Continuation Part 4: Discussion of the Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito case

[LondonJohn]

I found the charge - right at the beginning of the translated Hellman report. How cool is that?

So she had to know Lumumba was innocent (Hellman held she did, of course) and if in accusing him her aim was to gain something for herself or another then she can be charged with an aggravated version of the basic offence (as she was). Hellman finds her guilty but without the aggravated element:

Essentially, his rejection of the aggravating circumstance is bound up with his rejection of the argument that, if she were guilty of callunia she must be guilty of murder.

This makes sense. For basic callunia it just needs to be shown the false accusation was made and the defendant knew it to be false. For aggravated callunia the defendant must be shown to have been pursuing some kind of gain or impunity for herself or someone else.

I see what you're saying, and I agree in part. But my interpretation of Italian law on this issue differs from yours as regards the "knowledge of innocence" part. I believe that the SC must already have ruled at some point in the past that it is not necessary for a person charged with criminal slander to know for certain that the person they have accused is innocent. I believe that the current interpretation of this law is that it is sufficient to demonstrate that the accusation was made in a circumstance where no reasonable person would have any reason to make the accusation.

So, for example, suppose that I knew a sometimes-violent man (Mr A), and I knew that he had been drinking in a particular pub on a particular night when a vicious GBH-level assault was carried out on a person whom I knew Mr A despised. If I went to the police and told them that I thought Mr A might have been the assailant, a court would likely conclude that my accusation against Mr A was reasonable under the circumstances - even if it later turned out to be a false accusation.

But in Knox's case, if for one moment one removes from the picture the coercion, suggestion and pressure to confirm the police's version of , then Knox would indeed have had no reasonable reason to accuse Lumumba, yet she would not know for certain that he was innocent. Under such a scenario, she would therefore (under my interpretation) still potentially be guilty of criminal slander.

Another reason why I think the law has been interpreted in the way I suggest is this: if it were indeed necessary for Knox to have known Lumumba to be innocent in order for her to have committed criminal slander, then surely her defence lawyers would be shouting this very argument in their SC deposition. Surely they would have written something along the lines of this: "The court found that Knox had no involvement in the murder, so therefore she could not, by definition, have had any way of knowing whether or not Lumumba was involved in it. Therefore she cannot be guilty of criminal slander."

But Knox's lawyers haven't put this argument at all. Instead, they are focussing on the area of mens rea as it pertains to the coercion etc.

 

[anglolawyer]

Well, no. My action is intended to help my friend. It is therefore made without malice, whatever the truth of his involvement in the murder. If you like, I can change the example so he is, to my knowledge, guilty of the murder. It doesn't make a difference, I would still not be guilty of callunia if malice is an ingredient of the offence.

I disagree, for the reason I gave before (the murder accusation and your false accusation of burglary should be treated entirely separately, and you are therefore intending to harm your friend by accusing him of burglary).

Why should they be treated separately? What do you mean by 'treated'? We are talking about my state of mind. In my mind they are intimately bound up. I want to get my friend off the murder charge. I want him to benefit from my false accusation. I intend him no harm.

in my opinion, you would be wrong. And I do not think your 'wider sense' is a valid concept since malice more or less means intent to harm.

Fair enough: we'll agree to differ. But on the second sentence, I think I'm right in saying that "malice" in a legal context usually refers specifically to physical harm or injury - and not to other harm such as loss of liberty, damage to reputation and so on. So I think that my wider context has validity.

Malicious prosecution is a crime not involving violence, it includes the requirement of malice and it's pretty darn close to what we are discussing too. Malice also shows up in defamation where it defeats claims of qualified privilege. There it also means intent to harm another. If I stand up at a shareholders' meeting and falsely denounce the chairman as a fraudster I will escape liability in slander so long as I am not motivated by malice. So I don't agree to differ on the suggested basis.

Objective intent, subjective intent or presumed intent?

Objective intent, and also presumed intent. Any reasonable person should know that making false criminal accusations against a person is likely to do that person harm.

