On Consciousness

[Belz...]

I am pretty sure I do not like the words 'holistic' being thrown around, but the above does remind me of some possibly apocryphal story of Galileo. The idea was Galileo wanted to show a priest of some kind (Bishop, Cardinal, Pope?) his telescope and how it showed the moon was not perfect. The priest would not look through it because, as he said, "It doesn't work that way. It just makes your eyes malfunction."

There is definitely something anti-science in the way PixyMisa responded to above. It has an anti-sensation bias.

I disagree. Pixy's point, I think, is simply that the drug modifies the brain's chemistry and causes you to experience things that do not have a deeper meaning: it's just your brain being played with. Zeuzzz's claim that hallucinations somehow mean something is misguided, and science knows this quite well.

Yes, a very well put and erudite point.

What else would you expect from the master of erudition ?

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Yes, a very well put and erudite point.

Thank Carl Sagan. Best I can do is ape his quips.

 

[steenkh]

The experience of red itself,

something comp.lit never seem to talk about, the experience of sensation.

The experience of sensation constitutes the special pattern that says "red". In a program this could be the hex code FD1D1D, and in the brain it would be certain neurons firing at a certain frequency. That is all.

What did you expect?

 

[dlorde]

Could this be exactly what the Brain does;
Simulate or model the world as abstractions through data collected by sensors(senses).

Aha! so the brain is simulating the computer...

But seriously, yes, it does model via abstractions.

 

[tensordyne]

The experience of sensation constitutes the special pattern that says "red". In a program this could be the hex code FD1D1D, and in the brain it would be certain neurons firing at a certain frequency. That is all.

What did you expect?

And that is where comp.lit fails, right there above. The experience of the sensation of red is of its own kind. It should be respected as such. The pattern of letters that make up the word red is not the experience of the sensation of red. The wave-length of light, a hexcode and neurons firing at a certain frequency (even if that produces the experience of the sensation of red), all the above are not the experience of the sensation of red.

The experience of sensation (of red and whatever else) is something we should all be able to agree is important enough to give it a term. For the moment let's call it p-consciousness (it should just be consciousness if people were not so annoying).

Plus, that is one weird sentence: The experience of sensation constitutes the special pattern that says "red".

Who is this that is saying "red" and why is that important to the experience of the sensation of red or its putative existence?

 

[dlorde]

... If both parties understand that the different levels of simulation fidelity may have different impacts, it's easy. If not it's an uphill battle, because you first have to fight them to get them to talk about a seemingly-unrelated matter of simulations and repeatedly demonstrate how it's not just a baffle for special pleading, it really is an important thing.

Yeah, but it's a tiresomely easy target for straw-manning and evasion

 

[tensordyne]

Thank Carl Sagan. Best I can do is ape his quips.

Thanks Carl Sagan, you had some awesome quips!

Then again, he is dead, so thanking him is pretty pointless. Oh well, interesting thing to me is how to decide the difference between being an apologist for a failed intellectual idea or being a woo master who is too stuborn or dumb to admit the establishment has it figured out already. Public laughter does not seem the correct measure to determine which is which.

 

[tensordyne]

I don't think it's due to an unwillingness to address the issue, Tensor, but rather a different understanding of what it means. To me, for instance, there is no real distinction between what you call the sensation of red, and the purely mechanical reaction of my nervous system to a bunch of photons at that wavelength. In other words, they simply do away with the loaded language and include the sensation in the physical process, rather than assume it's something distinct.

Ah, but that is the point, they are distinct concepts. Both, the idea of the experience of the sensation of red and any ideas associated with how such sensations may come about, are abstract ideas. There are quite likely several different ideas currently in contention about how the red color sensation experience occurs. Each of them is different and each does not affect the idea of the experience of the sensation of color itself.

So I say this, if you are comp.lit, I respect your hypothesis (as far as it goes) that experience of sensation occurs due to computation (or some such similar idea), but I find it troubling this loss of a separate conception for the experience of sensation (troubling in a kind of anti-science way). There is no loading of language to talk about experiencing sensation, especially when talking about consciousness because that is what consciuousness is!

 

[tensordyne]

I disagree. Pixy's point, I think, is simply that the drug modifies the brain's chemistry and causes you to experience things that do not have a deeper meaning: it's just your brain being played with. Zeuzzz's claim that hallucinations somehow mean something is misguided, and science knows this quite well.

