Very well, fair enough. Here is the longer version.
The claim that the 9/11 attacks were a part of an intentional government conspiracy by the FBI and CIA is false. Your claims are a combination of well known facts and unsubstantiated personal opinion.
A. Facts
1. Ali Soufan, Moussaoui, Alat, Cole bombing, Kuala Lumpur, bin Attash, al Qaeda, Khalid al-Mihdhar, others, meetings, photographs, associations. All these are very well known undisputed published public facts
provided by government investigations and form the bulk of your posts. These facts are not in dispute and in hindsight form and integrated narrative. Predicting the Past is a common gift.
2. There is no evidence the CIA and FBI knew beforehand that the Cole bombing and 9/11 attacks would take place and allowed them to happen.
B. Opinions. (A view or judgment formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge.)
Quotes paloalto
1. CIA allowed the Cole bombing and 9/11 attacks to take place.
“It is clear that almost every mention of Soufan was left out of the DOJ IG report to hide the CIA criminal culpability in not only allowing the Cole bombing to take place but also the attacks on 9/11 to take place.”
2. CIA perpetrated a massive criminal conspiracy. “
All of this information was kept completely secret from Soufan and the other FBI Cole bombing investigators in massive criminal conspiracy by the CIA that involved the Pakistan CIA Station, the Yemen CIA Station and the Bin Laden CIA Station, aka Alec Station.”
3. George Tenet orchestrated this massive criminal conspiracy. “The only person that could have orchestrated this massive CIA criminal conspiracy was George Tenet himself.”
These personal opinions are unsubstantiated. You have no evidence for any of these claims.
CIA and FBI intelligence recorded shortcomings explain the failure to stop the Cole and 9/11 attacks.
DOJ IG concluded that deficiencies in FBI’s handling of intelligence, individual failures, systemic problems, lack of an effective analytical program, failure to use the FISA stature fully, inadequate organization, were the reasons for the success of al Qaeda’s Cole and 9/11 attacks, not that the CIA and FBI knew beforehand that the Cole bombing and 9/11 attacks would take place and allowed them to happen.
From “Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004)” - Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (DOJ IG) released publicly June 2006.
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf
Quote DOJ IG (2006)
“CHAPTER SIX - RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our review found many deficiencies in the FBI’s handling of intelligence
information related to the September 11 attacks. In addition to individual
failures, which we detail at the end of each chapter, we found significant
systemic problems that undermined the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program. For
example, before the September 11 attacks the FBI lacked an effective
analytical program, failed to use the FISA statute fully, and was inadequately
organized to disseminate timely and sufficient information within the
Intelligence Community. As we detailed in this report, these systemic
problems significantly affected the FBI’s handling of the Phoenix Electronic
Communication (EC), the Moussaoui investigation, and the pursuit of
intelligence information relating to Hazmi and Mihdhar, two of the September
11 terrorists.”
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Also see the riveting, poignant documentary on the FBI’s leading expert on Al Qaeda, hero John O’Neill, that fleshes out the FBI’s systemic failures.
“The Man Who Knew”
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/view/
Quote PBS Frontline
“FRONTLINE's story on John O'Neill spotlights two central issues that emerged during the 9/11 Commission hearings held in the spring of 2004 investigating why the U.S. intelligence community failed to prevent the Sept. 11th terrorist attack:
- The 9/11 Commission's investigation revealed that America's $30 billion intelligence community, spread over more than a dozen agencies, was disorganized, fractured and impaired by organizational and legal restrictions on the sharing of information.
These disclosures directly relate to John O'Neill's story. He came tantalizingly close to possibly uncovering the 9/11 plot. But his investigations into the USS Cole terrorist attack and into Al Qaeda's presence in the United States were both undermined by the CIA and FBI's failure to share information with each other. Read FRONTLINE's "What If" report for details.
- The 9/11 Commission hearings also revealed how the FBI was not capable of functioning as a domestic intelligence service because of limited resources as well as a culture and organization that emphasized a traditional law enforcement approach to counterterrorism. FBI agents were trained to build criminal cases that could be prosecuted. As the 9/11 Commission's Staff Statement noted, "The Bureau rewarded agents based on statistics reflecting arrests, indictments and prosecutions. As a result, fields such as counterterrorism and counterintelligence, where investigations generally result in fewer prosecutions, were viewed as backwaters."
John O'Neill had run up against this FBI culture; his counterterrorism efforts directly threatened the dominance of the group who held sway over the bureau - the criminal division. O'Neill also fought to improve the FBI's resources and capabilities to fight the new terrorism, arguing for a plan that represented a seismic shift in the way the FBI had always operated. One example: He would have given authority to a new more analytic agent who would have enhanced technology to fight terrorism. As the 9/11 Commission hearings disclosed, "66 percent of the bureau analysts were not qualified to perform analytic duties."
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/could/911commission.html
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In conclusion, fleshed out and substantiated, with the bulk of your claims comprised of well known facts provided by the government’s investigations and journalists, plus unsubstantiated personal opinions:
No Pulitzer for you.
Or for anyone with similar claims.
QED.
Thanks for your reasonably well researched reply. At least you are using the information that is now available to analyze what went wrong.
But your conclusions are still wrong for the following reasons.