In that case, malice is inherent in the crime of calunnia, which is the proposition I dispute. It is certainly not a stated part of the definition of the crime, which is not decisive, admittedly, since if you are correct it does not need to be, but it is normal when defining crimes and putting them on the statute book to specify all their elements.

Another example (I only need one) - I falsely report a person, who is sadly now in a permanent vegetative state and incapable of standing trial, for a murder I committed. Where's the harm in that? Same goes for anyone not capable of sustaining harm due to the accusation (perhaps someone who enjoys diplomatic immunity).

Duress does not negative mens rea. It provides a defence to a charge even though all the elements, including mens rea, can be proved. You hold a gun to my head and tell me to shoot Grinder and I do so, because I am in fear of my life. I have the requisite mens rea to murder Grinder but, assuming the jurisdiction I am in allows duress as a defence to murder, I get off.

I'm fully aware that duress does not in itself negate mens rea. I merely mention it because it feeds into to the conditions which did negate mens rea in this instance.

How?

The word 'duress' itself does not appear in Amanda's appeal and I am not sure I see Hellman dealing with it as a distinct concept. Hellman is saying that even if her dominant purpose was to escape the situation she had the requisite mental capacity to make, and did make, a false accusation.

And I agree with Hellmann up to this point. I believe that Knox did know what she was saying, and the likely impact of what she was saying. But the coercion and suggestion elements, coupled with evidence that the police essentially forced her to "remember" the police's own version of events, are the things that negate mens rea in my opinion.

And there you are again, saying coercion (=duress) negates mens rea. Not only is this conceptually wrong but what you are saying is internally contradictory. 'She knew what she was saying and its likely impact' (= mens rea, per LJ, except that now she subjectively intends harm) but the coercion negates mens rea. Maybe all you are saying is that the coercion ought to provide her with a defence even though she had the requisite intent, but this is my proposition and you are disagreeing with it.

I think he may be wrong for another reason and that is that she did not know, nor ought she to have known Lumumba was innocent but I confess to confusion about it. If Hellman is satisfied she did not commit the murder nor play any part in it nor was she present then he must be assessing her statement of mind on those assumptions. Clearly, she has no information of her own on which to base the accusation. So what if the cops told her they knew it was Lumumba? She still has to say, 'well, fine! That's what you say. How the heck do I know? I was at Raf's all evening.'

I don't agree with this. I think it is entirely possible to commit criminal slander in Italy without knowing that the person you have accused is innocent. If I walked into a Milan police station tomorrow and accused the manager of the hotel in which I was staying of being the true murderer of Meredith Kercher, I'd potentially be committing criminal slander.

Well, I don't see how, given that the definition of the offence includes an express requirement of knowing the accused is innocent. But I agree you would be convicted in your example for the same reason Amanda was. Are you saying Hellman got this part of the law wrong? If so, and I hope you prove to be right, on what basis? Can you point to any judicial authority on the point or are you arguing from principle?

You would need to show her consciousness was so altered by the interrogation process, lack of sleep etc that she did not know what she was doing and Hellman expressly found that not to be the case.

He is saying she had legal capacity. Unlike, say, a drunk who might be out of his mind and flinging accusations around without knowing what he was saying.

As I said, I think Knox DID know what she was doing. But that is very different from doing it with a "guilty mind" - i.e. the requisite mens rea.

I don't see the difference in relation to this offence.

 

[Charlie Wilkes]

I must say that Hellmann's thinking on the calumny is so weird that it does undermine the credibility of his ability to think straight. How could anyone find her not guilty and still hold her guilty of calumny? Bizarre.

You need to forget about right vs. wrong, truth vs. falsehood, and think like a bureaucrat. It was a ploy to minimize the civil liability of the justice system, comparable to how the WM3 case was resolved with an Alford plea.

Were you watching live when the verdict was overturned? It was pure theater.

Hellmann and his jury stayed out longer than expected, and kept everyone waiting in suspense.

Then they came back in, and he began by saying the court had partially overturned the verdict.