I know PixyMisa's and Zeuzzz's points, and I even agree with the general outline of the reviews given thus far, but look how unscientific is the attitude above in terms of PixyMisa's position. PixyMisa is saying that there is no need for anyone to think about what this drug is possibly doing or showing us through experience of it because PixyMisa is already sure ahead of time there is no value in such.

Zeuzzz has the much more scientific attitude, go look for yourself. Give it a try, it is not going to kill you and you might (from the reports I have heard and read it is more than likely a fact that you will) experience something that shakes your view of reality (the one thing PixyMisa definitely does not want). How do you know unless you do it yourself?

Lets say DMT did do nothing more than scramble your circuits for a while. There would still be a scientific case to be made for people experiencing the effects first hand. Perhaps the experience will show what it is like to experience synesthesia, or perhaps in the Altered State of Consciousness (ASC) you will be able to experience some new form of sensation, like added colors. That kind of information can be added together so that various hypothesis can be formulated.

Basically, unless you have health or legal concerns, I find it unscientific to hold the ostridge in the sand attitude of PixyMisa.

 

[tensordyne]

Exactly.

 

[PixyMisa]

I am pretty sure I do not like the words 'holistic' being thrown around, but the above does remind me of some possibly apocryphal story of Galileo. The idea was Galileo wanted to show a priest of some kind (Bishop, Cardinal, Pope?) his telescope and how it showed the moon was not perfect. The priest would not look through it because, as he said, "It doesn't work that way. It just makes your eyes malfunction."

There is definitely something anti-science in the way PixyMisa responded to above. It has an anti-sensation bias.

Argument from non-existent ignorance. We know what psychoactive drugs do, and in many cases we know how. And what they do is make your brain malfunction.

 

[PixyMisa]

I disagree. Pixy's point, I think, is simply that the drug modifies the brain's chemistry and causes you to experience things that do not have a deeper meaning: it's just your brain being played with. Zeuzzz's claim that hallucinations somehow mean something is misguided, and science knows this quite well.

Hence my stopwatch analogy: Not only are you messing with your brain, but you are judging the relevance of the outcome using the same instrument you just messed up.

 

[PixyMisa]

I know PixyMisa's and Zeuzzz's points, and I even agree with the general outline of the reviews given thus far, but look how unscientific is the attitude above in terms of PixyMisa's position.

Wrong. My position is purely scientific. You just happen not to like the results.

PixyMisa is saying that there is no need for anyone to think about what this drug is possibly doing or showing us through experience of it because PixyMisa is already sure ahead of time there is no value in such.

No.

Zeuzzz has the much more scientific attitude, go look for yourself.

Quite the opposite. We've already explored this scientifically, and he is proposing that we throw all that away on the basis of.... Nothing. Absolutely nothing.

Again, your bias is blinding you to reality.

Give it a try, it is not going to kill you and you might (from the reports I have heard and read it is more than likely a fact that you will) experience something that shakes your view of reality (the one thing PixyMisa definitely does not want).

Psychoactive drugs by definition cause your brain to malfunction. Hallucinatory drugs doubly so. No experience under the influence of such drugs can be a valid reason to question your view of reality, and in any case, your ability to judge such experiences has been compromised by the same drug that induced them.

How do you know unless you do it yourself?

How do you know that jumping off the Brooklyn Bridge will cause you to plummet to your death... Unless you do it yourself?

Sorry, tensdoryne, but you couldn't be more wrong. It is your position, and Zeuzzz's, that is desperately closed-minded and anti-science.

 

[PixyMisa]

Just a note: When I say "You couldn't be more wrong", that should be interpreted as an admonition, not a challenge.

 

[rocketdodger]

And that is where comp.lit fails, right there above. The experience of the sensation of red is of its own kind. It should be respected as such.

First, I am pretty sick of this "comp.lit" term. It betrays an ignorance of the actual state of science -- did you know that pretty much every neurobiologist and neuroscientist who does any real research supports the computational model? And if you don't mean "supporter of the computational model" when you say "comp.lit" then what do you mean? Are you just using that term because piggy uses it?

