to disagree. But all it really says is 'science measures things', with the 'morality' element being a red herring. Sience cannot derive a moral code. There are physical laws, science is good at those, but morality is not a particle or a wave. If your moral code says 'do not kill', you didn't use science to arrive at that conclusion. You can use science to establish whether someone is dead and if you caused it. But calling that the answer to a moral question is misleading. It's the answer to a factual question.

I did read your earlier post that you now link to. I had issues with point 4 (you cannot derive a moral imperative from logic, you have to start with a moral imperative to reach a logical conclusion as to whether a given action is moral).

I baulked utterly at point 5, but thought I'd let others post and let you develop the ideas before I chipped in. Specifically, I question your use of the word 'innocents'. You and I may agree they are, but from the morality of the teenage islamist they are not. I do not understand your grounds for claiming your morality is right and his " logically, factually, irrevocably and objectively wrong" except insofar as it is at odds with your own (which you clearly rate quite highly). You go on to say "He does not actually want to die, he does not actually want to kill [people we see as] innocents." I do not understand how you can claim someone who voluntary takes an action that kills [innocents] and himself 'does not want to die' and 'does not want to kill'. Yes he does, on both counts. We may agree he shouldn't, we may agree it's immoral, while he thinks it's utterly moral, but science can't decide either way.

 

[Sophronius]

Well I am trying to understand what it is you're trying to argue, which is why I just presented what I currently understand to be what you're claiming. Here it is again:

'Science can accurately and objectively measure things. Those measurements are the only reliable input we can use in answering questions that can be answered objectively. Moral questions are a sort of question. Therefore, assuming you have a morality with rules against which a given or hypothetical result can be compared, science is able to provide measurements which can tell us whether that given or hypothetical result is moral.'

If that's what you're arguing, I can't see much reason to disagree. But all it really says is 'science measures things', with the 'morality' element being a red herring. Sience cannot derive a moral code. There are physical laws, science is good at those, but morality is not a particle or a wave. If your moral code says 'do not kill', you didn't use science to arrive at that conclusion. You can use science to establish whether someone is dead and if you caused it. But calling that the answer to a moral question is misleading. It's the answer to a factual question.

Not exactly. I am going one step further than you think. Science can not only measure the effects of an action, but also what is (morally) desired in the first place. I am arguing that science can determine (determine as in "measure", not determine as in "pull from nowhere") the objective as well as determine whether it is being achieved. I am saying that every step within a moral argument is within the purview of science, in much the same way that consciousness is an entirely scientific matter and not magical as people intuitively seem to think. Again, this does not mean that science can pull morals out of thin air, but what I am saying is much more significant than "You can use science to evaluate whether someone is dead".

In the hope of making my point a bit clearer, here is my train of logic step by step:

1) Science can determine what someone's preferences really are
2) Preferences are the only thing that can motivate someone. You do not need an additional outside reason to satisfy your preferences, your preferences are your own motivation
3) Science can determine the outcome of actions and rank them in accordance with those (weighted) preferences
4) Given the above points, science can determine what is the logical thing for someone to do, given their preferences and expected outcomes of actions
5) In practice, most people really do value each other's preferences. From this morality is derived. The only alternative to this kind of morality is circular nonsense morality, which I assume nobody is interested in.
6) Given 4) and 5), science can determine what is morally desired by a society, as well as how to achieve it. Morality is therefore entirely within the purview of science.

Is there any fault in my logic? I don't see one.

I did read your earlier post that you now link to. I had issues with point 4 (you cannot derive a moral imperative from logic, you have to start with a moral imperative to reach a logical conclusion as to whether a given action is moral).

You cannot derive a moral imperative from logic, but you can derive a moral imperative using logic by measuring preferences and following them to their logical conclusion. The point being that the fact that science has to start from somewhere should not be taken as an excuse to just make up whatever morality sounds cool. Logic and facts still determine the answer, no matter where you start from. It's not a matter of opinion. Only preferences (observable facts) and logic determine the answer to moral questions.

