Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Edx]

If you would take the transporter, it seems to me you must say, "No, nothing has been lost." If you wouldn't take the transporter, you must say, "Yes, something has been lost." What, exactly? Isn't it the separate material perspective which enabled the twins to have a conversation? In simplest terms, it takes two to tango -- haven't we lost one of the twins, a separate material perspective, a person?

Afaics, that's the fundamental divide. The transporter-takers don't see the second twin as another person; the transporter-rejecters do.

Because to the person that is being destroyed they are now dead, a copy isnt the same as the original. It doesnt matter if you cant tell them apart. Its a lot of rationalism to try and get away from this, its a good thing we dont have this technology!

 

[blobru]

Because to the person that is being destroyed they are now dead, a copy isnt the same as the original. It doesnt matter if you cant tell them apart. Its a lot of rationalism to try and get away from this, its a good thing we dont have this technology!

I agree; they are separate material perspectives, worthy of being preserved, no matter how similar the content of their perspectives, even if it happens to be identical (I think you misread my post; or I miscommunicated it; or both).

 

[Croc411]

It is pertinent to your reasoning. The creature that's seeing this post right now and the consciousness it generates would never get to see Mars by using the transporter as a matter of objective fact; yet a machine that kills it while sending a copy to Mars is OK, because at least there's an identical creature that can call itself the same name somewhere in the universe.

It's because that copy on Mars will produce conscious states that are almost identical to the ones my body produced before it was disintegrated. And these states are all that matters.

You claim not to be particularly concerned because you don't feel incredibly attached to your body as such, and that consciousness and self are just illusions; yet you must have some sort of attachment to them, because one of your conditions for participating is that there must be a "Croc411" living somewhere in the universe by the end of the experiment.

I'm attached to my current conscious state, because that is all that matters to me. I'm the sum of my memories and my personality traits and I'd like those to be preserved.

Bodies are interchangeable because the particles they consist of are interchangeable and this is a natural law.

Further you claim this to be the materialist position; but I don't see how it can be. The materialist position is that consciousness is produced by a brain; ...

Yes, biological or artificial. The thing that produces consciousness must consist of matter and/or energy on its basic level.

... once that brain is dissolved, the consciousness it creates can't exist anymore.

Once that brain is dissolved, it will stop producing conscious states. But those conscious states might as well be produced by a copy of that brain.

By saying that an identical (yet distinct in space and time from the original) brain can be created, ...

You move through space and time every day. Yet you don't consider yourself a different person every time you have relocated.

... the consciousness that results will be the "same person"; this seems to suggest that consciousness has some special quality that makes it distinct from from the atoms and molecules that project it.

Of course it's distinct from the atoms and molecules it emerged from because it is just patterns of information. Is a software program distinct from the atoms of the computer it was typed on initially is running on? Sure.

This is further reinforced by your claim that as long as the atoms used to rebuild you are "facing the same way" (to simplify things), to you that's "good enough" to call them the "same" atoms and proceed with the argument as if that's true, even though it is objectively not true.

Here you leave the realm of science. We know that atoms cannot carry any information about their history. We know that they are interchangeable with each other. If that wasn't the case, it would invalidate quantum theory.

That consciousness is a unique thing that can be "transferred" to objectively different sets of particles seems quite not-materialist to me.

Imagine the unthinkable: imagine that the particles your body (including your brain) consists of are indeed replaced over the time of your life.

You know what? That's exactly what happens ...

 

[AvalonXQ]

Materialism states that the material is all there is.

You claim that two things which are materially identical are not identical.

Therefore, you claim that materialism is false.

 

[Edx]

Materialism states that the material is all there is.

You claim that two things which are materially identical are not identical.

Therefore, you claim that materialism is false.

They would be identical, but there is also two of them. If you destroy one of them, there there is only 1 left.

The attraction of the idea of a teleporter is that you can travel the distance quickly, if you're only being copied it doesn't matter how perfect the copy YOU arent actually going anywhere, only a copy of you is. If the transporter didnt kill you afterwards, then all you did is create a copy of you at the other end which from its perspective was transported, but thats not you. From your perspective you'd press ENERGISE and you'd still be exactly where you were, now if you then put a gun in your mouth and blew your head off, there may be a copy of "your" participial structure of atoms still walking around in the universe but you'd still be just as dead as you would be if killed yourself right now.