Second, lets talk about "kinds." You suggest there is some difference between the perception of red and the experience of the perception of red. Tell me why you consider the first jump to be different than any of the rest:

1) Perception of red
2) Experience of perception of red
3) Experience of experience of perception of red
4) Experience of experience of experience of perception of red
5) Experience of experience of experience of perception of experience of perception of red
.
.
.
n) Experience of ... < repeat n - 2 times > ... experience of perception of red

Here is what I think. I think we perceive red. I think if we focus on our perception of red we become conscious of perceiving red. We experience red. I think if we focus on the fact that we are experiencing red, we are experiencing what it is like to experience red. And so on.

Every level beyond the simple perception of red is merely conscious awareness that we are perceiving red, or perceiving the perceiving of red, up to as many levels of recursion that our little brains can hold ( not many ).

I have asked this before of people -- did you simultaneously "experience" all the colors in the monitor when you typed a response to this post? All the colors in the smiley faces and icons right below? What about the colors of the table in front of you right now? Don't tell me you were experiencing those just now, I know you would be lying. You didn't until I just mentioned it, and you looked, and focused on that.

Do you perceive every leaf when you look at a forest? Do you perceive every vehicle on the road when you drive home? Every building in the distance? Every section of sidewalk?

Wait a second -- those things are in your visual field. So what does it mean that you don't "experience" them?

Note that I asked piggy this exact same question like a year or two ago, and he still hasn't responded to it despite the fact that he somehow finds time to write walls of text that suck up entire hard disks at the server farm hosting this site. What does that tell you?

 

[steenkh]

And that is where comp.lit fails, right there above. The experience of the sensation of red is of its own kind.

Why do you think that? Can you do it without claiming that there is more to the brain than physics?

Plus, that is one weird sentence: The experience of sensation constitutes the special pattern that says "red".

Who is this that is saying "red" and why is that important to the experience of the sensation of red or its putative existence?

It is your brain that is recognising "red". There is nothing more to it than that the output of the visual system has been recognised as being "red". What more is there to the sensation of red than the sensation of red?

 

[tensordyne]

steenkh, I am answering your questions and post first even though yours was the last response. Your post seemed the most down to earth and honest.

Why do you think that? Can you do it without claiming that there is more to the brain than physics?

Hmm. I do not see how recognizing that experience of sensation is it's own concept calls into question physics as a discipline in any way. You would just have a physics of brain cells and a physics of how the experience of sensation works. It is still physics.

It is your brain that is recognising "red". There is nothing more to it than that the output of the visual system has been recognised as being "red". What more is there to the sensation of red than the sensation of red?

There is nothing more to the experience of sensation than the experience of sensation as far as concepts go. We have five types of experience of sensation even though we have many more than just five senses.

What I do not want is the phenomena of experience of sensation being replaced, clandestinely or otherwise, by various people who have ideas about how the experience of sensation works (or other philosophies, such as that the same implicitly does not exist, as seems to be the case with comp.lit).

 

[PixyMisa]

Hmm. I do not see how recognizing that experience of sensation is it's own concept calls into question physics as a discipline in any way. You would just have a physics of brain cells and a physics of how the experience of sensation works. It is still physics.

Right. So where's the problem?

There is nothing more to the experience of sensation than the experience of sensation as far as concepts go. We have five types of experience of sensation

See my short note above. Admonition, not challenge.

What I do not want is the phenomena of experience of sensation being replaced, clandestinely or otherwise, by various people who have ideas about how the experience of sensation works (or other philosophies, such as that the same implicitly does not exist, as seems to be the case with comp.lit).

Nobody is "replacing" anything, just explaining it. If you have mystical hangups about the nature and value of experience that cannot withstand those explanations.... Tough.

And further, nobody here has said or implied that sensation doesn't exist. At best, you haven't bothered to pay any attention either to the original posts or to the many previous attempts to correct your misinterpretation. At worst, you are simply being dishonest.

 

[tensordyne]

You are up next rocketdodger. I am not sure if I will respond to PixyMisa since that is all sorts of crazy going on there (I want to say he or she sometimes on this forum, but then I do not know of anyones gender or desired gender on the site {I am a he if it matters to anyone}).

