A Philosophy Professor Discusses Ayn Rand in his Ethics Class

[Earthborn]

What is objectivism's solution to this?

The usual solution proposed by objectivists/libertarians/anarcho-capitalists is the price mechanism. If lots of people value unpolluted land, the price of unpolluted land goes up and a rational land owner would try not to diminish the value of his/her land. Throwing one's pollution on someone else's land is an act of force, and that's a big no-no, so the obvious solution for a land owner is to limit pollution.

It makes of course a few big assumptions:

• If something is objectively important, then lots of people will care about it. Conversely, if few people value (=are willing to pay for) something then it can't be all that important.
• How much people value something will be effectively reflected in the price.
• Price is a very strong incentive. Owners almost always try to keep the monetary value of their property as high as possible.

 

[Akri]

Sort of. Here's what I actually wrote: "If a philosophy has "central tenets" that are provably untrue (such as "human beings have direct contact with reality through sense perception, that one can attain objective knowledge from perception through the process of concept formation and inductive logic"), then it fails almost immediately." I expected someone to respond to it a bit sooner.

The line I was thinking of was "If it also assumes very specific answers to difficult philosophical issues ("reality exists independent of consciousness")[...] then there is not a lot of reason to consider it a useful philosophy." (snipped the additional issues you raise, since we're only talking about the first one).

I'm not sure that Rand ever claimed that humans have direct contact with reality through sense perception (I seem to recall her acknowledging that senses can give inaccurate information, such as when someone is nearsighted). Googling turns up a lot of places where the quote is used in a description of Objectivism, but they all seem to have taken it from the Wikipedia article, which has the opening paragraph marked with "[citation needed]".

Other philosophers before her (Kuhn, Popper, etc) have argued quite convincingly that it isn't a necessary assumption. Objective reality does not need to be truly knowable even to make scientific progress. Instead of trying to prove what ideas about reality are true, one can also make progress by showing how some ideas are more difficult to prove untrue than others even if they are falsifiable.

But if reality isn't knowable then how can you even show that "some ideas are more difficult to prove untrue than others even if they are falsifiable"? Could you perhaps offer a concrete example where progress could be made while acting on the assumption that reality is unknowable? I think that might make it easier for me to understand what you mean.

I would argue that the assumption is even a dangerous one. If one assumes that reality is knowable, and it turns out that it isn't, then one is further away from reality then when one assumes it isn't knowable and it turns out that it is. The former assumption made one believe in a lie, the latter makes one humbly admit that one didn't know everything.

The lie of the former assumption can get you killed. Imagine you're standing in front of a speeding train. Either reality is knowable and thus you can be sure the train is real, or reality is unknowable and you can't be sure the train is real. So we have four possible outcomes:

1. You assume reality is unknowable and are correct--the "train" passes through you and you are unharmed.
2. You assume reality is unknowable and are incorrect--you stay on the tracks and are killed by the train.
3. You assume reality is knowable and are correct--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.
4. You assume reality is knowable and are incorrect--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.

There may be benefits to assuming that reality is unknowable and being correct, but there is a massive downside to assuming reality is unknowable and being wrong. Thus it seems more useful to make the former assumption, even if you acknowledge that it is just an assumption.

If reality isn't knowable, it can still matter a lot what we do. Maybe not to the universe as a whole, maybe not to God, but it may still matter to ourselves.

I was referring to situations like the train scenario above. I agree that even in an unknowable reality certain choices we make will still matter to us, but other choices will not have any context which we could use to determine the best course of action.

 

[marplots]

The lie of the former assumption can get you killed. Imagine you're standing in front of a speeding train. Either reality is knowable and thus you can be sure the train is real, or reality is unknowable and you can't be sure the train is real. So we have four possible outcomes:

1. You assume reality is unknowable and are correct--the "train" passes through you and you are unharmed.
2. You assume reality is unknowable and are incorrect--you stay on the tracks and are killed by the train.
3. You assume reality is knowable and are correct--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.
4. You assume reality is unknowable knowable and are incorrect--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.

