Some backup for the obvious:
Chuck Hagel, 2007: "People say we're not fighting for oil. Of course we are. They talk about America's national interest. What the hell do you think they're talking about? We're not there for figs."
General Abizaid, 2008: "Of course it's about oil, it's very much about oil, and we can't really deny that. From the standpoint of a solider who's now fought in the middle east for six years – my son-in-law's fought there for four years, my daughter's been over there, my son has served the nation – my family has been fighting for a long time."
David Frum, today: "I was less impressed by Chalabi than were some others in the Bush administration. However, since one of those 'others' was Vice President Cheney, it didn't matter what I thought. In 2002, Chalabi joined the annual summer retreat of the American Enterprise Institute near Vail, Colorado. He and Cheney spent long hours together, contemplating the possibilities of a Western-oriented Iraq: an additional source of oil, an alternative to US dependency on an unstable-looking Saudi Arabia."
This was a really valuable document for pre-Iraq war thinking on energy strategy, geopolitics and how Iraq fit in, commissioned by Cheney and looks like James Baker was involved in this one. Whole thing is worth a read but this was a good quote:
For the most part, U.S. oil policy has relied on maintenance of free access to Middle East Gulf oil and free access for Gulf exports to world markets, relying heavily on military preparedness. The U.S. has forged a special relationship with certain key Middle East exporters that had an expressed interest in stable oil prices and, we assumed, would adjust their oil output to keep prices at levels that would neither discourage global economic growth nor fuel inflation. Taking this dependence a step further, the U.S. government has operated under the assumption that the national oil companies of these countries would make the investments needed to maintain enough surplus capacity to form a cushion against disruptions.
But recently, things have changed. These Gulf allies are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests increasingly at odds with America’s strategic considerations. They have become less inclined to lower oil prices in exchange for security of markets, and evidence suggests that adequate investment is not being made in a timely enough manner to increase production capacity in line with growing global needs. The opening of new media outlets in the Middle East has also increased the likelihood that a linkage will emerge in the minds of citizens there between the U.S. alliance with Israel and cooperation on oil prices. Moreover, a trend toward anti-Americanism could affect regional leaders’ abilities to cooperate with the U.S. in the energy area. The resulting tight markets have increased U.S. and global vulnerability to disruption and provided adversaries undue potential influence over the price of oil. Iraq has become a key “swing” producer, posing a difficult situation for the U.S. government...
Cheney and company saw their current dominance in the region showing some signs of fragility... Iraq was a key player in contributing to uncertainty in the region in terms of the continued American influence there... and I guess what's ironic was that an identified trend of "anti-Americanism" reducing cooperation with the Americans was to be solved by invading and occupying a ME nation... I guess they just cherry picked the stuff they liked..
