A Philosophy Professor Discusses Ayn Rand in his Ethics Class

[Buckaroo]

When I said that I was not using emotions to determine whether a moral system is right or wrong you said that I was abdicating my innate moral sense. So either you're saying that emotions determine morals, or you were committing the equivocation fallacy.

Nope. Your emotions with respect to moral judgement are a result of your innate moral sense, not the other way around. Moral behavior is guided by them, but they are not necessarily the sense itself. They're usually a pretty good metric, and are ignored at one's peril.

 

[Akri]

Nope. Your emotions with respect to moral judgement are a result of your innate moral sense, not the other way around. Moral behavior is guided by them, but they are not necessarily the sense itself.

Does this mean that I should consider my emotions to be an indicator of what my innate moral sense says? If the answer is "yes" then please provide evidence that emotions can be reliably used for this despite the number of things that regularly impact them (such as diet, exercise, and sleeping habits).

 

[Dinwar]

Dude, seriously? Page after page of "No time for evidence, Rand addressed this, go read a book" and you can still ask me this question with a straight face?

Citations count as evidence.

And I've seen the "evidence" for an evolved morality. None of it proves that empathy, as you describe it, is required for morality. Most rely heavily upon meme theory, which ignores the fact that humans can create new thoughts. The concept also doesn't address the rational foundations of morality, instead substituting an ineffable sensation for rational thought! Or, worse, they substitute what animals do for rational thought. Worse, because this notion (that morality can be derived from examining nature) was disproven by Darwin.

If you want to prove to me that human morality is completely evolved, point to the fossil humans showing the evolution of empathy. Because otherwise you've just got Just So Stories.

You're simply confusing the culturally-determined expression of morality with the moral sense itself.

Not really. I'm asking you to prove that the two are separate. YOU are making the claim. I'm not--I'm saying morality is able to be rationally derived from axiomatic statements (with the understanding that axioms are those statements which an opponent must accept in order to refute them). So I'm essentially arguing that morality is always something humans figure out. There is a standard against which they can be measured, but all human moral codes are products of human minds.

Yes, that's exactly what I said.

Fair enough--you merely said that if I don't feel empathy I'm a sociopath. The thing is, I DO feel empathy--just as I feel happyness, sadness, fear, and other emotions. My interpretation is wildly different from yours, however. I don't view empathy as an irresistable force that defines morality, the way you appear to view it (if you don't view it that way, you may want to reconsider how you present your ideas). Rather, I view it the same way I view all emotions: as an estimate of how well reality correlates with my ideals. I'm happy when my siblings are happy because I value their happiness. I'm sad when they're sad because their sorrow is a disvalue to me. The emotions some feel are completely irrelevant to me and do not impact me in the slightest, even as a twinge of empathy--and if you think that's a problem, please explain to me how I'm supposed to feel about a child molester being happy.

I'm not talking about ethics, I'm talking about morality. They are very different things.

Funny: philosophers don't agree with you. There is no tradition in philosophy of differentiating between ethics and morality. They are, according to philosophy, synonymous. If you know of a field that differentiates between them, please let us know the field and the difference.

Merton: The practical application of collective ownership of the means of production is STATE ownership of the means of production. That's how every communistic country works in the real world, and is a necessary consequence of the communistic theory. State ownership of the means of production is a violation of (actually a negation of) property rights, a foundational right as far as Objectivism is concerned. You cannot remove one of the foundations of the ethical theory and remain consistent with it.

However according to Objectivist morals you can shout obscenities at someone and refuse to do business with them for bigoted reasons, and still be acting completely morally. You'd be a jerk, but not immoral.

To be clear: Objectivists differentiate between political and social transgressions. The law, under O'ism, can ONLY protect rights. Since shouting obscenities isn't a violation of anyone's rights, the person cannot be prosecuted or subjected to arbitration (which is legally binding). You CAN, however, take actions to destroy the person socially: ostrecizing them, refusing to do business with them, and advertising their actions (truthfully; if you lie you're committing a type of fraud and can be prosecuted).

 

[Akri]

State ownership of the means of production is a violation of (actually a negation of) property rights, a foundational right as far as Objectivism is concerned. You cannot remove one of the foundations of the ethical theory and remain consistent with it.

Are governments actually able to own property at all under Objectivism? And if not, how are things like government buildings (courthouses, jails, etc) handled?