There may be benefits to assuming that reality is unknowable and being correct, but there is a massive downside to assuming reality is unknowable and being wrong. Thus it seems more useful to make the former assumption, even if you acknowledge that it is just an assumption.

I changed that to what I think you meant. I like the framing, but it misses a few things. The first is that you have weighted them equally, but the more important objection is that behaviors have a cost and making mistakes is not without consequence.

Here's my example: Let us say I think reality is knowable and am incorrect. I may continually act on my fears (which, given the impressive number of fears I can imagine, far outnumber any real fears) and take action, even action harmful to me, because of my fears. I might sacrifice many good things in service to the idea of a train that doesn't exist.

But there's another twist. Some reality may be knowable (I think "testable" is better) while other portions may not be. Even if the limiting factor is my own access to information, the problem comes out the same way. By advocating for "knowing reality is real and being correct" we have left out my belief in ghosts and other things that I should react to, not because I have that knowledge, but because to not react to ghosts (or the coming fictional comet) would subject me to possible harm.

What's needed isn't so much a final answer, but a way to evaluate risk and costs, and finally, a convincing test I can apply.

 

[Akri]

I changed that to what I think you meant.

In the words of Sheldon Cooper, "oh gosh golly I've made a boo-boo!" Thanks for pointing it out--I swear I proofread that part like 3 times.

I like the framing, but it misses a few things. The first is that you have weighted them equally, but the more important objection is that behaviors have a cost and making mistakes is not without consequence.

I don't see how you can say I missed the idea that mistakes have consequences, since that was a major part of that argument. I will grant you the other issues, though.

Here's my example: Let us say I think reality is knowable and am incorrect. I may continually act on my fears (which, given the impressive number of fears I can imagine, far outnumber any real fears) and take action, even action harmful to me, because of my fears. I might sacrifice many good things in service to the idea of a train that doesn't exist.

This is very true. It's equally true that if reality is unknowable acting on those fears may be even more important for your safety than you're able to realize . If you're afraid of bees, then maybe the reality is that those bees, should they sting you, will infect you with a venom that will cause you eternal torment. If reality is unknowable then ANY action we take could lead to the worst possible outcome. Staying on the tracks may not get you hit by the train, but maybe the ground will open up and swallow you. Getting off the tracks may avoid the train (or not--maybe trains don't actually need tracks) but you may get devoured by zombies instead. You might get over your fear of milk (I'm imagining you as Monk for this scenario) only for demons living in milk to take over your body.

So yes, it's entirely possible that assuming reality is knowable when it isn't could lead you to a fate that is as bad or worse than the inverse situation. Unfortunately there is absolutely nothing you can do to mitigate that risk, even if you assume reality is unknowable and are incorrect. You're still left with no way of determining where the actual risks lie, and what the actual consequences of your actions could be. Assuming reality is knowable at least gives you a framework for assessing risks and judging the costs of your actions, even if those assessments and judgements turn out to be wrong.

I hope I explained that well.

What's needed isn't so much a final answer, but a way to evaluate risk and costs, and finally, a convincing test I can apply.

It seems to me that in order to do those things you must be able to know things about reality, which automatically means reality is not unknowable.

 

[marplots]

(bunch of good stuff snipped)
I hope I explained that well.

You did, thank you.

It seems to me that in order to do those things you must be able to know things about reality, which automatically means reality is not unknowable.

I'm working on another idea. Suppose reality isn't knowable, but its effects on me are. I wonder if I can make that work somehow. My gut feeling is that pragmatically, it doesn't matter either way -- that assuming reality is knowable or not wouldn't have to result in any difference in behavior.

For example, if I believe gravity is real, whether or not it is in some particular case, I'm unlikely to test it by jumping off a building. What can I really say, other than I am assuming, if I don't actually test the things I believe are so?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I'm working on another idea. Suppose reality isn't knowable, but its effects on me are. I wonder if I can make that work somehow. My gut feeling is that pragmatically, it doesn't matter either way -- that assuming reality is knowable or not wouldn't have to result in any difference in behavior.

