Nothing could be farther from the truth. I have been on here weeks (maybe months) saying as soon as they couldn't confirm AA11 hit WTC1 that they should have scrambled Langley and put those aircraft up over top of Washington,DC,in case it were to head that way (proactive).
Why would they do that? They already had two fighter airborne. You would have left the entire eastern ADIZ undefended.
A position from which it could be defended from ALL directions (including the South West from which AA77 approached).
Defended? From what?
It's the members of this form,defenders the official story,who have defended MARR's decision to wait until he had a 'target' (reactive).
He didn't wait until he had a target, he merely declined to unnecessarily waste his very limited assets and leave his entire AO undefended performing functions that are not part of his duties.
Trouble is AA11 was descending when they lost the signal. If it didn't hit WTC1 and continued to descend,then it could have been flying under radar! It could have flown the 200 miles to Washington,DC, and NEVER appeared on their screens as a target!
No one knew that. The aircraft's transponder turned off before it began its descent, and only the ARSR-4 radars have height-finding capability (and FAA don't have access to that data anyway). Its last known altitude was at FL 290.
It wasn't until the aircraft's flight was reconstructed after the fact that they determined it started to make a rapid descent at 0838.
They had to have known of that possibility and weren't going to a damn thing about it!
No one had any idea what AA11 was doing. That means the range of possibilities was virtually endless. The most probable explanation, at that time, was that it was going to land at a NY airport.
With no actionable intelligence, and a matter NORAD isn't particularly concerned with, the only really sensible thing to do was keep trying to gather information.
The reality is, at that point, it wasn't of particularly high importance to NEADS - their primary responsibility is to watch for uncleared entry into the ADIZ from international airspace.
So,tell me why did they think they needed 3 aircraft out of Langley at 9:14? What prompted Nasypany to request Langley be scrambled at 9:09? Could it be the FAA told the truth in it's original time line? According to which (revised 2004) at 9:09 the FAA reported that there were as many as 11 possibly hijacked aircraft. Something had to convince the other people at NEADS that putting up the SOF was a good idea.
I actually suspect Craig Borgstrom's scramble was a case of miscommunication. The actual AAD Scramble for the Langley fighters was a 2-ship scramble, not a 3-ship scramble.
I suspect Borgstrom misunderstood NEADS' phone call. It was clearly only a query to see how many aircraft they could get airborne
if needed. When the scramble came, he assumed it meant him to, so joined in.
Some of the NEADS staff were quite surprised when they learned QUIT was a 3-ship flight instead of a 2-ship flight.