On Consciousness

[Fudbucker]

Mary of Frank Jackson's Mary's Room^WP argument.

On checking that page, I learned that Jackson has since rejected his own argument as flawed and now considers the mind to be entirely a function of the physical brain. Well, good for him.

Irrelevant though. If the argument is sound and valid, it doesn't matter what the arguer thinks.

 

[PixyMisa]

That's not what I got from it. Do you think you can know what a thing like skydiving is just by reading about it?

The argument is very explicit: It doesn't say that Mary has read about colour vision, it says that Mary knows everything there is to know about colour vision.

There is something about experience that needs to be... experienced to understand it.

That's the premise and conclusion of the Mary's room argument. Which is why Jackson ended up rejecting it.

Irrelevant though. If the argument is sound and valid, it doesn't matter what the arguer thinks.

The argument isn't valid.

 

[Belz...]

That is true. If you don't know you're conscious... I don't know what to tell ya.

I don't know. Might just be an illusion, right ?

 

[deadendmind2013]

I read an article recently, by Shaun Nichols, in Scientific American Mind, Nov-Dec 2011,
p 18-19. It's about Experimental Philosophy dealing with the process of consciousness and free will. Really interesting.

◆Experimental Philosophy. Edited by J. Knobe and S. Nichols. Oxford University Press, 2008.
◆◆On the Psychological Origins of Dualism. B. Fiala, A. Arico and S. Nichols in Creating
Consilience: Integrating the Sciences and Humanities. Edited by E. Slingerland and M. Collard.
Oxford University Press, 2011.

 

[Dancing David]

That is true. If you don't know you're conscious... I don't know what to tell ya.

Nice funny haha

So answer the question:
-how do you know you are conscious?

Or is this just like many other supposedly self evident things.

 

[AlBell]

That is true. If you don't know you're conscious... I don't know what to tell ya.

Nice funny haha

So answer the question:
-how do you know you are conscious?

Or is this just like many other supposedly self evident things.

Self-evident, yes, for many of us who deem ourselves conscious.

What behaviors do you need to observe to convince you you are conscious?

 

[Dancing David]

Self-evident, yes, for many of us who deem ourselves conscious.

What behaviors do you need to observe to convince you you are conscious?

That is sort of the point of asking, how do people know they are conscious?

 

[AlBell]

Self-evident, yes, for many of us who deem ourselves conscious.

What behaviors do you need to observe to convince you you are conscious?

That is sort of the point of asking, how do people know they are conscious?

So what specific behaviors do you observe that prove to you you are conscious?

Evasion noted.

 

[Dancing David]

So what specific behaviors do you observe that prove to you you are conscious?

Evasion noted.

I am not sure what I am evading, I go with the medical model, I am pointing out that consciousness is a label applied to behaviors. I don't assume I am conscious.

So which question am I answering?


You are the one saying it is self evident, I believe it is a social language construct. And I tend to go with the medical levels of consciousness.

Self-evident, yes, for many of us who deem ourselves conscious.

 

[AlBell]

I am not sure what I am evading, I go with the medical model, I am pointing out that consciousness is a label applied to behaviors. I don't assume I am conscious.

So which question am I answering?


You are the one saying it is self evident, I believe it is a social language construct. And I tend to go with the medical levels of consciousness.

I see.

http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/consciousness

Which behaviors therein do you observe to conclude you are conscious?

 

[Dani]

That is sort of the point of asking, how do people know they are conscious?

They just realize. That's why the concept exists.

From that, you can conclude many other things, like the fact that you're posting on an internet forum.

 

[tsig]

Naïve? Naïve? Naïve? Who the hell is ‘poor Mary’ and why are you sorry and what has this black and white room got to do with anything?

But on to the naivete. Reading. I could provide billions of words to describe just how far beyond ridiculous this argument is…but one will suffice: Picasso.

…meaning…of course…just how many words would you have to digest before you could claim to have achieved even a fraction of the subjective experience of Picasso? Same applies to every, single, human, being, who, has, ever, lived (to one degree or another).

…which is entirely the point.

If you continue to doubt this…I suggest you read a thousand books about Mount Everest and the stories of those who have climbed it. Then go and climb it yourself. Then read a book explaining why words are invariably utterly inadequate in conveying the totality of subjective experience. A writer (ironically) by the name of Ursula K. LeGuin put it best: Words are only approximations of meaning.

Meaning. Now there’s an interesting word.

