Did Lee deliberately lose at Gettysburg?

[NightStar76]

Also! Lee did not deliberately lose Gettysburg, but Early definitely deliberately lost the battle of Cedar Creek.

 

[dudalb]

Scapegoating Longstreet is a favorite pastime of the ancestor worshipers



There's enough blame to go around, but at the end it mostly points at Lee, who was in charge.

Longstreet gets flack & unfair blame because post-war he joined the Republican Party and helped Reconstruction. Unacceptable behavior for the 'boo-hoo we lost' crowd.

Although a Union man to the core, I did support the drive to give Old Pete a statue at Gettysburg...which finally happened in 1998.
I suspect the sympathitic view of Longstreet in the film "Gettysburg" had something to do with that.
And I think that the film might have struck a major reason why Lee ordered Pickett's Chargeure Hubris...the classic flaw in many good generals.

 

[Craig4]

Longstreet told Lee:

The enemy is there because he wants us to attack him there and that is a very good reason not to attack him there. (not a direct quote)

Lee should have listened. That fact that he didn't makes him a less capable commander.

 

[Corsair 115]

... and (2) The Federals always seem to have another Army ready to go faster than he could defeat them.

In another words, it was, as many wars tend to be, a war of attrition. Whichever side had the most resources would eventually grind out a victory.

 

[dudalb]

In another words, it was, as many wars tend to be, a war of attrition. Whichever side had the most resources would eventually grind out a victory.

The genius of Grant was that he understood this. Best expressed in his famous line on the Overland campaign of 1864 "I will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer".

 

[catsmate]

There is a big difference between what could be done in Napoleon's time and what could be done in the civil war time. In Napoleon's time you could charge the enemy and expect most of your troops to get to the enemy's front line so that hand to hand combat could take place. But since then guns had improved so that that assumption was no longer valid.

The problem was that weapons tech had just reached the stage where a rifle was a common weapon in an army and tactics had not caught up to technology.

Yes. The ACW was a transitional war, between the smoothbore 'volley and bayonet' tactics of the Napoleonic wars and the magazine rifle/machine gun era of a few decades later. Because there was little large scale warfare most commanders were still trying to adapt tactics to the new realities.

The most common longarm of the ACW was the P53 rifled musket or a clone of it; now this was already obsolete before the ACW began (compared to breech loaders such as the Dreyse M.1841) but it fired nearly three times as fast as the smoothbores it replaced and had several times the accurate range. This exposed advancing troops to far more effective fire from defenders.

 

[fitzgibbon]

Seconded!

I am reading a good book right now on what it takes to win a war when one is outnumbered, and one the excellent points that the author makes is that Lee often drove right towards the center of the enemy. Which is brave but can be reckless.

Whereas, a better plan is to attack the enemy forces when they are exposed, but shortly before they have a chance to get properly organized; which is what Longstreet wanted to do and Napoleon often did.

You'd probably like "Strange Fatality" by James Elliot. It's about the Battle of Stoney Creek during the War of 1812 when the British/Canadian ability to fight was at its nadir. Given the lopsided numbers involved (US forces far exceeded those that could be commanded by the British), necessity is the mother of invention and a British attack on the US encampment was organised for the middle of the night. The encampment was achieved through stealth (of British troops who'd had the flints from their muskets removed against accidental discharge), sleep (of the US camp in general but more importantly of many of the night guard in a nearby church) and subterfuge (the US password having been gained though the method is in dispute).

What could've been an overwhelming guerrilla victory very nearly turned out to be a self-inflicted coupe de grace as (IIRC) NCOs behind the line let out a cheer that roused the US troops and alerted them to the position of the 'enemy'. In fact, all that saved the British attack was a single cannon shot that didn't come as a small group of British troops were advancing on the cannon that were decimating the ranks, an order having been sent by the US general to cease fire. The British troops silenced the guns and in that one action, the momentum of the war turned.

Had the attack not happened or turned out badly (or at least less successfully for the British), the British troops would've continued to York and likely on to Kingston (perhaps even to Quebec) and most of the Canadas would have been in US hands by the end of campaigning in 1813, never likely to return to British control.

So fortune can favour the brave (or foolhardy; depends on who gets to qualify it). Certainly it had with Brock 50 years before at Detroit and Michilimackinaw with more lopsided odds. Could Lee have been looking back to such relatively recent comparisons?

Fitz

p.s. For those interested, the Wiki entry on the Battle of Stoney Creek makes for an interesting read. [/OT]

 

[dudalb]

Yes. The ACW was a transitional war, between the smoothbore 'volley and bayonet' tactics of the Napoleonic wars and the magazine rifle/machine gun era of a few decades later. Because there was little large scale warfare most commanders were still trying to adapt tactics to the new realities.

The most common longarm of the ACW was the P53 rifled musket or a clone of it; now this was already obsolete before the ACW began (compared to breech loaders such as the Dreyse M.1841) but it fired nearly three times as fast as the smoothbores it replaced and had several times the accurate range. This exposed advancing troops to far more effective fire from defenders.

