Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Jack by the hedge]

That's a choice between sacrificing myself in the transporter in order to give a copy of me an opportunity to live, or taking a slender chance of saving myself on the spaceship.

A choice between whether I want to live (low probability of success) or whether I'm willing to die to provide my children with a 'me' to depend on (virtually guaranteed).

Tricky.

 

[Recovering Agnostic]

I don't think its extraneous at all, it is getting to the bottom of how the transporter would work, revealing that it does not "move" you, it copies and then deletes you. If you could come up with a transporter that "moves" you I would happily step in.

The thought experiment doesn't deny that, but this is interesting. How would you tell the difference?

Scenario 1: The transporter disassembles your body, effectively killing it, then recreates exactly the same body somewhere else

Scenario 2: The transporter somehow (let's call it magic) moves your entire body from one place to another

How would you know, as you stepped out of the transporter at your destination, which of those you were using?

That's a choice between sacrificing myself in the transporter in order to give a copy of me an opportunity to live, or taking a slender chance of saving myself on the spaceship.

A choice between whether I want to live (low probability of success) or whether I'm willing to die to provide my children with a 'me' to depend on (virtually guaranteed).

Tricky.

So you're prepared to accept a "copy" in some circumstances for the benefit of others. I find that intriguing, but it's probably another extraneous detail. What if you had no children, no friends, all your family were dead, and so on?

 

[dafydd]

The people in Star Trek who used the transporter seemed to suffer no ill effects.

 

[Thunderchief]

The thought experiment doesn't deny that, but this is interesting. How would you tell the difference?

Scenario 1: The transporter disassembles your body, effectively killing it, then recreates exactly the same body somewhere else

Scenario 2: The transporter somehow (let's call it magic) moves your entire body from one place to another

How would you know, as you stepped out of the transporter at your destination, which of those you were using?

You can't tell the difference, they are identical, but not the same. In the same way I could have a perfect cube of carbon in front of me, and then duplicate it so I have two identical cubes of carbon. Now send one to Mars on a space ship, we now have two identical cubes of carbon, one on earth, one on Mars. They are not the same cube though are they?

The survivors of your two experiments can't tell the difference, that does not change the fact that the guy who steps into the transporter in scenario 1 is now dead.

Identical but not the same. do you get what I mean? I'm not sure I'm being clear.

 

[Thunderchief]

The people in Star Trek who used the transporter seemed to suffer no ill effects.

Not true, in fact it goes wrong that often that I'm surprised they ever approved its use! ;-) It has to be at least once a season! Damn dangerous things, these transporters. ;-)

 

[Nick227]

wrong we are definitively speaking of something substancial and material : the brain. You can play around with saying the I is an illusion or whatever.

I'm saying the brain creates thoughts and attends to them. In this attention it appears that there is most definitely someone who is having the thoughts.

But as a materialist I know that this sense of there being someone listening to thoughts is erroneous. There is no little man living in my head. It is simply that this sense of personal selfhood emerges from attending to thought. This is how the brain creates the effect.

And, because this sense of personal selfhood is a brain-created illusion, and utterly insubstantial, it cannot be destroyed. You can destroy the brain, but you can't destroy an illusory centre it has learned to create, because it has no substance, no location, and no temporal aspect.

Again, let me ask you , what if the process was not in reality a simple transfer, but first you get excruciatingly murdered over a long time, then the copy emerge without memory of it (the memory copy stops at the point where the torture murder starts).

Well, I wouldn't like to be excruciatingly murdered, regardless of whether I was being copied or not, to be honest.

Would you take the transporter ?

Nope! Don't want to die. But I have to accept that this is the irrational reaction of a brain conditioned though evolution to behave in a certain way when faced with death. I know that the No response can't be justified intellectually.

If you say no, I have to ask you why not. The End state is fully identical with the transporter , the process is exactely the samer up to the point you push the button. The only difference is that the dematerialisation is killing you in painful way, which the copy will not be aware of.

As a materialist I have to believe that instantaneous dematerialisation is painless as there would be no neurology left to generate pain responses.



Nick

 

[dafydd]

Not true, in fact it goes wrong that often that I'm surprised they ever approved its use! ;-) It has to be at least once a season! Damn dangerous things, these transporters. ;-)

I'm not a fan of the show, I haven't seen many episodes. What kind of things used to go wrong?

 

[Thunderchief]

I'm not a fan of the show, I haven't seen many episodes. What kind of things used to go wrong?

Oh all sorts, classic one is Riker getting left behind for 10 years or something, for some reason the original is not vaporised, but the copy is created, who then goes off to be the Riker we all know and love. leaving the original to think he has been abandoned on some planet for years. On Voyager Tuvok and Nelix get blended together, creating a third character, Tuvix. Who is then killed at the end to undo it.

See, not safe! ;-)

 

[wobs]

Surely there are a number of people here who have been through the transporter at the now closed Star Trek Experience in Vegas?
I thought it rocked.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

...So you're prepared to accept a "copy" in some circumstances for the benefit of others. I find that intriguing, but it's probably another extraneous detail. What if you had no children, no friends, all your family were dead, and so on?