Just a note to all you drooling conscious-machine fanatics who’ve forgotten that poll I included a while back from a recent AI conference. Close to half the participants polled doubted that machine consciousness could ever be achieved. Note the word ‘ever’. Perhaps they know something you don’t.

Know. Another interesting word.

And since we’re on the subject…what actually is 2+2 Pixy? Interesting to note…that neither you nor anyone in the entire history of the human race has yet managed a coherent answer that doesn’t depend entirely on faith. Trivial and inconvenient.

If you don't understand 2+2 then you're going to have some hard sledding trying to understand consciousness.

 

[Dancing David]

Al Bell,
I am composing this prior to reading any other posts, ‘consciousness’ in my experience is not a single unified experience. It seems to have different component and they seem to have variable expression and states.

So as I have stated I tend to see it more as a rubric under which we place a lot of separate events, but then people in conversation often just say the word ‘consciousness’ as though it has one unitary meaning, which is what I object to.

As someone who has had long term sleep disturbance, I have experienced a wide variety of states which seem to partake of different aspects and levels of the blob labeled as ‘consciousness’. So one thing commonly referred to is ‘awareness’. And that seems to vary widely in what it means, even when asleep it seems there are various levels of ‘awareness’, we respond to sounds and stimuli, even though we are not ‘awake’. So the first is to establish the base level of ‘not responsive’ or appearing to not be aware of stimuli or at least able to respond to stimuli. So there is the state of ‘no response to stimuli’, which can be loud sounds, shaking or even the application of things that are generally considered ‘painful’ or ‘extremely uncomfortable’. And there seem to be times when humans are in this state where they are ‘non-responsive’, they can be shaken, yelled at, have pressure applied to nerve points under the skin and they do not seem to ‘respond’. And that is without considering the states that they are aware and not able to respond, due to nerve damage or things like ketamine. So even at the base line we get right into the depths. There are states where people do not have awareness of stimuli, they do not seem to respond to stimuli, they are ‘unconscious’ but then there is a category in which people are aware and having experiences, yet unable to show that in any way. So right away we get into the duality of personal experience and observable events from the outside and ‘inside’.

So with those caveats, I have noticed many different levels of awareness in my own experience, there are times of semi awareness on the edges of waking and sleeping, the transitions through tem. Then there seem to be the partial states where around sleep I seem to be aware of some aspects of ‘personal experience’ and not others, aware of memories and thoughts but not the radio next to the bed, aware of the radio show but not my body. And all sorts of variation, which also seem related to levels of awareness in dream states, in dreams it seems that the events are composed of ‘partial’ experiences, all visual at times, visual and somatic at others, verbal or emotional and verbal cognition. All changing and variable.

And so to when entering the different levels of ‘awake’ as opposed to ‘not really awake’, upon waking getting up, arousing from a deep sleep, there seems to be mainly ‘awareness’ of the body and maybe some ‘verbal cognition’ and sometimes ‘memory’ . There seems to be a great deal of variability in levels of arousal when first waking, slow semi aware events and full awareness events. Some days it seems as though I go through a range of awareness, staring with partial awareness of physical sensations, some thoughts and memories, and mainly trained habits, gradually moving into more awareness and integration with events. Some days I fell always half asleep, others I wake fully ‘awake’ and aware and go through the day that way. But it seems that even awareness rises and falls during the day and changes a lot over the course of time.

So even in one aspect of what I label as consciousness there seems to be a great deal of variability, a lot of awareness seems to be related to the levels of arousal and the sleep wake cycle of my body. Then there seems to be general awareness and focused, trained awareness and automatic awareness. Much less the exclusion for things from awareness.

So it goes with all things I would include in consciousness, and there seems to be a lot of over lap: awareness, interaction, response, verbal cognition, visual cognition, memory of many types, pattern awareness, comparison, concentration, volition, ‘ability to compose’, composure and self control.

So that is just the start of the discussion….

 

[Mr. Scott]

There seems to be a great deal of variability in levels of arousal when first waking, slow semi aware events and full awareness events. Some days it seems as though I go through a range of awareness, staring with partial awareness of physical sensations, some thoughts and memories, and mainly trained habits, gradually moving into more awareness and integration with events.

I'll submit that if we can't be specific about what we are conscious of, then the whole idea of consciousness is meaningless.

I'm not sure what conclusion to draw from that but I can't think of a refutation right now.

I'll also submit that the whole idea of consciousness is a cultural artifact concocted before there was any science to examine the idea. Now that we have science that has not uncovered any trace of the magic bean presumed by our pre-scientific culture, we need to redefine it.