First, I am pretty sick of this "comp.lit" term. It betrays an ignorance of the actual state of science -- did you know that pretty much every neurobiologist and neuroscientist who does any real research supports the computational model? And if you don't mean "supporter of the computational model" when you say "comp.lit" then what do you mean? Are you just using that term because piggy uses it?

By all means, if you do not like the term comp.lit, tell me one that you would like me to use (within reason). I remember reading or hearing somewhere that Anthropologists have this problem with naming people. They ask a tribe what the call themselves and it is usually something like "The Good People". When asking the same tribe the name of the other tribe down the river it turns out to be "The Bad Stupid Ones", or something to that effect.

There is a truth in that piggy used the term so I did. I am a fan of piggy's writing. He defined comp.lit in a previous set of posts, as well as the neurobio position. So, if you guys get together (dlorde, PixyMisa, rocketdodger, et. al) and give your position a name I will use it without reservation.

Second, lets talk about "kinds." You suggest there is some difference between the perception of red and the experience of the perception of red. Tell me why you consider the first jump to be different than any of the rest:

1) Perception of red
2) Experience of perception of red
3) Experience of experience of perception of red
4) Experience of experience of experience of perception of red
5) Experience of experience of experience of perception of experience of perception of red
.
.
.
n) Experience of ... < repeat n - 2 times > ... experience of perception of red

I am sorry, I can not agree with the above. There is the (normal) experience of the perception of red. There is no experience of experience of... It does not work the same way that thinking about thinking about thinking ... works. So in the list above there is only 1. and 2., as far as I can tell.

Here is what I think. I think we perceive red. I think if we focus on our perception of red we become conscious of perceiving red. We experience red. I think if we focus on the fact that we are experiencing red, we are experiencing what it is like to experience red. And so on.

I like this kind of honest approach above.

Focus is a term that goes with one of the uses of the word conscious, such as how it is used in the third sentence above. Whether you focus (are conscious of) something that is red or if red is just in your visual field, you have consciousness with red in it.

Every level beyond the simple perception of red is merely conscious awareness that we are perceiving red, or perceiving the perceiving of red, up to as many levels of recursion that our little brains can hold ( not many ).

The 'simple' perception of red is hard enough for me The rest is thinking about thinking about... the perception of red, as far as I can tell. Personally, I can think of uncountably many uncountably many... uncountably many times of thinking of thinking of whatever.

I have asked this before of people -- did you simultaneously "experience" all the colors in the monitor when you typed a response to this post? All the colors in the smiley faces and icons right below? What about the colors of the table in front of you right now? Don't tell me you were experiencing those just now, I know you would be lying. You didn't until I just mentioned it, and you looked, and focused on that.

Do you perceive every leaf when you look at a forest? Do you perceive every vehicle on the road when you drive home? Every building in the distance? Every section of sidewalk?

Wait a second -- those things are in your visual field. So what does it mean that you don't "experience" them?

Note that I asked piggy this exact same question like a year or two ago, and he still hasn't responded to it despite the fact that he somehow finds time to write walls of text that suck up entire hard disks at the server farm hosting this site. What does that tell you?

Lots of questions! The level of detail that one experiences is of course dependent on many factors. As I type into the forum I have a series of experiences so I am not sure if the language above is correct. At any one moment, while I am typing in the post, yes, I am experiencing all the colors on my screen. Not sure why that is so hard per se...

This reminds me of the binding problem and Gestalt phenomena.

 

[dlorde]

By all means, if you do not like the term comp.lit, tell me one that you would like me to use (within reason).
...
So, if you guys get together (dlorde, PixyMisa, rocketdodger, et. al) and give your position a name I will use it without reservation.

We are not clones; although we may have broadly similar views in some respects, we each have our own opinions. Like all forum contributors, you necessarily have a very limited knowledge of both. If you could find the strength to resist the urge to pidgeon-hole us into a distorted worldview of your own devising, and respond to what we actually post, we might communicate more effectively.

At any one moment, while I am typing in the post, yes, I am experiencing all the colors on my screen. Not sure why that is so hard per se...

It is not physiologically possible. What you are experiencing is a construct, a good-enough approximation of what you 'know' is out there. The overlap of colour vision and foveal clarity at the retina is way too small for you to be directly sensing more than a tiny fraction of what you actually experience as vision at any time.