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Bernardo Kastrup on Coast to Coast

Yes, interesting fellow. But not one I take seriously since he can only present his position through argumentative logic.
 
Yes, interesting fellow. But not one I take seriously since he can only present his position through argumentative logic.

If you are referring to the other thread, maybe I overdid a bit, Steve. But I'm still willing to engage in a less argumentative way. By the way, thanks for posting this.
 
Bernardo, do you have any thoughts how your overall position could or specific points could be tested empirically ?
 
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I can never take anyone seriously on Coast to Coast. Though, interestingly enough... Didn't they have like, Bill Nye or someone on Coast to Coast recently?
 
Bernardo, do you have any thoughts how your overall position could or specific points could be tested empirically ?

Hi Steve,
Yes, I think the specific point that the brain does not generate the mind can be tested empirically. I wrote extensively about it in this article. For simplicity reasons, the article implicitly adopts dualist metaphors. I am NOT a dualist though, and I suggest here how the ideas in the article can be reconciled with Idealism. I'm right now in the process of writing a book detailing all this extensively.
Gr, B.
 
Bernardo, do you have any thoughts how your overall position could or specific points could be tested empirically ?

Regarding the broader notions of Idealism, have a look at this:

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality

The non-local realist theories that are left need to abandon non-contextuality. They would basically entail that the reality we experience is indeed a function of mind, but there is an objective reality that we can't experience. Naturally, the objection is: why to make this abstraction? So the paper seems to support Idealism strongly.

Evidence aside, I might ask the same question of Realism: What proof is there that there is a strongly-objective world outside of mind, since all knowledge is, by definition, in mind?
 
Regarding the broader notions of Idealism, have a look at this:

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality

The non-local realist theories that are left need to abandon non-contextuality. They would basically entail that the reality we experience is indeed a function of mind, but there is an objective reality that we can't experience. Naturally, the objection is: why to make this abstraction? So the paper seems to support Idealism strongly.

Evidence aside, I might ask the same question of Realism: What proof is there that there is a strongly-objective world outside of mind, since all knowledge is, by definition, in mind?
That's a rather easy conclusion. Find a brick wall. Ball up your fist and slam it into the wall. What will the result be ? Lots of pain and broken bones I'd imagine. Now wait several weeks for the bones to mend. Then repeat the experiment, but this time change local realism. Now, are you absolutely confident in your philosophical worldview you can change local realism ?

I read the article. While the article appears correct the article only addresses reality on the quantum level. It does not address the point where quantum effects give way to the macroscopic world. In the last paragraph a physicist much more learned than both of us combined feels the philosophical conclusions drawn by the experimenters is subjective.

Something to consider.
New Theory Explains How Objective Reality Emerges from the Strange Underlying Quantum World


http://blogs.scientificamerican.com...es-from-the-strange-underlying-quantum-world/
 
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Regarding the broader notions of Idealism, have a look at this:

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality

The non-local realist theories that are left need to abandon non-contextuality. They would basically entail that the reality we experience is indeed a function of mind, but there is an objective reality that we can't experience. Naturally, the objection is: why to make this abstraction? So the paper seems to support Idealism strongly.

Evidence aside, I might ask the same question of Realism: What proof is there that there is a strongly-objective world outside of mind, since all knowledge is, by definition, in mind?

Considering I don't think you actually know what Leggett's inequality means, I suspect you are just waving around something from QM and abusing teh terminology and then equating it to philosophical realism. Which has almost no relation to philosophical realism. I shall start a thread in SMT about this, where you are welcome to present a case for why your use of the Leggtt's inequality has some bearing on philosophical realism.

Can you even name the first part of Leggtt's definition of macroscopic realism and what it means in QM?

However given you past behavior I won't hold my breath.

The moon does exist when you don't look at it.
 
Hi Steve,
Yes, I think the specific point that the brain does not generate the mind can be tested empirically. I wrote extensively about it in this article. For simplicity reasons, the article implicitly adopts dualist metaphors. I am NOT a dualist though, and I suggest here how the ideas in the article can be reconciled with Idealism. I'm right now in the process of writing a book detailing all this extensively.
Gr, B.

Since it's not possible to edit a post once you leave I've too start anew.

I've given a cursory read through of the above links. All you do is talk analogy. Nothing within those links answers the question, which is, can you devise an empirical experiment ? The question can be answered with one of two words yes or no. If the answer is yes than explain what the experiment would be.
 
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Find a brick wall. Ball up your fist and slam it into the wall. What will the result be ? Lots of pain and broken bones I'd imagine. Now wait several weeks for the bones to mend. Then repeat the experiment, but this time change local realism. Now, are you absolutely confident in your philosophical worldview you can change local realism ?

Sounds very much like Samuel Johnson's refutation of immaterialism - kicks large rock: "I refute it thus!". Seems equally valid :)
 
Hi Steve,

That's a rather easy conclusion. Find a brick wall. Ball up your fist and slam it into the wall. What will the result be ? Lots of pain and broken bones I'd imagine. Now wait several weeks for the bones to mend. Then repeat the experiment, but this time change local realism. Now, are you absolutely confident in your philosophical worldview you can change local realism ?