I baulked utterly at point 5, but thought I'd let others post and let you develop the ideas before I chipped in. Specifically, I question your use of the word 'innocents'. You and I may agree they are, but from the morality of the teenage islamist they are not. I do not understand your grounds for claiming your morality is right and his " logically, factually, irrevocably and objectively wrong" except insofar as it is at odds with your own (which you clearly rate quite highly). You go on to say "He does not actually want to die, he does not actually want to kill [people we see as] innocents." I do not understand how you can claim someone who voluntary takes an action that kills [innocents] and himself 'does not want to die' and 'does not want to kill'. Yes he does, on both counts. We may agree he shouldn't, we may agree it's immoral, while he thinks it's utterly moral, but science can't decide either way.

The point of that example is not to superimpose my preferences onto his. The point is that he is factually wrong. He believes he is doing good in the name of the lord. There is no lord so he is wrong. My preferences have nothing to do with this. Unless you believe that a morality based on falsehoods is just as valid as any other? If that is the case, you must judge morality to be entirely meaningless.

 

[jiggeryqua]

Not exactly. I am going one step further than you think. Science can not only measure the effects of an action, but also what is (morally) desired in the first place. I am arguing that science can determine (determine as in "measure", not determine as in "pull from nowhere") the objective as well as determine whether it is being achieved. I am saying that every step within a moral argument is within the purview of science, in much the same way that consciousness is an entirely scientific matter and not magical as people intuitively seem to think. Again, this does not mean that science can pull morals out of thin air, but what I am saying is much more significant than "You can use science to evaluate whether someone is dead".

So you're saying you can use science to decide whether someone should be dead. Or not. I thought, from much of what you'd said (and the fact that you hadn't yet contradicted my statements of that thought), that you agreed that science cannot produce a moral code. But that's what you now appear to be saying. Science can and should decide what is 'good' and what is 'bad'.

In the hope of making my point a bit clearer, here is my train of logic step by step:

1) Science can determine what someone's preferences really are
2) Preferences are the only thing that can motivate someone. You do not need an additional outside reason to satisfy your preferences, your preferences are your own motivation
3) Science can determine the outcome of actions and rank them in accordance with those (weighted) preferences
4) Given the above points, science can determine what is the logical thing for someone to do, given their preferences and expected outcomes of actions
5) In practice, most people really do value each other's preferences. From this morality is derived. The only alternative to this kind of morality is circular nonsense morality, which I assume nobody is interested in.
6) Given 4) and 5), science can determine what is morally desired by a society, as well as how to achieve it. Morality is therefore entirely within the purview of science.

Is there any fault in my logic? I don't see one.

Starting at 1) (and why not...) how does 'science' determine someone's preferences. You ask me my preferences, I tell you. What part has 'science' (as opposed to the reality that science measures) played in that?

Onwards to 2)... Let's plug in a random example. Let's say my preference is to blow up innocents. I don't need any other motivation than that preference. That is my morality, and 'science' has acknowledged it (but not determined it).

3) Science certainly can measure how much carnage I achieve, we have no dispute on that point. It can answer whether my morality is satisfied by the action, but it cannot answer whether the action is moral. It does not answer the moral question, unless morality is made meaningless.

4) I think logic determines the logical thing to do - I'm not sure whether logic is a 'science', per se? But either way, again, it's not answering a moral question, it's measuring something against a model answer to a moral question that is arrived at by some other method.

5) In practise, science isn't much interested in what 'most people' think. Most people think there's a Sky Daddy, though they don't all agree on what form it takes. Why is one popular opinion more valid as a basis for morality than the other?

6) Given bread, we could have bread and butter, if we had any butter. You don't need 'science' to establish what a society holds to be moral, you just ask them. Unless you're broadening the definition of 'science' to include 'asking people something and listening to their answer with your ears and your brain, which are definitely processes science can explain'. But I wouldn't call most market researchers 'scientists'...