 

[blobru]

Materialism states that the material is all there is.

Which could be taken to exclude the existence of things like space-time and an object's location in it; that's why modern "materialists" tend to prefer physicalism^WP (basically, a more sophisticated rewording):

...everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties

You claim that two things which are materially identical are not identical.

Identical material configurations but different locations; and as "location" is a physical property (see list of physical properties), the two things are not physically identical, and therefore, according to physicalism, not the same.

Therefore, you claim that materialism is false.

Any version of materialism which denies location is a property is false; luckily, physicalism doesn't (in fact, physicalism explicitly makes the case that two things identical in every respect except location are still two physically distinct, separate and different things).

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Materialism states that the material is all there is.

You claim that two things which are materially identical are not identical.

Therefore, you claim that materialism is false.

No. Two pennies which are materially identical are identical, but they are not both the same penny.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Identical material configurations but different locations; and as "location" is a physical property (see list of physical properties), the two things are not physically identical, and therefore, according to physicalism, not the same.

The problem of objecting to the use of the transporter is twofold.

First, you have to create a coherent concept of a "self."

Then, you have to argue that this concept is violated by the transporter but is not violated by activities you don't object to, like going to sleep at night.

The problem with your physicalism example is that it doesn't distinguish between using a transporter and taking a bus. In both cases the person has moved and therefore is no longer physically the same. Why, then, do you not argue against taking a bus? In what way does taking a bus preserve your life that using a transporter does not?

 

[Croc411]

Yes I feel that this is similar to my position as well, it does seem duelistc to some degree, like the consciousness is not attached to the brain that creates it. which it must be in materialism.

No, it must not. All materialism requires is that a conscious state must have emerged from some material substrate, not a particular one. It is indeed not attached to one particular body - multiple bodies can independently produce the same state, of course.

Do you think your brain somehow attaches magical watermarks to the states it produces?

 

[Jack by the hedge]

... modern "materialists" tend to prefer physicalism^WP ...

Any version of materialism which denies location is a property is false...

Ooh. That's interesting. It looks like this thread might not be going round in circles for a change.

 

[Mijin]

No. Two pennies which are materially identical are identical, but they are not both the same penny.

Exactly. To clarify things the two concepts are sometimes referred to as numerical vs qualitative identity.

Nobody usually claims numerical identity = qualitative identity, it's only in the context of consciousness that they do that (in the hopes of making some awkward problems go away).

 

[Nick227]

I agree with this to an extent, that is the illusion after all, but this is just a word game. It is the brain that experiences it, saying "my brain" simply limits it to the physical body from the words are coming out of.

Brains don't experience, they process. Nick

 

[blobru]

The problem of objecting to the use of the transporter is twofold.

First, you have to create a coherent concept of a "self."

Separate materially-configured perspective.

Then, you have to argue that this concept is violated by the transporter but is not violated by activities you don't object to, like going to sleep at night.

The problem with your physicalism example is that it doesn't distinguish between using a transporter and taking a bus. In both cases the person has moved...

No, that's your claim. Transporter-rejecters claim the original hasn't moved. A separate copy identical in all respects except location has been created.

...and therefore is no longer physically the same. Why, then, do you not argue against taking a bus? In what way does taking a bus preserve your life that using a transporter does not?

Because I get on the bus, arrive at my location, and am not destroyed. There is no original left behind at the bus stop to imply (if we ignore location, and of course the changes wrought by the trip versus staying behind) that either the person arriving at the destination or the person staying behind at the pick-up point could be destroyed without losing anything.

In the transporter example, either the original or the copy can be destroyed with, according to those who would take it, no loss of life. Okay, to make it analogous, let's assume the same for the bus: when one twin arrives at the destination, there's another twin still at the pick-up point; since there's no loss of life whichever we destroy, let's make the chances of being destroyed 50/50 for each. Now that the bus trip is analogous to the transporter, taking the bus gets me (arriving at the destination) destroyed one out of every two trips. No thanks.

That's why I like my buses not to be transporter-analogous; and would stay off any that were (and transporters besides, of course).

 

[Nick227]

Frankly, I think this is confused on a number of levels.