In a measured, sonorous tone, he read this boilerplate crap about how he was confirming the calumnia charge, and went through what the penalty for that was.

Camera pans to Amanda, who is on the edge of her seat, trembling in abject terror.

And THEN, the moment of glory - "Knox, Amanda is free, and so is Raffaele Sollecito."

It will be very hard for Hollywood to recreate that scene as effectively as Hellmann scripted it in real life. I'm tempted to think he found her guilty of calumnia so he could play it out that way. But, more realistically, I'm pretty sure it was for the reason I mentioned above. It had nothing to do with an actual calculation of guilt or innocence on this secondary charge.

 

[anglolawyer]

I thought this area of your post was worthy of being addressed in more detail separately.

In the scenario you describe in the highlighted section, you in fact do not have the requisite mens rea for the crime of murder. This is central to the whole issue we're discussing. In your scenario, while you shoot Grinder with the knowledge and intent to harm him, you do so because you are under what you perceive to be a "either he dies or I die" choice. And the law would say that under such extraordinary circumstances, a reasonable person might have done exactly what you did do: shoot Grinder.

This is because the definition of mens rea is now much more detailed and nuanced than it once was. Historically, you would have been correct to state that your very act of knowingly firing the gun at Grinder with the knowledge that this would harm him would have constituted mens rea for murder (or at least manslaughter). But in modern jurisprudence, the concept of mens rea is now governed by so-called "modes of culpability", which take into account the circumstances under which the crime occurred and the actual outcome of the criminal act.

So in the modern definition of mens rea, the circumstances you describe surrounding your shooting of Grinder would almost certainly lead a court to conclude that in fact you did NOT possess the requisite mens rea for murder (or even manslaughter). This is also why people who kill in self-defence can be rightly acquitted of any crime related to the death of the victim, provided they can show the court that they were in a position where any reasonable person would have felt that their own life was in danger. This is not mitigation: it is an argument that the requisite mens rea was not present. They are two very different things.

I would be interested to see you back that up with some authority, meaning judicial authority. The mens rea for murder in England and Wales is 'malice aforethought'. That is a term of art meaning 'intent to kill or cause serious arm'. The definition goes back to the Homicide Act 1957 (still in force) and before that was the creation of the common law.

When I shoot Grinder I intend to kill him. Therefore, I act with malice aforethought. But I have a defence which trumps the charge. Same with self defence. I shoot Grinder dead because he is about to stab me in my bed. I intend to kill or seriously harm him but the defence trumps the charge. I am not acquitted because I did not form the necessary intent but because the context in which I did so is one which society does not penalise.

 

[anglolawyer]

I see what you're saying, and I agree in part. But my interpretation of Italian law on this issue differs from yours as regards the "knowledge of innocence" part. I believe that the SC must already have ruled at some point in the past that it is not necessary for a person charged with criminal slander to know for certain that the person they have accused is innocent. I believe that the current interpretation of this law is that it is sufficient to demonstrate that the accusation was made in a circumstance where no reasonable person would have any reason to make the accusation.

So, for example, suppose that I knew a sometimes-violent man (Mr A), and I knew that he had been drinking in a particular pub on a particular night when a vicious GBH-level assault was carried out on a person whom I knew Mr A despised. If I went to the police and told them that I thought Mr A might have been the assailant, a court would likely conclude that my accusation against Mr A was reasonable under the circumstances - even if it later turned out to be a false accusation.

But in Knox's case, if for one moment one removes from the picture the coercion, suggestion and pressure to confirm the police's version of , then Knox would indeed have had no reasonable reason to accuse Lumumba, yet she would not know for certain that he was innocent. Under such a scenario, she would therefore (under my interpretation) still potentially be guilty of criminal slander.

Another reason why I think the law has been interpreted in the way I suggest is this: if it were indeed necessary for Knox to have known Lumumba to be innocent in order for her to have committed criminal slander, then surely her defence lawyers would be shouting this very argument in their SC deposition. Surely they would have written something along the lines of this: "The court found that Knox had no involvement in the murder, so therefore she could not, by definition, have had any way of knowing whether or not Lumumba was involved in it. Therefore she cannot be guilty of criminal slander."

