Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[RenaissanceBiker]

There was a TNG episode that involved a transporter duplicate of Riker. He beamed back to the Enterprise from a dangerous mission and he continued to have a successful career in Starfleet. It was later discovered that the transporter malfuctioned and the original Riker never dematerialized. He was stuck on some remote planet or space station alone for years before being rescued. The original Riker eventually left Starfleet and the series continued with the copy.

 

[AvalonXQ]

This is why for me also; the copy may think he's me, and everyone else would think the same, but obviously I would not experience what he sees or feels. So I don't see why anyone would think that the copy is me, just because the original is destroyed first?

As a materialist, how do you quantify this idea of the difference between "the original" and "the copy," or claim that one of the two is "you" and not the other? Particularly, how do you justify claiming that "you" exist in a way that is continuous with the "you" that existed yesterday, and how does the teleportation event interfere with that?

Let's say that tonight you go to sleep, and while you're asleep somebody puts a machine in the room and leaves. The machine is programmed to replace you atom-for-atom half the time, and the other half the time leave you alone. It does not record which of these it does.

Is there any way for you to prove whether the machine destroyed you or not? If not, how can you argue that there is any difference between "the original" and "the copy" experiencing something?

 

[aggle-rithm]

The original Riker eventually left Starfleet and the series continued with the copy.

..and he ended up in a Cardassian prison. All thanks to transporters!

Nope, not for me.

 

[Myriad]

Here's a slight variation, especially for those who would not use the teleporter.

You and a total stranger are kidnapped by a mad scientist. The stranger is the same age and has remarkably similar physical characteristics to you.

The two of you will be forced to participate in an experiment. One of you will be placed in the Sending chamber. There, the subject's brain will be invasively scanned; the process will be painless, but will completely disintegrate the brain.

The other subject will be placed in the Receiving chamber. There, the neural connections of the subject's brain will be altered to replace all of its memories, habits, and perceptional patterns (encompassing such things as which foods you like the taste of) with those from the scanned brain in the Sending chamber. This process is rapid and physically painless.

The Mad Scientist flips a coin to decide who goes in which chamber. If it comes up heads, you will go in the Sending chamber. While the coin is in the air, what are you hoping it comes up as?

Few people would want to be in either chamber, of course. But in this case non-participation is not an option. Which chamber would you prefer to be in?

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[aggle-rithm]

As a materialist, how do you quantify this idea of the difference between "the original" and "the copy," or claim that one of the two is "you" and not the other? Particularly, how do you justify claiming that "you" exist in a way that is continuous with the "you" that existed yesterday, and how does the teleportation event interfere with that?

Let's say that tonight you go to sleep, and while you're asleep somebody puts a machine in the room and leaves. The machine is programmed to replace you atom-for-atom half the time, and the other half the time leave you alone. It does not record which of these it does.

Is there any way for you to prove whether the machine destroyed you or not? If not, how can you argue that there is any difference between "the original" and "the copy" experiencing something?

This actually happens to all of us, but it takes about ten years to make the copy. Something about the long duration makes it easier.

 

[AvalonXQ]

This actually happens to all of us, but it takes about ten years to make the copy. Something about the long duration makes it easier.

I think materialists still have this idea that there's something unique about the continuity of their experiences, as if the fact that the same physical brain cells are being used now as were being used 20 seconds ago is the reason you're still you. That's how you get this silly notion that if we suddenly replace the physical matter with different physical matter, it's a "different person" experiencing the thoughts - despite the fact that there's absolutely no physical evidence or other material fact you can point to that actually supports there being any difference.

Your mind is the data processing your brain does, and a different physical brain having exactly the same thoughts would represent the same mind, not a "new" or "different" one in any quantifiable material sense.

 

[phunk]

I think materialists still have this idea that there's something unique about the continuity of their experiences, as if the fact that the same physical brain cells are being used now as were being used 20 seconds ago is the reason you're still you. That's how you get this silly notion that if we suddenly replace the physical matter with different physical matter, it's a "different person" experiencing the thoughts - despite the fact that there's absolutely no physical evidence or other material fact you can point to that actually supports there being any difference.

Your mind is the data processing your brain does, and a different physical brain having exactly the same thoughts would represent the same mind, not a "new" or "different" one in any quantifiable material sense.