You're right that it's an extraneous detail. It doesn't really address the transporter dilemma at all - the scenario is simply whether there's a point at which my possibility of surviving is so low that I'd surrender even that miniscule chance to benefit my children. Maybe I would. I don't know.

 

[Thunderchief]

Nope! Don't want to die. But I have to accept that this is the irrational reaction of a brain conditioned though evolution to behave in a certain way when faced with death. I know that the No response can't be justified intellectually.

As a materialist I have to believe that instantaneous dematerialisation is painless as there would be no neurology left to generate pain responses.

I don't understand why it is irrational to not want to die? why would a materialist be happy to die just because there is an identical copy walking around? It makes no sense to me.

I also don't want to die weather its painless or not.

 

[RenaissanceBiker]

IF Lt. Cmdr. Montgomery Scott is running them, of course.

Scotty was once marooned on a space station with life support running out, no chance of rescue and no viable destination within transporter range. He used the station transporter to beam himself no where. He remained in the pattern buffer until Picard and the TNG crew found him and beamed him back to the transporter room.

Not true, in fact it goes wrong that often that I'm surprised they ever approved its use! ;-) It has to be at least once a season! Damn dangerous things, these transporters. ;-)

It is still safer than using a shuttle craft. It is probably a lot safer than driving a car or flying in an airplane.

 

[Thunderchief]

It is still safer than using a shuttle craft. It is probably a lot safer than driving a car or flying in an airplane.

I don't think so, I drive my car every day and I have yet to be merged into a disturbing blend of annoying characters! ;-)

 

[Recovering Agnostic]

You can't tell the difference, they are identical, but not the same. In the same way I could have a perfect cube of carbon in front of me, and then duplicate it so I have two identical cubes of carbon. Now send one to Mars on a space ship, we now have two identical cubes of carbon, one on earth, one on Mars. They are not the same cube though are they?

No, but if anyone's saying they're the same (I might even have done that previously), it's an informal shorthand for being identical.

The survivors of your two experiments can't tell the difference, that does not change the fact that the guy who steps into the transporter in scenario 1 is now dead.

Identical but not the same. do you get what I mean? I'm not sure I'm being clear.

There might be a problem with terminology here. The original collection of cells we think of as a person is no longer grouped in such a way as to warrant that title. We're in agreement on that point. But if a different set of cells are created/arranged/reanimated in exactly the same way somewhere else, we need to be very careful about what we're saying, because it depends on what makes us "us". Who was the guy you're saying got killed?

If you're a materialist, you believe (or ought to) that consciousness and our sense of self is an emergent property of neural function, which leads naturally to the conclusion that the "copy" would be as much you as the "real" you. You don't have to like that or feel comfortable with it (you may well have the same reaction as Nick227 that it feels wrong, even while admitting that there's no rational basis for that feeling), but it's the logical result of your beliefs. If you're not a materialist, of course, none of this applies.

It's not something I'd do for fun, and if I look at it the wrong way, it gives me the squicks, but if I'm interested in preserving "me", what does that mean? Would I still be "me" if I was a Futurama-style brain in a jar? If my thought process were stored in a computer? We're back to the mad scientist experiment mentioned earlier - would you rather provide the body or the brain, given the choice? I'd say brain every time.

I think the sticking point here is that we all have a sense (or illusion) of continuous consciousness, and for obvious evolutionary and survival reasons that sense of self is bound up with the meat puppet we call "us". Our instinctive understanding, which has served us very well, is that if you destroy the body, you destroy "us", so the idea of destroying that body to be recreated somewhere else appals us. But if you'd choose to be the brain for the mad scientist's new creation, I don't think you really believe that.

I understand. Really. There's a part of me, even as I'm typing this, that thinks the result of going through a transporter would be that I die, and someone else is created who just thinks he's me. He'd be me to all intents and purposes, but the "real" me would be dead. Because my instinct is to associate my identity with my bodily existence and apparently continuous consciousness, so I see the fate of the original as my fate. But rationally, I don't believe that. I believe if the concept of "me" means anything, it's something that can be maintained by a transporter. "My" thought patterns would still be the same, and even in an identical body, so "I" would still exist, even more so than if my thoughts were saved to a hard drive.

(In the unlikely event that transporters like this are ever invented, I predict that people will get over these worries pretty quickly, not just because it starts to seem normal, but because every time you go through one, the person who steps out would be the one who "survived". After a few trips, that would breed a massive amount of complacency.)

 

[rocketdodger]

No; the individual human who enters the transporter is killed, and a duplicate is created in the new location. Word games about the duplicate being able to call itself "me" aside: objectively, one subject's brain processes ended at one point, and the other subject's brain processes began at a later point, with no continuity bridge in between.

This is wrong. There is the same continuity as always.