6) again. Merely placing 'therefore' before an assertion does not make it true. I want to see how morality can be derived by science and I do not agree that you have done that.

You cannot derive a moral imperative from logic, but you can derive a moral imperative using logic by measuring preferences and following them to their logical conclusion. The point being that the fact that science has to start from somewhere should not be taken as an excuse to just make up whatever morality sounds cool. Logic and facts still determine the answer, no matter where you start from. It's not a matter of opinion. Only preferences (observable facts) and logic determine the answer to moral questions.

The point of a moral question is not what the answer is (which can be measured by science). It's what the answer ought to be (which is not measurable by science. Maybe I misunderstand your use of the term 'preference', which implies the possibility of the moral question "Should I slaughter babies" being answered 'scientifically' by establishing that my preference is for slaughtering babies, making the scientifically derived morality that it is ok to slaughter babies.

The point of that example is not to superimpose my preferences onto his. The point is that he is factually wrong. He believes he is doing good in the name of the lord. There is no lord so he is wrong. My preferences have nothing to do with this. Unless you believe that a morality based on falsehoods is just as valid as any other? If that is the case, you must judge morality to be entirely meaningless.

Yes, I get that you don't want a morality derived from any of the world's ancient religions, because those religions posit a being that does not exist. But to throw out the commonality they all have, that has developed (unscientifically) through millenia of human society - that we should treat others as we would wish to be treated - seems at odds with your broad claim, as well as throwing the baby out with the bathwater. That said, all that has been developed (and which you appear to propose) is a concensus, a majority opinion. That's not science and it does not make the resulting morality 'right' and any other morality 'wrong'.

I don't judge morality to be meaningless, but I do judge your claims to be meaningless.

 

[qayak]

So you're saying you can use science to decide whether someone should be dead. Or not. I thought, from much of what you'd said (and the fact that you hadn't yet contradicted my statements of that thought), that you agreed that science cannot produce a moral code. But that's what you now appear to be saying. Science can and should decide what is 'good' and what is 'bad'..

Your question is a bit like asking whether science can tell you whether someone should turn on their computer or not? It is a useless question that completely misses the point of the discussion.

Science is a process, not an answer. Science can indeed tell you which is more morally acceptable. That people will still come up with different answers to the same questions doesn't change that. Science (statistics) can tell you which poker hand is more likely to come up but that doesn't stop the majority of people from betting against the odds, does it?

Your argument is the same one used by religious people to say that morality can only come from the bible. Wrong, morality can come from a lot of places. The systematic study of ethics has indeed given us a "better" moral system than ad hoc passages from old books written by ignorant men.

Applying a proven process to any field will almost always be an improvement.

 

[jiggeryqua]

Your question is a bit like asking whether science can tell you whether someone should turn on their computer or not? It is a useless question that completely misses the point of the discussion.

Science is a process, not an answer. Science can indeed tell you which is more morally acceptable. That people will still come up with different answers to the same questions doesn't change that. Science (statistics) can tell you which poker hand is more likely to come up but that doesn't stop the majority of people from betting against the odds, does it?

Your argument is the same one used by religious people to say that morality can only come from the bible. Wrong, morality can come from a lot of places. The systematic study of ethics has indeed given us a "better" moral system than ad hoc passages from old books written by ignorant men.

Applying a proven process to any field will almost always be an improvement.

My argument is most certainly not the same one used by religious people to say that morality can only come from the bible. Actual reading of my actual words would have revealed quite the opposite. Indeed, my concern is that proponents of 'scientific morality' want to claim the monopoly that religions have held in the past. My position is that neither one is a credible source of morality and I have no interest in worshipping priests in black frocks or white coats.

I'm fascinated as to how you judge your (I'm skipping over the "us", as though 'we' had already embraced a universal ethic) moral system to be 'better' than any other - that's not me defending old books written by ignorant people, cast aside that foolish false dichotomy, please. If you mean it better matches your value system, then there's no surprise there and no worthwhile claim.