For example, if I believe gravity is real, whether or not it is in some particular case, I'm unlikely to test it by jumping off a building. What can I really say, other than I am assuming, if I don't actually test the things I believe are so?

The short version is that post-Descartes everyone but theists pretty much accepts that you can't have certain knowledge about anything except possibly your own existence, just various degrees of probabilistic belief based on the observed consistency of your subjective experiences.

Or in less fancy terms you can't be absolutely certain of anything, but the universe certainly seems to behave predictably so you can be justified in being very nearly absolutely certain that gravity exists and you exist and so on.

 

[Brainache]

From what I've read here, would I be right to say that one major problem with Objectivism is that it requires not just that reality is knowable, but that humans can know everything?

This concept of "Enlightened Self Interest" seems to rely on people knowing every consequence before they decide on a course of action.

Have I read that right?

 

[Akri]

From what I've read here, would I be right to say that one major problem with Objectivism is that it requires not just that reality is knowable, but that humans can know everything?

I don't think so. For instance, Rand says that errors of knowledge are not errors of morality--a distinction that would not need to be made if her philosophy assumed perfect knowledge.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

From what I've read here, would I be right to say that one major problem with Objectivism is that it requires not just that reality is knowable, but that humans can know everything?

This concept of "Enlightened Self Interest" seems to rely on people knowing every consequence before they decide on a course of action.

Have I read that right?

Well, Ayn Rand was never exactly a sophisticated thinker. Her economic and moral beliefs works equally well or equally badly whether you think reality is knowable or not. So it's a superfluous premise, really, or at best one that can easily be made superfluous without sacrificing anything of value.

However it does make it rather obvious that she either hadn't read or hadn't understood Descartes and so in philosophical terms she was about four hundred years behind the times.

 

[Earthborn]

So it's a superfluous premise, really, or at best one that can easily be made superfluous without sacrificing anything of value.

It can be made superfluous without sacrificing anything of value. The only thing that needs to be sacrificed is Objectivism's claim of objectivity. Without it, you just end up with something like Austrian Economics, which I also think is pretty nutty. At least that assumes that all value is subjective.

 

[Akri]

You did, thank you.

Glad I could help

I'm working on another idea. Suppose reality isn't knowable, but its effects on me are. I wonder if I can make that work somehow. My gut feeling is that pragmatically, it doesn't matter either way -- that assuming reality is knowable or not wouldn't have to result in any difference in behavior.

In that circumstance I'd say you're right, it doesn't make much practical difference if reality is actually knowable or not, and would not result in a change of behavior. However I think an Objectivist would argue that if the effects of reality are knowable then reality is knowable to a certain extent. To use the train example again, you might be wrong in thinking that its a train which is going to hit and kill you, but you are able to know that something will kill you if you stay on the tracks. So by knowing the effects you have some knowledge, however limited, of reality.

 

[Earthborn]

The line I was thinking of was "If it also assumes very specific answers to difficult philosophical issues ("reality exists independent of consciousness")[...] then there is not a lot of reason to consider it a useful philosophy."

Consciousness and its relation to reality is still very much a philosophical conundrum, just look at all the P-Zombie/teletransporter threads on this forum. To just assume one specific answer and use it as a "central tenet" is not going to produce very good philosophy.

(I seem to recall her acknowledging that senses can give inaccurate information, such as when someone is nearsighted).

The problem is deeper than just seeing reality a bit blurrier. By necessity the sensory mechanisms both throw away huge amounts of data, and fill in parts that are missing. You see things that aren't really there, and fail to see things that are. Despite what Rand claims, much of this is completely automatic. What she calls "volitional consciousness" doesn't even enter into it, if it is a meaningful concept at all.

But if reality isn't knowable then how can you even show that "some ideas are more difficult to prove untrue than others even if they are falsifiable"?