Actually the 1861 Springfield Rifle Musket was the most common weapon. Although very similiar to the 53 Enfield,it was not a clone.
Agreed that the North lost a huge chance by not adapting a breech loading rifle at the war's start, when several perfectly viable breech loaders were available.

 

[Polaris]

Actually the 1861 Springfield Rifle Musket was the most common weapon. Although very similiar to the 53 Enfield,it was not a clone.
Agreed that the North lost a huge chance by not adapting a breech loading rifle at the war's start, when several perfectly viable breech loaders were available.

This was true later in the war, but during early hostilities there was a gap between the US and CS forces in that the overwhelming numbers of rifled muskets were in Union hands while the Confederates had to make due with smoothbore.

 

[dudalb]

This was true later in the war, but during early hostilities there was a gap between the US and CS forces in that the overwhelming numbers of rifled muskets were in Union hands while the Confederates had to make due with smoothbore.

Correct. And the Army Of The Potomac was a major source...in the early years....of rifled muskets upgrades for the Army of Northren Virginia.

 

[tsig]

In honor of the sesquicentennial of the seminal strife of the Civil War, I present this theory.

Anyone who has ever stood at the Copse of Trees and looked down across the long sweep of the wheat fields to the distant tree line knows the utter futility of Pickets Charge.

How could anyone think that the the attackers would be able to march across that open ground, uphill, in the July heat and have the strength to fight a well entrenched defender?

Did Lee really forget the brutal lessons taught to the union army at Fredricksburg?

Or was he simply old and weary of war and looking for that last grand gesture?

If he wanted the war to end he could have surrendered the ANV.

He felt that his army commanded by him could do anything so Picket's charge was an act of hubris.

 

[theprestige]

If he wanted the war to end he could have surrendered the ANV.

He felt that his army commanded by him could do anything so Picket's charge was an act of hubris.

And Grant was his nemesis?

It does have a certain classical literary appeal, but I suspect it is overly simplistic.

Lee was, by acclaim of his peers and demonstrated accomplishments in the historical record, one of the finest generals to ever graduate West Point, and probably one of the finest generals of all time.

To write off Pickett's charge, in a single sentence, as a simple act of hubris, seems to fall far short of the full detail and complexity of the history--and the men--that led up to that event.

If I were to make an oversimplified analysis, I'd say that Gettysburg was a bad battle, Lee made the best of it, and his best wasn't good enough. But such is war.

 

[tsig]

And Grant was his nemesis?

It does have a certain classical literary appeal, but I suspect it is overly simplistic.

Lee was, by acclaim of his peers and demonstrated accomplishments in the historical record, one of the finest generals to ever graduate West Point, and probably one of the finest generals of all time.

To write off Pickett's charge, in a single sentence, as a simple act of hubris, seems to fall far short of the full detail and complexity of the history--and the men--that led up to that event.

If I were to make an oversimplified analysis, I'd say that Gettysburg was a bad battle, Lee made the best of it, and his best wasn't good enough. But such is war.

One of his demonstrated accomplishments was to lose the war. Good generals win them.

 

[Redwood]

Lee understood that he could not sustain a war of attrition with the North. Even at Chancellorsville, the losses were about equal between the two sides, and proportionately greater for the South. Lee's only chance was for a decisive victory to end the war (either that, or a more passive campaign of harassment, which he never considered).

Hence, Lee took a gamble at Gettysburg and lost.

 

[tsig]

Lee understood that he could not sustain a war of attrition with the North. Even at Chancellorsville, the losses were about equal between the two sides, and proportionately greater for the South. Lee's only chance was for a decisive victory to end the war (either that, or a more passive campaign of harassment, which he never considered).

Hence, Lee took a gamble at Gettysburg and lost.

He never had to gamble all he had to do was move towards Washington, find a right, tight hill and wait for the Union army to immolate itself.

 

[theprestige]

He never had to gamble all he had to do was move towards Washington, find a right, tight hill and wait for the Union army to immolate itself.

Given the reluctance of Union generals to engage Lee in open battle if they could at all avoid it, a more likely outcome would have been finding a right, tight hill and sitting there surrounded by the Union army until he ran out of food and water and was forced to surrender.

 

[tsig]

Given the reluctance of Union generals to engage Lee in open battle if they could at all avoid it, a more likely outcome would have been finding a right, tight hill and sitting there surrounded by the Union army until he ran out of food and water and was forced to surrender.

Just like McClellan did?

The pressure to attack would have been irresistible.

 

[Loss Leader]

Or was he simply old and weary of war and looking for that last grand gesture?

Dear lord, man.

 

[dudalb]

Just like McClellan did?

The pressure to attack would have been irresistible.

But I doubt Meade would have engaged in a series of frontal assaults the way that Burnside did at Gettysburg.

 

[tsig]

But I doubt Meade would have engaged in a series of frontal assaults the way that Burnside did at Gettysburg.

I think you meant Fredricksburg.


I'm afraid we've drifted off topic so I'll not speculate any more lest our posts get sent to the Bad Place. Thanks for the discussion.