Morality is not a question of statistics. The poker analogy is so flawed as to be useless.

By the by, you start by referencing my 'question', though I can't find one in the part of my post you quoted or anywhere else in my previous post that would make the reference clear. What question do you mean? Better still, give me an example of a genuine moral question that science can (or could, eventually) answer. By which I mean a question where scientific process decides what is moral, what is good or right. Because otherwise the claim to be 'answering' moral questions is meaningless. Science can only measure whether a proposed answer or an actual act meets moral criteria that have been derived earlier. It cannot define moral criteria.

 

[kellyb]

Kellyb: I am using morality to mean: Those rules that are derived from moral preferences, specifically a desire to satisfy other people's preferences.

Do you see that you're having to use the word "moral" to define "moral"?

You can define morality as something else I suppose, but I don't see why it matters since using different definitions won't change the underlying reality.

It matters a LOT in demonstrating whether or not science can determine morality. If "moral preferences" are like "tastes in music", then science can hone in on means and mediums, like the way pop music stations and record companies do.

So claiming that a desire to be moral is not sufficient reason to be moral is the same as claiming that a desire to eat ice cream is not sufficient reason to eat ice cream. You seem to be laying the bar for morality at an unreasonably high level.

Actually, people are motivated to actions and inactions by numerous, simultaneous, often conflicting objectives. One can desire ice cream while also desiring to be thin more.

 

[epepke]

emphasis mine

Reduce it to 1010 words then tie him up for weeks on end arguing that his word count is wrong.

Evil. I like it.

Maybe I'll make it so that the decision hinges on whether "well-being" counts as one word or two.

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

Evil. I like it.

Maybe I'll make it so that the decision hinges on whether "well-being" counts as one word or two.

Brilliant!

 

[marplots]

If our hypothetical Jihadist justifies his behavior, saying, "It is moral to kill myself (and others) in the service of God and His commands," and your objection is to say, "There is no God," you have not attacked his moral stance at all. All you've done is claim that his stance doesn't apply. It may still be moral, and would be actionable as soon as God appeared.

All the other factual touchstones seem to be about consequences that flow from some action, not the morality behind the actions directly.

This is the reason a moral sense cannot be addressed objectively. They are different magisteria and orthogonal. It is the difference between the conceptual circle of mathematics and any particular circle one might draw.

When we apply morality, we do so by abstracting from the real. It is never the case that some fact about the world is moral all on its own. A tree isn't moral, nor a rock, nor the fact that this baby is breathing or has ceased to breathe. None of these are moral statements. It is only when we extract the meaning and make them abstract that we can perform our calculus on them.

 

[mumblethrax]

Ok, I see where the problem lies. You seem to think that a desire to satisfy preferences is not sufficient a reason to be moral.

No, I think documenting a desire to satisfy preferences is not sufficient to produce prescriptions, which is the thing you seem to want to do when you use words like "derive" and "deduce" rather than "describe". You're just introducing a regress problem here: why should the desire to satisfy preferences be satisfied?

Incidentally, where did "the desire to satisfy preferences" come from? Are you assuming that a generalized desire to satisfy preferences is widely held, did you conduct a survey, do you want to argue that it inheres in the fact of preferences itself, or are you introducing it as a way of making sense out of a collection of human preferences?

I ask you: What other reason could there be?

The primary competitor, apart from other flavors of consequentialism, would be something like "those acts are permissible which, when universalized, do not lead to contradiction." This is the same incredulity that Harris wants to pass off as reasoning, but it is unfortunately defeated by ever having taken an introductory class in moral philosophy.

There is no such thing as an outside source of morality, I am sure we agree. So the only meaningful kind of morality is the kind that comes from human preferences.

I think the kind of preference utilitarianism you're describing is a perfectly decent kind of morality, but it doesn't automatically follow from anti-realism.