But Knox's lawyers haven't put this argument at all. Instead, they are focussing on the area of mens rea as it pertains to the coercion etc.

It would be interesting to know about the judicial authority you mention. It makes complete sense that certainty should not be required, which is why I formulated the offence (before I tracked down the actual thing):

'A person commits calunnia when [with intent to cause harm to another] he falsely accuses that other of a criminal offence knowing or in circumstances in which he ought to have known the accusation to be false.'

Take out the words in square brackets and the highlighted words and you have the basic article 368 offence. Me and Cassazione have improved it

 

[LondonJohn]

I would be interested to see you back that up with some authority, meaning judicial authority. The mens rea for murder in England and Wales is 'malice aforethought'. That is a term of art meaning 'intent to kill or cause serious arm'. The definition goes back to the Homicide Act 1957 (still in force) and before that was the creation of the common law.

When I shoot Grinder I intend to kill him. Therefore, I act with malice aforethought. But I have a defence which trumps the charge. Same with self defence. I shoot Grinder dead because he is about to stab me in my bed. I intend to kill or seriously harm him but the defence trumps the charge. I am not acquitted because I did not form the necessary intent but because the context in which I did so is one which society does not penalise.

"Intent" and "mens rea" are two different things. Once can intend to commit a certain act (e.g. shooting someone with a firearm), and have the intent to cause fatal harm by having done so, without having the mens rea to make it a criminal act. Intent is only one element of mens rea*.

Does every soldier who shoots dead an opposition soldier in warfare have the mens rea for murder? Did the celebrated executioner Albert Pierrpoint have the mens rea for murder when he put the rope around the necks of those he hanged then knowingly killed them by opening the trap door under their feet?

* ETA: I'd repeat that in the past, intent and mens rea used to be so closely connected as to pretty much mean the same thing. But the modern interpretation of mens rea takes into account far more than sheer intent.

 

[Grinder]

I will stop using otiose if mens rea is also put to bed.

There is no justification for shooting Grinder. Now LJ and BW that's another matter.

Rather than making up stories about farmers' daughters or drunken sailors, how about just looking at the actual situation we are talking about?

Massei was able to say that Amanda knew that Patrick was not involved because she was there and knew he wasn't. She named him to divert the PLE from her at that moment and that's all that mattered. Guilty. Even though even in that scenario the police obviously pushed her into it and she may not have known exactly what she signed because she didn't write it, many can accept that she should be found guilty. I personally think that even the guilty have rights and if one tortured someone into a false accusation, they shouldn't be found guilty of that crime.

Hellmann having found that she was not at the scene couldn't say that she knew he wasn't there. That is the crucial point in making his affirmation of the conviction bizarre. When that fact is added to her signing a document clearly written by the police in Italian at a point where she didn't have command of the language, it makes it even more bizarre. Then add to that the "case closed" press conference and the truths that they knew before she buckled and it becomes even more bizarre.

Raising the crime to murder under duress rather than making a statement against another under duress clouds rather than clarifies the issue. Anglo may be able to help with the details but saying "uncle" while having your arm twisted isn't the same as shooting someone while experiencing the same arm twist. The accusation can be undone but the shooting, not so much.

 

[LondonJohn]

It would be interesting to know about the judicial authority you mention. It makes complete sense that certainty should not be required, which is why I formulated the offence (before I tracked down the actual thing):

'A person commits calunnia when [with intent to cause harm to another] he falsely accuses that other of a criminal offence knowing or in circumstances in which he ought to have known the accusation to be false.'

Take out the words in square brackets and the highlighted words and you have the basic article 368 offence. Me and Cassazione have improved it

I agree! I don't have the time or inclination (or, for that matter, a sufficient knowledge of arcane Italian legal vocabulary...) to find out whether or not the SC indeed has interpreted the law in the way that you and I suggest - but I think it's fairly likely, given the ruling of Hellmann and the SC submission of Knox's lawyers.