 

[Buckaroo]

Does this mean that I should consider my emotions to be an indicator of what my innate moral sense says? If the answer is "yes" then please provide evidence that emotions can be reliably used for this despite the number of things that regularly impact them (such as diet, exercise, and sleeping habits).

This is a puzzling request. It implies that you believe there could be some combination of lifestyle influences that that would negate the feeling of revulsion and guilt resulting from e.g. rape, or the murder of an innocent human being. I would be very interested to hear what factors you believe could do this.

ETA: On second thought, don't bother. I'm outta here.

 

[Buckaroo]

Blah blah blah

Whatever, man. have fun with it.

 

[Akri]

ETA: On second thought, don't bother. I'm outta here.

I shall try to contain my disappointment.

 

[Mister Agenda]

Not really. Rand was around long before Obamacare. Diana Hsieh was blogging 11 years ago. Leonard Peikoff has been around longer. Alex Epstien hasn't addressed Obamacare at all, far as I know. Ari Armstrong focuses on political activism and the like. Nethanial Brandon focused on psychology. To say that Objectivists are merley complaining about Obamacare is to flagrantly and malliciously mischaracterize the philosophy and its advocates.

Those are anecdotes, my friend. If you want to refute me, cite a study. Remember, the problem with anecdotes isn't that they're false, it's that they don't add up to a valid generalization. You have some examples, Myriad has some examples, that doesn't tell us how most people who develop an interest in O'ism come to that interest.

The "question" is nothing but mudslinging, and is an example of the type of thing that's only tollerated when discussing Objectivism. Anywhere else the slinger would be called out on it. Here, however, we're expected to meekly accept that we're guilty until we demonstrate otherwise. Sorry, but I refuse to do that. YOU make an accusation, YOU support it.

Nevertheless, I found it interesting enough to respond to. It's fine with me if your mileage varies and you enjoy being the post police for this thread.

It's philosophy. It has jargon. And honestly, Rand was pretty good about defining her terms and sticking to them.

In my opinion, there wasn't a good reason to say 'selfish' instead of 'self-interest'. I'm entitled to dislike her terminology, and you're entitled to make a big deal about me not liking it if you wish.

Emotions aren't tools of cognition.

They can be if you're willing to examine why you feel them in a particular instance. If I take an instant dislike to someone, if I think about it, I might realize it's because of some trait they share with someone who wronged me. I can then evaluate if it's rational to feel that way. Without the feeling, I would not be consciously aware of the trait. Something that alerts me to a cognitive issue seems like a tool of cognition to me.

Empathy is a type of emotional response.

Empathy is the ability to recognize the emotions of others. It's emphatically a tool of cognition. Although it's commonly associated with pity and compassion, being able to put yourself in a killer's shoes to understand their motivation is also an exercise in empathy.

It's not that O'ism rejects the concept of empathy, it's just that it's nto viewed as a way to learn anything about external reality. At best, it's a way to learn about our values.

And in my opinion, O'ism is mistaken about that. Empathy is a way to understand the emotional responses of others, and the emotional responses of others are valid things to enter into my moral calculations.

O'ism is not a Stoic philosohpy (which was the hardest thing for ME to wrap my head around).

Agreed.

At best, it's a way to learn about our values.That's not the issue. If you want to help people, nothing in O'ism prevents you. What you're NOT allowed to do is force me to help them.

I'm aware that O'ism is fine with me helping people. But if I have to violate your (say) property rights to save someone's life, I will do it if that's the only way I can see to get it done, and I will believe it was the ethical thing to do. I am not an O'ist, I may not be as quick to resort to this tack as some others, but what the greatest good for the greatest number is, is something I consider. There is such a thing as a lesser evil. If the only way to save a dozen people is to push a fat man off a bridge, that will haunt me for the rest of my life, but I believe it's the right call (referring to a famous ethical dilemma). If cutting your taxes in half means thousands of people will lose their jobs, I'm not going to be in favor of the cut, despite not liking that you're being forced to pay for other people's welfare. I see too many shades of gray to be an O'ist. I'm open to better ways to do things, I'm all for reducing wasteful and ineffective spending, I think it's good for taxes to be low, I think it's good for people to have as much liberty as possible; but I also think those things should be constrained by the general welfare.

 

[Merton]

Merton: The practical application of collective ownership of the means of production is STATE ownership of the means of production. That's how every communistic country works in the real world, and is a necessary consequence of the communistic theory. State ownership of the means of production is a violation of (actually a negation of) property rights, a foundational right as far as Objectivism is concerned. You cannot remove one of the foundations of the ethical theory and remain consistent with it.

