Prosecution Appeal of Calunnia Charge
MISSING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TELEOLOGICAL LINK IN THE CRIME OF CALUMNY.
CONTRADICTION OR MANIFEST ILLOGICITY OF THE RULING; VICE RESULTING FROM RECORDS OF THE TRIAL:
FROM THE STATEMENTS OF PATRICK DIYA LUMUMBA, FROM THOSE OF THE DEFENDANT AMANDA KNOX HERSELF
AND FROM THE CONTENT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LATTER AND HER MOTHER ON NOVEMBER 10 2007 -
Article 606, section e), last part, of the penal procedural code.
The Court of Assizes of Appeals [C.A.A.] has recognized Knox responsible of the crime of calumny at count F), to the detriment of Patrick Diya Lumumba, but it did not recognize the aggravating circumstance quoted in article 61 section 2 of the penal code, with which Knox had been charged, of having committed calumny in order to obtain for herself and the other partners in crime the impunity for murder and particularly for Guede, he too colored as Lumumba.
The C.A.A. has therefore recognized the calumny charged on Knox, but it excluded any relationship with the murder.
In order to provide a logical and rational motivation the C.A.A. first explained why Knox named Lumumba, then, trying to overcome the evident contradiction existing between holding Knox responsible for the calumny against Lumumba and clearing her of the crime she knew Lumumba was not involved in, explained why Knox could not be unaware of Lumumba's innocence and, at the same time, why she was not involved in the murder.
These are points of the ruling, as we will see, deeply and manifestly illogical and contrasting with the case findings that will be subsequently shown.
Why Lumumba's name?
According to the C.A.A., Knox slandered Lumumba only in order to put an end to the "stress" of the "interrogations".
The challenged verdict as a matter of fact does not agree with the Prosecution's thesis that Knox, distressed because Sollecito had denied the alibi that they were together that night, decided to say what had happened, substituting Lumumba to Rudi.
According to the judges of the appeal,
"The obsessive length of the interrogations, carried out during [both] day and night, by more than one person, on a young and foreign girl who at the time did not speak Italian at all well, was unaware of her own rights, did not have the assistance of an attorney (which she should have been entitled to, being at this point suspected of very serious crimes), and was moreover being assisted by an interpreter who — as shown by Ms. Bongiorno — did not limit herself to translating, but induced her to force herself to remember, explaining that she [Amanda] was confused in her memories, perhaps because of the trauma she experienced, makes it wholly understandable that she was in a situation of considerable psychological pressure (to call it stress seems an understatement [appare riduttivo]), enough to raise doubts about the actual spontaneity of her statements; a spontaneity which would have strangely [singolarmente] arisen in the middle of the night, after hours and hours of interrogation: the so-called spontaneous statements were made at 1:45 am (middle of the night) on 11-6-2007 (the day after the interrogation had started) and again at 5:45 am afterward, and the note was written a few hours later." (challenged ruling, page 30).
Well, aside from the serious and totally groundless allegations concerning the non spontaneity of Knox's statements, it cannot be understood from what the Court derives [the existance of] a wholly particular psychological stress in the American girl, such as to induce her to commit a serious calumny just to "get rid" of the questions of the investigators.
In the course of the investigations for such an heinous homicide it is a totally normal occurrence that the investigators during the first days of the inquiry make questions, even at length and persistently, to people who can give informations concerning the facts.
The Italian flatmates of the victims, particularly Romanelli, their friends, the boys living downstairs, as well as the fellow countrywomen of Kercher, who did even come back from the United Kingdom to answer to further questions after having been questioned at length at the QUestura, all of them had to undergo long examinations, but none of them decided to accuse an innocent in order to "get rid" of the investigators' questions.
Concerning this point it must be further observed that it was Knox who presented herself of her own initiative at the Questura to accompany Raffaele Sollecito, who had to be questioned: "Knox was waiting and was making the cartwheel and the split and was quiet until she was showed the cell phone" (record of Knox's cross examination June 13 2009, pages 17-18 and record of Inspector Rita Ficarra's examination on February 2 2009).
