Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[blobru]

I'd really like to know if there is anyone who would not use the teletransporter, but who would accept the freezing and revival process (without teleportation in between) I described earlier.

Assume an important, but not pure-survival, reason for doing either one, such as a space mission.

Respectfully,
Myriad

If I understand you correctly, I would make the argument for that choice (an aside: I won't say I would choose it, because committing to a choice seems to lead people to identify with it and then become quite passionate in defending it, which is entertaining to watch, but often disastrous for rationality; at least that's the philosophers' take, and my experience and observation as well) as follows:

Cryonics (freezing) doesn't destroy the local material system; it merely 'freezes', i.e. suspends its activity (one of which, or an ensemble of which, is described as "consciousness", though it's irrelevant whether the subject [the local material system] is conscious or unconscious at the time of the freezing). Cryonics (freezing) works by removing all the heat from the local material system: thermodynamically, for the system, entropy goes to zero, and time with it. Relative and external to the frozen system, time will continue, but in the local frame of the frozen system, without heat, without change, thermodynamically and relativistically, it doesn't; time stops. So if you believe the "mind" (I prefer mind to "consciousness", where it includes subconscious states, as less confusing, making the obvious point that a mind, as an activity of a body, derives from and is only as continuous as that body; helps avoid [hopefully] charming but childish questions like "but where does my consciousness go when I'm asleep?" - like asking "but where does my walking go when I'm sitting down?") is an activity of the body, then cryonics makes perfect sense. However, if you believe that the mind is an activity of the body, and here we mean "a mind", a particular mind, is an activity of a particular body materially localized in spacetime, locus of a particular synchronous frame-of-reference and point-of-view both relativistically and phenomenologically, then you will not use the teletransporter, as it destroys the body, and obviously, that body's "mind" (all the activities of that body we describe and label as "mind") with it.

Phew - sorry, got way explicit there, but sometimes, with tricky questions like this, it can't be helped (as the essence of philosophy and rationality - explicit definition: specificity & consistency - even if it makes for explanations no one wants to read (see the various "I HATE PHILOSOPHY!" threads). In shorter form, if minds are activities of bodies, something a body does, then when a body doesn't exist, neither do its activities (which include its mind). Destroy a body, destroy a mind. Cryonics doesn't destroy a body, just removes the heat and time from it (speaking thermodynamically and relativistically); from the local material spatiotemporal perspective of the body, activities (including mind) persist with it and are continuous, as no time passes (until the body's thawed out - heat and change and time reintroduced into the local system). Therefore: freeze me? Yes, please. Teleportation, according to the logic of this argument, since it does destroy a body, destroys a mind too (for the mind is the body, completely dependent on it; specifically, a subset of its material processes, made real by the body in a local material system), the mind of whoever (whatever material system) steps into it. Therefore: teleport me? No, thanks.

Aw, hell. Still way too long. Gist of it: if a mind is a subset of a body's activities, then destroying a body destroys its mind. Why choose cryonics and not teleportation? Cryonics doesn't destroy the body (or its mind); teleportation does.

Anyway, apologies for... my clone's over-specific, long-winded and off-putting stop-and-go parenthetical style; if only I had written it, it would have been much clearer (well, somewhat clearer; perhaps; wouldn't bet on it though). (More seriously, it is a tricky question - look at the disagreement in this thread! - so any argument for or against or in-between is bound to be as well, I suppose).

 

[Clive]

My initial feeling about using the transporter over some large distance is "hell no".

Suppose however that one of the early test models of the transporter contains the body to be "transported" in a sealed container (and perhaps also made of transparent material so we can imagine observing the test from the outside). In this case the person being "transported" is only very briefly and more or less instantaneously dissolved into a vapour of particles before being very quickly reassembled again out of exactly the same set of atoms, etc.

Was he "destroyed"? Did he die?

Suddenly it doesn't seem so clear and thus I find this version easier to accept as something I might do, perhaps in return for a very handsome reward for being the first test subject.

It doesn't seem that it should really matter and I suspect a large part of this has something to do with the knowledge that it's the same atoms and the same place with only a very brief period of "death".

On the other hand if "real magic" was apparently possible, would you volunteer for an experiment where Harry Potter would turn you into a flying pig for a day before eventually waving his wand again to return you to your previous human form?

I'm not sure that the teletransporter thought experiment is really all that different from considering being Harry's test subject, despite all the entertaining discussion it produces.