Look at what happens in the body of someone who doesn't use the teleporter. There is a particle A that bounces into a particle B, leading to a change in B. This is a "causal" event, because A "caused" the change in B. If you wanted to, you could track all the causal events that led to A being in the state it was in immediately prior to interacting with B. It might look like this:

event(1 ) --> event( 2 ) --> ... --> event( n ) --> event( A hits B ) --> < the future >

Now can you tell me how this causal sequence is changed by inserting a teleporter event somewhere? Suppose the teleporter magicks the person to another location instantly. The sequence might look like this:

event( 1 ) --> event( 2 ) --> ... --> event( n ) --> TELEPORT --> event( A hits B ) --> < the future >

Look carefully -- do you see how the TELEPORT event completely invalidates the rest of the sequence? No, you don't -- because it doesn't. The sequence of causal events leading up to the current moment in time are identical, except for a single extra event, that doesn't alter the relative states of any of the particles in the person's brain. From the perspective of the particles -- and hence any physical process in your body -- the TELEPORT event is a No-op.

To the extent that there exists any continuity in the physical processes ( which isn't a simple yes/no, mind you ), it is entirely preserved by the teleport.

Also it is worth noting that there could be a type of teleporter that was definitely NOT a no-op. For example if the teleporter scaled the translations between every particle up by 100% -- effectively making you twice your size -- the forces holding everything together would likely be vastly different, and you might instantly dissolve into goo upon materialization. But we aren't talking about those kinds of teleporters.

 

[rocketdodger]

The survivors of your two experiments can't tell the difference, that does not change the fact that the guy who steps into the transporter in scenario 1 is now dead.

Identical but not the same. do you get what I mean? I'm not sure I'm being clear.

I understand what you are getting at. My dispute is with your definition of "dead."

Suppose Jedi were real, and the real good ones found a way to continue existing, in a way, after their body dies. Like Yoda and and Obi-wan did, they became "blue glowies" after their body died.

Are they dead, or not?

Not such a simple answer, is it?

So in a world where teleporters are real, the notion of "dead" is similarly complex. The original body is dead, but the same consciousness lives on. Are they dead, or sorta-dead, or what?

 

[Guybrush Threepwood]

..However another part of me thinks this is an awful waste. If it could create a new me without needing to destroy the original I would prefer that. That way there are now two of me that can get twice the stuff done

And the fact that 'stuff' includes spending your cash and banging your girlfriend doesn't bother you at all?

 

[Nick227]

I don't understand why it is irrational to not want to die? why would a materialist be happy to die just because there is an identical copy walking around? It makes no sense to me.

What do you believe is actually different in the identical copy?

Nick

 

[Thunderchief]

No, but if anyone's saying they're the same (I might even have done that previously), it's an informal shorthand for being identical.


There might be a problem with terminology here. The original collection of cells we think of as a person is no longer grouped in such a way as to warrant that title. We're in agreement on that point. But if a different set of cells are created/arranged/reanimated in exactly the same way somewhere else, we need to be very careful about what we're saying, because it depends on what makes us "us". Who was the guy you're saying got killed?

The original person who stepped into the transport is the one who gets killed, isn't that obvious? The transporter is creating a copy do we agree? The copy is identical, but not the same, again obviously because one is on Mars. So why would the Version on Earth be happy to die, just because there is a version of him wandering around on Mars? Conversely would you expect the version on Mars to happily kill themselves, if it was decided that there was a mistake and the version on earth didn't want to go to Mars any more?

I really don't see the logical leap that says identical objects are the same object.

The version on Earth will not perceive what the version on Mars is experiencing, therefore they are not the same, and therefore the version on earth would die if the transport worked as intended. So why would a Materialist get into the transporter? certainly not to experience Mars, he never gets there after all.

If you're a materialist, you believe (or ought to) that consciousness and our sense of self is an emergent property of neural function, which leads naturally to the conclusion that the "copy" would be as much you as the "real" you. You don't have to like that or feel comfortable with it (you may well have the same reaction as Nick227 that it feels wrong, even while admitting that there's no rational basis for that feeling), but it's the logical result of your beliefs.

I am a Materialist and I have no problem with the copy being just as much me as the real me, what I have a problem with is how this magically (as far as I can tell) makes the mind being generated by the brain on Mars the same as the Mind being generated by the Brain on earth. for example; if I have two identical computers running a copy of the the same software would you say they are the same? I would say that they are identical but not the same. The owner of Computer 1 would not be happy if you destroyed it, but then said "oh but it's ok there is an identical computer over there". its just that the owner of the brain cant complain, he's dead!

Does that help explain? where am I going wrong?

 

[Thunderchief]

What do you believe is actually different in the identical copy?

Nick

There is nothing different, it is identical. That does not make it the same though, after all one is on Mars. how can they be the same. do you agree that you could create two identical objects? If you do, surly it is obvious that they are identical but not the same. After all you could move one and not the other. If they were the same anything that happened to one would happen to the other.

any help?