The below conclusions are not backed up by this own DOJ IG report:
Quote DOJ IG (2006)
“CHAPTER SIX - RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our review found many deficiencies in the FBI’s handling of intelligence
information related to the September 11 attacks. In addition to individual
failures, which we detail at the end of each chapter, we found significant
systemic problems that undermined the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program. For
example, before the September 11 attacks the FBI lacked an effective
analytical program, failed to use the FISA statute fully, and was inadequately
organized to disseminate timely and sufficient information within the
Intelligence Community. As we detailed in this report, these systemic
problems significantly affected the FBI’s handling of the Phoenix Electronic
Communication (EC), the Moussaoui investigation, and the pursuit of
intelligence information relating to Hazmi and Mihdhar, two of the September
11 terrorists.”
This conclusion attempts to blame the 9/11 attacks on "the many deficiencies in the FBI’s handling of intelligence information related to the September 11 attacks". But this conclusion is contrary to the very information found in this DOJ IG report and from additional information found in the defense exhibits entered into the Moussaoui trial.
This conclusion does not explain why the person who was directly supervising Corsi and Middleton, Tom Wilshire, a former Deputy Chief of the CIA bin Laden unit, and who knew immediately on August 22, 2001, when he and Corsi were told in Wilshire’s FBI office that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US that these two al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US only in order to take part in a massive al Qaeda terrorist attack, why he did not immediately alert the FBI criminal investigators to find these terrorists before they had time to carry out a al Qaeda terrorist attack inside of the US. Why did he not alert every manager at the FBI HQ that these two al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the for no other reasons than to take part in a massive al Qaeda terrorist attack.
Wilshire had sent an email to his CIA CTC managers Richard Blee, and Cofer Black on July 23, 2001 indicating that Mihdhar and Hazmi would be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda terrorist attack. Wilshire worked with Corsi to write up a EC on August 22, 2001 to start an “intelligence investigation” for Mihdhar and Hazmi not a criminal investigation. But both Corsi and Wilshire knew that the CIA had a photograph of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur, (Wilshire knew that by January 2001, Corsi by August 22, 2001), knew that meant that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing, knew that was a major crime that meant that this information should have gone immediately to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing, Bongardt and his team. Yet not only was this information kept secret from Bongardt and his team, but when John Liguori sent Corsi’s EC to Bongardt on August 28, 2001, Corsi refused to allow Bongardt to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, even though Bongardt also knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in horrific al Qaeda terrorist attack.
No deficiency in the FBI handling of information can explain why FBI IOS HQ Agent Dina Corsi told FBI Agent Steve Bongardt on August 28, 2001 that he could not start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, because the NSA did not allow the NSA information in her EC to go to any FBI criminal investigator when she had already been approved to give this information to Bongardt and his team by the NSA just the day before on August 27, 2001.
This DOJ IG conclusion does not explain why Corsi lied to shut down Bongardt’s criminal investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi. On August 28, 2001, after Corsi claimed the NSA information in her EC prevented Bongardt from getting her EC, Bongardt asked her to get a opinion from the NSLU attorneys at FBI HQ on the issue if he could start an investigation since Bongardt did not see any connection to this NSA information and any FISA warrant, the only reason why the NSA approval would even be needed to send this information to FBI criminal investigators.
Corsi told Bongardt on August 29, 2001 that the attorney she and her boss Rod Middleton had consulted had ruled that Bongardt could not take part in any investigation from Mihdhar and Hazmi. But the 9/11 Commission report page 538 foot note 81 says that on November 7, 2002 Sherry Sabol told DOJ IG investigators, testimony transcribed by the DOJ IG investigators, that she told Corsi that since the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant, Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. Corsi, and also Middleton, her boss, had lied in order to shut down FBI Agent Steven Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, when both she and Middleton knew a huge al Qaeda terrorist attack was just about to take place inside of the US and also knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda terrorists who were going to take part in this attack.
On August 30 2001, the photo of Walid bin Attash was sent by the CIA to Rod Middleton. So Corsi’s boss also knew by August 30, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing yet none of these people, Corsi, Middleton and Wilshire, called Bongardt to tell him to immediately start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
The conclusion in the DOJ IG report does not explain any of this and their conclusions are in fact contrary to the very information found in this report, clearly showing that even the DOJ IOG was obfuscating the facts around why the attacks on 9/11 had taken place.
While the DOJ IG report tried to write off Corsi’s crimes committed while trying to shut down Bongardt’s; investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi with “Corsi was confused over rules regarding FISA warrants”, the email she sent to John Liguori on August 29, 2001 show she was in no way confused when she shut down Bongardt’s criminal investigation.
In email on August 29, 2001 to Liguori, Defense Exhibit #681, she says “if at such time as information is developed indication evidence of a substantial Federal crime this information will be passed over the wall”. But Corsi had already told DOJ IOG investigators that she knew by at least August 22, 2001 that the CIA had a photo of bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur and knew this directly connected both Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing. This was 6 days before she shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
Not only is this information about Corsi’s knowledge that the CIA had the photo of bin Attash in the DOJ IG report page 301, but the DOJ IG had the written testimony of Attorney Sherry Sabol, on November 7, 2002, indicating that she told Corsi that there was no reason to shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi. This written testimony clearly known to the DOJ IG and yet deliberately was left out of the DOJ IG report, as was the July 23, 2001 email by Wilshire back to his CTC managers indicating that Mihdhar was be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda terrorists attack.
This is further evidence that the DOJ IG report, while in most cases was the most accurate had deliberately left out critical information directly pointing at the criminal culpability of FBI HQ agents and managers allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place.