I do not consider state ownership to be socialism. Just to elucidate, what you refer to as a "communist country" is actually a Marxist country: a massively authoritarian elite that controls the means of production in order to pave the way for a stateless society (communism). The economic system of the USSR, for example, has been referred to as state capitalism because the state should be viewed as a private entity denying its citizens access to the MoP. When I say socialism, I mean that no private entities control the MoP, whether this refers to a government or individuals.

Could you please respond again, taking this new information into consideration?

ETA: I suppose I should have made it clear that I've been referring to libertarian socialism, not the authoritarian socialism of Marx and his followers. My bad.

 

[marplots]

There are a great many interesting things to discuss, but the recent posts have me thinking I've missed something basic and Dinwar's mention of "innate moral sense" being a myth brought something to mind.

As I understand it, one of the basic principles of Objectivism is acting in one's own rational self-interest as the generator of morality/ethics. But this makes me think about how human interactions occur: whenever there is a transaction, there has to be a disparity in value. That is, I must value the exchange of what I have for what you have more than I value my current condition.

Note that the "value" doesn't have to be monetary (I may feel good about being generous, or think our relationship worth sustaining, or any of a number of conceptual values), and that the values may be additive in the sense that some combination makes the exchange worthwhile even if there is harm to me in the mix -- it's the sum total that matters.

With this in mind, the evaluation here, the rational bit, is predicated on the pre-rational (or a-rational, but not irrational) thing we call "value." This is not empirical either, but arises unbidden from unseen attributes of whatever it means to be human. I may, for example, value the aesthetics of something highly or at least more than I value having the money I give you to paint me a picture. I never analyze my evaluation, I discover it and it appears unbidden when I am presented with something to value. So far, I hope none of this is controversial.

But look at what results. Since the rational bit is predicated on the a-rational, we are left asking if ethics/morality itself can't simply be of the same categorical type. I may very well expect that to be human is to have a certain ill-described set of pre-rational values that will be applied. Since ethics and morality are about human interactions, we'd like to see if humans share some body of precepts they then use as input into their rational machine. Those that do not have this generally shared set are then deemed defective or flawed in the same way that someone missing a leg would be. And this is no different in type than how we would say someone who doesn't value eating or breathing or the ability to see holds alien values and is defective. We rightly expect fellow humans, by their nature, to have some values in common.

If humans generally share a compulsion (a "felt" duty) to help others, even at a cost to themselves, this isn't in the realm of the rational, but something inherent in humans, a value used to then calculate rational decisions.

I propose that this is so. If it is, then any demand to act in a way that promotes the inherent ethos isn't really a compulsion so much as a reminder of what you ought to do anyhow. Those that disagree merely identify themselves as defective, in the same way that a criminal can be said to be defective or immoral because she is unable or unwilling to act legally. Objectivism would hold that such a class (defective) exists as well, being those who do not recognize the truths offered up under that philosophy. Someone who doesn't act in their own self interest is flawed, at least in that case if not fundamentally so.

While the value system is invisible, in the sense that how I feel is, the results can be tested empirically by asking whether someone would help another given the means and opportunity. I think we do and would generally. I'd further stipulate that the systems we have now are based on the same mechanism -- a general sense of right, wrong and the proper/noble way to act. Those who act otherwise could then be said to be morally deficient, or at least "other-valued". They could rightly be seen as defective if our standard is going to be someone who instinctively cares for another.

 

[Mister Agenda]

Well-said, marplots, that gives me some food for thought.

 

[Dinwar]

Are governments actually able to own property at all under Objectivism? And if not, how are things like government buildings (courthouses, jails, etc) handled?

This one I'm not sure about. Personally, I believe that they WOULD be allowed to own property--as you said, courthouses, jails, etc. need to be owned. Military hardware as well. Things like roads are a grey area to me. Government investments is another.

But this makes me think about how human interactions occur: whenever there is a transaction, there has to be a disparity in value.

True. However, value is relative. What's valuable to me may be worthless to you. Necklaces and bracelets are of minimal value to me--I make the bloody things, and if I want one I can whip one out relatively quickly. They are valuable to others, however. Thus, I can trade my bracelets to others for stuff I value, and we both consider ourselves as coming out ahead.

There's nothing pre-rational or a-rational or anti-rational or whatever-rational about value. It's easily estimated--provided one does not assume that value has to be universal (this is, among other things, the flaw in Communism as proposed by Marx).