All the so called "interrogations" up to the statements of 5.45 a.m. on November 6 2007 were collections of concise informations where Knox was heard as "[person] informed about the facts" and to which no counselor could participate. It is really upsetting how the C.A.A. ignores the procedural role that Knox had till when the Police Officers of the Flying Squad of Perugia suspended the examination of Knox as provided by article 63 of the penal procedural code, having surfaced against her clues of responsibility for the murder; from that moment on Knox was not subjected anymore to examination or "interrogation".
The Court stated that the "interrogations" were run by many people, evidently also the one as a consequence of which Knox reached the peak of "stress" and slandered Lumumba, but such a circumstance, put forward by the defense in the filing of their appeal, is totally groundless.
If the county Court [i.e. C.A.A. of Perugia] had delved into the reading of the records of the trial, they would have had the opportunity to notice that the defendant herself during the conversation with her mother on November 10 2007, pages 43-44, confessed:
A[manda Knox]: I said...what happened is that they all had left the room, at that moment one of the police officers said: "I am the only one who can save you, I'm the only one who can save you. Tell me just a name". And I said: "I don't know!" And then they said, I said: "can you show me the message that I received from Patrick?!" Because I didn't remember I had answered him, and so they showed me the message and then I said: "Patrick..." And then I thought to Patrick, of seeing Patrick, that is I think I completely lost my mind and I imagined uhm...to see him and...
M[ellas Edda, Knox's mother]: See him where?
A: See him near the basketball court.
M: Ok
A: And then at my home, I uhmm, imagined that it went that way in the kitchen, that is uhmmm...because I could hear her screaming, but that is not true. It is not [true].
M: So, yes, they now say that you were...Ok.
A: And so it is not true. I said that only because I thought it could be true, because I imagined it. I did not say it to protect myself; and I feel horrible for this. Because I put Patrick in this horrible situation, he is framed in prison now, and it is my fault. It is my fault that he is here. I feel horrible. I did not want to do this. I just was frightened and confused, but now I'm not.
M: Ok, ok.
A: I am here and I am safe and I'm in the clear. But I do not want to stay here; because I know that I do not deserve to stay here.
M: Ok.
From the words of the defendant one infers that, at a certain point, all those who had participated in the "interrogation", as it is called by the C.A.A., get out, except for a "police officer" who invites Knox to remember; then the officer asks her to show the reply message to Patrick, Knox did not remember that she had answered and it is then that she accuses Lumumba.
The Court, instead, reenacts the crucial moment of calumny referring, according to them, to the statements of interpreter Donnino, according to which Amanda had an outright emotional shock when "the matter of the exchange of messages with Lumumba was raised". And then, if Lumumba was innocent, why this shock? Because, the Court answers "from having reached the limit of emotional tension" (pages 31-32).
Once more the Court builds up an hypothesis which is sheer conjecture devoid of any confirmation.
Donnino states (see the statements at the hearing of March 13 2009, page 137) that Amanda had denied to have replied to Patrick's message but, when the opposite was proven to her by showing her the reply, she had the emotional shock and started to accuse Lumumba.
The Court of Assizes [C.A., i.e. the Court of first level] had focused on the same circumstance and had excluded the hypothesis of a "forcing" by the Police on Knox in order that she accused Lumumba and this because the latter was absolutely not at the attention of the investigators, who did not have, therefore, any other consideration aside, any reason to push Knox to accuse Lumumba (see C.A. ruling page 418).
The absolute motivational illogicity of the Court and the misrepresentation of case findings do not end here.
According to the challenged ruling (page 32) "constructing a brief story around that name would certainly not have been particularly difficult, if for no other reason than that many details and inferences [illazioni] had already appeared in many newspapers the next day, and were circulating all throughout the city, considering the modest dimensions of Perugia."
But the next day [the day after the murder], contrarily to the Court's statement, nothing was known and there was no possibility of making inferences. From what certain facts did the Court draw this conviction? In the ruling is missing any indication which can transform the formulated hypothesis into a sure fact upon which to build a plausible supposition; the hypotheis is untested and the deduction is imaginative, totally invented by the Court, void of any objective verification.