Do you agree that if we could make an exact copy of you and send it on a trip to Mars, while you remained on Earth, the original you on Earth would not experience the trip to Mars?

 

[Beerina]

No you are what you are made from, and when that is gone be it dematerialized or decomposed into rot, you are dead. ETA: you are an *emerging* property of that material. Destroy the material and that emerging property is gone. It does not matter if you construct an *exact* equivalent copy somewhere else.

You are confusing or making the false equivalency of separating the memory+thought, and the holder of it (body). This nearly beg an elan vital or a soul.

An identical clon of you atom by atom is not you. It is a copy which is indiferentiable by the external universe, true, but you died. Your consciousness is not continuying. The cosnciousness of the copy started the moment it was created, but with already made memory.

One could argue every time you fall unconscious, and I mean not even dreaming, which is a kind of I think therefore I am consciousness, you die.

You are relying on stored memories to inform the later-awakened consciousness on its personality and whatnot.

It's like a candle that was blown out and relit. Is it the same flame? Is that even meaningful?

So disassembly may already be overkill for killing you, even if the exact same atoms are reassembled into the exact same place.

Still, I have no problem "dying" in the sense of sleeping or this most restrcted type of teleportation. I will re-awaken, not a copy, which would awaken regardless of whether the original was destroyed or kept.

 

[Thunderchief]

As a materialist, how do you quantify this idea of the difference between "the original" and "the copy," or claim that one of the two is "you" and not the other? Particularly, how do you justify claiming that "you" exist in a way that is continuous with the "you" that existed yesterday, and how does the teleportation event interfere with that?

Let me clarify that the "copy" would certainly think that he is me, and other than his location, there would be no way to tell that he is not me. Its just that it is obvious to me that "I" would not see thought his eyes, and as such he cannot be me.

For example if there was a transporter from here to Mars, and I step in on earth but a problem occurs which prevents me from being erased, but the copy is still sent to Mars. would you agree that the "me" that is on earth cannot see what is happening to the "me" on Mars?

This is just the same if the original is destroyed first, but in that case as someone said there is just no one left to say; "hey I'm dead" ;-)

Let's say that tonight you go to sleep, and while you're asleep somebody puts a machine in the room and leaves. The machine is programmed to replace you atom-for-atom half the time, and the other half the time leave you alone. It does not record which of these it does.

Is there any way for you to prove whether the machine destroyed you or not? If not, how can you argue that there is any difference between "the original" and "the copy" experiencing something?

We first off for clarity; does it destroy the original then create a copy? or is it destroy an atom, then replace with identical atom?

However in either case there would be no way to tell if you were a copy or the original. that does not change the fact that if it did perform the copy, you would be a copy not the original.

 

[Recovering Agnostic]

Because a copy is just that. it is a different person , a twin with the same memory, but the initial person simply died and is not continuing. It is simple as that.

In fact at some level you probably already recognize what I am hinting at. Why would it matter to you if you are *explicitely* killed (with or without torture) if a copy of you is made up at your destination with your memory ?

Again if you destroy the original material brain you kill the person. It does not matter if reconstitute a 100% copy at the end. That person will be virtually identical to the universe, but the original died.

I recognise what you're getting at, I just don't agree. I see your equivocation about the difference between small changes and wholesale changes in my constituent atoms in just the same way as you see my perceived equivocation about (what you consider) my personal death.

But I don't care if I'm explicitly killed. Pain would be a factor to consider, as would any memory of the process, which I'd expect might be traumatic, but if it was a choice between hopping on a spaceship with a 50% chance of reaching its destination without blowing up or walking into a transporter which would (we'll assume painlessly and perfectly) kill me and recreate me at my destination, I'd take the latter, because it would guarantee the perpetuation of my consciousness, which is what I think of as "me".

Justifying that decision is harder - Baggini and Stangroom set up several scenarios, and mark your answers to them as either consistent or not, because these are questions that aren't amenable to simple "right" or "wrong" responses.

 

[AvalonXQ]

If there's no difference between "the copy" and "the original," continuing to distinguish between them or hinge your identity on being one and not the other is not reasonable.

Claiming that if your physical brain is destroyed and replaced then the person thinking ceases to be "you" is equally meaningless. Your mind is an emergent property of your brain; moving it from one physical substrate to another doesn't suddenly make it "not you."