The non-existence of an inner experiencer is clearly not a prediction of materialism; the closest we can say is that the two concepts are incompatible.

Well, imo, materialism is highly incompatible with the idea that there's a little man living in your head, a la Cartesian dualism.

But, I would dispute even that. The fact that no-one's found a way to resolve the two phenomena is not in itself proof that they are incompatible.

Sit down. Observe your inner workings. There are thoughts - correct? When attention is not on the thoughts, is there anyone there? Look. Really look.

We could rephrase qualia as "the illusion of colour, pain etc" and it would still be a significant unsolved problem in neuroscience how the brain can generate such an illusion, how we could tell whether a given organism is experiencing the illusion, what decides on the nature of the illusion (e.g. what a bat's illusion of ultrasound is like) etc

The notion that an experiencer exists is the illusion. It's not about phenomena.

Nick

 

[Clive]

Are those here claiming they would be happy to use the transporter (including of course the destruction of the "original" body/brain in the process) also comfortable with the killing of one of a newly born set of "identical twins"?

I know the newly born twins aren't as "identical" as the copy created in the mythical star trek transporter scenario but it's only a matter of degree, surely?

 

[Nick227]

Because to the person that is being destroyed they are now dead, a copy isnt the same as the original. It doesnt matter if you cant tell them apart. Its a lot of rationalism to try and get away from this, its a good thing we dont have this technology!

This is the perspective of the illusory social construct, not reality.

The brain is conditioned to behave as though there is an experiencer somehow living inside it.

Even the most basic objective examination of the facts clearly reveals that this belief is utter nonsense.

Yet the belief is so powerful, even otherwise highly rational individuals will imagine all sorts of foolishness rather than accept what is plain apparent.

Nick

 

[blobru]

Are those here claiming they would be happy to use the transporter (including of course the destruction of the "original" body/brain in the process) also comfortable with the killing of one of a newly born set of "identical twins"?

I know the newly born twins aren't as "identical" as the copy created in the mythical star trek transporter scenario but it's only a matter of degree, surely?

As this is a thought-experiment, no reason not to have them come firing out of the birth canal at the same instant, completely identical in matter and configuration (maybe hugging each other in identical manners and looking into one another's eyes), only differing in physical location. If location is really irrelevant: eeny-meeny-miny-squish! (nothing's lost, though the mother who could have sworn those were two babies coming down her pipes and not one will be a bit hard to convince; then again, we all know how irrational mums can be: just give her a sedative, she'll be fine).

 

[Nick227]

Are those here claiming they would be happy to use the transporter (including of course the destruction of the "original" body/brain in the process) also comfortable with the killing of one of a newly born set of "identical twins"?

I know the newly born twins aren't as "identical" as the copy created in the mythical star trek transporter scenario but it's only a matter of degree, surely?

For a start you have to kill one in utero very early on. A lot of separation can occur before birth.

Secondarily, more psychologists these days recognize the effect that womb death has on the surviving twin.

Thirdly, the pod twin would be identical, no "matter of degree" about it.

Fourthly, the twins coexist for a period. The pod creates an identical replacement.

I don't see this example as a useful parallel.

Nick

 

[Clive]

For a start you have to kill one in utero very early on. A lot of separation can occur before birth.

Secondarily, more psychologists these days recognize the effect that womb death has on the surviving twin.

Thirdly, the pod twin would be identical, no "matter of degree" about it.

Fourthly, the twins coexist for a period. The pod creates an identical replacement.

I don't see this example as a useful parallel.

Nick

So, if there's a very minor flaw or or other limitation within the star trek transporter technology leading to a very short period of coexistence of the two bodies and/or just a few very small differences introduced in the copying process then it's not okay when we destroy the original, but if the copy is made "instantaneously" and is "absolutely identical" then everything is just fine and dandy?

 

[Nick227]

So, if there's a very minor flaw or or other limitation within the star trek transporter technology leading to a very short period of coexistence of the two bodies and/or just a few very small differences introduced in the copying process then it's not okay when we destroy the original, but if the copy is made "instantaneously" and is "absolutely identical" then everything is just fine and dandy?

It's a thought experiment for those who consider themselves materialists.

So you replicate everything material and then look if you ate cool to travel.

You can "what if...?" If you like but for me its the original experiment I find interesting.

Nick