You could read Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, or a favourite of mine Bruno Latour. Or you could read a bit about them, their ideas are clear enough that you don't need to claim that their philosophy can only be understood if you read their own work. Even their critics seem to be able to represent them reasonably well. Only cultists claim that one can only fairly criticise their favourite philosopher's ideas if you slogged through their unreadable works.

Could you perhaps offer a concrete example where progress could be made while acting on the assumption that reality is unknowable?

Take Heisenberg's uncertainty principle; it states pretty clearly that some things about reality are ultimately unknowable. Once you accept that, it is actually pretty useful. There are also Gödel's incompleteness theorems didn't stop progress in mathematics, or the halting problem of Turing machines that actually started progress in computing. Or how about the fact that the observable universe is just a tiny part of the entire universe; according to some theories the observable universe may be similar in size compared to the universe, as an atom is compared to the observable universe. What's outside the observable universe is unknown.

Those show that some things about reality are completely unknowable, and they are just little problems compared to the big questions.

1. You assume reality is unknowable and are correct--the "train" passes through you and you are unharmed.
2. You assume reality is unknowable and are incorrect--you stay on the tracks and are killed by the train.

You forgot to mention:
1.5. You assume reality is unknowable and are correct--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.
2.5. You assume reality is unknowable and are incorrect--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.

Just because it is unknowable whether the train is "real" doesn't mean I won't move away from it. Whether or not the train is real, it may be just as real as I am. An imaginary train may very well run over imaginary me, ending my illusion of life.

According to quantum mechanics, there actually is a non-zero chance that the train passes right through you, though it is safer to bet against it.

There may be benefits to assuming that reality is unknowable and being correct, but there is a massive downside to assuming reality is unknowable and being wrong.

This argument is rather similar to Pascal's Wager.

I agree that even in an unknowable reality certain choices we make will still matter to us, but other choices will not have any context which we could use to determine the best course of action.

Then perhaps we should admit that for those choices there is no answer. That seems to me a more practical way of dealing with those choices than to assume there is a answer and declaring your preferred answer to be "objective reality".

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Take Heisenberg's uncertainty principle; it states pretty clearly that some things about reality are ultimately unknowable. Once you accept that, it is actually pretty useful. There are also Gödel's incompleteness theorems didn't stop progress in mathematics, or the halting problem of Turing machines that actually started progress in computing.

...

Those show that some things about reality are completely unknowable, and they are just little problems compared to the big questions.

Hm, I don't know if those are good ideas of unknowable things - unknowable seems to imply that there is something that can be known, but cannot be reached, rather than some piece of knowledge that simply doesn't exist in the first place because it is counterfactual. It is, for example, impossible to attain knowledge that Obama is Hitler in disguise, because that's simply not true.

The HUP works in a similar way. According to Bell's theorem, there is no hidden precise momentum and position that can be known. As things are governed by the wave function, and the wave function by its nature does not have precise values but probability densities - the only precise values you have are the results of your measurements. When you force a particle into a precise position, its momentum really does go all over the place.

Gödel's incompleteness theorem is of a similar character - it uses clever formalism to make up a completely absurd mathematical statement which very obviously does not have a real solution, because any solution would be logically inconsistent. Thus the solution is not unknowable, it simply cannot exist.

Turing's halting theorem works in a similar way to Gödel's incompleteness theorem (in fact it is VERY similar, though easier to digest). Turing essentially proves that the halting function would have to, IIRC when applied to itself by a proxy, return 1 when it returns 0, and vice versa.

So I would say that these are rather examples of things we would expect to exist, but which actually do not.

 

[Akri]

Consciousness and its relation to reality is still very much a philosophical conundrum, just look at all the P-Zombie/teletransporter threads on this forum. To just assume one specific answer and use it as a "central tenet" is not going to produce very good philosophy.

That would depend on how you define "a good philosophy", would it not? And the issue was whether or not it could produce a useful philosophy. It seems to me that for most people in most situations assuming that reality exists independent of consciousness is more useful than assuming the opposite.

The problem is deeper than just seeing reality a bit blurrier.

Yes, I know. The point was that Objectivism does not state that we have direct contact with reality through our senses.

