Fifty Years Ago: The Cuban Missile Crisis

[fleabeetle]

I feel that something of a case can be made in favour of the "ignorance-is-bliss" approach...

That was my point. I may not have phrased it clearly.

I was agreeing with you, not quarreling with you -- sorry -- as frequently observed, on the Internet nuances are often not clear.

 

[Brown]

I don't remember the crisis, and I've not asked my parents about it. I expect that things might have been more tense if you were living in a potential target community--such as New York or Washington--than if you lived in, say, Waverly, Iowa. But on the other hand, it is possible (though unlikely) that Waverly may have been a potential target, as a sizable radar installation used to sit just outside of town.

I shall have to ask my parents about their recollections, next time I talk to them.

As I grew up, I was sort of dimly aware that there had been some sort of Cuba-centered conflict involving the USA and the USSR, but I did not know the details and I did not know how close to actual war the parties had come. When I was in high school, one of my teachers decided to show us "The Missiles of October," which was quite a good drama about the crisis, told from the points of view of the Americans and the Soviets. William Devane was a convincingly pensive JFK, and Martin Sheen was also good as an emotional yet calculating Bobby Kennedy. In a bit of irony lost on me at the time, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was portrayed by Howard Da Silva, who had been blacklisted in the 1950s because of suspected Communist sympathies.

 

[TimCallahan]

According to this site WW III was really close. Here's a quote from the article:

Had the United States launched an airstrike and invaded Cuba, the Soviet commander on the scene would almost certainly have responded with about 100 tactical nuclear weapons under his control – tactical nuclear weapons JFK did not even know were on the island. The US would have felt compelled to respond in kind triggering an escalation to nuclear Armageddon. As RFK later recalled, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council advising JFK during the crisis was full of “bright, able dedicated people, all of whom had the greatest affection for the US, [but] if six of them had been President...the world might have been blown up”.

 

[Gregoire]

One interesting thing about the first source I cited is it showed how the Intelligence services were blamed even though the head of the CIA had warned Kennedy at least as early as August to look for missiles. I was reading this book back in 2006 during the Iraq War and so I couldn't help but notice the parallels.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=8684132#post8684132

 

[catsmate]

It's surprising how many incidents that occurred during the crisis didn't lead to war given the tensions of the time;

• the explosion of the Soviet satellite 62 Beta Iota
• the sabotage alarm at the Duluth Sector Direction Center that caused nuclear armed F-106 interceptors to take off
• the test launch of a Titan missile from Vandenburg on 26OCT
• this launch also caused an alert from Moorestown Radar installation
• later that same facility issues a launch warning to NORAD due to a training tape error
• the failure of the two man system at Malmstrom Air Force Base
• Malmstrom also experienced several problems with the control systems of it's Minuteman missiles
• the NATO alerts, issued against Macmillan and Norstad's agreement no to do so
• the UK Bomber command exercises
• the missile launch alert from the Laredo radar site

Lots of little things that would be filtered during peacetime but during a heightened alert could have triggered a response.

 

[Brown]

This story reports a few wrinkles that previously escaped notice. Castro, in addition to being an overtly de-stabilizing force, thought that he would get to KEEP the tactical nukes. The Soviet representative initially agreed, then realized that Castro was a loose cannon. And he told a whopping lie to get the nukes away from Castro.

"The headline here is just how close Cuba came to being a nuclear power," James Hershberg of the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington told the Miami Herald.
...
While the world breathed a sigh of relief as the Soviets began removing the long-range missiles, Castro fumed. He had been bypassed in negotiations between the two superpowers. Set on keeping the Hiroshima-sized nuclear warheads, he began to chafe at his handlers in Moscow. Concerned the cigar-chomping revolutionary might do something to ruin the agreement, Khrushchev dispatched his number two, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan, to Havana to calm Castro down.

Although he would learn soon after arriving that his wife of 43 years had died, Mikoyan had little time to grieve. In sensitive negotiations that would remain secret for decades, Mikoyan initially told Castro he could keep the tactical nukes that had escaped U.S. notice.
...
Mikoyan [later] decided on his own that Castro could not be trusted and that the missiles must be removed from the island. He told Castro that a Soviet law -- which did not exist -- banned a permanent transfer to the Cubans.

"So you have a law that prohibits transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to other countries? It's a pity. And when are you going to repeal that law?" Castro asked.

"We will see," Mikoyan replied.

 

[Garrette]

I am speaking outside my expertise here, and I do not want to give the impression that I am a USSR fan, but the more I learn over the years the more I begin to realize that -- despite his cruel despotism -- Khruschev and his regime were eminently practical and not an empire builder. Am I wrong?

ETA: So I guess I am saying that we were fortunate not only that we had JFK, but also that they had Nikki.

 

[RedRatSnake]

So I guess I am saying that we were fortunate not only that we had JFK, but also that they had Nikki.