Newspapers got interested in Lumumba only the day after November 6 because he was arrested. He was never talked about before.
Here too we have to record a further fall of the ruling in the false inductive reasoning fouded on the "petition of principle" already remarked in the preamble of the recourse, which ends in the vice of extrinsic inconsistency of the ruling as per article 606 section e) of the penal procedural code.
Why Amanda knew that Lumumba was innocent?
According to the C.A.A. there would be no contrdiction between holding Knox responsible of calumny against Lumumba in connection with the Kercher murder and, so, conscious of his innocence and the fact that such offence was not finalised to obtain, for her and the other crime partners, the impunity for that crime of murder.
The Court of Assizes [Court of first level] was very conscious of the intimate connection existing between the calumny imputed to Knox and her involvement in the Kercher murder and had no doubts in recognizing the existence of the aggravating circumstance. Referring to the Prosecution's thesis [assunto accusatorio], the Court of first level affirms that "...Amanda Knox could know that Lumumba was innocent of the crime of murder only because she had participated to the crime and, hence, she knew the real perpetrators of the crime: had not she participated to the crime or had not she been anyhow present in the house at Via della Pergola, she could not have known that Lumumba was innocent" (ruling of first level, page 34) [it is not on page 34, I could not find that sentence in the Massei ruling]
It is difficult to challenge the extreme coherence and rationality about this matter of the Prosecution's thesis [assunto accusatorio], that the challenged ruling is however compelled to reject (see page 35 of the ruling) in order to be able to defend its decision.
How can a person be sure of the non involvement of another person in a given crime if the former is not involved in the same crime?
(note 27: cfr Cassazione Penal Section VI September 14 2007 n. 34881 (hearing of March 7 2007) Profeta et al. and also Cassazione Penal Section II, January 21 2009, n.2750 (hearing of December 16 200) Aragona [RV 237675])
According to the Court of Assizes of Appeal [Court of second level], instead, Knox's conviction for calumny is based on the fact that she was certain of the complete non involvement of Lumumba in the Kercher murder, even if being herself totally univolved in it too.
The Court of Assizes of Appeal justified its conclusion, affirming that Knox was certainly conscious of Lumumba's innocence but not because the defendant had participated to the crime and knew who the perpetrators were, but because "...the lack of evidence of a connection between Lumumba and Meredith Kercher [should have] allowed Amanda Knox, even if actually innocent herself and far from the house on Via Della Pergola" (pages 34-35).
But this is not corrispondent to the case findings: it is not absolutely true that there was no connection between Lumumba and Meredith.
In his statements of April 3 2009, Patrick Diya Lumumba relates that he made the acquaintance of Meredith right through Amanda (record of the statements of Lumumba on April 3 2009, pages 151-152).
The connection was indeed there and it was Knox herself, who had introduced Lumumba to the victim.
The explanation invoked by the Court, in one of the most critical passages of the ruling, to reconcile the psychological element of the acknowledged calumny against Lumumba with the alleged non involvement of Knox in the murder is thus contradicted by the certain facts acquired during the first level trial.
The vice forthcoming from the missing correspondence between the evidentiary result [risultato probatorio] at the basis of the reasoning of the judge and the trial record [atto processuale] or evidentiary record [atto probatorio] (defined in terms of "trial related contradiction" [contraddittorietà processuale], different and distinct from the "logical" one) is not subjected anymore to the limit of having to be found in the text of the challenged ruling [rilevabilità testuale dalla motivazione del provvedimento impugnato], being it possible to evidence it, in force of the now allowed "hetero-integration", also through other records related to the trial or of evidentiary nature, provided that they are specifically quoted.
The recent reformulation of article 606 section e) of the penal procedural code by article 8 of Law number 46/2006, has widened the perimeter of the vice of motivation with reference to the conceptual category of "contradiction", in which the Court of Assizes of Appeal of Perugia incurred in this subject too.