So, I'll propose that consciousness be defined as receiving and processing external or internal stimulus.

 

[AlBell]

I'll submit that if we can't be specific about what we are conscious of, then the whole idea of consciousness is meaningless.

I'm not sure what conclusion to draw from that but I can't think of a refutation right now.

I'll also submit that the whole idea of consciousness is a cultural artifact concocted before there was any science to examine the idea. Now that we have science that has not uncovered any trace of the magic bean presumed by our pre-scientific culture, we need to redefine it.

So, I'll propose that consciousness be defined as receiving and processing external or internal stimulus.

The device you typed that on certainly receives external stimulus and via coding internal stimulus yet it by no understanding today should be deemed conscious.

We remain imo at subjectivity as the real attribute, and I await nomination of behaviors one observes in oneself that leads one to claim consciouness.

 

[Belz...]

I'll submit that if we can't be specific about what we are conscious of, then the whole idea of consciousness is meaningless.

Maybe it is, indeed.

 

[Mr. Scott]

The device you typed that on certainly receives external stimulus and via coding internal stimulus yet it by no understanding today should be deemed conscious.

We remain imo at subjectivity as the real attribute, and I await nomination of behaviors one observes in oneself that leads one to claim consciouness.

OK, the device I'm typing on is conscious of my keyboard and mouse input. My browser is conscious of how the words compare with its spelling dictionary. In fact, it's conscious of the word you misspelled which you were not conscious of. What's never been programmed into my browser is our cultural notion of the subjective experience.

I submit that this whole idea of the subjective experience is a cultural artifact, and, if we were to produce a computer that we could explain this to, it would report experiencing it just like us.

How would you propose explaining the subjective experience to a machine such that it would conclude it didn't have any? By definition? As in, "since you are a machine, you cannot experience this?"

 

[AlBell]

The device you typed that on certainly receives external stimulus and via coding internal stimulus yet it by no understanding today should be deemed conscious.

We remain imo at subjectivity as the real attribute, and I await nomination of behaviors one observes in oneself that leads one to claim consciouness.

OK, the device I'm typing on is conscious of my keyboard and mouse input. My browser is conscious of how the words compare with its spelling dictionary. In fact, it's conscious of the word you misspelled which you were not conscious of. What's never been programmed into my browser is our cultural notion of the subjective experience.

I submit that this whole idea of the subjective experience is a cultural artifact, and, if we were to produce a computer that we could explain this to, it would report experiencing it just like us.

How would you propose explaining the subjective experience to a machine such that it would conclude it didn't have any? By definition? As in, "since you are a machine, you cannot experience this?"

I'm unable to address those comments. Nor do I know how you arrived at them from my post you quoted in response to your "So, I'll propose that consciousness be defined as receiving and processing external or internal stimulus.".

Discuss subjectivity with a machine? Please do so.

 

[dlorde]

I'll submit that if we can't be specific about what we are conscious of, then the whole idea of consciousness is meaningless.

I'm not sure exactly what you mean by that. I can remember times when, for a short time, I was specifically conscious only of being conscious - a 'cogito ergo sum' experience - everything beyond that was vague and ill-defined, non-specific, confusing even.

Was I conscious or not by your proposal for the meaningfulness of consciousness?

And if specifically being aware (conscious) of being conscious alone is sufficient for meaningful consciousness, I submit that your submission is itself meaningless. Descartes got there first.

 

[Mr. Scott]

I'm not sure exactly what you mean by that. I can remember times when, for a short time, I was specifically conscious only of being conscious - a 'cogito ergo sum' experience - everything beyond that was vague and ill-defined, non-specific, confusing even.

Was I conscious or not by your proposal for the meaningfulness of consciousness?

And if specifically being aware (conscious) of being conscious alone is sufficient for meaningful consciousness, I submit that your submission is itself meaningless. Descartes got there first.

In my earlier post, I mentioned internal stimulus. The technical term for this is feedback, in which some upstream part of the mechanism feeds back to a downstream part:

I'll submit that if we can't be specific about what we are conscious of, then the whole idea of consciousness is meaningless.

I'm not sure what conclusion to draw from that but I can't think of a refutation right now.

I'll also submit that the whole idea of consciousness is a cultural artifact concocted before there was any science to examine the idea. Now that we have science that has not uncovered any trace of the magic bean presumed by our pre-scientific culture, we need to redefine it.

So, I'll propose that consciousness be defined as receiving and processing external or internal stimulus.