You could read Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, or a favourite of mine Bruno Latour. Or you could read a bit about them, their ideas are clear enough that you don't need to claim that their philosophy can only be understood if you read their own work. Even their critics seem to be able to represent them reasonably well. Only cultists claim that one can only fairly criticise their favourite philosopher's ideas if you slogged through their unreadable works.

Objectivists don't claim that you can only understand Rand's ideas by reading HER books (in fact, I believe Dinwar has mentioned at least one other source of good information on the topic). What they typically say is that you can only understand Rand's ideas by reading valid (that is, not containing false information) about Objectivism. Which is exactly what you're doing here. Instead of offering an answer to the question you're telling me "go read and then you will understand."

And frankly I don't care enough about this conversation to do homework for it.

Take Heisenberg's uncertainty principle; it states pretty clearly that some things about reality are ultimately unknowable. There are also Gödel's incompleteness theorems didn't stop progress in mathematics, or the halting problem of Turing machines that actually started progress in computing. Or how about the fact that the observable universe is just a tiny part of the entire universe; according to some theories the observable universe may be similar in size compared to the universe, as an atom is compared to the observable universe. What's outside the observable universe is unknown.

Edit: I'm just going to point to TubbaBlubba's response for this.

You forgot to mention:
1.5. You assume reality is unknowable and are correct--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.
2.5. You assume reality is unknowable and are incorrect--you step off the tracks and the train passes by.

Fair enough. I think I originally meant to include those, and then got distracted.

Just because it is unknowable whether the train is "real" doesn't mean I won't move away from it. Whether or not the train is real, it may be just as real as I am. An imaginary train may very well run over imaginary me, ending my illusion of life.

Yes, the train might be as real as you are. Or it may not exist at all. There may be flaming hell pits on either side of the tracks that will kill you if you step off to avoid the train. If reality is unknowable then you have absolutely no basis for determining if you should stay on the tracks or not. You're making a blind guess either way, and either choice could put you in the worse position.

According to quantum mechanics, there actually is a non-zero chance that the train passes right through you, though it is safer to bet against it.

This argument is rather similar to Pascal's Wager.

In some ways, yes.

Then perhaps we should admit that for those choices there is no answer. That seems to me a more practical way of dealing with those choices than to assume there is a answer and declaring your preferred answer to be "objective reality".

Should I eat vegetables? If reality is knowable then the answer is "yes"--I want to live a long life and be free of health problems as much as possible, and all of the evidence I can gather shows that eating vegetables is important for achieving those goals. But if reality is unknowable then I have no idea if vegetables actually improve health and longevity. I don't even know that vegetables actually exist. Perhaps I could get better health and longevity by eating icecream all day?

According to you, the most practical solution here is to say "I don't know". Except that if reality is knowable then A) I must choose to eat something or eventually I will die (so I can't simply step back from the question due to a lack of information), and B) if I choose to only eat icecream I will not achieve my goals, and will instead become very sick and probably die. Meanwhile if reality is unknowable then either choice could be right or wrong, but I have no way of determining that so I may as well flip a coin.

 

[Myriad]

Meanwhile if reality is unknowable then either choice could be right or wrong, but I have no way of determining that so I may as well flip a coin.

That's sometimes called the 50/50 Fallacy and is a subtype of the Balance Fallacy. A choice or outcome not being known for certain does not make it reasonable to assume that it's a 50/50 probability either way.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Akri]

That's sometimes called the 50/50 Fallacy and is a subtype of the Balance Fallacy. A choice or outcome not being known for certain does not make it reasonable to assume that it's a 50/50 probability either way.

Respectfully,
Myriad

Very true. Both outcomes could be good, or both could be bad, or there could be varying degrees in-between. But without any means of determining the possible risks/rewards of either choice then I still may as well just flip a coin and hope that the option I choose is a good one (not necessarily THE good one, as the other option may be good as well, but A good one). The coin flip isn't because there's a 50/50 chance of one option being right, but because if I'm only considering two options then it's a binary decision, and coins are a useful way of making arbitrary binary decisions.