 

[anglolawyer]

"Intent" and "mens rea" are two different things. Once can intend to commit a certain act (e.g. shooting someone with a firearm), and have the intent to cause fatal harm by having done so, without having the mens rea to make it a criminal act. Intent is only one element of mens rea*.

So it is, so it is, but it's kinda the main part of it.

Does every soldier who shoots dead an opposition soldier in warfare have the mens rea for murder? Did the celebrated executioner Albert Pierrpoint have the mens rea for murder when he put the rope around the necks of those he hanged then knowingly killed them by opening the trap door under their feet?

Neither the soldier not Pierrepoint need worry since their victims are not 'under the queen's peace' which is part of the actus reus (sorry Grinder). It is not murder to kill an enemy alien nor to execute a judicial warrant to execute. Mens rea does not come into this at all.

* ETA: I'd repeat that in the past, intent and mens rea used to be so closely connected as to pretty much mean the same thing. But the modern interpretation of mens rea takes into account far more than sheer intent.

Absent the requested judicial authority, this does put me in mind of our recent difference in another place over the correct spelling of 'minuscule'. Do words mean what you say they mean LJ?

 

[acbytesla]

You need to forget about right vs. wrong, truth vs. falsehood, and think like a bureaucrat. It was a ploy to minimize the civil liability of the justice system, comparable to how the WM3 case was resolved with an Alford plea.

Were you watching live when the verdict was overturned? It was pure theater.

Hellmann and his jury stayed out longer than expected, and kept everyone waiting in suspense.

Then they came back in, and he began by saying the court had partially overturned the verdict.

In a measured, sonorous tone, he read this boilerplate crap about how he was confirming the calumnia charge, and went through what the penalty for that was.

Camera pans to Amanda, who is on the edge of her seat, trembling in abject terror.

And THEN, the moment of glory - "Knox, Amanda is free, and so is Raffaele Sollecito."

It will be very hard for Hollywood to recreate that scene as effectively as Hellmann scripted it in real life. I'm tempted to think he found her guilty of calumnia so he could play it out that way. But, more realistically, I'm pretty sure it was for the reason I mentioned above. It had nothing to do with an actual calculation of guilt or innocence on this secondary charge.

Way to go Charlie, you said exactly what I did, but much more articulately. Like the flair.

 

[Grinder]

Let me remind all that I live in the USA where we have a Second Amendment which specifically states that I may arm myself. I will put an end to all this shooting of Grinder.

It is frightening to think what the world would be like, if you brits had a Second Amendment! God save the british sausage. (Yes, Minister!)

ETA - when the verdict came out the common rational for the guilty calumnia verdict was the cost to the state of Amanda's four years. Certainly it is a possibility but still makes his thinking look bad. If that was his thinking and it is as clear to all that it was wrong, he would know that the Corte Suprema di Cassazione would have to overturn it.

 

[anglolawyer]

I will stop using otiose if mens rea is also put to bed.

There is no justification for shooting Grinder. Now LJ and BW that's another matter.

Rather than making up stories about farmers' daughters or drunken sailors, how about just looking at the actual situation we are talking about?

Massei was able to say that Amanda knew that Patrick was not involved because she was there and knew he wasn't. She named him to divert the PLE from her at that moment and that's all that mattered. Guilty. Even though even in that scenario the police obviously pushed her into it and she may not have known exactly what she signed because she didn't write it, many can accept that she should be found guilty. I personally think that even the guilty have rights and if one tortured someone into a false accusation, they shouldn't be found guilty of that crime.

Grinder, you have a noble mind.

Hellmann having found that she was not at the scene couldn't say that she knew he wasn't there. That is the crucial point in making his affirmation of the conviction bizarre. When that fact is added to her signing a document clearly written by the police in Italian at a point where she didn't have command of the language, it makes it even more bizarre. Then add to that the "case closed" press conference and the truths that they knew before she buckled and it becomes even more bizarre.