 

[blobru]

Good point. At present, the "real magic" of Star Trek's teleporter is apparently impossible (apparently to me that is, assuming my understanding of the physics and implications correct, no small assumption), unless you ignore the relevant theories of relativity, thermodynamics and quantum mechanics (see No-teleportation theorem^WP, previously posted). If those theories change or are replaced, so it's no longer apparently impossible, then it becomes a "serious" discussion. Until then, it's not, and shouldn't be taken seriously, any more than kids arguing in a playground over whether Superman would beat the Hulk in a fight (of course he wouldn't: Kal-El is strong and fast and can fly and everything, thanks to the rays of Earth's yellow sun; but Hulk strong, Hulk smash! Case closed).

 

[Edx]

No I won't. There'll be one me, just as there was before. If you can't tell whether a "death" really occurred without studying the intricate details of the mechanism, then it's a difference that makes no difference.

Im confused as to how you manage to see it as you do.

If you created a machine that could make an exact copy of you in every single way even down to your memories before you pressed the "ACTIVATE" button, why wouldnt you feel bad about putting a gun in your mouth and blowing your brains out? Its not like you will pull the trigger and open your eyes as your copy, you'll be dead, you'll be gone. Your copy may be alive and there may be no way to tell the difference, but your brain will be dead.

Maybe you actually see life very, very different...

 

[aggle-rithm]

Good point. At present, the "real magic" of Star Trek's teleporter is apparently impossible (apparently to me that is, assuming my understanding of the physics and implications correct, no small assumption), unless you ignore the relevant theories of relativity, thermodynamics and quantum mechanics (see No-teleportation theorem^WP, previously posted). If those theories change or are replaced, so it's no longer apparently impossible, then it becomes a "serious" discussion. Until then, it's not, and shouldn't be taken seriously, any more than kids arguing in a playground over whether Superman would beat the Hulk in a fight (of course he wouldn't: Kal-El is strong and fast and can fly and everything, thanks to the rays of Earth's yellow sun; but Hulk strong, Hulk smash! Case closed).

Probably a better discussion would revolve around a true artificial intelligence, something that is currently not possible but is at least theoretically more plausible than the transporter.

There were several characters in the Star Trek universe who, despite being artificial beings, were nonetheless conscious and were given the same rights to self-determination as anyone else. The problematic one was the Doctor from Voyager, who was not a physical entity but merely a computer program.

The writers dealt with the existential difficulties by giving the Doctor an impossible property: His program could not be copied from one place to another, but only moved. This is nonsensical, since moving is the same process as copying, but with an extra step: Deleting the original.

This was a necessary plot point not only to increase the sense of danger (Oh, noes, what happens if we can't get him back?!?) but to convince the viewers that the Doctor was a "real" entity, who could die just like a human. There was no possibility that he could be simply restored from a backup, because that would somehow "cheapen" the sense that he is a vibrant and unique individual.

This brings up the reality of what it means to make an exact copy of something extremely complex: It is insanely difficult to do. Unless the operating system supporting a program is exactly the same, a complex computer program will not behave the same way when moved from one location to another. There are just too many initial states and other variables to deal with, and here we're talking about something far simpler than a sentient being.

 

[Thunderchief]

Yes, I would feel fine. Because I know there is no persistent "me" anyway and there never was, that it's just an illusion. Because I know that the copy is so similar to me that I would not lose anything significant. Because I know that this world view is simple, fits the data perfectly and doesn't require magic.

Hi, I've been away from this thread for the weekend, so If, I've missed replying to anyone, let me know.

I'm intrigued by this answer, Are you a materialist Croc? because I don't think I've come across a materialist yet who would be happy to be killed in this case?

 

[Thunderchief]

They are and are not individuals, which I appreciate doesn't help very much! The brain learns to create the illusion for itself of having a personal self that is doing and experiencing, but it doesn't actually have such a thing.

Thus it seems that when the original is killed so something tangible is lost - this experiencer or doer. If you yourself imagine getting into the pod and pushing the button, probably a voice inside is saying "I'm going to die!" Am I right?

But this is the illusion. There is, according to materialism, no "I" that is going to die here, just a body dematerialising, and being replaced with an identical copy.

Some body dies, but some one does not.

Nick

Thanks for replying, sorry it's taken so long to get back to you.

But there are still two separate illusions being generated are there not? one in each copy? Even if they are identical I cant see how it doesn't matter if one of them dies. I think what I'm trying to say is even though the "I" is an illusion it is the product of the living matter that is about to die, having an identical copy doesn't stop that "I" from dying.

Make any sense?

 

[Checkmite]

I don't think that is theoretically possible. The light from a light bulb seems pretty similar after it has been off for a while (despite being made from completely different photons), but my consciousness seems to constantly change; I certainly don't feel the same after a good night's sleep than before it.