Yes and no from how i see it, we had deployed missiles close to their country and gave them a good scare. But ! in return they sent unregulated Nukes and lots of them right off our coast, i say it was a bit over reaction and didn't need to be that way.
Thing is we had two cool headed leaders that worked it out after they realized what they had both done. Of course lot's of other stuff went on but to cut it down and just make a quick post that's how i see it.

Tim

 

[angrysoba]

I like Hitchens's take on it when he says, "I still remember where I was the day that JFK nearly killed me."

 

[catsmate]

Yes and no from how i see it, we had deployed missiles close to their country and gave them a good scare. But ! in return they sent unregulated Nukes and lots of them right off our coast, i say it was a bit over reaction and didn't need to be that way.
Thing is we had two cool headed leaders that worked it out after they realized what they had both done. Of course lot's of other stuff went on but to cut it down and just make a quick post that's how i see it.

Tim

From the Soviet strategic perspective it was (arguably) a good idea. It offset the Soviet Union's inferiority in long range missiles (ICBMs) by allowing them to deploy shorter ranged missiles (IRBMs) usefully close to the USA.
The US had similar missiles in Turkey and Europe.

 

[Craig B]

I am speaking outside my expertise here, and I do not want to give the impression that I am a USSR fan, but the more I learn over the years the more I begin to realize that -- despite his cruel despotism -- Khruschev and his regime were eminently practical and not an empire builder. Am I wrong?

ETA: So I guess I am saying that we were fortunate not only that we had JFK, but also that they had Nikki.

I think Khrushchev was more an "empire holder" than an "empire builder". The Cuban régime did not originate as part of any Soviet imperial initiative, but once it was there, K supported it, within the limits of reason.

I also think K was sincerely trying to humanise and reform Soviet communism. Unlike his successors, he appears to have believed in it as a valid ideology. But it proved to be unreformable, and when a much later leader appeared who was resolved to reform it, no matter what, it simply fell to pieces in his hands. Never has a mighty empire collapsed with so little fuss. There is nothing as flimsy as a false ideology, once the falseness becomes generally known and admitted! Just like the Emperor's New Clothes, is simply vanishes as if it has never been, for in an important sense, it never really was.

 

[autumn1971]

I think Khrushchev was more an "empire holder" than an "empire builder". The Cuban régime did not originate as part of any Soviet imperial initiative, but once it was there, K supported it, within the limits of reason.

I also think K was sincerely trying to humanise and reform Soviet communism. Unlike his successors, he appears to have believed in it as a valid ideology. But it proved to be unreformable, and when a much later leader appeared who was resolved to reform it, no matter what, it simply fell to pieces in his hands. Never has a mighty empire collapsed with so little fuss. There is nothing as flimsy as a false ideology, once the falseness becomes generally known and admitted! Just like the Emperor's New Clothes, is simply vanishes as if it has never been, for in an important sense, it never really was.

In Dark Sun by Rhodes, there is an anecdote about Khruschev's initial reaction after being at a test of a Soviet nuclear device; he is reported as saying that he was relieved, because no leader would be insane enough to use them. Humanizes him a bit.

 

[Gregoire]

I am speaking outside my expertise here, and I do not want to give the impression that I am a USSR fan, but the more I learn over the years the more I begin to realize that -- despite his cruel despotism -- Khruschev and his regime were eminently practical and not an empire builder. Am I wrong?

ETA: So I guess I am saying that we were fortunate not only that we had JFK, but also that they had Nikki.

I strongly support your desire to look past ideology and try to understand the motivations that led to historical events. Too many people to this day reject any attempt to understand their enemies and indeed overlook what they would have done in a similar circumstance. I think your approach is the skeptical way to look at the situation.

Many historians have a similar mindset. But I think they would disagree with the idea that Khrushchev was really being practical. The ones I have read, at least, have been very critical of him.

Specifically, they ask, what did he expect the United States to do when they found out? Particularly when he explicitly lied to Kennedy about not putting missiles in Cuba. There is an impression that Khrushchev, being a true believer as you point out, let his romanticism get the best of him. And he also seemed to have a profound misunderstanding how democratic governments functioned.

Here is how one historian puts it after discussing the crisis at length:

"The best explanation, in the end, is that Khrushchev allowed his ideological romanticism to overrun whatever capacity he had for strategic analysis. He was so emotionally committed to the Castro revolution that he risked his own revolution, his country, and possibly the world on its behalf……"

He goes on to compare Khrushchev to

"Lenin and Stalin, who rarely allowed their emotions to determine their revolutionary priorities….(Khrushchev) was like a child playing with a loaded gun."

Source:

http://www.amazon.com/dp/0143038273...=11.56&hvptwo=&hvqmt=b&ref=pd_sl_5iaprwirs1_b

pp77-78

 

[catsmate]

There's an article on the crisis over at Restricted Data that's rather interesting, with some good links. Given the quantity of operational nuclear weapons on Cuba in November 1962 (>150 including FROG and FRK missiles), the small number of operational medium range missiles (that could reach as far as Washington DC and Dallas) and the lack of physical security on the weapons (no PALs) there was a lot of potential for a major disaster.