Idealism entails that the medium of reality is mind itself, i.e. subjective perception. It does NOT entail that your egoic will can change reality on a whim. Nor does it entail that only the egoic part of mind exists (i.e. the unconscious mind, empirically verified to be real, is not discarded as a creative force). So I am saying that everything is in mind -- including your body and brain -- NOT that you can change all of reality at will.

The dynamics of mind certainly obeys patterns and regularities, which correspond to what we've come to call the 'laws of physics.' Idealism does not deny these patterns and regularities, only the unprovable metaphysical assumption that they correspond to the behavior of things outside of mind.

I read the article. While the article appears correct the article only addresses reality on the quantum level. It does not address the point where quantum effects give way to the macroscopic world. In the last paragraph a physicist much more learned than both of us combined feels the philosophical conclusions drawn by the experimenters is subjective.

Thanks for the link. But I guess you're mixing two things up. The Nature paper does not deal with the measurement problem, i.e. to how/why a superposition state 'collapses' into the reality we know. It deals simply with entanglement, an acknowledged phenomenon. Entanglement applies to particles, be them photons, electrons, etc. Insofar as these particles are the building blocks of reality, the conclusions extracted from entanglement experiments do apply to reality at large. This is not what is disputed as far as the conclusion of the paper, and the paper is very explicit in concluding that standard realism cannot hold in reality at large. Here is the complete Nature paper: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.2529.pdf.

What is being debated now is whether there isn't a non-local realist theory that still survives these results. There are a couple of candidates, but they give up non-contextuality, which basically means that the reality we see is indeed the effect of mind, but that there is an unmeasurable reality independent of mind. My position is that such is an unbelievably contrived and forced alternative aimed purely at denying the simpler and more natural alternative, which is that there is only mind.
 
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Considering I don't think you actually know what Leggett's inequality means, I suspect you are just waving around something from QM and abusing teh terminology and then equating it to philosophical realism. Which has almost no relation to philosophical realism. I shall start a thread in SMT about this, where you are welcome to present a case for why your use of the Leggtt's inequality has some bearing on philosophical realism.

Can you even name the first part of Leggtt's definition of macroscopic realism and what it means in QM?

However given you past behavior I won't hold my breath.

The moon does exist when you don't look at it.

David, this is a childish and substance-less reply. The implications of this paper are well-known and debated openly. Your suggestion that I am making things up is patently ludicrous.
 
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Since it's not possible to edit a post once you leave I've too start anew.

I've given a cursory read through of the above links. All you do is talk analogy. Nothing within those links answers the question, which is, can you devise an empirical experiment ? The question can be answered with one of two words yes or no. If the answer is yes than explain what the experiment would be.

That's a puzzling statement. The paper I linked to has a section called "predictions" and another called "evidence" that both clearly suggest empirical tests. And I replied your original question with three posts, not only this one.
 
Sounds very much like Samuel Johnson's refutation of immaterialism - kicks large rock: "I refute it thus!". Seems equally valid :)

Indeed! Johnson supposedly tried to refute Berkeley by kicking the rock and saying that. It is, however, well-known as a fallacious refutation. If anything, the similarity of the argument makes my point.

According to realism/materialism, the rock that Johnson saw and felt when kicking it was entirely a brain-constructed hallucination. All of Johnson's experiences, which is what he appeals to in his argument, where in his head alone. Still according to realism/materialism, the real world is an abstract, colorless, formless realm of interacting electromagnetic fields that modulate our brain-constructed hallucinations. Therefore, if anything, Johnson's argument favors idealism: if the rock he felt was the real deal, then idealism holds.
 
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Indeed! Johnson supposedly tried to refute Berkeley by kicking the rock and saying that. It is, however, well-known as a fallacious refutation. If anything, the similarity of the argument makes my point.

According to realism/materialism, the rock that Johnson saw and felt when kicking it was entirely a brain-constructed hallucination. All of Johnson's experiences, which is what he appeals to in his argument, where in his head alone. Still according to realism/materialism, the real world is an abstract, colorless, formless realm of interacting electromagnetic fields that modulate our brain-constructed hallucinations. Therefore, if anything, Johnson's argument favors idealism: if the rock he felt was the real deal, then idealism holds.

Well, he did have a brain involved. Are we going to make that an ideal too or the experiencer only?
 
How am I to determine which of the words used in the presentation refer to real things and which hallucinatory. Even a word like "inertia" is grounded in what might be a figment of my imagination -- how are we to talk about this stuff, given it may be so?

Every noun, every relationship, every adjective is based on my supposition that the listener (and even the listener themselves) is connected in a meaningful way to reality. I wonder how the solipsist is able to say anything and why?
 
... the conclusions extracted from entanglement experiments do apply to reality at large. This is not what is disputed as far as the conclusion of the paper, ...

Bernardo, could you point out how the conclusions of the paper you linked to support (unlike "not dispute") your above hilited statement?
 

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