I only figured out today there are two versions of calunnia: basic and aggravated. Massei convicted of the aggravated version and Hellman downgraded it to basic because the statutory aggravating element was not proved. I posted the aggravating circumstance above. Here it is again:

... all with the aim of obtaining impunity for all [involved] and in particular for RUDY HERMANN GUEDE, himself [a person] of color as LUMUMBA.

When that falls away it's back to the basic version in article 368, also posted above. I am willing to uphold the rejection of Amanda's conviction under the law as I understand it and on the facts as found.

Raising the crime to murder under duress rather than making a statement against another under duress clouds rather than clarifies the issue. Anglo may be able to help with the details but saying "uncle" while having your arm twisted isn't the same as shooting someone while experiencing the same arm twist. The accusation can be undone but the shooting, not so much.

True. And it is not clear that duress operates or should operate as a defence to murder in all jurisdictions. I was just trying to be graphic.

 

[anglolawyer]

You need to forget about right vs. wrong, truth vs. falsehood, and think like a bureaucrat. It was a ploy to minimize the civil liability of the justice system, comparable to how the WM3 case was resolved with an Alford plea.

Were you watching live when the verdict was overturned? It was pure theater.

Hellmann and his jury stayed out longer than expected, and kept everyone waiting in suspense.

Then they came back in, and he began by saying the court had partially overturned the verdict.

In a measured, sonorous tone, he read this boilerplate crap about how he was confirming the calumnia charge, and went through what the penalty for that was.

Camera pans to Amanda, who is on the edge of her seat, trembling in abject terror.

And THEN, the moment of glory - "Knox, Amanda is free, and so is Raffaele Sollecito."

It will be very hard for Hollywood to recreate that scene as effectively as Hellmann scripted it in real life. I'm tempted to think he found her guilty of calumnia so he could play it out that way. But, more realistically, I'm pretty sure it was for the reason I mentioned above. It had nothing to do with an actual calculation of guilt or innocence on this secondary charge.

Judges here do something similar: 'I sentence you to one year in prison ... (dramatic pause) ... suspended for two years'.

I am as cynical as you and hope Hellman has craftily teed up a successful Cassazione appeal. I cannot otherwise understand the moral basis for this repugnant conviction.

 

[Charlie Wilkes]

WHO REALLY CARES WHAT FRANK SFARZO HAS DONE SINCE?

The controversy swirling around Frank is well suited to the talent and stature of those who find it interesting. They can consume their lives with it, and no one will be seriously hurt. I don't have a problem with that.

 

[Supernaut]

Re; "slander" and "defamation" by AK ...

... of Lumumba and the Police.

I'd like to remind you all that there are NO recordings, and therefore NO transcripts of what Amanda said, and when, before she, Raff and Lumumba were arrested (due to "forgetfulness", or "lack of money for maintaining the equipment" - yeh, right.).

ALL the charges made against Amanda, Raff and Lumumba were predicated on the basis of a "summary" type-written by someone in Italian covering a single A4 sheet ("sir - my homework!"), with her signature and that of 30 other Italians appended.

As Acbytesla remarked - bringing these charges against her, finding her guilty, then upholding the conviction after exonerating her of murder is just frikking NUTS. It makes an ass of the Law, whichever you look at it.

Why even try to rationalise it with long dissertations on said "Law"?

 

[Supernaut]

Wow!!! That is the first time anyone ever thought I was right about something. Need to make an entry in my diary.

Whats weird about the calumny charge, is that many guilters use the calumny charge also to point out that Hellman's reasoning is bizarre.

Frankly, I think Hellman was just throwing the prosecution a bone by convicting her on that. Stupid rationale, but that is what I think. He was defending Italian jurisprudence without really doing Amanda any more harm since most importantly Amanda would be able to go home.

Quite.

He did what he had to - get Amanda and Raff the hell out prison - but the bottom line is, he's a professional and he wanted to stay on at least some of his peers' Christmas card lists.

 

[Supernaut]

As I said, I think Knox DID know what she was doing. ......

Which was; sign a sheet of A4, type-written in a language she had barely started to learn!!!!