After all, there is literally nothing else that could possibly motivate us. So claiming that a desire to be moral is not sufficient reason to be moral is the same as claiming that a desire to eat ice cream is not sufficient reason to eat ice cream. You seem to be laying the bar for morality at an unreasonably high level.

Moral sentences will tend to make greater demands than other kind of non-declarative sentences, which is why we scratch our heads over how they obtain. If I say "Killing is wrong" or "We ought to satisfy preferences," I'm saying something stronger than "I don't like spinach." "I like ice cream" is not usually given as a reason for why you should eat ice cream, but that is what we're usually doing with moral utterances.

Why? Saying that morality is part of our universe (it is, since we are in it) is entirely different from saying that there is morality in the universe that is universally compelling.

Because saying "morality can be derived from reality" will tend to make people think that you're advancing some flavor of moral realism.

Morality is part of our universe in much the same way the God is--that is, they both exist under our hats.

I am merely arguing in favour of logically deducing human morality.

That's like saying you're merely arguing in favor of squaring the circle. That's the thing you cannot do. You cannot deduce oughts from ises. You need at least a couple of oughts to begin with, which means that human morality precedes your reasoning, and is not a result of it.

 

[mijopaalmc]

That's like saying you're merely arguing in favor of squaring the circle. That's the thing you cannot do. You cannot deduce oughts from ises. You need at least a couple of oughts to begin with, which means that human morality precedes your reasoning, and is not a result of it.

You can logically deduce a set of moral actions, but you need to start with a set of moral axiom (and, possibly, some moral inference rules) first. What Harris has done is assert he can prove moral axioms, which out-right absurd because axioms are a priori true.

 

[kellyb]

You can logically deduce a set of moral actions, but you need to start with a set of moral axiom (and, possibly, some moral inference rules) first. What Harris has done is assert he can prove moral axioms, which out-right absurd because axioms are a priori true.

Well, he tries to wiggle out of that by saying (in effect) they're "presuppositions" on par with other scientific axioms. He's not claiming to prove the moral axiom, per say, but rather wanting the value of human well-being to be on par with one plus one equalling two.

The difference, of course, is that in science, very very little is taken as axiomatic (contrary to what Harris says...he seems to think the value of heath is taken as an axiom in medical science; a weird position for a neuroscientist to take), and the usefulness and value (or lack thereof!) of the evidence is experimentally observed, not presupposed. The usefulness of the "moral axioms" are not falsifiable or even testable.

 

[marplots]

You can logically deduce a set of moral actions, but you need to start with a set of moral axiom (and, possibly, some moral inference rules) first. What Harris has done is assert he can prove moral axioms, which out-right absurd because axioms are a priori true.

It might be even worse than this. I'm not convinced that logical rules should even apply.

 

[mumblethrax]

You can logically deduce a set of moral actions, but you need to start with a set of moral axiom (and, possibly, some moral inference rules) first. What Harris has done is assert he can prove moral axioms, which out-right absurd because axioms are a priori true.

I think that's true (except to say that you needn't start with axioms--you can start with principles understood as something like rules that do not express propositions), but the moral axiom will necessarily be normative. Deducing the normative from the natural is the thing that we don't seem to be able to do.

I haven't read Harris' book, he strikes me as a lazy thinker on this topic.

 

[blutoski]

I think that's true (except to say that you needn't start with axioms--you can start with principles understood as something like rules that do not express propositions), but the moral axiom will necessarily be normative. Deducing the normative from the natural is the thing that we don't seem to be able to do.

I haven't read Harris' book, he strikes me as a lazy thinker on this topic.

I was going to hold off until I finished it, but as of halfway through, it's pretty much garbage and I'm having difficulty getting motivated to finish.

I'm struggling to understand what he's saying exactly. He seems to have made a thesis, but the text is circling around it, not really trying to support it. It's not like reading John Locke.