Those are anecdotes, my friend.

Actual Objectivists practicing Objectivism don't count as data? I'm sorry, but that's patently ridiculous.

You want studies, look up Dr. Hsieh's thesis. If an Objectivist writing MORE THAN A DECADE BEFORE THE BILL WAS PASSED doesn't prove that O'ists came at the philosophy for reasons other than a particular bill, your standards of proof are flawed.

You have some examples, Myriad has some examples, that doesn't tell us how most people who develop an interest in O'ism come to that interest.

Myriad has given NO examples. The ONLY data are on my side. And my examples completely refute the notion that Objectivism is a reaction to Obamacare, so even a single one would be sufficient. Besides, even if everyone but me was guilty of the rationalistic self-justifications Myriad accused me of, that doesn't make ME guilty of it. Prove that I came to O'ism over that issue and there's something worth talking about. Until then, it's nothing but petty mudslinging intended to smear Objectivists.

 

[Akri]

With this in mind, the evaluation here, the rational bit, is predicated on the pre-rational (or a-rational, but not irrational) thing we call "value."

Values are pre-rational only in the sense that you can experience a value (meaning you might see something and think "I want that!") before you've consciously analyzed why you want it. However that does not mean the value doesn't have a rationale behind it which could be understood upon introspection.

To use a personal example related to Objectivism: I know someone who has a first edition copy of Atlas Shrugged, signed by author Terry Goodkind (I forget if it's also signed by Rand or not). When he told me this my initial thought was basically "lucky him!" In other words, I would value that book. And if I think about it I can tell you exactly why I would value that book (I've been influenced quite a bit by the writings of both Rand and Goodkind, so having an item that relates to both of them would be special. Additionally I find humor in imagining Goodkind's reaction to being handed a first addition Rand book). To be fair, the reasoning behind that value was immediately evident to me, but if it wasn't the reasoning would still be present.

 

[Dinwar]

I do not consider state ownership to be socialism. Just to elucidate, what you refer to as a "communist country" is actually a Marxist country: a massively authoritarian elite that controls the means of production in order to pave the way for a stateless society (communism). The economic system of the USSR, for example, has been referred to as state capitalism because the state should be viewed as a private entity denying its citizens access to the MoP. When I say socialism, I mean that no private entities control the MoP, whether this refers to a government or individuals.

Could you please respond again, taking this new information into consideration?

ETA: I suppose I should have made it clear that I've been referring to libertarian socialism, not the authoritarian socialism of Marx and his followers. My bad.

I'm not sure I can imagine how this would work (Gaetan represents the most consistent view of libertarian socialism I've ever seen). I'd rather not straw-man your position; could you please give a brief explanation as to how you can have libertarian socialism?

My initial thought: If non-private entities control the means of production (which, by the way, necessarily must consist of land, resources, machines, etc.--all things that could, without that designation, still be owned) the system would quickly degrade until a small handful of people made the decisions. At that point, to say they don't own it is mere sophistry. Again, I don't believe the USSR was a violation of Socialist principles, but rather a necessary consequence. Nature abhores a vaccuum, and a power vaccuum is no different than a physical one in that regard. The only way to make sure absolutely no one controls the means of production is to make sure there's nothing to control; otherwise, SOMEONE has to make the decisions.

That said, that's only an initial reaction, based on my understanding of what you're saying. I'm not sure my understanding is in agreement with yours.

 

[Myriad]

I didn't mean Obamacare was the one single specific issue that people have been invoking Objectivism to oppose. That's just a recent and representative example. Working roughly backwards, in the US, there's also certain Patriot Act provisions, the Disabilities Act, racial integration, environmental laws, urban planning, Social Security (and the entirety of the New Deal), foreign aid, lend-lease, income taxes, public schools...

Sorry, I thought that was obvious.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[marplots]

(much clipped to address a particular point)
There's nothing pre-rational or a-rational or anti-rational or whatever-rational about value. It's easily estimated--provided one does not assume that value has to be universal (this is, among other things, the flaw in Communism as proposed by Marx).

We can test this easily enough. Here is the method I propose. Start with something valuable and ask for the rational basis for the evaluation. Money is a good one.

Do you value money? Why? ... and iterate.
This then leads, stepwise, into a deepening well of values for one thing based on values for another thing (a rational comparison exercise) until, I propose, you reach some point where the answer will be, "Because I do." This last step is an observation, not a rational conclusion.

