For your entertainment.
Have a look between 9:46 and 38:35 min of this audio interview.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Wug-VNgR4E
Have a look between 9:46 and 38:35 min of this audio interview.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Wug-VNgR4E
Yes, interesting fellow. But not one I take seriously since he can only present his position through argumentative logic.
Bernardo, do you have any thoughts how your overall position could or specific points could be tested empirically ?
I can never take anyone seriously on Coast to Coast.
Bernardo, do you have any thoughts how your overall position could or specific points could be tested empirically ?
Regarding the broader notions of Idealism, have a look at this:
http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality
The non-local realist theories that are left need to abandon non-contextuality. They would basically entail that the reality we experience is indeed a function of mind, but there is an objective reality that we can't experience. Naturally, the objection is: why to make this abstraction? So the paper seems to support Idealism strongly.
That's a rather easy conclusion. Find a brick wall. Ball up your fist and slam it into the wall. What will the result be ? Lots of pain and broken bones I'd imagine. Now wait several weeks for the bones to mend. Then repeat the experiment, but this time change local realism. Now, are you absolutely confident in your philosophical worldview you can change local realism ?Evidence aside, I might ask the same question of Realism: What proof is there that there is a strongly-objective world outside of mind, since all knowledge is, by definition, in mind?
Regarding the broader notions of Idealism, have a look at this:
http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality
The non-local realist theories that are left need to abandon non-contextuality. They would basically entail that the reality we experience is indeed a function of mind, but there is an objective reality that we can't experience. Naturally, the objection is: why to make this abstraction? So the paper seems to support Idealism strongly.
Evidence aside, I might ask the same question of Realism: What proof is there that there is a strongly-objective world outside of mind, since all knowledge is, by definition, in mind?
Hi Steve,
Yes, I think the specific point that the brain does not generate the mind can be tested empirically. I wrote extensively about it in this article. For simplicity reasons, the article implicitly adopts dualist metaphors. I am NOT a dualist though, and I suggest here how the ideas in the article can be reconciled with Idealism. I'm right now in the process of writing a book detailing all this extensively.
Gr, B.
Find a brick wall. Ball up your fist and slam it into the wall. What will the result be ? Lots of pain and broken bones I'd imagine. Now wait several weeks for the bones to mend. Then repeat the experiment, but this time change local realism. Now, are you absolutely confident in your philosophical worldview you can change local realism ?
That's a rather easy conclusion. Find a brick wall. Ball up your fist and slam it into the wall. What will the result be ? Lots of pain and broken bones I'd imagine. Now wait several weeks for the bones to mend. Then repeat the experiment, but this time change local realism. Now, are you absolutely confident in your philosophical worldview you can change local realism ?
I read the article. While the article appears correct the article only addresses reality on the quantum level. It does not address the point where quantum effects give way to the macroscopic world. In the last paragraph a physicist much more learned than both of us combined feels the philosophical conclusions drawn by the experimenters is subjective.
Considering I don't think you actually know what Leggett's inequality means, I suspect you are just waving around something from QM and abusing teh terminology and then equating it to philosophical realism. Which has almost no relation to philosophical realism. I shall start a thread in SMT about this, where you are welcome to present a case for why your use of the Leggtt's inequality has some bearing on philosophical realism.
Can you even name the first part of Leggtt's definition of macroscopic realism and what it means in QM?
However given you past behavior I won't hold my breath.
The moon does exist when you don't look at it.
Since it's not possible to edit a post once you leave I've too start anew.
I've given a cursory read through of the above links. All you do is talk analogy. Nothing within those links answers the question, which is, can you devise an empirical experiment ? The question can be answered with one of two words yes or no. If the answer is yes than explain what the experiment would be.
Sounds very much like Samuel Johnson's refutation of immaterialism - kicks large rock: "I refute it thus!". Seems equally valid![]()
Indeed! Johnson supposedly tried to refute Berkeley by kicking the rock and saying that. It is, however, well-known as a fallacious refutation. If anything, the similarity of the argument makes my point.
According to realism/materialism, the rock that Johnson saw and felt when kicking it was entirely a brain-constructed hallucination. All of Johnson's experiences, which is what he appeals to in his argument, where in his head alone. Still according to realism/materialism, the real world is an abstract, colorless, formless realm of interacting electromagnetic fields that modulate our brain-constructed hallucinations. Therefore, if anything, Johnson's argument favors idealism: if the rock he felt was the real deal, then idealism holds.
... the conclusions extracted from entanglement experiments do apply to reality at large. This is not what is disputed as far as the conclusion of the paper, ...