It may have that difference; but like the light bulb, the consciousness is purely a function of the makeup of the light bulb.

For what it's worth, the reason that your consciousness doesn't "feel the same" after a good night's sleep is because the physiological feedback from your body is different, not because the consciousness process itself is inherently different. If you were to fill the light bulb with a certain type of gas, or paint the light bulb with a certain type of paint, the light would "look different" despite the mechanics behind the light's coming about still being the same.

 

[Checkmite]

Yes, I would feel fine. Because I know there is no persistent "me" anyway and there never was, that it's just an illusion. Because I know that the copy is so similar to me that I would not lose anything significant. Because I know that this world view is simple, fits the data perfectly and doesn't require magic.

Would you volunteer to be killed if, say, a volunteered-death solution was proposed to help alleviate overcrowding?

 

[Myriad]

Aw, hell. Still way too long. Gist of it: if a mind is a subset of a body's activities, then destroying a body destroys its mind. Why choose cryonics and not teleportation? Cryonics doesn't destroy the body (or its mind); teleportation does.

I suspect that others share your view. I've rarely seen the same kind of "I would never do that!" reaction to cryo suspension as depicted e.g. in Alien (or, if you prefer, in Austin Powers) that people often have to Star Trek teleportation. Perhaps because if people saw that kind of suspension as having their current conscious self eradicated and replaced with a similar but different one, then they'd have to start wondering about ordinary sleep, unconsciousness, and medical anesthesia too.

But of course, there are the obvious follow up questions.

What if the cryonically frozen person was disassembled, the individual atoms transported to a new position, and then reassembled (still frozen) atom for atom. And then later revived? Would that make any difference in the outcome, and if so, what difference?

And, what if the cryonically frozen person was disassembled, and then reassembled (still frozen) atom for atom using different atoms of the same types? And then later revived? Would that make any difference in the outcome, and if so, what difference?

If in any of these scenarios the original person dies, when does the death happen? Does it happen when the frozen body is disassembled, or does the disassembly somehow project death backward in time to when the person was frozen?

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Nick227]

Thanks for replying, sorry it's taken so long to get back to you.

But there are still two separate illusions being generated are there not? one in each copy? Even if they are identical I cant see how it doesn't matter if one of them dies. I think what I'm trying to say is even though the "I" is an illusion it is the product of the living matter that is about to die, having an identical copy doesn't stop that "I" from dying.

Make any sense?

Yes, makes perfect sense.

The thing is... the illusion is not being experienced by anything. The illusion is that there is someone or something experiencing.

The situation is like perfectly reproducing a hoop and then saying that the hole in the centre isn't the same!

Nick

 

[blobru]

I suspect that others share your view.

This view (I'm trying not to cop to any view; and doing my usual bang-up job, apparently).

I've rarely seen the same kind of "I would never do that!" reaction to cryo suspension as depicted e.g. in Alien (or, if you prefer, in Austin Powers) that people often have to Star Trek teleportation. Perhaps because if people saw that kind of suspension as having their current conscious self eradicated and replaced with a similar but different one, then they'd have to start wondering about ordinary sleep, unconsciousness, and medical anesthesia too.

We do have a tendency to identify ourselves with our consciousness, don't we (psychological basis of a lot of metaphysics and religion, perhaps). The fact that we are bodies that do things we label "consciousness" and many other things we're not conscious of yet obviously depend on to survive seems abhorrent. Fair enough. But abhorrent or not, if we are our bodies, then there's not much reason to wonder about sleep, unconsciousness, anesthesia, etc. We, parts of our living body, are conscious sometimes, and sometimes we/they're not.

But of course, there are the obvious follow up questions.

What if the cryonically frozen person was disassembled, the individual atoms transported to a new position, and then reassembled (still frozen) atom for atom. And then later revived? Would that make any difference in the outcome, and if so, what difference?

Hmm... a 'frozen' atom, that would be fun (almost said "very cool" but caught myself in the nick of local spacetime, cause I like to think I'm above that sort of thing). Of course, from physics we know that you can't 'freeze' atoms in the sense of suspending them in a certain state: if you removed all "heat" (transferable energy) from the system, the atoms wouldn't exist; and cooling atoms very close to absolute zero makes them decohere into boson blobs (Bose–Einstein condensate^WP), erasing the atomic state your were hoping to transport for reassembly. So (assuming my understanding of the physics correct [and the physics itself correct]), with the premise we're already into storybook-land, which can be a nice place to visit (hi Invisible Pink Unicorn, Flying Spaghetti Monster, Thor, Apollo, Christ, Krishna, Xenu, Xena, Wally and The Beaver!), even illuminating (morally, I'm very much inspired by Capt Kirk, in spite of all the sudden __ pauses __ in his __ line __ delivery, which I don't think he can help and I wish people wouldn't make fun of), but there's no way we and our consciousness can live there (unfortunately: Star Trek looks like fun).