As for the "copy on Mars" situation, there's no material justification for considering the one on Mars to be "the copy." They're both the same, and so they're both "really you." Any attempt to justify giving one precedence over the other is contrary to materialism.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

... if it was a choice between hopping on a spaceship with a 50% chance of reaching its destination without blowing up or walking into a transporter which would (we'll assume painlessly and perfectly) kill me and recreate me at my destination, I'd take the latter, because it would guarantee the perpetuation of my consciousness, which is what I think of as "me".

How about if they scanned you before flight then left you behind and just took a data file with them to build a perfect replica at the destination? Would that be better, worse or the same?

 

[Thunderchief]

If there's no difference between "the copy" and "the original," continuing to distinguish between them or hinge your identity on being one and not the other is not reasonable.

Claiming that if your physical brain is destroyed and replaced then the person thinking ceases to be "you" is equally meaningless. Your mind is an emergent property of your brain; moving it from one physical substrate to another doesn't suddenly make it "not you."

As for the "copy on Mars" situation, there's no material justification for considering the one on Mars to be "the copy." They're both the same, and so they're both "really you." Any attempt to justify giving one precedence over the other is contrary to materialism.

Saying the Copy and the original is just for clarity, they are functional identical, I agree.

Would the "me" on Earth experience what the "me" on Mars is going though? if not then surly you can understand what I mean when I say that "I" would be the "me" on earth?

 

[Recovering Agnostic]

How about if they scanned you before flight then left you behind and just took a data file with them to build a perfect replica at the destination? Would that be better, worse or the same?

It's different. That creates the possibility of having two people going around, both of whom are me. I'm not sure I'd like it, even more so if there was any chance of our paths crossing, but who is the "me" who wouldn't like it? Both of us would think in the same way, and we'd both feel real.

To turn it around, what if they scanned me and created a copy, but wiped our memories of the process? How would either of us know which was the "real" one? And if there's no way of telling, what basis do you have for saying that the person stepping out of a transporter wouldn't be me?

 

[Babbylonian]

I wouldn't. The reason the new me wouldn't be the "real" me is continuity of consciousness. My duplicate can think that there's been no break but my original being is still dead as disco. In the TV show(s) the process has been interrupted and people have been stated to be reconstructed from a recorded "pattern." It therefore follows that the process can "clone" without ever dematerializing the original (which, as has been pointed out, happened in that reality's canon). That's enough evidence for me that the original dies during the transporter process.

I've got enough issues dealing with the fact that I have to sleep but at least that's a natural discontinuity and there's no good option. Anesthesia, which can provide a completely dreamless sleep, is also worrisome but at least I can be reasonably certain that the doctors didn't take my gallbladder out by changing me to energy and running me through a machine which turned me back to matter sans gallbladder.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Would the "me" on Earth experience what the "me" on Mars is going though?

No.

if not then surly you can understand what I mean when I say that "I" would be the "me" on earth?

And if I claimed that "you" would be the "you" on Mars, could you provide any evidence to justify considering one or the other?

 

[aggle-rithm]

Not sure if anyone's mentioned it, but "Think Like A Dinosaur" is a rather disturbing short story that does a good job of exploring the ethical considerations of teleportation. It goes into the consequences of a possible transport malfunction in which, until the success of the transport can be verified, the original must be kept alive. But only until...

 

[Nick227]

An identical clon of you atom by atom is not you. It is a copy which is indiferentiable by the external universe, true, but you died. Your consciousness is not continuying. The cosnciousness of the copy started the moment it was created, but with already made memory.

The Teletransporter returns! I was having another Teletransporter debate of an entirely different kind in the Arts section. Anyway...

I find what you write essentially correct, but consciousness does not belong to a "you." This "you" is merely an emergent property of that consciousness. Would you not agree?

Nick

 

[Metullus]

No.



And if I claimed that "you" would be the "you" on Mars, could you provide any evidence to justify considering one or the other?

If I have a 1970 Roadrunner and I create, by whatever means, a replica of that 1970 Roadrunner that is identical to, and in no imaginable way distinguishable from, the original, do I now have two 1970 Roadrunners? Or do I have a 1970 Roadrunner and a Replica 1970 Roadrunner that I simply cannot distinguish from one another?

 

[BenBurch]

Depends on the era. NX-01? Not bloody likely! NCC-1701 - sure.