 

[Dinwar]

Only cultists claim that one can only fairly criticise their favourite philosopher's ideas if you slogged through their unreadable works.

This is one of those claims that demonstrates a person's mind shuts down when Rand is concerned.

Rand is new. There simply hasn't been TIME for detailed analysis the way that there is for older philosophers. So there's not as much to pick from. It's frankly easier to point to Rand's own works, because finding a good analysis thereof is actually harder than finding the originals. That said, as Akri said, I've pointed out several secondary sources that are worth looking at. I don't necesarily always agree with them, but the Ayn Rand Institute, Dr. Diana Hsieh, Dr. Leonard Peikoff (both Ph.D.s in philosophy), and a few others are at least honest. Some of Nathanial Brandon's early works are good, but he's dangerous--his later works demonstrably distort the philosophy. If you see a Libertarian analysis of Objectivism you can assume it's extremely biased. It still may be worth reading, but you have to do so with the understanding that at least parts of it will be lies.

Much of what there is to pick from tends to be on the level of criticism that Kevin_Lowe is presenting: ad hom attacks, insults in the guise of arguments, and a general lack of understanding of the philosophy or even willingness to discuss it honestly (the constant derogatory comments make it clear that KL isn't interersted in discussion, merely in preaching). No one considers such works valid when they address other works, but when they are written about Rand they magically become acceptable.

Do you need to read Rand's own works? No, of course not. There are plenty of valid analyses of her philosophy out there, as I've pointed out. You ARE required by the standards of academia to demonstrate that your source IS valid, however, and we are allowed to point out the shortcomings. Anyone who's done any research at all can tell you the difficulties in processinig secondary sources. In this case, it's easier to go with the primary sources--they are widely available, after all. The ARI even has some of her more famous lectures available for free. Going to secondary sources, particularly among those unfamiliar with the history of Objectivism, will greatly increase the risk of error (not all who call themselves O'ists are honest, and even the honest ones can make mistake).

None of this should be news to anyone. These are standard caveats in research, applicable to everything from philosophy to paleontology to astrophysics. I'm sorry, but the fact that the benefits of primary sources needs to be pointed out in a discussion is indicative of a lack of objectivity among the participants. No Objectivist asks for Rand to be placed above all other philosophers. What we are fighting for is a fair hearing--and when people discard the standard procedures of research, it's clear that that is not happening.

Also, the phrase "...slog through their unreadable works" is unnecessarily emotionally manipulative. YOU may find them unreadable, but I should think it's quite clear that others do not. I for one find Atlas Shrugged to be an enjoyable read--not something to read when I want to relax, but certainly something I enjoy coming back to. People can disagree with you and not be wrong.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Rand is new. There simply hasn't been TIME for detailed analysis the way that there is for older philosophers.

The way there hasn't been enough time for detailed analysis of Heidegger, Popper, Wittgenstein or Sartre?

 

[Akri]

Also, the phrase "...slog through their unreadable works" is unnecessarily emotionally manipulative. YOU may find them unreadable, but I should think it's quite clear that others do not. I for one find Atlas Shrugged to be an enjoyable read--not something to read when I want to relax, but certainly something I enjoy coming back to. People can disagree with you and not be wrong.

And it's important to remember that her works include nonfiction, which is all pretty straightforward in my opinion (and more interesting to read than her fiction--again, in my opinion).

 

[Dinwar]

The way there hasn't been enough time for detailed analysis of Heidegger, Popper, Wittgenstein or Sartre?

I was thinking more Aistotle to Kant. Obviously interest is anotherr factor: more people are interested in certain philosophers than others, which generates more books on those philosophers than others. This has nothing, necessarily, to do with the quality of the philosophy; intellectual circles have fads just like any other social group.

You want to get into a discussion of the potential biases, I'd suggest you start with the criticisms of Sepkoski's Curve. Many of them are applicable, with minor revisions (obviously erosion isn't an issue, but I do know of books that lack commentary because most of them were destroyed in floods and fires, for example).