But, I invite you to try it and see where it goes. It may very well not end and become circular as well, but then I'd identify it as tautological and not rational.

As to Marx, I am sadly not well versed in the philosophy. However, it may be that values are only generally shared and open to interpretation, a second order, valuing of values if you will. He may also have misidentified one or taken a general to be more specific than was warranted.

 

[Akri]

I didn't mean Obamacare was the one single specific issue that people have been invoking Objectivism to oppose. That's just a recent and representative example. Working roughly backwards, in the US, there's also certain Patriot Act provisions, the Disabilities Act, racial integration, environmental laws, urban planning, Social Security (and the entirety of the New Deal), foreign aid, lend-lease, income taxes, public schools...

Sorry, I thought that was obvious.

Respectfully,
Myriad

The burden of proof is still on you to demonstrate that Objectivists all accept the philosophy because it gives them a rationalization for opposing those things, as opposed to genuinely believing in what the philosophy has to say.

 

[marplots]

Values are pre-rational only in the sense that you can experience a value (meaning you might see something and think "I want that!") before you've consciously analyzed why you want it. However that does not mean the value doesn't have a rationale behind it which could be understood upon introspection.

Are you saying there is a pre-conscious rational evaluation happening? I find this difficult to fathom. But if not, how is the feeling generated? Each of the rational reasons you dredge up to explain why you value something is based on some deeper evaluation, isn't it?

My view is that the impulse or reaction comes first, is unbidden and hidden, and the reasoning comes post-hoc. It is not hard for me to construct a rationale for disliking something I actually like, I can do it either way with the same level of logical force. So, for example, I can argue both for and against why I may value a Monet more than a Picasso (or the other way round), but neither explanation should convince you that I actually do value one more than the other.

When I am "of two minds" I do exactly this. I say to myself, I value this candy bar more than this dollar and tell you why it must be so. A minute later, I can justify the reasons why I'm not going to buy that candy bar. In truth though, I simply identified a preference for a soda instead.

 

[Dinwar]

We can test this easily enough. Here is the method I propose. Start with something valuable and ask for the rational basis for the evaluation.

You can try that with ANYTHING. The final answer depends on the thinker. In Objectivism, it ends in the pre-moral choice and the axioms. All of which may be made prior to one understanding the reasoning behind them, but all of which can also be derived from logical premises.

As to Marx, I am sadly not well versed in the philosophy. However, it may be that values are only generally shared and open to interpretation, a second order, valuing of values if you will. He may also have misidentified one or taken a general to be more specific than was warranted.

No. He stated that value comes from the labor put into the production of the thing. It's called the labor theory of value, if I recall correctly.

Most values are generally shared, within a range. But even with something as fundamental as food we can see differences in individual valuation. I value squirrel quite highly as a foodstuff, while others find it an actual disvalue, for example. Marx is, therefore, demonstrably wrong in his theory of value. And that's just one refutation; there are innumerable others.

I didn't mean Obamacare was the one single specific issue that people have been invoking Objectivism to oppose. That's just a recent and representative example.

Doesn't really matter--you're still wrong. Dr. Hsieh's work illustrates the flaw. And again, even if every other O'ist came to the philosophy to oppose something, it doesn't mean that *I* do. Thus, you STILL have to prove that I'm holding the views I do for the reason you propose.

I eagerly await your proofs. My sister has been barking up that tree for 23 years now, and systematically failed in every attempt. I doubt anyone else is going to prove that I have such a moronic reason for believing the philosophy. The fact is much, much simpler: I believe it because I've found it to be true.

 

[marplots]

The burden of proof is still on you to demonstrate that Objectivists all accept the philosophy because it gives them a rationalization for opposing those things, as opposed to genuinely believing in what the philosophy has to say.

Aren't these the same thing? I think philosophy and religion share this property: I will accept, and be attracted to, the system which most closely matches what I already take to be so. That's not to say I won't then adopt other attributes, but here we run into the possibility of rejecting a religion or philosophy when a mismatch happens. So, for example, I may agree that Objectivism is sound, but upon finding out the practical results, reject it again. And so too with religion, where I may believe in some aspects but only later on find out about the virgin birth (or whatever) and cry, "That's too much. I quit."

If this is a good picture, it has the wonderful result of explaining why we keep making up new philosophies and religions -- we don't find one that fits us comfortably enough and tailor our own.