The crux of it (the physical obstacle to teleportation; see again: No-teleportation theorem^WP) seems to be obtaining, preserving, and transferring information [at that scale]. It's not an issue in storybook-land because the information's all in the author's head and the fans just go along for the ride; it is an issue in reality, however, because physics, at least according to my understanding of its current form, doesn't permit it.

And, what if the cryonically frozen person was disassembled, and then reassembled (still frozen) atom for atom using different atoms of the same types? And then later revived? Would that make any difference in the outcome, and if so, what difference?

In a universe where that were possible, I'd say jump into the teletransporter in any form (maybe -- the devil's in the fictional, metaphysical details). The physics of our universe seems to constrain us to one place and time and body, one spacetime locus of materially-instantiated 'information', however, and I don't see any way to squirm out of it (at the moment: will gladly see one if someone can point it out [without rubbing my nose in it too much, please; fragile ego and all]).

If in any of these scenarios the original person dies, when does the death happen? Does it happen when the frozen body is disassembled, or does the disassembly somehow project death backward in time to when the person was frozen?

Respectfully,
Myriad

If those scenarios were possible, that would certainly be difficult to work out. Maybe physics is the universe's way of protecting us from having to.

 

[Croc411]

I'm intrigued by this answer, Are you a materialist Croc? because I don't think I've come across a materialist yet who would be happy to be killed in this case?

Hardcore materialist, hardcore reductionist. Materialism basically just states that everything can be traced back to matter/energy on the fundamental level.

I've never stated anything saying otherwise. On the contrary, it's the anti-teleporter crowd that always tries to introduce the mysterious magical property of some persistent self (either implicitely or explicitely).

To be honest, Thunderchief, I think that you haven't got your head around the concept of the illusionary self yet, or (if you have) you've not yet managed to internalize it.

 

[Croc411]

Would you volunteer to be killed if, say, a volunteered-death solution was proposed to help alleviate overcrowding?

If a recent copy of my body is allowed to live on, if the death process is painless and if the copy would receive, let's say, a considerable sum of money for my inconveniences then sure, kill me.

 

[The Greater Fool]

Oops. Didn't complete thoughts, didn't know I posted.

 

[Checkmite]

If a recent copy of my body is allowed to live on, if the death process is painless and if the copy would receive, let's say, a considerable sum of money for my inconveniences then sure, kill me.

Surely not - the point is to alleviate overcrowding; creating a copy of you and then killing you would result in no net change.

Nope; no copy, no sum of money (since you'll be dead and can't spend it). We'll go ahead and make it painless. Still game?

 

[megaresp]

Your copy may be alive and there may be no way to tell the difference, but your brain will be dead.

Maybe you actually see life very, very different...

I guess I also see 'life very, very different' to you.

If I lose a hand or a foot or both - my experience of 'me' existing continues.

If 'I' lose my current meat sack - but my conscious thoughts, memories and feelings are magically transported into another meat sack - the thing that 'my' current meat sack regards as 'I' continues to exist. If an exact copy of my body is used, it's no different to restoring a sector-by-sector image of my old hard disk onto a new one. I'm merely shifting the OS to another 'box'.

Seems obvious to me.

Personally, I think it gets a lot more interesting when considering relocation of one's I-ness to a different brain-host: whether that host be human, non-human or even artificial.

 

[Croc411]

Surely not - the point is to alleviate overcrowding; creating a copy of you and then killing you would result in no net change.

I was under the impression the overcrowding was because too many copies of people had been made (by using teleporters wrongly or whatever).

Nope; no copy, no sum of money (since you'll be dead and can't spend it). We'll go ahead and make it painless. Still game?

Do you think I'm crazy or tired of life or what? Of course not. I don't see what this has to do with teleporters or philosophy of self.

 

[Ranb]

I'm frankly shocked Doctor McCoy was coerced into using a transporter at all as he knew exactly how it worked and he knew he was being destroyed only to be replaced by a perfect copy, memories and all.

In one of the early Trek novels from the 70s he said:

It's just creepy. And it makes me sad to think of all the times my favorite TNG characters died before my eyes, yet I never realized it.

I think it was from the Blish novel Spock Must Die. If I remember correctly Spock responded with " A difference that makes no difference is no difference at all". I'm with Spock on this one.

Ranb

 

[ynot]

Would I use a Star Trek type transporter? . . . Yes I would . . . eYs lowud I . . .