 

[Supernaut]

You need to forget about right vs. wrong, truth vs. falsehood, and think like a bureaucrat. It was a ploy to minimize the civil liability of the justice system, comparable to how the WM3 case was resolved with an Alford plea.

Were you watching live when the verdict was overturned? It was pure theater.

Hellmann and his jury stayed out longer than expected, and kept everyone waiting in suspense.

Then they came back in, and he began by saying the court had partially overturned the verdict.

In a measured, sonorous tone, he read this boilerplate crap about how he was confirming the calumnia charge, and went through what the penalty for that was.

Camera pans to Amanda, who is on the edge of her seat, trembling in abject terror.

And THEN, the moment of glory - "Knox, Amanda is free, and so is Raffaele Sollecito."

It will be very hard for Hollywood to recreate that scene as effectively as Hellmann scripted it in real life. I'm tempted to think he found her guilty of calumnia so he could play it out that way. But, more realistically, I'm pretty sure it was for the reason I mentioned above. It had nothing to do with an actual calculation of guilt or innocence on this secondary charge.

You gotta be cruel to be kind!!

I've tried to think more kindly of the old duffer, but yeh, I reckon he'd been conferring with a lot of other people besides his fellow "judges" in the appeal, and this was nothing but the the crass political theatre you describe.

 

[LondonJohn]

I will stop using otiose if mens rea is also put to bed.

There is no justification for shooting Grinder. Now LJ and BW that's another matter.

Rather than making up stories about farmers' daughters or drunken sailors, how about just looking at the actual situation we are talking about?

Massei was able to say that Amanda knew that Patrick was not involved because she was there and knew he wasn't. She named him to divert the PLE from her at that moment and that's all that mattered. Guilty. Even though even in that scenario the police obviously pushed her into it and she may not have known exactly what she signed because she didn't write it, many can accept that she should be found guilty. I personally think that even the guilty have rights and if one tortured someone into a false accusation, they shouldn't be found guilty of that crime.

Hellmann having found that she was not at the scene couldn't say that she knew he wasn't there. That is the crucial point in making his affirmation of the conviction bizarre. When that fact is added to her signing a document clearly written by the police in Italian at a point where she didn't have command of the language, it makes it even more bizarre. Then add to that the "case closed" press conference and the truths that they knew before she buckled and it becomes even more bizarre.

Raising the crime to murder under duress rather than making a statement against another under duress clouds rather than clarifies the issue. Anglo may be able to help with the details but saying "uncle" while having your arm twisted isn't the same as shooting someone while experiencing the same arm twist. The accusation can be undone but the shooting, not so much.

WRT the highlighted part, I (and I think also Anglo, and - it appears - Knox's own lawyers) believe that it's not necessary for Knox to have known for sure that Lumumba was not involved in order for her to have committed criminal slander. If this is the case, then Hellmann's ruling is not bizarre in this specific respect - although I would argue that it is incorrect for other reasons.

And the reason the discussion drifted onto murder was because murder serves as an easier example around which to discuss the concept of mens rea.

 

[anglolawyer]

WRT the highlighted part, I (and I think also Anglo, and - it appears - Knox's own lawyers) believe that it's not necessary for Knox to have known for sure that Lumumba was not involved in order for her to have committed criminal slander. If this is the case, then Hellmann's ruling is not bizarre in this specific respect - although I would argue that it is incorrect for other reasons.

And the reason the discussion drifted onto murder was because murder serves as an easier example around which to discuss the concept of mens rea.

Well, the law says 'know' but if it means that literally then one could imagine all sorts of defences based on fanciful arguments about what 'knowing' means. The law is unworkable unless 'knowing' includes being deemed to know somehow. Otherwise, on my understanding of what passed, Amanda could not know Lumumba was not the killer.

But look, say the interrogation was in fact pretty reasonable and not excessively threatening, mind-altering or abusive. She would be guilty wouldn't she? So it all depends on just how bad things were and it was for Massei then Hellman to make the relevant findings about that. As I see it, Hellman says 'OK it was bad, but not that bad.'